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SURVEY
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. A&S
Manufacturing Co.: Realignment of Parties in Diversity
Jurisdiction Cases
"The Judicial Power shall extend... to Controversies...
between Citizens of different States."'
It is difficult to imagine that the Founding Fathers intended these
words to allow deep-pocketed insurance companies to utilize the fed-
eral courts to their advantage. Insurance companies and other large
corporations have consistently preferred the treatment of the federal
courts and have relied on diversity jurisdiction to be heard in the fo-
rum of their choice.2 Suits involving multiple parties and complicated
litigation have flooded the federal dockets, and many federal judges
have struggled to unravel the complex issues presented in these cases.
3
Motions for realignment of parties in diversity cases have forced the
federal courts to devise methods to properly position the parties
around the controversies presented.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY 262-64 (1992); Richard
D. Allen, Forum Battles From the Insurer's Perspective, COVERAGE, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 27,
35.
3. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE 40-41 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY] (citing diversity
cases as constituting "about half the civil trials in federal court .... making them more
time-consuming and expensive to process" and referring to a 1988 study which found that
diversity cases cost the federal court system $131 million annually, over one-tenth of the
federal judicial budget); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND RE-
FORM 59-93 (1985). Posner documented a 250% increase in the federal district court
caseload from 1960 to 1983, from 80,000 to 280,000 cases, and an increase of 686% in
courts of appeals cases, from 3,765 in 1960 to 29,580 in 1983. Id. at 63-64; see also ABA
STANDING COMM. ON FED. JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A CENTURY OF GROWTH 40
(1989) (concluding that "[g]rowth in the federal courts of appeals has been in only one
direction in recent years: toward more cases and more cases of greater complexity"); Paul
L. Langer, Significant Current Developments in Environmental Insurance Coverage, in 1
ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE CLAIMS AND LITIGATION 1994, at 129, 131 (PLI
Comm. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4450, 1994) (referring to insur-
ance litigation explosions in federal and state courts and the resulting inconsistent and
conflicting decisions).
4. Because diversity jurisdiction requires all parties on one side of a suit to be com-
pletely diverse from all parties on the other side of the suit, Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806), parties often dispute on which side of a suit they fall, using motions
for realignment in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction.
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Two distinct tests for realignment evolved from the Supreme
Court's seminal decision in City of Indianapolis v. Chase National
Bank--the substantial controversy test and the primary purpose test.
6
The Fourth Circuit recently endorsed one of these two realignment tests
in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. A&S Manufacturing
Co., 7 following the lead of about half of its sister circuits and ratifying
the primary purpose approach as its method for assessing
realignment.8
This Note details the Fourth Circuit's recent realignment decision
in United States Fidelity and Guaranty.9 In order to clarify the issues
raised in realignment cases, this Note summarizes the historical devel-
opment of diversity jurisdiction 0 and outlines City of Indianapolis v.
Chase National Bank, the leading Supreme Court decision on realign-
ment." This Note then describes the interpretations given to Indian-
apolis by the various circuit courts and illustrates the methods the
circuits have employed to determine whether realignment of parties is
proper.12 The methods used by the circuit courts, the substantial con-
troversy and primary purpose approaches, are then catalogued ac-
cording to their merits and weaknesses. 3 Next, this Note discusses
alternatives to the two controlling realignment tests, including a third
approach and the abolition or limitation of diversity jurisdiction. 4 Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that while the Fourth Circuit's adoption of
the primary purpose test in United States Fidelity and Guaranty cor-
rectly interpreted the text of Indianapolis, that decision itself did not
present an acceptable result.' 5
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (USF&G), Federal
Insurance Company (Federal), and Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company (Hartford) were insurance carriers for A&S Manufacturing
Company (A&S) on various A&S sites in Maryland and New Jersey.
16
A&S was involved as a defendant in an action by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for violations of the Coin-
5. 314 U.S. 63 (1941).
6. Id. at 69; see infra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
7. 48 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1995).
S. Ia& at 133.
9. See infra notes 16-49 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 79-116 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 117-44 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 145-61 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
16. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. A&S Mfg. Co., 839 F. Supp. 347, 348 (D. M.
1993), affd, 48 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1995).
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prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA).17 Charging A&S with violating CERCLA18
by causing environmental contamination, the EPA sought recovery of
the cost incurred in mitigating the property damage caused by the
contamination. 9 A&S petitioned its insurance carriers for indemnifi-
cation and/or payment of its defense in the EPA action, but all three
carriers refused to pay.20
USF&G initiated a declaratory judgment action in the United
States District Court of Maryland to determine the rights and liabili-
ties of A&S's insurance carriers under the policies on A&S sites."'
USF&G named A&S, Federal, and Hartford as defendants and based
jurisdiction solely on diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.2
A&S filed a motion for realignment of the parties and a motion
to dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 A&S argued
that all of the insurers in the declaratory judgment action should be
aligned as plaintiffs because'.&te dispositive issue in the action was
whether any of A&S's insurance carriers were obligated to indemnify
and defend A&S in the EPA suit.24 The requested realignment of all
insurance carriers as plaintiffs would destroy complete diversity be-
17. Id-
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9626 (1994).
19. United States Fidelity & Guar., 839 F. Supp. at 348. The environmental contamina-
tion claim resulted from the release of hazardous substances at the Maryland, Sand, Gravel
& Stone quarry, and the EPA sought recovery from A&S, as well as several other defend-
ants, for present and future costs associated with the clean up and property damage. Id.
20. Id.; see United States v. Maryland Sand, Gravel and Stone Co., No. HAR 89-2869,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14035 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 1994) (unpublished) (detailing the EPA
action against A&S and other defendants).
21. United States Fidelity & Guar., 839 F. Supp. at 348.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 348-49. In order to hear a case, a federal court must find subject matter
jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1332. Because there was no federal ques-
tion under § 1331, the requirements of § 1332 had to be met in order for this suit to pro-
ceed. Section 1332 provides in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of inter-
est and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and citizens and subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties;
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994).
24. United States Fidelity & Guar., 839 F. Supp. at 348.
1981
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cause A&S and Federal are both citizens of New Jersey, compelling a
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.35
The District Court of Maryland granted A&S's motion for re-
alignment and dismissed the case, basing its decision on the principles
set forth in City of Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank.26 The
Supreme Court in Indianapolis held:
To sustain diversity jurisdiction there must exist an "actual,"
"substantial," controversy between citizens of different
states, all of whom on one side of the controversy are citizens
of different states from all parties on the other side ...
Whether the necessary "collision of interests" exists.., must
be ascertained from the "principal purpose of the suit" and
the "primary and controlling matter in dispute."27
The district court in United States Fidelity and Guaranty inter-
preted this language to require application of a "primary purpose"
test,28 which involves identifying the "primary issue in the suit and
"determin[ing] whether a real dispute exists between opposing parties
over that issue." 29 Applying this test to the issues in the case, the
district court determined that the primary issue in dispute was
whether A&S was entitled to indemnification or the cost of its defense
from its insurance carriers.3 ° Thus, the court found that all of the in-
surers' interests were adverse to A&S and that the parties should be
realigned to reflect the primary issue in dispute.3'
USF&G appealed the decision to a panel of the Fourth Circuit,
contending that the district court erred in applying the primary pur-
25. Id at 348-49. Chief Justice Marshall, in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806), required complete diversity for an action to fall within the statutory grant of
diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 267. Complete diversity requires that no party on one side of
the suit be from the same state as any party on the opposite side of the suit. Id.; see 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1993); 1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcrcE 0.71[5.-
2] (2d ed. 1995). The parties involved in United States Fidelity & Guar. were all corpora-
tions, and under § 1332, "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by
which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business
... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994). USF&G was incorporated in Maryland and, there-
fore, was a citizen of Maryland. A&S and Federal had their principal places of business in
New Jersey and were both citizens of New Jersey for diversity purposes. Hartford was
incorporated in the state of Connecticut and, therefore, was a citizen of Connecticut.
United States Fidelity & Guar., 839 F. Supp. at 348-49.
26. United States Fidelity & Guar., 839 F. Supp. at 348-49 (citing City of Indianapolis v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941)).
27. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69 (citations omitted).
28. United States Fidelity & Guar., 839 F. Supp. at 351.
29. Id. at 349.
30. Id at 351.
31. Id.
(Vol. 741982
1996] FEDERAL DIVERSITY CASE REALIGNMENT
pose test to ascertain whether realignment was appropriate.32 The
Fourth Circuit began its analysis of the case by recognizing the split
among the circuits as to the appropriate test to apply in realignment
cases.33 Presently, the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits all utilize the
primary purpose test endorsed by the district court.34 The Second and
Seventh Circuits employ the substantial controversy test, which
USF&G urged the Fourth Circuit to adopt.
35
The Fourth Circuit identified City of Indianapolis v. Chase Na-
tional Bank3 6 as the controlling Supreme Court authority on the test
for realignment of parties .3  As previously mentioned, the various cir-
cuits have devised two different tests for realignment from the holding
in Indianapolis: the substantial controversy test and the primary pur-
pose test.38 Under the substantial controversy test, realignment is im-
proper if any substantial conflict may be found between the parties.39
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Indian-
apolis considered several issues raised by the parties adverse to re-
alignment,40 but it stated that the Supreme Court's inquiry was solely
in pursuit of identifying the principal purpose of the action as opposed
to applying a "substantial controversy" test.4' The Fourth Circuit re-
jected the substantial controversy test because of its tendency to "al-
low[ ] parties to easily manipulate diversity jurisdiction" by identifying
32. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. A&S Mfg. Co., 48 F.3d 131, 132 (4th Cir.
1995).
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d
1085, 1088-91 (6th Cir. 1992) (endorsing the primary purpose test in realignment- deci-
sions); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 942 F.2d 862. 864-67 (3d Cir.
1991) (same); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519,
1523 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); accord Zurn Indus., Inc. v. Action Constr. Co., Inc., 847
F.2d 234,237 (5th Cir. 1988) (also adopting the primary purpose test, although not cited in
the Fourth Circuit's opinion).
35. United States Fidelity & Guar., 48 F.3d at 132; see also Maryland Casualty Co. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617,621-24 (2d Cir.) (applying the substantial controversy test),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 655 (1994); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 657 F.2d 146,
149-51 (7th Cir. 1981) (same). Other circuits adopting the substantial controversy test in-
clude the Eighth and Tenth. See Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 570 F.2d 1384,
1387-88 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 826 (1978); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1966).
36. 314 U.S. 63 (1941).
37. United States Fidelity & Guar., 48 F.3d at 132-33.
38. See supra notes 34-35 (listing circuits according to test adopted).
39. United States Fidelity & Guar., 48 F.3d at 133 (citing Maryland Casualty Co., 23
F.3d at 622-23).
40. Id- (citing City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 73 n.3 (1941)
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any hypothetical dispute between the parties.42 USF&G argued that
the substantial controversy test was valid, pointing out that the Fourth
Circuit had endorsed it on several occasions in the past.43 However,
the Fourth Circuit rejected USF&G's argument and distinguished
each case. 4
After clearly indicating its endorsement of the primary purpose
test, the court proceeded to determine the principal issue underlying
the suit.45 Looking to the pleadings and the nature of the suit,46 the
court concluded that the primary conflict in the action stemmed from
the indemnity and legal fees that A&S sought from its insurers. 7
Therefore, the proper alignment of the parties was insured (A&S)
against insurers (USF&G, Federal, and Hartford).48 Because this
alignment of the parties destroyed complete diversity, the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court and dismissed the action for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.49
Realignment issues are necessarily intertwined with diversity ju-
risdiction because the realignment of parties often will destroy com-
plete diversity requirements. The authority for diversity jurisdiction is
rooted in Article III of the Constitution, which provides: "The Judi-
cial Power shall extend.., to Controversies between Citizens of dif-
ferent States . . . . The Framers' justifications for diversity
jurisdiction included: protection of out-of-state citizens from local
bias 5 1 providing citizens of the various states access to a superior fed-
42. Id
43. Id. USF&G identified J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Innis, No. 92-1273, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1315 at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 1993) (unpublished); American Ins. Co. v. Lester,
214 F.2d 578, 581 (4th Cir. 1954); and C.Y. Thomason Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty
Co., 183 F.2d 729, 733 (4th Cir. 1950), as Fourth Circuit decisions utilizing the substantial
controversy test. United States Fidelity & Guar., 48 F.3d at 133.
44. United States Fidelity & Guar., 48 F.3d at 133. The Fourth Circuit claimed it was
concerned with the district court's determination of the primary dispute in Lester, not its
application of the primary purpose test. Id. The court also stated that Thomason and J.B.
Hunt could be read to support either test and did not indicate that the Fourth Circuit had
embraced the substantial controversy test. Id.
45. Id. at 133-34.
46. See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957) (stating that determining whether
there is a "collision of issues ... is a practical not a mechanical determination and is re-
solved by the pleadings and the nature of the dispute" (citations omitted)).
47. United States Fidelity & Guar., 48 F.3d at 134.
48. Id
49. Ia
50. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
51. CARL MCGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES 27-28 (1967) (quoting James Madison's speech to the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion); see also ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 96 (1987) (stating
that the "accepted rationale for this diversity jurisdiction is that the federal courts were
tribunals presumed to be free from local influence"); Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdic-
1984 [Vol. 74
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eral court system,52 and encouraging interstate commerce.53 In the
years since the ratification of the Constitution, Congress and the judi-
ciary have generally placed more restrictive limits on the grant of ju-
risdiction to citizens of different states.
Diversity jurisdiction was first limited by Congress in the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, which required one of the parties to be a citizen of
the state in which suit was brought and implemented a minimum
amount in controversy requirement. 4 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, decided
in 1806, limited diversity jurisdiction further by requiring complete di-
versity among parties.55 Later, Congress eliminated the need for one
of the parties to be a citizen of the state in which suit was brought,
56
authorized removal to federal courts,57 and revised the minimum
amount-in-controversy requirement several times.53 A final notable
tion: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. Rnv. 197, 199-205 (1982)
(stating that "protect[ion of] out-of-state litigants from local prejudice and, concomitantly
promot[ion of] harmony among the states" were justifications enumerated by the Founding
Fathers for diversity jurisdiction (footnote omitted)).
52. See McGOWAN, supra note 51, at 27-28 (citing James Madison's speech to the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention); see also Marsh, supra note 51, at 200,210-12 (naming access to
superior federal courts as a justification for diversity jurisdiction).
53. John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROns. 3, 22-28 (1948); Marsh, supra note 51, at 200, 205-09. The justifications offered for
diversity jurisdiction have been subject to much criticism. See MAx FARRAND, THE FRAM-
ING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (1913) (stating that "[t]o one who
is especially interested in the judiciary, there is surprisingly little on the subject to be found
in the records of the convention"); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Juris-
diction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483, 484, 510 (1928) (commenting on the small "amount of
thought [given by the Framers] to the construction of a federal judiciary" and stating that
the justification concerning "fears of local hostilities, which had only a speculative exist-
ence in 1789.... are still less real today"); Carl McGowan, Federal Jurisdiction: Legislative
and Judicial Change, 28 CASE WEST. RES. L. REv. 517, 530-33 (1978) [hereinafter Mc-
Gowan, Federal Jurisdiction] (stating that state court bias is no longer a reason to sustain
diversity jurisdiction); Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judi-
cial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 239-40 (1948) (advocating the limitation of
diversity jurisdiction).
54. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73,78. The Judiciary Act of 1789 set the
amount-in-controversy requirement at $500. Id.
55. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806); see supra note 25 (dis-
cussing the Strawbridge holding requiring complete diversity).
56. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C
§ 1441 (1994)).
57. Id. § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71.
58. The minimum amount in controversy requirement was raised to $2,000 in 1887 and
1888, Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, sec. 1, § 1332(a), 25 Stat. 433, 433-34; Act of Mar. 3,
1887, ch. 373, sec. 1, § 1332(a), 24 Stat. 552, 552-53 (amended in 1911); increased to $3,000
in 1911, Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, sec. 24, § 1332(a), 36 Stat. 1087, 1091; to
$10,000 in 1958, Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, see. 2, § 1332(a), 72 Stat. 415, 415
(amended in 1958); and most recently to $50,000 in 1988, Judicial Improvements and Ac-
cess to Justice Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, sec. 201(a), § 1332(a), 102 Stat.
4646, 4646 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994)).
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development occurred in 1958, when Congress amended the diversity
statute to recognize corporations as citizens of states in which they are
incorporated or have their principal place of business.
59
As diversity jurisdiction evolved, federal judges were often asked
to determine the proper alignment of parties in order to ensure that
complete diversity requirements were satisfied. City of Indianapolis v.
Chase National Bank,6° handed down by the Supreme Court in 1941,
is unequivocally the most significant decision in realignment jurispru-
dence.6 A five to four decision,6' Indianapolis afforded Justice Felix
Frankfurter an opportunity to place limitations on diversity jurisdic-
tion.63 Indianapolis involved a complicated arrangement of four prin-
cipal parties-Chase National Bank (Chase), the City of Indianapolis
(City), Citizens Gas Company of Indianapolis (Citizens Gas), and In-
dianapolis Gas Company (Indianapolis Gas).
Chase was the trustee under a mortgage deed securing a bond
issued to Indianapolis Gas.6' Subsequently, Citizens Gas was formed
to compete with Indianapolis Gas, and, at the end of twenty-five
years, Citizens Gas was to be conveyed to the City subject to the com-
59. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, sec. 2, § 1332(a), 72 Stat. 415,415 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994)). One commentator has argued that the 1958
amendment encouraged corporations to rely more heavily on realignment of parties to
achieve diversity because it limited their citizenship to their state of incorporation or prin-
cipal place of business. William A. Braverman, Note, Janus Was Not a God of Justice:
Realignment of Parties in Diversity Jurisdiction, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1072, 1092 (1993).
60. 314 U.S. 63 (1941).
61. See 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3607 (Supp. 1995) (identifying Indianapolis as "the leading case" on realignment juris-
prudence); Braverman, supra note 59, at 1074 (citing Indianapolis as the exclusive guide
for federal judges in realignment decisions).
62. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion, Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 68, while
the dissent was led by Justice Jackson and joined by Chief Justice Stone, Justice Roberts,
and Justice Reed, id. at 77 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
63. Justice Frankfurter was long opposed to diversity jurisdiction and wrote several
articles on the subject. See Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction-In Reply to
Professor Yntema, 79 U. PA. L. REv. & AM. L. REG. 1097 (1931) [hereinafter Frankfurter,
Note on Diversity Jurisdiction]; Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between
United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); Felix Frankfurter & James M.
Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States: A Study in the Federal
Judicial System, 40 HARV. L. REv. 834 (1927). Justice Frankfurter, while a professor at
Harvard Law School, also encouraged several of his students to produce commentary on
the subject. See BRUCE A. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 88 &
n.55 (1982) (citing Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV.
L. REv. 483 (1928) and referencing unpublished research papers written by A.H. Feller
and N. Jacobs entitled "Proposed Limitations on the Diversity of Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts" and unpublished studies on the Swift v. Tyson decisions by Harry Shulman
and Lowell Turrentine).
64. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 70.
1986 [Vol. 74
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pany's " 'outstanding legal obligations.' "65 After the two gas compa-
nies competed for seven years, Indianapolis Gas leased all of its
property to Citizens Gas for a term of ninety-nine years.66 As part of
the rental agreement, Citizens Gas was required to pay the interest on
the outstanding bond debt and annual sums equal to a six percent
return on Indianapolis's stock.67 At the end of twenty-five years, Citi-
zens Gas conveyed all of its property and obligations to the City, and
Citizens Gas and the City thereafter denied any accountability for the
bond payments initially pledged by Indianapolis Gas to Chase.68
Chase instituted suit against Citizens Gas, the City, and Indianap-
olis Gas, asking the court to declare the lease agreement between Citi-
zens Gas and Indianapolis Gas valid and to obligate the City to pay
the interest on the bond payments pursuant to the terms of the lease.69
Citizens Gas and the City denied the validity of the lease and claimed
that the actual dispute was between the City and Indianapolis Gas,
both citizens of the same state.7 ° The Supreme Court agreed, found
that the validity of the lease was the primary dispute, and realigned
the parties around this issue.71
In reaching its decision to realign, the Indianapolis Court utilized
language that has since been interpreted variably by the circuit
courts.72 Justice Frankfurter wrote:
To sustain diversity jurisdiction there must exist an "actual,"
"substantial" controversy between citizens of different states,
all of whom on one side of the controversy are citizens of
different states from all parties on the other side. Diversity
jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the federal courts by
the parties' own determination of who are plaintiffs and who
defendants. It is our duty.., to "look beyond the pleadings
and arrange the parties according to their sides in the dis-
pute." ... Whether the necessary "collision of interests" ex-
ists, is therefore not to be determined by mechanical rules. It
must be ascertained from the "principal purpose of the suit"




68. Id at 70-71.
69. Id. at 71.
70. Id. Indianapolis Gas and the City of Indianapolis were both citizens of Indiana for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
71. Id. at 72-76. Realigning the parties in this manner resulted in parties from Indiana
on both sides of the suit and led the Supreme Court to hold that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 75-76.
72. See infra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
73. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69-70 (citations omitted).
1987
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Under this analysis, Justice Frankfurter determined that the con-
trolling matter in the suit hinged on whether the lease between Indi-
anapolis Gas and Citizens Gas bound the City, and that everything
else was just "window-dressing designed to satisfy the requirements of
diversity jurisdiction."'74 The Court also recognized that the suit could
be brought in state court and emphasized the constitutional and con-
gressional limits on diversity jurisdiction.75
The dissenters in Indianapolis, led by Justice Jackson, would have
held that sufficient conflicts existed between the parties to avoid re-
alignment, and stated that realignment in this case would cause unfair-
ness and delay.76 Justice Jackson agreed that realignment is
appropriate in instances where the " 'arrangement of the parties is a
mere contrivance,' ,,77 but refused to limit the court's recognition of a
cause of action to ones that were "more 'actual' or 'substantial' than
the other.
78
The circuits are almost evenly divided on whether Justice Frank-
furter's words advocate realignment when no substantial controversy
is present between the parties or when the parties are not aligned
around the primary issue in dispute.79 The courts that utilize the sub-
stantial controversy test in realignment cases80 begin their analysis by
identifying all disputes between the parties, and then if an actual or
substantial conflict exists, even if it is not the primary issue, realign-
ment will be denied.81
74. Id at 72.
75. Id at 76-77. Justice Frankfurter noted that congressional limits on diversity juris-
diction have been influenced by a need to protect states' rights and to avoid burdening the
federal courts with " 'business that intrinsically belongs to the state courts' in order to keep
them free for their distinctive federal business." Id. at 76 (citation omitted).
76. Id at 81-84 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
77. Id at 82 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
78. Id at 80 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
79. See supra notes 34-35 (listing the division of the circuit courts).
80. See supra note 35 (identifying the Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits as
adopting the substantial controversy test).
81. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 623 (2d Cir.) (re-
quiring an actual, substantial controversy in order to avoid realignment), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 655 (1994); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 657 F.2d 146, 151 (7th Cir.
1981) (stating that realignment is proper where "no actual, substantial conflict" exists);
Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 570 F.2d 1384, 1388 (10th Cir.) (holding that an
actual controversy existed between the parties and refusing to realign), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 826 (1978); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 870 (8th Cir.
1966) (requiring the controversy to be actual and substantial); see also Syms, Inc. v. IBI
Sec. Serv., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 53, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that realignment is inappropri-
ate where there is a "clear 'collision of interest' " between the parties); American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Flintkote Co., 565 F. Supp. 843, 846-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that" 'a
mere mutuality of interest in escaping liability is not of itself sufficient to justify realign-
ment.' " (quoting Trane, 657 F.2d at 151)); Irving Trust Co. v. Century Export & Import,
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The Seventh Circuit formally embraced the substantial contro-
versy test in American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Trane Co.' Ameri-
can Motorists and several other insurance companies refused to
defend their insured, Trane, against a claim by a third party.8 3 Ameri-
can Motorists filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court in-
yoking diversity jurisdiction and seeking a declaration of its rights and
liabilities to Trane and Trane's other insurers.' One of Trane's other
insurers filed a motion to realign the parties to reflect all the insurance
companies interested in escaping liability to Trane on one side.85 The
court noted the relevant language in Indianapolis and stated that
"[r]ealignment is proper where there is no actual, substantial conflict
between the parties that would justify placing them on opposite sides
of the lawsuit. '8 6 Because American Motorists would benefit from a
holding that another one of Trane's insurers had a duty to defend
Trane,8 7 the Seventh Circuit found that a substantial conflict existed
and reversed the lower court's order to realign.88
The recent decision in Maryland Casualty Co. v. W.R. Grace &
Co. reflects the Second Circuit's preference for the substantial contro-
versy test.8 9 Maryland Casualty arose out of underlying lawsuits
against an asbestos manufacturer, Grace.90 Maryland Casualty filed a
declaratory judgment action in federal court to determine its rights
and liabilities in the asbestos litigation and named Grace and its pri-
mary insurer as defendants. 91 Jurisdiction was based solely on diver-
sity of citizenship.92 Grace moved to realign the parties as insurers
opposing insured, which would have destroyed the basis for diversity
jurisdiction.93 The Second Circuit reviewed the two approaches to re-
alignment and adopted the substantial controversy test "because it
S.A., 464 F. Supp. 1232, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that the fact that "one defendant
may benefit should [the] plaintiff prevail against another defendant [is] not ... a sufficient
basis for realignment").
82. 657 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 148. Several contractors sued Trane in connection with the sale of heat ex-
changer units. Id.
84. 1&. at 148-49.
85. Id. at 149.
86. Id. at 151.
87. Id. at 150.
88. Id. at 151.
89. Maryland Casualty Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 622 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
90. Id. at 619-20.
91. I. at 620. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty added several other Grace insurers as
defendants. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 621.
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permits courts deciding whether diversity exists to consider the multi-
ple interests and issues involved in the litigation." 94 The court stated
that its "approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's chief con-
cern in Indianapolis that parties not manipulate alignment to manu-
facture diversity jurisdiction."'95 Then, the court found that the
insurance companies had interests in avoiding liability to Grace and in
avoiding liability to one another.96 These interests constituted a sub-
stantial conflict, and the court declined to realign the parties.97
A number of other circuits employ a primary purpose test in re-
alignment cases.98 The primary purpose test requires the court to
identify the principal dispute in the suit and then realign the parties
around that dispute.99 The circuits adopting the primary purpose test
have modeled their test on the language and result reached by the
court in Indianapolis.'00
The Third Circuit applied the primary purpose test in Employers
Insurance of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Company,10 1 a 1991 deci-
sion closely resembling the facts presented in United States Fidelity
and Guaranty. Crown Cork & Seal Co. brought a state court action
seeking indemnification from several of its insurers, including
Wausau, for alleged environmental contamination claims. 2  Wausau
filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court against Crown
Cork & Seal and six other insurers to determine its rights and obliga-
tions regarding the environmental contamination claims.10 3 Crown
94. Id at 622.
95. Id. at 623.
96. Id The Second Circuit noted that "[r]ealignment hinges on those issues that di-
vide the parties, not on those on which they agree." Id.
97. Id at 624.
98. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted the primary purpose test).
99. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 48 F.3d at 133 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that
"the principal purpose test entails two steps," identifying the primary issue, and aligning
the parties around the issue); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co.,
955 F.2d 1085, 1091 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussing the primary issue in dispute and stating that
the parties must be realigned around it); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal
Co., 942 F.2d 862, 866-67 (3d Cir. 1991) (identifying the primary issue in dispute and af-
firming the district court's order for realignment); Zurn Indus., Inc. v. Action Constr. Co.,
847 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1988) (identifying the principal claim and holding that the par-
ties were properly aligned around it); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1523-24 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (inquiring as to the " 'primary and
controlling matter in dispute' " and arranging the parties around it).
100. City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941). See supra note 73
and accompanying text for full text of the relevant Indianapolis language.
101. 942 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1991).
102. Id. at 863.
103. Id Wausau's suit was based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id.
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Cork & Seal filed a motion for realignment of the parties as insured
against insurers and a motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because such realignment would destroy complete diversity. 10 4 The
Third Circuit cited the relevant language in Indianapolis'0 5 and noted
the two approaches that had been utilized in realignment cases.106
The court read the language in Indianapolis narrowly and held that it
did not support the substantial controversy test.10 7 Applying instead
the primary purpose approach, the Third Circuit identified the pri-
mary issue as the liability of its insurers to Crown and realigned the
parties as insured against insurers. 08
Another decision administering the primary purpose test, United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., also involved
an insurer instituting a declaratory judgment action to determine its
rights and liabilities to the insured and other insurers in an underlying
environmental contamination claim.'0 9 Thomas Solvent, the insured,
and one of its insurers filed motions for realignment of the parties as
insurers against insured." 0 The court began by recognizing that re-
alignment would destroy complete diversity and necessitate a dismis-
sal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."' The Sixth Circuit adopted
the primary purpose test previously endorsed by the Third, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits and held "that Indianapolis Gas requires that parties be
aligned in accordance with the primary dispute in the controversy,
even where a different, legitimate dispute between the parties sup-
ports the original alignment."" 2 Applying the primary purpose test to
the facts in Thomas Solvent and finding that the primary dispute in-
volved the insurers' duties to indemnify Thomas, the court realigned
104. IL Crown and one of its insurers were citizens of Pennsylvania and realignment
would place them on opposite sides of the suit in violation of complete diversity require-
ments. Id.
105. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
106. Crown Cork & Seal, 942 F.2d at 864-65.
107. M. at 866-67. The Third Circuit noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has long inter-
preted statutes conferring diversity jurisdiction with 'jealous restriction' and 'strict con-
struction,' so as not to infringe on 'state sensitivities.' " Id. at 866. Furthermore, it stated
that their application of the primary purpose test more closely comports with the need for
"federal courts in diversity litigation to 'scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the
precise limits which the statute has defined.' " Id. at 866-67 (quoting City of Indianapolis
v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1941)).
108. Id.
109. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1086-87
(6th Cir. 1992).
110. Id. at 1087.
111. Id. at 1088.
112. Id. at 1089.
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the parties as insured against insurers and dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction." 3
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States Fidelity and Guar-
anty re-emphasized the need for the Supreme Court to resolve the
conflict between the circuits' two interpretations of the Indianapolis
language. In analyzing the merits of the primary purpose and substan-
tial controversy test, the Fourth Circuit chose to strictly construe the
language in Indianapolis and adopt the primary purpose test.' 4 The
court also highlighted several disadvantages of the substantial contro-
versy test, including the manipulation of diversity jurisdiction and the
potential for forum shopping." 5 Although not explicitly stated by the
Fourth Circuit, it may be inferred that the court wished to curtail the
burgeoning impact of insurance litigation on the federal courts by re-
quiring a stricter test."1
6
Despite the solid arguments made by the United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Court in favor of the primary purpose test, proponents
of the substantial controversy test enumerate equally solid arguments
in favor of that approach. Although the language of the majority
opinion in Indianapolis is mainly utilized by advocates of the primary
purpose test," 7 that same language may also be read to accommodate
the substantial controversy test. The Indianapolis majority stated that
"[t]o sustain diversity jurisdiction there must exist an 'actual,' 'sub-
stantial' controversy"'"18 and this language can reasonably be cited in
support of the substantial controversy approach. The dissent in Indi-
anapolis also offers encouragement to champions of the substantial
controversy test."19 Justice Jackson would realign parties only "where
113. Idi at 1091.
114. United States Fidelity & Guar., 48 F.3d at 133. In finding support for the primary
purpose test, the court cited Indianapolis as requiring a court to "ascertain the 'collision of
interests' from the 'principal purpose of the suit, and the primary and controlling matter in
dispute' " and stated that this language "cannot be disregarded as mere surplusage." Id.
115. Id
116. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (detailing the increase in the federal court
caseload).
117. See supra note 34 (naming courts which strictly construe the language in Indianap-
olis to support adopting the primary purpose test).
118. City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) (citations omit-
ted). In constructing this language, Justice Frankfurter relied on Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U.S.
32, 36 (1911), which indicated that arrangement of parties in diversity suits should reflect
the "actual controversy.... looking beyond the formal arrangement made by the bill," and
on Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders Union Local No. 68, 254 U.S. 77, 81 (1920),
which required the presence of a "substantial controversy" to sustain diversity jurisdiction.
Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69.
119. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 79 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (utilizing the language " 'ac-
tual' and 'substantial' enough to support the jurisdiction").
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no real cause of action is asserted."'120 The dissent would undoubtedly
uphold the substantial controversy test applied by several of the cir-
cuits and presumably recognize an even weaker test for identifying a
controversy between parties.
12
One advantage of the substantial controversy test is that it allows
diversity actions an easier procession through the federal courts.' 22 It
also extends more flexibility to courts in deciding whether diversity is
present than the primary purpose test. 23  Finally, because the sub-
stantial controversy test results in realignment and subsequent dismis-
sals for lack of jurisdiction less frequently than the primary purpose
test, a strong argument may be made that the substantial controversy
test more accurately reflects the Constitution's broad grant of jurisdic-
tion to citizens of different states by allowing more citizens access to
the federal courts.
124
Opponents of the substantial controversy test, however, believe it
permits manipulation of diversity requirements because some adver-
sity can be found between almost any parties to a suit."25 Addition-
ally, the substantial controversy approach requires a liberal reading of
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Indianapolis and would appear to
render the dissent unnecessary.
12 6
Strictly construed, the language and holding in Indianapolis lend
substantial weight to the primary purpose approach implemented by
the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits."27 Indianapolis spe-
cifically inquired into "the 'primary and controlling matter in dis-
pute' " and found that "[e]verthing else in the case [wa]s incidental to
120. Id at 80 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
121. The dissent indicated realignment is proper when" 'the arrangement of the parties
is merely a contrivance between friends for the purpose of founding a jurisdiction which
otherwise would not exist,' " but did not suggest that a controversy must be substantial to
avoid realignment. Id. at 82 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Holmes in Dawson v.
Columbia Ave. Sav. Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 181 (1905)).
122. See Braverman, supra note 59, at 1114.
123. Maryland Casualty Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 622 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
124. See John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L. REv. 7, 9-13
(1963) (discussing the Constitution's grant of diversity jurisdiction to the judiciary); J.
Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and The Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L.
REV. 317, 327 (1967) [hereinafter Wright, The Federal Courts] (stating that "if the Consti-
tution confers the authority, we may exercise it in furtherance of any decent social
purpose").
125. Braverman, supra note 59, at 1117.
126. See United States Fidelity & Guar., 48 F.3d at 133 (finding that the substantial con-
troversy allows a party to claim "some hypothetical adversity between diverse parties" in
order to find a substantial conflict); Braverman, supra note 59, at 1117.
127. See supra notes 34, 98-113 and accompanying text.
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[the validity of the lease, the] dominating controversy.' 1 28 In a foot-
note to the opinion, the majority recognized that other disputes might
exist between the parties, but stated that "diversity jurisdiction [can-
not] be rested upon so flimsy a basis.' 1 29 This narrower approach is
also supported by the fact that Justice Frankfurter, the author of the
majority opinion in Indianapolis, opposed diversity jurisdiction
throughout his tenure and attempted to place limits upon it.'
30
One of the principal benefits of the primary purpose test is its
ability to limit the scope of diversity jurisdiction, especially in cases
involving multiple parties and issues.' 3' This test also allows the fed-
eral courts to avoid attempts by parties to circumvent the require-
ments of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.132 Federal judges utilizing a primary
purpose approach may exercise more discretion in detennining the
primary issue in dispute, and litigants, in order to avoid realignment,
must identify the issue with which they are aligned as the primary one
in dispute instead of merely one issue in the suit.' 33 Finally, the pri-
mary purpose approach bolsters state's rights by limiting access to the
federal court system for claims that are not based on federal
questions. 3
One criticism of the primary purpose approach is that it puts
courts in the position of investigating the merits of a case before juris-
diction is established in order to determine which issues are actual
disputes and which issue is the primary purpose of the litigation.
35
Another weakness of this approach may be found by exploring the
precedent cited by Justice Frankfurter in Indianapolis. Justice Frank-
furter utilized language from East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia R.R.
v. Grayson, referring to the "principal purpose of the suit"'3 6 and
Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, referring to the "primary and controlling matter in dis-
128. City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 72 (1941).
129. Id. at 73 n.3. Justice Frankfurter declared that "[tihe tail flies with the kite." Id.
130. See supra note 63 (citing articles authored by Justice Frankfurter which opposed
diversity jurisdiction).
131. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 942 F.2d 862, 866 (3d
Cir. 1991) (discussing the Supreme Court's "strict construction" and "jealous restriction"
of diversity jurisdiction in deciding to adopt the primary purpose test).
132. Braverman, supra note 59, at 1113.
133. Id. at 1113.15.
134. See Crown Cork & Seal, 942 F.2d at 866-67 (citing the protection of "state sensitiv-
ities" as a reason for adopting the primary purpose test).
135. Braverman, supra note 59, at 1122-23.
136. City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) (citing East Ten-
nessee, Virginia & Georgia R.R. v. Grayson, 119 U.S. 240, 244 (1886)).
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pute."'' 37 While East Tennessee can be read as supporting the primary
purpose test, the facts of Merchant's Cotton Press indicate the
Supreme Court did not limit itself to an investigation of the primary
dispute. 138 Instead, the Court analyzed all potential issues in dispute
and concluded that no conflict existed. 39
Two other cases cited by Frankfurter, Dawson v. Columbia Ave-
nue Savings Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co.'40 and Sutton v.
English,'4' may be interpreted as providing more support for the sub-
stantial controversy test than for the primary purpose test. The Daw-
son court, led by Justice Holmes, realigned the parties when no
controversy existed, but did not define the standard for determining
when an existing controversy will sustain jurisdiction1 42 It may be in-
ferred from the Dawson opinion that if some "collision of interest"
had existed between the parties, realignment would have been im-
proper. 43 In Sutton, although the Court realigned the parties around
a primary dispute, its reason for doing so rested on its interpretation
of the facts of the case and not in the application of any realignment
test.1'
137. Id. at 69-70 (citing Merchant's Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
151 U.S. 368, 385 (1894)).
138. The Supreme Court detailed the possible disputes in the case and determined that
no dispute existed between Merchant's Cotton Press and the plaintiffs in the action.
Merchant's Cotton Press, 151 U.S. at 385-87.
139. 1l
140. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69 (citing Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Sav. Fund, Safe De-
posit, Title & Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905)). The Supreme Court in Dawson in-
structed the federal courts to "look beyond the pleadings and arrange the parties according
to their sides in the dispute" and determine whether the necessary "collision of interest"
exists. Dawson, 197 U.S. at 180-81.
141. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 75 n.4 (citing Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199,204 (1918)).
Frankfurter referred to Sutton and Indianapolis as "applications of the same principle." Id.
However, Sutton held that parties must be aligned around their "attitude towards the ac-
tual and substantial controversy." Sutton, 246 U.S. at 204.
142. Dawson, 197 U.S. at 181.
143. See id. (stating that "[n]o difference or collision of interest or action is alleged or
even suggested").
144. In Sutton, the heirs of Mary and Moses Hubbard protested Moses's establishment
of a charitable trust and Mary's gift of land to her niece. Sutton, 246 U.S. at 201-03. The
complaint named the three trustees and the niece as defendants and the lower court re-
aligned the niece as a plaintiff, destroying diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 203-04. The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that the niece was properly a defendant
because that was "her attitude towards the actual and substantial controversy." Id. at 204.
Although the Sutton decision may be read as identifying the disputes and selecting the
primary dispute around which to align the parties, it is more probable, as Justice Jackson
suggested in his Indianapolis dissent, that the court was "disagree[ing] with the lower
court's view of the facts rather than with its view of the law." Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 83
(Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Braverman, supra note 59, at 1110 (analyzing Frank-
furter's interpretation of Sutton in Indianapolis).
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Taking into account the merits and disadvantages of the substan-
tial controversy and primary purpose tests, an attractive alternative
might be a combination of the two. This third approach to realign-
ment, which has been applied by the First Circuit in U.S.I. Properties
Corp. v. M.D. Construction Co.'45 involves identifying the primary dis-
pute and then considering whether any other controversies warrant
aligning the parties differently. 4 6 This test provides the benefits of
the substantial controversy and primary purpose approaches-
preventing judicial limitation of diversity jurisdiction and preventing
manipulation of diversity jurisdiction requirements by the parties.
147
However, this test places extensive discretion in the hands of judges
and could produce arbitrary results.'
48
Another solution to the problems created by realignment may be
to abolish or limit diversity jurisdiction. 49 It appears that the underly-
145. 860 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that the court's "task [wa]s to determine 'the
primary and controlling matter in dispute,' and then determine whether any actual colli-
sion in interests remains" (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989).
146. Id; see also Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 798 F. Supp.
156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (adopting a realignment approach based on footnote three in
Indianapolis that combines elements of the substantial controversy and primary purpose
tests); Braverman, supra note 59, at 1118-23 (advocating the ideal realignment test, based
on footnote three in Indianapolis).
147. See Travelers Indemnity, 798 F. Supp. at 159; Braverman, supra note 59, at 1119. In
Travelers Indemnity, the district court opted for a realignment test that would recognize an
actual, substantial controversy as long as it was not hypothetical and not based on a face-
value reading of the pleadings. Travelers Indemnity, 798 F. Supp. at 159. The court's test,
like the substantial controversy test, allows more diversity cases access to federal court, but
also provides limits to manipulation of diversity requirements by requiring an investigation
into the conflict beyond a mere look at the pleadings and assertions of the parties.
148. Braverman, supra note 59, at 1122.
149. See, eg., Richard Allan, Demarche or Destruction of the Federal Courts-A Re-
sponse to Judge Friendly's Analysis of Federal Jurisdiction, 40 BROOK. L. REv. 637, 655-56
(1974) (supporting the abolition of diversity jurisdiction); Howard C. Bratton, Diversity
Jurisdiction-An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347, 350-51 (1976) (citing the
overload of the courts and the problems with applying state law after Erie as reasons to
abolish diversity jurisdiction); Frankfurter, Note on Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 63, at
1100 (1931) (arguing for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction); McGowan, Federal Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 53, at 533-34 (supporting limits on diversity jurisdiction); Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: The Silver Lining, 66 A.B.A. J. 177, 178
(1980) (supporting abolition of diversity jurisdiction because its benefits are random and it
would reduce procedural difficulties); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdic-
tion: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 971-72
(1979) (advocating abolition of diversity jurisdiction and stating that it will solve the
problems created by realignment); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Sur-
vey and A Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REv. 317, 319 (1977) (advocating a "local option" plan
where each federal district opts to limit or eliminate diversity jurisdiction); Wechsler, supra
note 53, at 239-40 (supporting the limitation of diversity jurisdiction); Charles A. Wright,
Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 26 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 185, 192-208 (1969) [hereinafter Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction]
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ing controversy regarding diversity jurisdiction has affected the circuit
courts' treatment of realignment decisions leading courts to adopt a
realignment test that corresponds to their ideal view of diversity juris-
diction. The substantial controversy test provides a broader applica-
tion of diversity jurisdiction, while the primary purpose test seeks to
limit diversity jurisdiction. 150 The American Law Institute's extensive
study of the federal court system in 1969 concluded that:
diversity jurisdiction continues to serve an important func-
tion in our federal system, but ... it presently extends to
substantial classes of cases with no valid justification for be-
ing in the national courts and omits some that should have
access to a federal forum.... These considerations are rele-
vant both to the specific proposals for change in the scope of
diversity jurisdiction and to the broader question, answered
by the Institute in the negative, as to whether this head of
jurisdiction should be abolished.' 5
More recently, the Federal Courts Study Committee suggested
that: "Congress should limit federal jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship .... At the least, it should effect changes to curtail the
most obvious problems of the current jurisdiction."' 52
Some of the more compelling reasons for the dilution of diversity
jurisdiction include the overcrowded federal docket, 53 the obsoles-
cence of the classic justification that diversity jurisdiction avoids local
(investigating the ALI proposals and generally agreeing that diversity jurisdiction should
be limited).
150. See, e.g., Braverman, supra note 59, at 1115.
151. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 1-2 (1969); see also id. at §§ 1301-07 (detailing the proposed
limitations and alterations to diversity jurisdiction). The ALI's study sparked heated de-
bates in the legal community regarding the abolition and limitation of diversity jurisdiction.
See Bratton, supra note 149, at 349-54 (supporting the abolition of diversity jurisdiction
and citing the ALl proposals); McGowan, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 532 (dis-
cussing the ALl proposals and advocating the limitation of diversity jurisdiction); Wright,
Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 149, at 204 (generally supporting the ALl
proposals with some reservations). But see John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, 16 HARV. J. ON LEcis. 403, 405 (1979) [hereinafter Frank, Case for Diversity Jurisdic-
tion] (refuting arguments made by the ALI to limit diversity jurisdiction); Marsh, supra
note 51, at 197 n.1 (recognizing the ALI study as causing controversy); Wright, The Federal
Courts, supra note 124, at 319-21 (disputing the reasons enumerated by the ALL to abolish
diversity jurisdiction).
152. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 38. The Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee cited the caseload pressures and strain on the federal judicial budget as reasons for the
limitation of diversity jurisdiction to "narrowly defined exceptions." Id. at 39.
153. See Bratton, supra note 149, at 350-51; McGowan, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note
53, at 524.
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prejudice, ' 5  the interests the states have in hearing state cases,155 and
the difficulties the federal courts have had in applying state law after
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins'56 was decided.'57 Commentators have
offered many alternatives to abolition, which include denying in-state
litigants the power to invoke diversity jurisdiction, 58 increasing the
amount in controversy requirement, 159 and defining corporate citizen-
ship to include every state in which the corporation does business.
1 60
Abolition seems unlikely in view of Congress's rejection of past pro-
posals, but it remains to be determined whether Congress will imple-
ment any of the proposed limitations.'6
If the Supreme Court elects to resolve the tension among the cir-
cuits on realignment issues, proponents of the primary purpose test,
including the Fourth Circuit, have several strong arguments. 62 Con-
sidering these arguments, the text of Indianapolis, and the underlying
ideology espoused by Justice Frankfurter, the Fourth Circuit's inter-
pretation of the Indianapolis decision rests on solid ground. 63 How-
ever, even though the decision in United States Fidelity and Guaranty
is clearly justifiable, the results it effectuates are less creditable. The
right of the judiciary to hear controversies between citizens of differ-
ent states was broadly granted by the Constitution, and many of the
154. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 40-41 (finding that diversity juris-
diction causes friction between state and federal courts and the main justification for re-
taining diversity jurisdiction, local bias, was no longer prevalent); McGowan, Federal
Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 534.
155. See Allan, supra note 149, at 654-55; Bratton, supra note 149, at 349-50; Frank,
Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 151, at 411.
156. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts in diversity cases must apply state
law).
157. See Bratton, supra note 149, at 350; Frank, Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, supra
note 151, at 411; McGowan, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 529.
158. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 42; Marsh, supra note 51, at 221-22.
159. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 42; Marsh, supra note 51, at 224-25.
160. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 3, at 42; Marsh, supra note 51, at 225-26.
161. Previous proposals for either limitation or abolition of diversity jurisdiction have
failed. See S. 679, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1979) (proposing limits to diversity jurisdiction);
H.R. 130, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (proposing abolition); H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (same); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (same); S. 939, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932) (proposing limits to diversity jurisdiction); H.R. 11508, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932) (same); S. 4357, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) (same); S. 3151, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1928) (same).
162. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (outlining arguments in favor of the
primary purpose test including: protection of states rights, discouraging multiple party and
controversy litigation in federal courts, limiting diversity jurisdiction, and decreasing the
caseload of the overburdened federal courts).
163. See supra notes 63, 73 and accompanying text.
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original justifications for this grant of power still exist. 6" Relying on
a decision that has been ambiguously interpreted by the circuits, the
Fourth Circuit's adoption of the primary purpose test purports to limit
this grant of power to the judiciary by allowing the dismissal of more
diversity cases. 16  Further, the primary purpose test bestows consider-
able discretion on federal judges to determine the primary issue in a
suit. 66 Undoubtedly, this broad grant of discretion will lead to incon-
sistency among the federal courts.167
Although the arguments elicited by the Fourth Circuit in United
States Fidelity and Guaranty in favor of the primary purpose test are
compelling, the results of the test render it incompatible with the
broad constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction and the need for
consistency and efficiency in the federal court system. The substantial
controversy test or a combination of both tests might produce better
results, especially if combined with some of the suggested modifica-
tions to the diversity statute. 68 After United States Fidelity and Guar-
anty, the circuit courts' holdings regarding the test for realignment of
parties remain divided, but they emphasize the need for Congress or
the Supreme Court to clarify the ambiguity either through legislation
modifying 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or an opinion clearly outlining the appo-
site test for realignment.
APRIL N. EVERETTE
164. See Frank, supra note 124, at 9 (discussing the Constitution's broad grant of diver-
sity jurisdiction to the judiciary); Marsh, supra note 51, at 203 (defending an original justifi-
cation of diversity jurisdiction, the protection from local bias, by finding that "no one has
yet established, by survey or other empirical proof, that parochial bias has so dissipated
that diversity jurisdiction has become obsolete"); Wright, The Federal Courts, supra note
124, at 327 (stating that "if the Constitution confers authority, [the court] may exercise it in
furtherance of any decent social purpose").
165. The facts of United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. closely parallel those in realignment
cases in other circuits. See supra notes 82-97 and 101-13 and accompanying text (detailing
the facts in American Motorists, Maryland Casualty, Crown Cork & Seal and Thomas Sol-
vent). It can be inferred that there is no clear test mandated by the Supreme Court be-
cause the circuits are routinely applying different tests to similar facts.
166. See Braverman, supra note 59, at 1076 (arguing that the discretion granted to fed-
eral judges by the primary purpose test allows them to use "[r]ealignment... [as] a tool ...
to destroy diversity of the parties and dismiss suits-even those that may have been legiti-
mately aligned").
167. Id. at 1075.
168. See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
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Crossman v. Moore: The End of Relation Back with Regard
to Corrected Party Names in North Carolina
North Carolina and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)'s pro-
visions for relation back are critical for plaintiffs who make a mistake
by improperly naming a defendant or who fail to assert all possible
related claims in their original pleading.' When a plaintiff tries to use
relation back to add a party or claim, the court's resolution of the
issue either allows the plaintiff's claim to go forward for a decision on
the merits or it disallows the claim. Thus, the stakes are high: plain-
tiffs who lose on this issue will be completely barred from asserting
their new or additional claims.'
Traditionally, the federal rules have recognized two types of rela-
tion back.' One form arises when plaintiffs attempt to add additional
claims related to those already properly alleged in their timely com-
plaint.4 In general, this form of relation back is permitted if the new
claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence that
gave rise to the original, properly asserted claims.5 The second form
of relation back involves plaintiffs who file timely complaints, but fail
to name the correct defendants. 6 This was the issue most recently
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c); N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
2. See Crossman v. Moore, 341 N.C. 185, 186,459 S.E.2d 715,717 (1995) (recognizing
that the resolution of the relation back issue determines the case).
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c); see also LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHIrTEN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 523-35 (1994) (discussing history and requirements of amending pleadings
under the federal rules).
4. This type of relation back is codified in the first prong of Rule 15(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading
when (1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limita-
tions applicable to the action, or (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or at-
tempted to be set forth in the original pleading ... 
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(2).
5. See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 574 (1945); Rogerson v.
Fitzpatrick, 121 N.C. App. 728, 468 S.E.2d 447 (1996); Bowlin v. Duke Univ., 119 N.C.
App. 178,457 S.E.2d 757, disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 190,463 S.E.2d 233 (1995); Wooten
v. Warren, 117 N.C. App. 350, 451 S.E.2d 342 (1994).
6. This form of relation back is codified in the second part of Rule 15(c) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading
when ... (3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against
whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the
period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the
party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institu-
tion of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on
the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning
RELATION BACK
addressed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Crossman v.
Moore.7
North Carolina's rule for relation back of amendments to plead-
ings is substantially different from its federal counterpart. 8 North Car-
olina's Rule 15(c) states:
A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have
been interposed at the time the claim in the original pleading
was interposed, unless the original pleading does not give no-
tice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions
or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended
pleading.9
In Crossman v. Moore, the North Carolina Supreme Court inter-
preted this rule to encompass only the first form of relation back-
addition of related claims. 10 The court held that North Carolina's rule
for relation back does not apply to a situation in which plaintiffs need
to correct the names of defendants in order to carry the case forward
on the merits.' Without considering the practical consequences of
the rule it adopted,' 2 the court reasoned that the plain language of
Rule 15(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure does not
permit relation back with regard to corrected party names.'
3
The claims asserted in Crossman arose out of an automobile acci-
dent that occurred in Mecklenburg County on January 25, 1989.14 The
plaintiff filed a complaint on January 24, 1992, to recover for personal
injuries sustained in the accident.' 5 The original complaint named
Van Dolan Moore and the Dolan Moore Company as defendants. 6
The police officer's accident report listed Van Dolan Moore as the
the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the
party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
7. 341 N.C. 185, 459 S.E.2d 715 (1995).
8. Compare N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (allowing relation back of claims if original plead-
ing gives defendant notice of the "transactions" or "occurrences" alleged) with FED. R.
Civ. P. 15(c) (specifically referring to changing of the party or naming of the party).
9. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
10. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187,459 S.E.2d at 717. The court stated, "We hold that this
rule does not apply to the naming of a new party-defendant to the action." Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 187-88, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
13. Ild. at 187, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
14. Id. at 186, 459 S.E.2d at 716.
15. Id. North Carolina has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury ac-
tions resulting from negligence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Supp. 1995).
16. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 186, 459 S.E.2d at 716.
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driver of the automobile. 7 However, Van Dolan Moore's son, Van
Dolan Moore II, was the actual driver of the car.'
Van Dolan Moore filed a motion for summary judgment because
he was not the driver of the automobile involved in the accident. 9 In
response, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint to add
Van Dolan Moore II as a defendant.2 0 She also filed a motion re-
questing that the court allow the amendment to relate back to the
original complaint.2
The superior court judge granted the plaintiff's motion to amend
her complaint to add Van Dolan Moore II as a defendant, but denied
her motion for relation back. Since the complaint against Van Do-
lan Moore II did not relate back, the statute of limitations barred the
suit against him. Furthermore, since there was no basis for a suit
against Van Dolan Moore, the plaintiff was effectively barred from
any recovery for injuries sustained in the accident.2 3
The plaintiff appealed the denial of her motion for relation back
to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.24 A unanimous panel recog-
nized that in Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enterprises, Inc.,25
the court had adopted the rationale of Schiavone v. Fortune,26 in
which the United States Supreme Court applied a strict four-part
test27 in deciding whether to allow an amendment to correct a party's
name to relate back.28 The court of appeals reiterated the Schiavone
test, and recognized that the Supreme Court had rejected the conten-
tion that a plaintiff should be able to correct a defendant's name after
the statute of limitations expires so long as the plaintiff makes the
17. Crossman v. Moore, 115 N.C. App. 372,373,444 S.E.2d 630, 630 (1994), afj'd, 341
N.C. 185, 459 S.E.2d 715 (1995).






24. Crossman v. Moore, 115 N.C. App. 372, 373, 444 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1994), affd, 341
N.C. 185, 459 S.E.2d 715 (1995).
25. 96 N.C. App. 277, 283, 385 S.E.2d 801, 806 (1989), overruled by Crossman v.
Moore, 341 N.C. 185, 459 S.E.2d 715 (1995).
26. 477 U.S. 21 (1986); see infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
27. Id. at 29. The United States Supreme Court resolved the issue in Schiavone by
adopting a test that required a court to determine whether: (1) the basic claim arose out of
the conduct set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in received notice
so that it would not be prejudiced in its defense; (3) the party knew or should have known
that it would have been named in the original pleading but for a mistake as to identity; and
(4) the second and third requirements were fulfilled within the prescribed limitations pe-
riod. Id
28. Crossman, 115 N.C. App. at 375, 444 S.E.2d at 631-32.
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correction during the time allowed for service of process under Rule
4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 9
The court of appeals then pointed out that commentators had
criticized the Schiavone rule as being too harsh,30 and that, as a result,
the United States Congress amended Rule 15(c) to allow more claims
to relate back.3' However, while stating that "Schiavone, and thus
Ring Drug, represent a strict construction of Rule 15(c) that should be
reexamined,"32 the court refused to adopt a more lenient rule because
it was bound by its precedent unless overruled by the North Carolina
Supreme Court.33 Therefore, the court of appeals applied the Schia-
vone/Ring Drug test and held that the amended complaint did not re-
late back to the original complaint. 4 The court of appeals seemed
reluctant in refusing to allow the amendment to relate back, appar-
ently feeling that justice would have been better served by allowing
relation back in this instance.35 The court of appeals cited precedent
as its only reason for affirming the trial court's decision and stated that
"it is not a function of this Court to legislate.
'36
Recognizing the importance of the issue, the North Carolina
Supreme Court allowed discretionary review of the case. 37 The court
examined the language of Rule 15(c) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure and stated, "[w]e believe the resolution of this case
may be had by discerning the plain meaning of the language of the
rule."' 38 Next, the court noted that the language of the rule speaks of
29. Id. Rule 4(m) of the federal rules (formerly FED. R. Civ. P. 40)) provides:
'Time Limit for Service. If the service of the summons and complaint is not made
upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon
motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
30. Crossman, 115 N.C. App. at 375-76, 444 S.E.2d at 632 (citing Diane S. Kaplan &
Kimberly L. Craft, Time Warps and Identity Crises: Muddling Through the Misnomer/Mis-
identification Mess, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 257, 289-90 n.164 (1993)).






37. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 186, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
38. Id. at 187, 459 S.E.2d at 717. The court noted that North Carolina's rule for rela-
tion back is not derived from its federal counterpart, as are most of the states' rules of civil
procedure. Id. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), supra notes 4, 6 (allowing amendments
correcting party names to relate back if the defendant is notified of the action within the
period allowed for service of summons and complaint if other notice requirements are
met) with N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c), supra text accompanying note 9 (construed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Crossman as allowing relation back of related claims, but not
the addition of parties). Instead, the language of the North Carolina rule mirrors that of a
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claims, as opposed to parties, and that it allows relation back only
when there is notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved.
9
The court interpreted the statute to mean that there can be no notice
to a new party when the amendment of the complaint seeks to add a
new party.40 There can only be notice when the plaintiff uses the
amendment to correct the name of a party already involved in the
action as a defendant.4' Thus, the court concluded "that this rule does
not apply to the naming of a new party-defendant to the action. It is
not authority for the relation back of a claim against a new party.
'42
With this holding, the court eliminated any possibility of relation back
of corrected party names to add a new party in North Carolina.43
In its final task the court addressed how this holding compared to
precedent." First, the court stated that three previous decisions of the
court of appeals had examined the same issue, and each had refused
to allow the addition or correction of a party name to relate back to
the original complaint a.4  However, the court recognized that in Ring
Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enterprises,4 6 the court of appeals up-
held a trial court's decision to allow an amendment naming a new
party to relate back.47 The court expressly overruled Ring and stated:
"We overrule the holding in Ring, and do not approve of the rationale
of the other three cases so far as they are inconsistent with the reason-
ing of this opinion."48
rule from New York's rules of civil procedure. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187, 459 S.E.2d at
717; see N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 203(0 (McKinney 1992).
39. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
40. Id.
41. ld.
42. Id. Thus, while the North Carolina Court of Appeals had arguably advocated a
more lenient standard for the relation back of party names, the North Carolina Supreme
Court handed down a much more restrictive holding. See supra text accompanying notes
29-34, 40. The Court stated that its interpretation was consistent with the interpretation
given by the New York courts in applying its rule. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187,459 S.E.2d at
717 (citing Brock v. Bua, 83 A.D.2d 61 (N.Y. 1981)).
43. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187,459 S.E.2d at 717. The court went on to recognize that
other jurisdictions follow a different rule, but it noted that the language of those states'
rules differs from that in North Carolina's rule. Id.
44. l at 187-88, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
45. ld. at 187, 459 S.E.2d at 717. See Stevens v. Nimocks, 82 N.C. App. 350, 357, 346
S.E.2d 180, 184, cert denied, 318 N.C. 511, 349 S.E.2d 873 (1986), reconsideration denied,
318 N.C. 702,351 S.E.2d 760 (1987); Callicutt v. American Honda Motor Co., 37 N.C. App.
210, 212-13, 245 S.E.2d 558, 560 (1978); Teague v. Motor Co., 14 N.C. App. 736, 740, 189
S.E.2d 671, 673 (1972). For discussion of these cases, see infra note 83 (Stevens); infra
notes 57-59 and accompanying text (Callicutt); infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text
(Teague).
46. 96 N.C. App. 277, 385 S.E.2d 801 (1989).
47. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187-88, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
48. IdL at 188, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
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Before the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
relation back, the North Carolina Court of Appeals dealt with the is-
sue under North Carolina's Rule 15(c) in two significant cases.49 Each
time, the court of appeals refused to allow any correction of a party
name to relate back to the filing of the original complaint."0 In Teague
v. Asheboro Motor Co.,51 the plaintiff's original complaint named the
wrong business as defendant because the proper defendant had sold
the business to a new corporation. 52 Even though the new corpora-
tion conducted business under the name of the proper defendant, the
court of appeals did not allow the claim against the proper defendant
to relate back to the filing of the original complaint. Under the plain
language of Rule 15(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, "a claim asserted in an amended pleading relates back to the
original pleading, 'unless the original pleading does not give notice of
the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences,
to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading.' ,53 Ultimately the
Teague court did not find that the proper defendant received the req-
uisite notice.54
In Callicutt V. American Honda Motor Co.,55 the court of appeals
reached a similar conclusion.16 Finding that the determination of
whether relation back can be allowed rests on notice to the party
sought to be added, the Court concluded:
49. See Callicutt v. American Honda Motor Co., 37 N.C. App. 210, 245 S.E.2d 558
(1978); Teague v. Asheboro Motor Co., 14 N.C. App. 736, 189 S.E.2d 671 (1972).
50. Teague, 14 N.C. App. at 740, 189 S.E.2d at 673; Callicutt, 37 N.C. App. at 212-213,
245 S.E.2d at 673.
51. 14 N.C. App. 736, 189 S.E.2d 671 (1972).
52. Id. at 737, 180 S.E.2d at 671-72. The plaintiff was suing for personal injuries he
received from the alleged negligence of an automobile dealership. Id at 737, 189 S.E.2d at
671. After the accident, but before the complaint was filed, the dealership changed its
name and moved to a new location. Id at 737, 189 S.E.2d at 672. A new corporation
purchased the old dealership and continued doing business in the same location and under
the same name as the old dealership, Asheboro Motor Co. Id The complaint was filed
against this corporation, which technically had not been in existence at the time of the
injury. Id. When the plaintiff discovered this fact, he attempted to correct the name and
have it relate back to the original complaint. Id.
53. IkL at 739, 189 S.E.2d at 673 (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c)).
54. It at 740, 189 S.E.2d at 673.
55. 37 N.C. App. 210, 245 S.E.2d 558 (1978). This case was not technically a Rule
15(c) relation back case, but instead was a Rule 15(a) motion to amend the complaint. Id.
at 211, 245 S.E.2d at 559.
56. IeL at 213, 245 S.E.2d at 560. In this case, the plaintiff sued American Honda
Motor Co. for injuries he received while riding one of their motorcycles. Id. at 210, 245
S.E.2d at 559. After the statute of limitations had expired, he discovered that this company
was not the manufacturer of the motorcycle, but was only the retailer. Id. When he sought
to amend the complaint to include the manufacturer, the court refused to allow relation
back. Id. at 213, 245 S.E.2d at 560.
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If the effect of the proposed amendment is merely to correct
the name of the party already in court, clearly there is no
prejudice in allowing the amendment, even though it relates
back to the date of the original complaint.
On the other hand, if the effect of the amendment is to
substitute for the defendant a new party, or add another
party, such amendment amounts to a new and independent
[cause] of action and cannot be permitted when the statute
of limitations has run.57
In deciding these cases, the North Carolina courts had little gui-
dance from federal precedent. However, in 1986, the United States
Supreme Court tackled the issue of relation back with regard to party
names in Schiavone v. Fortune.8 In Schiavone the plaintiffs sought to
recover for an allegedly defamatory story in Fortune magazine.5 9 The
plaintiffs listed Fortune as the defendant in the original complaint,
even though Fortune is only the trademarked name of the magazine
published by Time, Incorporated.6 0 Nonetheless, the complaint was
served on the registered agent for Time.61 After the expiration of
New Jersey's one-year statute of limitations for libel actions, Time
moved to dismiss for failure to name it as a defendant within the statu-
tory period.62 The trial court granted Time's motion to dismiss, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.63
The United States Supreme Court utilized a four-prong test in
deciding whether an amendment could relate back.6 4 First, the basic
claim must have risen out of the conduct set forth in the original
pleading;65 second, the party to be brought in must have received no-
tice such that it would not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense;
66
third, the party must have known or should have known that, but for a
57. Id. at 212, 245 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting Kerner v. Rackmill, 111 F. Supp. 150, 151
(M.D. Pa. 1953) (citations omitted)). Interestingly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
applied the reasoning of a federal district court in reaching its conclusions. Id. When sub-
sequent developments in federal law moved toward a more lenient rule, North Carolina
courts at first began to follow. See Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enters., 96 N.C.
App. 277, 283, 385 S.E.2d 801, 806 (1989).
58. 477 U.S. 21 (1986). For a detailed discussion of the Schiavone decision, see Joseph
Dornfried, Note, Schiavone v. Fortune: Notice Becomes a Threshold Requirement for Rela-
tion Back Under Rule 15(c), 65 N.C. L. REv. 598 (1987).
59. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 22-23.
60. Id. at 23.
61. Id. Thus, the proper defendant had notice, and the suit was properly filed before
the statute of limitations had run.
62. Id. at 24.
63. Id. at 24-25.




mistake of identity, the action would have been brought against it;
67
and fourth, the second and third requirements must have been satis-
fied within the prescribed limitations period.68
The Supreme Court defined the "period provided by law for com-
mencing the action" as the statute of limitations, and held that the
amendment of the party name could not relate back to the original
complaint.69 Thus, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.70
The Court then sought to dispel the notion that the "period provided
by law" could mean the period provided for service of process under
Rule 4, in addition to the limitations period, by pointing out the advi-
sory committee's note regarding the adoption of the then-existing
Rule 15(c) in 1966.71
The Schiavone case has received extensive criticism for its per-
ceived creation of an extremely severe s'tandard.72 Commentators
have felt that the Schiavone rule leads to unjust results by dismissing
too many claims before they are heard on the merits.73 In 1991, this
67. Id
68. Id Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) has been amended since the time of the
Schiavone case. At that time, the rule stated:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the original pleading. An
amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if
the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1)
has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against him.
Id. at 24 n.5 (quoting former FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)). For the text of the current federal rule;
see supra notes 4 & 6.
69. Id at 30 (quoting former FED. R. Crv. P. 15(c)).
70. Id.
71. Id at 30-31. Justice Stevens entered a dissenting opinion in this case, in which he
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White. Id at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens argued that the four-part test had been satisfied, because " 'the period
provided by law for commencing the action' " includes both the time for filing the com-
plaint to avoid the expiration of the statute of limitations and the time for service of pro-
cess of the complaint. See id at 32-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting former FED. R.
Civ. P. 15(c)).
72. See Joseph P. Bauer, An Un-Fortune-Ate Illustration of the Supreme Court's Role
as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 728
(1988); Robert D. Brussack, Outrageous Fortune: The Case for Amending Rule 15(c)
Again, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 683 (1988); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of
Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MicH. L. Riv. 1507, 1572-73
(1987).
73. Much of the commentary has focused on unfair results relating to the service of
process. See Bauer, supra note 72, at 731; Brussack, supra note 72, at 697; Lewis, supra
note 72, at 1560. For example, if two plaintiffs are injured in the same automobile accident
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criticism influenced Congress to change the text of Rule 15(c) to allow
for relation back of corrected party names so long as the plaintiff
makes the amendment to the complaint within the time allowed for
service of process under Rule 40).74 The advisory committee's note to
the 1991 amendments specifically states that the amendment of the
text of the rule was made in order to change the result of the Schia-
vone decision.75 In addition, many states followed the congressional
lead and applied a less restrictive rule.76 Interestingly enough, while
the North Carolina courts were reluctant to adopt a standard as "lib-
eral" as the Schiavone rule-and were applying a very strict interpre-
tation of that rule when they did use it77-Congress amended the
Schiavone rule because they felt it was too harsh.
78
After the United States Supreme Court addressed the problem of
relation back of corrected party names, the stage was set for the North
Carolina courts to re-examine their treatment of the issue. In Ring
Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enterprises,79 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals expressly adopted the federal test espoused in
Schiavone8° and, for the first time, allowed relation back of a cor-
rected party name.81
and both of their complaints are filed before the statute of limitations expires, the out-
comes of their filings may be inconsistent. If Plaintiff A properly names the defendant, and
Plaintiff B does not, the claim with the properly named defendant can go forward, and
Plaintiff A need not serve the defendant until some time after the statute of limitations has
run. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (allowing 120 days for service of process after the filing of
the complaint). If Plaintiff B amends her complaint, she may properly serve the defendant
and give notice to the defendant that a suit has been filed before the defendant ever knows
that Plaintiff A has filed suit as well. Under Schiavone's notice requirement, only Plaintiff
A's claim can go forward, despite the fact that the defendant is not prejudiced in any
manner whatsoever by having to answer Plaintiff B's complaint. See Brussack, supra note
72, at 697; see also Peter A. Zorn, Note, Rule 15(c) and the Relation Back of Corrected
Party Names, 73 N.C. L. REv. 2189,2203-07 (1995) (noting that the rules require a defend-
ant brought into court by amendment to receive notice earlier than a defendant properly
named originally.)
74. See FED. R. Crv. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note (1991). Former FED. R. Cirv.
P. 4(j) is now FED. R. Crv. P. 4(m).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note (1991).
76. See, e.g., Frances T. Barnes, Court Liberally Applies Rules of Civil Procedure to
Case of Misnamed Defendant, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 102 passim (1995) (discussing South Caro-
lina's liberal application of the relation back rule).
77. See Franklin v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., 117 N.C. App. 28, 39-40, 450 S.E.2d 24,
31 (1994), aff'd, 342 N.C. 404,464 S.E.2d 46 (1995) (discussed infra notes 86-90 and accom-
panying text).
78. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note (1991).
79. 96 N.C. App. 277, 385 S.E.2d 801 (1989).
80. l. at 283, 385 S.E.2d at 806.
81. Id. Before Ring Drug but after Schiavone, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
heard one other case on this issue. In Stevens v. Nimocks, 82 N.C. App. 350, 346 S.E.2d
180 (1986), the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against the defendant Nimocks. Id.
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Ring Drug involved an unfair trade practices claim in which the
plaintiff, a drug retailer, alleged that Carolina Medicorp Enterprises
and Forsyth Memorial Hospital unfairly interfered with its contract
with the Blumenthal Jewish Home for the Aged.' The original com-
plaint failed to name Carolina Medicorp, Inc., the parent company of
Carolina Medicorp Enterprises. 83 After the statute of limitations had
run, the plaintiff sought to add Carolina Medicorp, Inc. and Salem
Health Services, another subsidiary, to the complaint and have those
claims relate back to the filing of the original complaint. s4 Applying
the Schiabone test, the court of appeals held that the addition of Caro-
lina Medicorp, Inc. related back to the filing of the original complaint,
but that the addition of Salem could not.
8 5
Just five years after Ring Drug, the court of appeals backed away
from the more liberal federal test that it had adopted. In Franklin v.
Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc.,86 the plaintiff, who was injured when she fell
at a grocery store, filed a timely complaint which was then served on
the proper registered agent for the store. However, the complaint
contained a minor error, naming as the defendant "Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc." instead of "Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.""8 The court deter-
mined that under the federal test8 9 the use of relation back would
have prejudiced the defendant unfairly, and thus refused the plaintiff's
motion to relate back to the original complaint.90
Until Crossman, the use of relation back of corrected party
names had never reached the North Carolina Supreme Court. The
supreme court could have utilized one of several approaches in Cross-
man. First, the court could have rejected the Ring Drug court's adop-
at 351, 346 S.E.2d at 180. After the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff sought to
add Nimocks' partner as a defendant. Id. The court refused to allow this claim to relate
back to the filing of the original complaint. Id. at 357,346 S.E.2d at 184. Although decided
after the United States Supreme Court had heard the Schiavone case, the Stevens court
made no mention of it. Id at 351-57, 346 S.E.2d at 182. However, the court did look to
federal precedent for guidance. Id. at 354, 346 S.E.2d at 182.
82. Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enters., Inc., 96 N.C. App. 277, 279, 385
S.E.2d 801, 803-04 (1989). The plaintiffs alleged an unfair trade practices violation under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988).
83. Ring Drug, 96 N.C. App. at 279, 385 S.E.2d at 803-04. However, all of the defend-
ants were subsidiaries of Carolina Medicorp Enterprises and the parent company, Carolina
Medicorp, Inc. Id. at 279, 385 S.E.2d at 803.
84. Id at 279-80, 385 S.E.2d at 804.
85. Id. at 283, 385 S.E.2d at 806.
86. 117 N.C. App. 28,450 S.E.2d 24 (1994), affd, 342 N.C. 404, 464 S.E.2d 46 (1995).
For a thorough discussion of Franklin, see Zorn, supra note 73, at 2190-95.
87. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 30-31, 450 S.E.2d at 26.
88. Id. at 30-31, 450 S.E.2d at 26-27.
89. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
90. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 39-40, 450 S.E.2d at 31.
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tion of the Schiavone rule; second, it could have reaffirmed the
adoption of the Schiavone rule;91 or third, it could have adopted a test
similar to the current federal test, as embodied in Rule 15(c) of the
Federal Rules. 92
The obvious trend nationwide was to follow the modem federal
relation back rule,93 or at least allow relation back of corrected party
names in some circumstances. 94 However, the North Carolina
Supreme Court did not follow this trend in Crossman.95 Instead, the
court chose the first option mentioned above,96 effectively ending the
doctrine of relation back of corrected party names in North Carolina.97
Before Crossman, the state recognized an outdated federal test that
commentators criticized as applying an extremely severe standard.98
With Crossman, the North Carolina Supreme Court has reverted to a
standard even more severe than the much-criticized test of Schiavone.
In coming to its decision, the court ignored the practical conse-
quences of its holding.99 In this respect, Crossman represents a com-
plete departure from state precedent, which at least examined the
consequences of a refusal to allow relation back. 100 The Crossman
court, by contrast, gave only cursory treatment to the ramifications of
its holding. The court made no mention of the potential for prejudice
to the plaintiff who otherwise may have possessed a valid claim.
91. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 669 So.2d 92, 95-96 (Miss. 1996)
("Since the United States Supreme Court and Congress have abandoned Schiavone it
seems illogical for Mississippi courts to adopt this harsh and unnecessary interpretation of
Rule 15."); Hughes v. Water World Slide, Inc., 442 S.E.2d 584,586 (S.C. 1994) (concluding
that South Carolina's Rules of Civil Procedure are consistent with post-Schiavone amend-
ments to Rule 15(c)).
94. See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Blastech, Inc., 852 S.W.2d 813, 813 (Ark.
1993) (requiring notice to the defendant, but allowing relation back of corrected party
names); Porter v. Good Eavespouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 1993) (same); Fennesy v.
L.B.I. Management, Inc., 847 P.2d 1350, 1355 (Kan. App. 1993) (same); Richlick v. Relco
Equip., Inc., 852 P.2d 240,241 (Or. App.), review denied, 860 P.2d 819 (1993) (same); Wil-
cox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1996) (same); Bashara v. Corliss, 632
A.2d 30, 31 (Vt. 1993) (same); Barney v. Auvil, 466 S.E.2d 801, 808-09 (W.Va. 1995)
(same).
95. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
96. The court expressly rejected the Ring Drug rule. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 188, 459
S.E.2d at 717.
97. Ia at 187, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
98. See Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enters., 96 N.C. App. at 283, 385 S.E.2d
at 806 (adopting the Schiavone test).
99. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
100. See Ring Drug, 96 N.C. App. 277, 284, 385 S.E.2d 801, 806-07 (1989); Stevens v.
Nimocks, 82 N.C. App. 350, 357, 346 S.E.2d 180, 184 (1986).
2010 [Vol. 74
RELATION BACK
The North Carolina Supreme Court may have reached a harsher
resolution of the issue than the plain language of the rule mandates.
North Carolina's Rule 15(c) states generally that if the original plead-
ing gives notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved pursu-
ant to the amended pleading, then the amended pleading may relate
back.' 10  Under the language of the rule, there are many circum-
stances in which a corrected party name could comply with the re-
quirements set forth therein.
For example, suppose a plaintiff files a suit against a business, but
erroneously fails to include a small part of the defendant's business
name. The plaintiff serves the proper registered agent before the stat-
ute of limitations expires, only to be faced with a motion for summary
judgment after the statute of limitations has run for failing to name
the proper defendant. The plaintiff amends the complaint and seeks
relation back for the amended complaint.
In this situation, the plaintiff has served the defendant with a
timely complaint detailing the transactions and occurrences giving rise
to the suit. Under the plain language of North Carolina's Rule 15(c),
when the original pleading gives notice of the transactions and occur-
rences to be proved pursuant to the amended complaint, the amended
complaint should relate back. One can make the argument that the
language of the rule allows for some instances in which relation back
of corrected party names should be allowed. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, did not approve of this interpretation of the
rule.
Under a narrow reading, one could interpret Crossman to deal
only with the situation in which a new defendant is brought into the
action, as opposed to the situation in which the plaintiff has already
served the proper defendant, but the complaint contains a misnomer.
The court's approach, however, does not suggest such a limited read-
ing. Because Crossman overruled Stevens, Teague, Callicutt, and Ring
Drug, °" but not Franklin, Crossman leaves in place the bar to relation
back of corrected party names-even in cases in which the defendant
has notice of the plaintiff's claim.10 3 When a plaintiff seeks to add a
new defendant, Crossman controls, and there can be no relation back.
To the extent that an amendment simply seeks to correct the defend-
ant's name, Franklin controls, and again there can be no relation back.
101. See N.C. R. Ov. P. 15(c).
102. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 188, 459 S.E.2d at 717 (overruling Ring Drug and stating
that Stevens, Teague, and Callicutt are overruled to the extent they are inconsistent with
Crossman.)
103. The above hypothetical illustrates such a situation.
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Given this potential for injustice to plaintiffs, the North Carolina
Supreme Court should, at the least, adopt a narrow interpretation of
Crossman. The court should recognize that when the proper defend-
ant has been served, although the defendant was misnamed in the
complaint, the defendant has received notice of the transactions and
occurrences giving rise to the claim. The court should refrain from
allowing Crossman to control that issue, and should overrule Franklin
as leading to results inconsistent with the plain language of Rule
15(c). 101 This way, the court could rejuvenate the doctrine of relation
back for plaintiffs who have merely made a technical error in prepar-
ing their pleadings.
The doctrine of relation back requires a more extensive overhaul
if just relief is to be afforded in North Carolina courts. As the North
Carolina Supreme Court properly noted in Crossman,105 the text of
North Carolina's Rule 15(c) is significantly different from the text of
the current federal rule.10 6 The North Carolina General Assembly
should examine this issue and consider an amendment to the text of
the North Carolina rule to correspond with the current federal rule.
The amendment to Federal Rule 15(c) marked a determination by
Congress that courts were dismissing many meritorious claims based
on meaningless technicalities. 10 7 Unfortunately, until the North Caro-
lina legislators amend Rule 15(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, North Carolina courts will continue to administer this
same brand of injustice.
L. THOMAS MCLEAN, JR,
104. The fact that Franklin led to results that were inconsistent with the plain language
of the rule stems from the fact that the court in Franklin decided the case under the old
Schiavone rule and not under the plain language of the North Carolina rule. Franklin v.
Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., 117 N.C. App. 28, 39, 450 S.E.2d 24, 31 (1994), affd, 342 N.C.
404, 464 S.E.2d 46 (1995). Since the court abandoned the Schiavone rule in Crossman,
Franklin is already on unsteady ground. See Crossman, 341 N.C. at 188, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
105. Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187, 459 S.E.2d at 717.
106. Compare supra notes 4 & 7 (relevant text of Federal Rule 15(c) with text accompa-
nying note 9 (text of the North Carolina rule).
107. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note (1991).
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Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation:
Should Doctors With AIDS Continue To Practice?
The vast majority [of doctors] have honorably abided by the
opening sentence of the Hippocratic Oath: "I shall first do no
harm." However, there are a few people in the medical estab-
lishment who have thrown away their oath and duty to others.
[Doctors who transmit AIDS to their patients] should be
treated no better than the criminal who guns down a helpless
victim on the street; the effect is the same.'
Sen. Jesse Helms
In August of 1990, when twenty-three-year-old Kimberly Bergalis
announced that she had contracted AIDS from her dentist, she be-
came "the emotional symbol of public fears that health workers pose
an HIV transmission threat."2 Before the Bergalis announcement,
fifty-three percent of Americans believed HIV-positive health care
workers should be banned from practice;3 after the announcement,
the percentage approached ninety percent.' In the wake of publicity
following Bergalis's infection, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
published recommendations for preventing the spread of HIV from
health care workers to patients.5 Subsequently, Congress passed legis-
1. 137 CONG. REC. S10,334 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Helms, argu-
ing it should be a crime, punishable by a 10-year jail sentence, for an HIV-positive health
care worker to perform invasive procedures without notifying the patient of his or her HIV
status). Not all Senators agreed. Arguing against Helms's position, Sen. Durenberger,
quoting a New York columnist, stated: "As always, we yearn for bright lines, for guaran-
tees, for absolutes. People look at photographs of Kimberly Bergalis, baked down to the
bones by illness, and see themselves. But bright lines are neither available, nor, in the last
analysis, right." Id. at S10,341 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger).
Sen. Kennedy added: "We cannot absolutely ensure ... that this situation might not occur
again sometime in the future. What we must try to do is shape and fashion the soundest
public health policy that we can to avoid such circumstances in the future." Id. (remarks of
Sen. Kennedy).
2. Laurie Jones, Continuing Debate Airs Facts, Fears, AM. MED. NEws, Oct. 14, 1991,
at 1.
3. Rebecca Voelker, Public Perceptions of AIDS; Polls: U.S. Understands Risks, but
Backs Testing, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 19, 1991, at 2 (reporting results of Centers for Dis-
ease Control surveys).
4. AIDS Victim Blames Policy: Related Developments, 51 FACTS ON FILE: WORLD
NEWS DIGEsr WITH INDEX 489, 516 (July 11, 1991). Results of a Gallup poll conducted in
May of 1991 revealed that 87% of Americans supported mandatory HIV testing of doctors
and dentists. Id. In North Carolina 78% of those polled said doctors with HIV should stop
practicing. Karen Garloch, Poll- Doctors With AIDS Should Stop Practicing, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, July 17, 1991, at Al, A4.
5. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone
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lation requiring states to adopt the CDC Guidelines or their
equivalent. 6 The CDC Guidelines stressed rigorous adherence to in-
fection control procedures, but recommended neither mandatory HIV
testing for health care workers (HCW) nor an outright ban on their
continued medical practice.7 Despite the position of the CDC and
Congress, in Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corpora-
tion (UMMSC),8 the Fourth Circuit held that a hospital could termi-
nate an HIV-positive surgeon based on the risk of transmission of
AIDS to his patients,9 even though that risk was admittedly low.10
This Note first describes the background, reasoning and holding
of the UMMSC decision." Next, it examines the history of AIDS-
related employment decisions'2 under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 197313 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA). 14 The Note then analyzes the UMMSC decision in
detail, calling attention to areas in which legal and medical opinions
appear to conflict, and exploring the underlying collateral issues which
may have influenced the Fourth Circuit's decision.' 5 Finally, the Note
concludes that the UMMSC decision is likely to be followed in other
courts, and observes that while fear of casual contact with HIV-posi-
tive individuals has decreased over the years, any discernible risk, no
matter how minimal, that a surgeon will transmit HIV to his patient
may be a legally sufficient justification for termination of his
employment.'
6
Dr. John Doe17 was in his third year of neurosurgical residency at
UMMSC when he was stuck with a needle while treating an HIV-
positive patient.'8 Dr. Doe subsequently tested positive for the AIDS
virus himself.19 The hospital temporarily suspended Dr. Doe while its
Invasive Procedures, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
RaP., July 12, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter CDC Guidelines].
6. Pub. L. No. 102-141, 105 Stat. 876 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300-ee-2 note (1994)).
7. CDC Guidelines, supra note 5, at 1-6.
8. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
9. Id. at 1267.
10. Id. at 1266.
11. See infra notes 17-50 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 51-99 and accompanying text.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
15. See infra notes 100-53 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 154-67 and accompanying text.
17. A pseudonym.
18. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1262.
19. Id. Whether Dr. Doe acquired the virus from the accidental needle stick or in
another manner is unknown. Id at 1262 n.4. The CDC has estimated that the risk of HIV
transmission after a needle-stick exposure to HIV-infected blood is about 0.3%. Mary E.
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panel of experts on blood-borne pathogens considered possible re-
sponses to the situation. 0 The panel recommended that, with certain
restrictions, Dr. Doe be allowed to continue his neurosurgical resi-
dency.2' Despite the panel's recommendations, UMMSC's head ad-
ministrators permanently terminated Dr. Doe's surgical privileges.22
Doe then sued the hospital, claiming his termination violated section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the ADA, and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 3 At trial, UMMSC
won summary judgment on all claims.24
The issue presented to the Fourth Circuit was whether Dr. Doe's
HIV-positive status provided a sufficient justification for UMMSC to
terminate his surgical practice.2 Analyzing the question under both
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA,2 6 the court initially noted that
Chamberland & David M. Bell, Centers for Disease Control, HIV Transmission from
Health Care Worker to Patient: What is the Risk?, 116 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 871,871
(1992). The risk appears minimal when compared with similar estimates about the risks of
Hepatitis B transmission, which are 100 times greater. Id. at 871 (noting 30% chance of
Hepatitis B transmission after needle-stick exposure to infected blood).
20. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1262.
21. Specifically, the panel recommended that Dr. Doe be allowed to perform all
neurosurgical procedures except certain exposure-prone techniques involving a type of sur-
gical wire. Id. Additionally, Dr. Doe was to strictly adhere to infection control proce-
dures, and notify both the hospital and the patient if his blood ever contacted that of a
patient. Id. Dr. Doe was also to donate blood for DNA sampling, in case a patient ever
sued the hospital for possible transmission of the virus. Id. Notably, the doctor was not
required to inform patients of his HIV-positive status before operating on them. Id.
For a discussion of tort liability for AIDS transmission, see infra notes 127-31 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of informed consent requirements when a patient is
treated by an HIV-positive health care worker, see infra notes 122-33 and accompanying
text.
22. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1262-63. The hospital offered Dr. Doe alternative residencies
in non-surgical disciplines, but Doe refused and insisted that the hospital reinstate his sur-
gical privileges. Id. Subsequently, UMMSC fired Dr. Doe altogether. Id. at 1263.
23. Id at 1264.
24. Id. The district court's opinion was not reported in the Federal Supplement.
25. Id at 1265. In deciding this issue, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo
because the district court had granted summary judgment. Id (citing Higgins v. E.I. Du-
Pont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988)).
26. The Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed the lower court's rejection of Dr. Doe's
Fourteenth Amendment claim. Id. at 1267. In his constitutional.claim Dr. Doe contended
that the hospital's unequal treatment of its employees, based on whether their HIV status
was known or unknown, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The UMMSC court
found that "[c]lassifications involving individuals with disabilities are subject only to ra-
tional basis scrutiny," and are therefore presumptively constitutional if" 'rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.' " Id. (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). The court found "as a matter of simple logic" that it would be
irrational for UMMSC to restrict the activities of its surgeons unless they knew the sur-
geons had HIV, and that preventing the spread of HIV was an "unquestionably legitimate
interest." Id Hence, the court quickly dispensed with the Fourteenth Amendment issue.
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both statutes prohibit firing a disabled but "otherwise qualified" em-
ployee because of her handicap.27 The court then noted that to estab-
lish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under either
statute, an employee must show three elements: "(1) that he has a
disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the employment...
and (3) that he was excluded from the employment... due to discrim-
ination solely on the basis of the disability. '28 However, if an em-
ployee's ability to perform the job cannot be accomplished through
"reasonable accommodation, '29 or if an employee poses a "direct
threat" 0 to others, she is not "otherwise qualified" for employment
and therefore has no claim under either the Rehabilitation Act or the
ADA.
Thus, the risk of transmitting HIV to patients was the key factor
in deciding whether Dr. Doe was "otherwise qualified" to practice
surgery under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. To evaluate this
risk, the Fourth Circuit applied the standard established in School
27. Id at 1264. The Rehabilitation Act states: "No otherwise qualified individual with
a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994), quoted in
UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1265 n.7 (emphasis added).
The ADA states: "[No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. V 1993), quoted in UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1265 n.8 (emphasis
added).
The Fourth Circuit evaluated the UMMSC case using the same analysis for both the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, because their anti-discrimination provisions are substan-
tively similar. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1265 n.9. Other courts have also read the statutes
together. E.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,332-33 (3d Cir. 1995); Ethridge v. State of
Ala., 860 F. Supp. 808, 812-13 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
An HIV-positive person, whether or not he exhibits symptoms of AIDS, is considered
disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. See Douglas W. Kamiec, Justice Department Mem-
orandum on Application of Rehabilitation Act's Section 504 to HIV-Infected Persons, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at D-1 (October 7, 1988) [hereinafter Justice Dep't Memo].
28. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1265; see Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994)
(setting out the same elements in an employment discrimination case in which HIV-posi-
tive prisoners were denied employment in a prison food service program).
29. The ADA states: "It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination ... that an
alleged application of qualification standards ... that ... deny a job or benefit to an
individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and ... such performance
cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), cited in
UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1265.
30. The Rehabilitation Act specifically excludes from its protection any "individual
who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such disease or
infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals." 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(D), cited in UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1265. "The term 'direct threat' means a
significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3), cited in UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1265.
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Board of Nassau County v. Arline'1 which balanced the gravity of
harm if the disease were transmitted against the likelihood infection
would occur.32 The Arline test weighed four factors to be considered
on the basis of current medical knowledge:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b)
the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious),
(c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to
third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be
transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.3
Guided by the Arline court's admonition to "defer to the reason-
able medical judgments of public health officials,"'  the UMMSC
court noted that all such officials agree that the risk of surgeon-to-
patient HIV transmission is low. 35 The CDC has estimated the risk
ranges from .0024% to .00024% in any given surgery.3 6 Over the
course of a career, however, the cumulative risk that an HIV-positive
surgeon will transmit the virus to a patient is between .8% and 8.1 %.31
The court was also persuaded by a medical study38 which concluded
that surgeons39 and in approximately 2% of all surgeries, the same
instrument that cuts a surgeon comes into contact with a patient's
open wound.4 ° While the UMMSC court recognized that this study
did not specifically address HIV transmission, it found the study use-
ful in determining circumstances under which HIV transmission might
occur.
41
31. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
32. See id. at 285-87.
33. Id. at 288.
34. Id.
35. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1263.
36. Chamberland & Bell, supra note 19, at 872.
37. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1263.
38. Jerome I. Tokars et al., Percutaneous Injuries During Surgical Procedures, 267
JAMA 2899 (1992), cited in UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1264. Dr. Tokars's study was a product of
the Hospital Infections Program at the CDC. Id. at 2899. Tokars and his colleagues stud-
ied a variety of surgical procedures, and compiled data on the risk of an instrument pierc-
ing the doctor's skin and then coming into contact with a patient's open wound. Id. at
2899-900. When a needle or other instrument pierces "through the skin," the resulting
injury is described as "percutaneous." See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DIcrION-
ARY 1256 (28th ed. 1994).
39. Tokars et al., supra note 38, at 2900.
40. Id. at 2902. The Tokars study concluded that the most common injury to surgeons
resulted from a needle stick when performing sutures. Id. at 2901. Of all the specialties
studied in Dr. Tokars's test, orthopedic surgery carried one of the lowest risks that an
instrument which cuts a surgeon will then come into contact with a patient's open wound.
Id. (revealing risk of blood-to-blood contact in orthopedic surgery as 0.3% to 0.4%, as
compared to the 9% risk associated with vaginal hysterectomy, which carried the highest
risk of doctor-patient blood-to-blood contact).
41. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1264 n.6.
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Against the backdrop of these statistics, the court also considered
the CDC's official guidelines on HIV-positive health care workers
(HCW).42 While the CDC did not recommend restricting the practice
of all HIV-positive health care workers who perform "invasive proce-
dures,"'43 it did authorize restricting procedures deemed "exposure-
prone."'  Exposure-prone procedures are those in which a surgeon is
likely to cut herself and have her blood come into contact with the
patient's open wound or mucous membranes.45 The CDC stated that
"HCWs who are infected with HIV... should not perform exposure-
prone procedures unless they have sought counsel from an expert re-
view panel and been advised under what circumstances, if any, they
may continue to perform these procedures.
'46
In light of the medical data and the CDC Guidelines, the Fourth
Circuit found that "UMMSC concluded that all neurosurgical proce-
dures that would be performed by Dr. Doe fit the definition of expo-
sure-prone procedures, and restricted his practice accordingly." 47 The
court deferred to the medical judgment of the hospital,48 and applied
the four-factor Arline test, concluding that "(1) HIV may be transmit-
ted via blood-to-blood contact in a surgical setting; (2) Dr. Doe will
always be infectious; (3) infection with HIV is invariably fatal; and (4)
there is an ascertainable risk that Dr. Doe will transmit the disease
during the course of his neurosurgical residency. 49 Therefore, the
court held that Dr. Doe posed a significant risk to his patients which
could not be overcome by reasonable accommodation, and that his
42. Id. at 1263-64.
43. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5. "Invasive procedures" are defined as "sur-
gical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major traumatic injuries" associated
with any of the following:
1) an operating or delivery room, emergency department, or outpatient setting,
including both physicians' and dentists' offices; 2) cardiac catheterization and
angiographic procedures; 3) a vaginal or cesarean delivery or other invasive ob-
stetric procedure during which bleeding may occur; or 4) the manipulation, cut-
ting, or removal of any oral or perioral tissues, including tooth structure, during
which bleeding occurs or the potential for bleeding exists.
Ia at 9 (quoting Centers for Disease Control, Recommendation for Prevention of HIV
Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.: RECOM.
MENDATIONS AND REP., 2S, 6-7S (Supp. Aug. 21, 1987)).
44. CDC Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5.
45. Id. at 4. "Exposure-prone" procedures are characterized by the simultaneous
presence of the surgeon's fingers and a needle, scalpel, surgical wire, or other sharp instru-
ment in a hard to see or "highly confined" anatomic site. Id.
46. Id. at 5.
47. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1266.
48. Id. The court stated: "We are reluctant under these circumstances to substitute
our judgment for that of UMMSC." Id.
49. Id. at 1265-66.
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termination did not violate either the Rehabilitation Act or the
ADA.5 0
It is worth noting that as little as ten years ago, discrimination on
the basis of HIV-positive status was a virtually unheard-of legal claim.
This can be primarily attributed to the fact that AIDS awareness was
not widespread until the fall of 1987, when it was reported that
"[v]irtually everyone (more than 99 percent) has heard of AIDS."'
's
However, even though Americans had at least heard of AIDS by that
time, they were still likely to hold inaccurate opinions about how the
disease is spread. 2
Additionally, it was not until 1987 that persons with contagious
diseases qualified as disabled under the Rehabilitation Act.53 In
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline4 the Supreme Court ruled
that a person's contagious status could constitute a handicap.55 The
Arline case involved a school teacher who was terminated because she
had tuberculosis.5 6 The school board fired Ms. Arline not because her
physical impairment prevented her from performing her job, but
rather because they believed her disease posed a threat to others.
57
Based on this distinction, the school board argued that they had not
violated the Rehabilitation Act, as the statute was meant only to ban
discrimination based on physical incapacity.5 8 Rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court stated:
The fact that some persons who have contagious diseases
may pose a serious health threat to others under certain cir-
cumstances does not justify excluding from coverage of the
Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious diseases.
Such exclusion would mean that those accused of being con-
tagious would never have the opportunity to have their con-
dition evaluated in light of medical evidence and a
50. Id. at 1266-67.
51. Deborah A. Dawson et al., AIDS Knowledge and Attitudes for September 1987,
148 ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STAT. OF THE NAT'L CENTER FOR
HEALTH STAT., Jan. 18, 1988, at 1 (reporting data from surveys conducted in August and
September of 1987).
52. Id. at 4-9. For example, 40% of people surveyed believed they could contract
AIDS from being coughed or sneezed on by someone who has AIDS, 47% believed they
could contract it from sharing plates, glasses, or utensils with an HIV-positive person, and
31% believed they could contract the disease from public toilets. See id. at 6.
53. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 285.
56. Id at 276.
57. Id at 281.
58. Id at 282.
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determination made as to whether they were "othervise
qualified."59
Because of the nature of its facts, the Arline decision left un-
resolved the question "whether a carrier of a contagious disease such
as AIDS ... could be considered, solely on the basis of contagious-
ness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act. '60 However, the
Court seemed aware that its ruling could be used to extend the Reha-
bilitation Act's protection to HIV-positive individuals, an implication
that Arline's critics argued would extend the Act beyond manageable
grounds.61 In response to this criticism, the Court predicted its deci-
sion would "assist local health officials by helping remove an impor-
tant obstacle to preventing the spread of infectious diseases: the
individual's reluctance to report his or her condition. ' 62 At a time
when public fear of AIDS was rampant,63 it is reasonable to assume
that the Court had more than tuberculosis in mind when it decided
Arline.
Just nineteen days after the Arline decision, Congress officially
amended the Rehabilitation Act and extended its protection to in-
clude individuals with contagious diseases.64 The amendment made it
clear however, that it would not be considered unlawful discrimina-
tion if an employer terminated an individual "who, by reason of such
disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals. '65
In light of the Arline opinion and the newly amended Rehabilita-
tion Act, the Justice Department issued a memorandum concluding
that HIV-positive individuals were protected by the Rehabilitation
Act.66 To be considered handicapped under the Act a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he either: "(i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life ac-
59. Id at 285.
60. Id at 282 n.7.
61. "The dissent implies that our holding rests only on our 'own sense of fairness and
implied support from the Act.' " Id. at 286 n.15; see id at 293 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("In Alexander v. Choate.... this Court stated that '[a]ny interpretation of § 504 must...
be responsive to two powerful but countervailing considerations-the need to give effect to
the statutory objectives and the desire to keep § 504 within manageable bounds.' The
Court has wholly disregarded this admonition here." (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 299 (1985))).
62. Arline, 480 U.S. at 286 n.15.
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing public fears and mispercep-
tions about AIDS after Americans first became aware of the disease in 1987).
64. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31
(Mar. 22, 1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (1994)).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (1994).
66. Justice Dep't Memo, supra note 27, at D-1.
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tivities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment."'67 The Justice Department noted that
even asymptomatic HIV carriers should be able to meet one or more
of these requirements.68 First, even though an individual may show
no outward signs of illness, he is still physically impaired because
" 'early stages of the disease may involve subclinical manifestations' "
of AIDS.69 Second, while asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals
"would not appear at first glance to have disabling physical effects
from their infection that substantially affect ... life activities, 7 ° the
knowledge of infection alone is sufficient to limit an individual's deci-
sion to have children-out of concern of passing the disease to her
fetus, or to engage in sexual relations-to protect her partner, both of
which may be considered "major life activities."'"
The Justice Department concluded that in most employment situ-
ations, which involve casual contact only, the low risk of transmitting
HIV yields "little, if any justification for treating infected individuals
differently from others."'72 Nevertheless, the memo predicted that in
certain employment contexts, "reasonable accommodation" would
not be sufficient to render an employee "otherwise qualified" for his
job:
While reasonable accommodation is part of the individual-
ized factual inquiry and therefore difficult to discuss in the
abstract, it clearly does not require allowing an HIV-infected
individual to continue in a position where the infection poses
a threat to others. This would appear to be the case with
infected health care workers who are involved in invasive
surgical procedures, and it may also be the case with respect
to other infected health care workers ... or individuals em-
ployed in jobs that entail responsibility for the safety of
others.73
The Justice Department quite prophetically predicted a bifur-
cated line of AIDS employment discrimination cases. One type of
67. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
68. Justice Dep't Memo, supra note 27, at D-2 to D-3.
69. Id at D-2 (quoting letter from C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General of the United
States, to Douglas W. Kamiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 195, at D-7 to D-8 (Oct. 7, 1988)). "Subclinical" manifestations are those "of
the early stage(s) of an infection or other disease or abnormality before symptoms and
signs become apparent or detectable by clinical examination or laboratory tests, or of a
very mild form of an infection or other disease or abnormality." DORLAND'S ILLUS-
TRATED MEDICAL DICnONARY 1594 (28th ed. 1994).
70. Justice Dep't Memo, supra note 27, at D-2.
71. Id at D-3.
72. Id at D-4.
73. Id at D-7.
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decision, typified by Chalk v. United States District Court,74 involves
employment accompanied by no more risk of HIV transmission than
casual contact entails. Chalk was a case of an HIV-positive school
teacher who was given a lateral transfer out of the classroom and into
an administrative position.75 Subsequently, the teacher sought and
lost an injunction to prevent the school system from restricting his
classroom duties.76 In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit
stated: "[T]here is no evidence of any significant risk to children or
others at the school. To allow the court to base its decision on the fear
and apprehension of others would frustrate the goals of section 504."
77
The other type of case involves employment accompanied by a
discernible, if low, risk of HIV transmission, much like UMMSC. One
of the early cases in this line was Doe v. Washington University,78
which involved an HIV-positive dental student whose coursework in-
cluded clinical work with patients.79 In that case, Washington Univer-
sity disenrolled the student once his H'IV status became known.80 The
dental school's administration used the CDC Guidelines as the basis
for its decision to dismiss the student.8' Facing the student's subse-
quent Rehabilitation Act challenge, the district court held that he was
not "otherwise qualified" to practice dentistry,' relying on the argu-
ment that while "the risk of transmission of HIV from an infected
dental worker to a patient may be minimal, there is still some risk of
transmission. 's
3
74. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
75. Id. at 703.
76. Id. at 704.
77. ld. at 711-12.
78. 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
79. l at 629.
80. l at 630.
81. Id. at 629 n.2. At the time, the 1987 CDC Guidelines were in effect, and they
called for the HIV-positive health care worker's personal physician to decide, in conjunc-
tion with the medical directors of the employing institution, whether the worker should
continue to practice. Id. The CDC Guidelines were updated in 1991. See CDC Guide-
lines, supra, note 5, at 1.
82. Washington University, 780 F. Supp. at 635.
83. Id. at 633. Washington University was decided at the peak of publicity surrounding
Kimberly Bergalis, see supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text, and the coincidence was
not ignored by the court: "Plaintiff asserts... that if proper barrier techniques are used an
HIV-infected doctor or dentist presents no threat of infecting his patients. This absolute is
refuted in the light of the Bergalis tragedy .... ." Washington University, 780 F. Supp. at
633 (footnotes omitted). For a critique of this logic, see infra note 164 (noting that the
CDC has publicly acknowledged that it may never be known how Kimberly Bergalis actu-
ally contracted AIDS).
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Similarly, in Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Can-
cer Center,'" the Fifth Circuit ruled that a surgical technician was not
"otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act to continue prac-
ticing exposure-prone activities." The Bradley court, like the court in
UMMSC, considered the CDC Guidelines for preventing HIV trans-
mission from health care worker to patient, and weighed the known
risks according to the test set forth in School Board of Nassau County
v. Arline. 6 The court concluded: "[w]hile the risk is small, it is not so
low as to nullify the catastrophic consequences of an accident. A cog-
nizable risk of permanent duration with lethal consequences suffices
to make a surgical technician with Bradley's responsibilities not
'otherwise qualified.' "87
Other courts have ruled similarly given similar facts. In Scoles v.
Mercy Health Corp.,8" an orthopedic surgeon was prohibited from
performing surgery unless he revealed his HIV status to his patients.89
The court observed that "[e]ven if the risk is 'exceedingly low' . . the
risk of blood to blood contact between the orthopedic surgeon and
patient during an invasive procedure is a real one."90 Unpersuaded by
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Chalk,9 the Scoles court distinguished
risks associated with casual contact, as was the case in Chalk, from
risks associated with surgery.92 The court ultimately concluded that
Dr. Scoles was not "otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation
Act, as he posed a direct threat to his patients.93
Only one case stands for the proposition that an HIV-positive
health care worker is "otherwise qualified" for employment. In Doe
v. District of Columbia,94 a fire department withdrew an offer of em-
ployment once it became aware that its prospective employee had
HIV.9 Part of the fireman's job description included rendering emer-
gency non-surgical medical treatment to victims. 96 The district court
84. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994).
85. Id. at 924.
86. IML; see supra note 33 and accompanying text (presenting the Arline test).
87. Bradley, 3 F.3d at 924.
88. 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
89. Id. at 767.
90. Id. at 769.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77 (discussing Chalk's conclusion that dis-
crimination based on unsupported fear of transmitting AIDS is unacceptable when HIV-
positive individual merely has casual contact with others).
92. Scoles, 887 F. Supp. at 769.
93. Id. at 772.
94. 796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992).
95. Id. at 564-65.
96. Id. at 561.
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found that the risk that an HIV-positive fireman would transmit the
AIDS virus to a victim while performing his duties was "extremely
remote. '97 It therefore ordered the fire department to instate Doe
immediately.98 Because of the non-invasive nature of a fireman's
health care duties, the court's application of the Arline test weighed in
favor of allowing his employment despite his HIV-positive status. 9
Given the current state of background law, the outcome of the
UMMSC decision might be characterized as unremarkable. The
Fourth Circuit was not the first' 00 and will likely not be the last'01
court to hold that performance of invasive procedures by an HIV-
positive health care worker constitutes a direct threat to the health of
patients, and is therefore unprotected by either the Rehabilitation Act
or the ADA. 02 What is remarkable about the UMMSC decision is
that it represents a point at which the opinions of the medical and
legal communities diverge. A careful examination of the way in which
the Fourth Circuit interpreted the CDC Guidelines and the Arline test
reveals this point."°3
The CDC Guidelines played a pivotal role in both the court's and
the hospital's decisions regarding Dr. Doe's future as a surgeon.'0 4 As
97. Id. at 569.
98. ld at 573. Aside from the court's holding, what is unique about Doe v. District of
Columbia is the fact that the fire department "presented no opening statement, no evi-
dence, and no closing argument." Id. at 560-61. The opinion gave no clues as to why the
fire department failed to assert a vigorous defense, but with the only evidence before the
court pointing in favor of the petitioner, it would have been surprising if he had lost his
case.
99. Id at 569. Coincidentally, another District of Columbia firefighter, who had hepa-
titis, won a lawsuit when the fire department disqualified him from performing mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation. Roe v. District of Columbia, 842 F. Supp. 563, 570 (D.D.C. 1993),
vacated, 25 F.3d 1115 (D.D.C. 1994) (ordering court to dismiss the complaint as moot).
Though hepatitis is vastly more contagious than HIV, see supra note 19, the court could
find no documented case of transmission through saliva, and therefore ruled that the risk
was low enough to favor the fireman under the Arline test. Roe, 842 F. Supp. at 569.
100. See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Washington Univer-
sity, Bradley, and Scoles decisions, precursors to UMMSC, which reached similar conclu-
sions about the low but deadly risks of HIV transmission from health care worker to
patient).
101. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text (discussing Mauro v. Borgess Medi-
cal Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mich. 1995), a recent case which followed the Bradley
and UMMSC rulings).
102. See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
104. The chief of the infectious diseases division at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Balti-
more, Maryland, has said that the CDC Guidelines are "viewed by people in medicine
almost like law." Christopher J. Gearon, CDC Won't Set Standard, Business Will, 9 BALTI-
MORE Bus. JOUR. No. 8, at 1 (July 26, 1991) (quoting John 0. Bartlett). UMMSC is also in
Baltimore.
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the Fourth Circuit noted, the CDC has advised: "Currently available
data provide no basis for recommendations to restrict the practice of
[health care workers] infected with HIV ... who perform invasive
procedures not identified as exposure-prone."' 5 The CDC generally
characterized exposure-prone procedures as those having a higher
likelihood that the health care worker will cut herself and come into
blood-to-blood contact with the patient.10 6 Thus, the most pertinent
advice from the CDC entails how exposure-prone procedures should
be identified and handled:
Exposure-prone procedures should be identified by medical/
surgical/dental organizations and institutions at which the
procedures are performed .... [Health care workers] who
are infected with HIV . . .should not perform exposure-
prone procedures unless they have sought counsel from an
expert review panel and been advised under what circum-
stances, if any, they may continue to perform these
procedures. °7
Describing the kinds of experts who should compose the review
panel, the CDC recommended, among others, "an infectious disease
specialist with expertise in the epidemiology of HIV... transmission"
and "a member of the [hospital's] infection-control committee, prefer-
ably a hospital epidemiologist."'08 Such experts composed the review
panel that considered Dr. Doe's continued performance as a
neurosurgical resident. 0 9 The hospital's blood-borne pathogen ex-
perts recommended that Dr. Doe continue his surgical practice "with
the exception of certain specific procedures involving the use of ex-
posed wire, which the panel deemed to involve too great a risk of
transmission of HIV to patients."110
105. CDC Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5 (emphasis added), quoted in UMMSC, 50 F.3d
at 1263.
106. Id., cited in UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1263.
107. Id., cited in UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1264.
108. Id. Other recommended experts which might be included on the panel were the
HIV-positive health care worker's personal physician, a health care worker with expertise
in the procedures that the HIV-positive professional performs, and state or local public
health officials to provide advice on the appropriate review process. Id. The CDC did not
mention hospital administrators as recommended members of the panel; rather, they
seemed to envision a group of infection control specialists who would make a balanced
decision in light of the specific ascertainable risks. Id.
109. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1262.
110. Id In a study of incidents where surgeons cut themselves during surgery, exposed
wire was specifically identified within a group of instruments that caused 3% of such inju-
ries. See Tokars et al., supra note 38, at 2900. The other instruments within the combined
3% risk group were scalpels and bovies. Id. The majority of injuries to surgeons-77%-
were from suture needles, and within that group, 49% were due to the surgeon's use of his
fingers, rather than a tool such as forceps, when performing stitches. Id. By definition,
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It was, however, a panel of hospital administrators, not epidemi-
ologists, who decided that Dr. Doe should be restricted from surgery
altogether."' The Fourth Circuit accepted this administrative deci-
sion, rather than the decision of the blood-borne pathogen experts, as
the controlling determination "that most or all of the procedures Dr.
Doe would perform as a neurosurgical resident fit within the CDC's
definition of exposure-prone procedures and that Dr. Doe should,
consistent with the CDC [Guidelines], be prevented from performing
them.""'  Thus, the court was unpersuaded by Dr. Doe's argument
that only the pathologist-panel's opinion was consistent with a careful
reading of the CDC Guidelines."13 Specifically, Dr. Doe contended
that, according to the mandate of Arline,"4 the Fourth Circuit should
have deferred to the CDC's recommendation that "specialist[s] with
expertise in ... HIV ... transmission"' 1 5 should determine which
exposure-prone procedures an HIV-positive surgeon should discon-
tinue.116 Doe further urged that restricting his practice according to
the pathologists' recommendation would have constituted a reason-
able accommodation that would "eliminate any significant risk of
transmission of HIV to his patients.""' 7 The UMMSC court rejected
this argument, stating:
The types of procedures in which Dr. Doe is engaged as a
neurosurgical resident are not so clearly outside the charac-
teristics of exposure-prone procedures identified by the CDC
that we can conclude that deference to public health officials
requires us to decide that Dr. Doe does not pose a significant
risk.1
18
The Fourth Circuit then noted that because "some measure of risk
[would] always exist" if Dr. Doe were to continue performing invasive
procedures, that risk was significant enough to prevent Doe from be-
ing "otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA.119
skin-piercing (a.k.a. "percutaneous") injuries during surgery represent a risk of transmis-
sion of HIV because they create the opportunity for blood-to-blood contact between sur-
geon and patient. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 5, at 4.
111. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1262-63.
112. Id. at 1264.
113. Id. at 1266.
114. 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987) (stating that "courts normally should defer to the reason-
able medical judgments of public health officials").
115. CDC Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5.
116. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1266.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Id But see Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting theoretical harm of HIV transmission as unsupported by medical evidence);
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The question left unanswered by the Fourth Circuit is what moti-
vated the court to accept the recommendation of the hospital adminis-
trators over the specialists. It is conceivable that the Fourth Circuit
was motivated by underlying policy concerns not overtly expressed in
the UMMSC opinion. Indeed, some argue that the CDC Guidelines
provide inadequate measures for protecting patients from contracting
HIV, and hence the courts should supplement the medical guidelines
with more stringent legal rulings.'2 Legal writers have argued in
favor of the same conclusion reached in UMMSC-that where there is
a risk of HIV transmission, a health care worker should not be permit-
ted to perform medical procedures.' 2 '
In UMMSC, the court seemed troubled by the fact that the expert
panel of pathologists recommended only that Dr. Doe not perform
certain exposure-prone procedures, and that he otherwise be allowed
to continue practicing without notifying patients of his HIV status.'2
This position is consistent with the CDC Guidelines, which imply that
informed consent is required if a health care worker will be perform-
ing an exposure-prone procedure, but not otherwise. 23 The CDC em-
phasized "the importance of confidentiality and the privacy rights of
infected [health care workers],"'' 4 and recommended that health care
workers "should know their HIV antibody status," but not that pa-
tients should have an absolute right to share in that information.
2 1
The American Medical Association has adopted essentially the same
position. 26
CDC Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that no medical basis exists for restricting HIV-
positive health care workers from performing nonexposure-prone invasive procedures).
120. See Mark D. Johnson, Comment, HIV Testing of Health Care Workers: Conflict
Between the Common Law and the Centers for Disease Control, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 479,
531-34 (1993).
121. See Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Inva-
sive Procedures, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 32, 34 (arguing that informed
consent is not essential for non-invasive procedures, but that HIV-positive medical profes-
sionals should never perform invasive procedures).
122. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1262 ("However, the [blood-borne pathogen expert] panel did
not recommend that Dr. Doe be required to obtain the informed consent of his patients
before performing surgical procedures.").
123. See CDC Recommendations, supra note 5, at 5. (stating that patients should be




126. See Abe Aamidor, Is Your Doctor HIV-Positive? Don'tAsk; Most Health-Care
Professionals Believe They Don't Have to Tell, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 11, 1996, at B-1
(reporting on discussions at Indiana World AIDS Day). The official policy of the AMA on
the issue of informed consent and HIV-positive health care workers is, in part: "[T]he
American Medical Association believes that HIV-infected physicians should not perform
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In contrast to the medical community's position, at least one
court has held that a surgeon has an affirmative duty to disclose his
HIV-positive status to patients. 127 The doctrine of informed consent
is a state law tort theory, and therefore different jurisdictions have
different standards of what a doctor must tell his patient. 128 Yet most
Americans want to know if their health care provider is HIV-positive,
and many feel that it is only right that an HIV-positive health care
worker end her career upon learning that she carries the AIDS vi-
rus.12 9 Some patients have even been allowed to sue based on inflic-
tion of emotional distress resulting from the fear of contracting AIDS
from doctors who did not disclose their HIV status.130 In rejecting the
invasive procedures which pose an identifiable risk of transmission, or should disclose their
seropositive status prior to performing the procedure and proceed only if there is informed
consent." AMA Releases Statement on HIV-Positive Physicians, 92 KANSAS MEDICINE 55
(1991) (quoting in full the official policy statement of the AMA, issued January 17, 1991)
(emphasis added). Though the statement reads as if to endorse informed consent for all
procedures performed by HIV-positive health care workers, the AMA continued with the
caveat, "[s]ome invasive procedures pose no identifiable risk of transmission . . . ." Id.
Therefore, like the CDC, the AMA appears to advocate informed consent only in the
limited circumstances of exposure-prone procedures.
127. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. 1991) (holding that
patient had right to know surgeon's HIV status for any and all surgical procedures,
notwithstanding the CDC Guidelines, which only require informed consent for those pro-
cedures determined by a medical panel to be exposure-prone); see also In re Milton S.
Hershey Medical Ctr., 634 A.2d 163, 163 (Pa. 1993) (upholding trial court order that hospi-
tal notify patients that physician was HIV-positive when treatment was rendered); cf
Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that HIV-
positive surgeon posed a "direct threat" to his patients, not that he was under a duty to
disclose); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561-62 (Minn. 1995) (holding that HIV-posi-
tive physician was not liable for negligent non-disclosure because patient was not injured;
leaving unresolved whether HIV-positive doctors must always disclose their status to
patients).
128. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Risk and Rationality: The Centers for Disease Control
and the Regulation of HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 213, 305
(1991). Bobinski discusses the fact that a slight majority of states assess informed consent
on the basis of what a reasonable doctor would tell his patient. l The remainder of states
have joined the trend of patient-oriented standards of informed consent, judged by what a
patient would reasonably want to know. Id. In patient-oriented jurisdictions, Bobinski
notes that "a significant proportion of patients may have difficulty 'rationally' considering
HIV-related risks." Id. The Supreme Court acknowledged this difficulty in School Bd of
Nassau Co. v. Arline, when it stated that "[flew aspects of a handicap give rise to the same
level of public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness." 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
129. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing public opinion polls about
fear of AIDS).
130. See, e.g. Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (1993) (holding that patient could
proceed with suit against doctor's estate for emotional distress due to fear of contracting
AIDS, despite the fact that patient was never actually exposed to HIV); Faya v. Almaraz,
620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs could proceed in suit against surgeon's
estate despite lack of proof that HIV transmission occurred, based on the fear that they
may have contracted HIV from surgeon, who never revealed his HIV status to patients but
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argument that Dr. Doe should be allowed to continue his residency
and stop performing only a few procedures without otherwise telling
his patients he had HIV, the Fourth Circuit's UMMSC decision sup-
ports a patient-based concept that "the protection of the patient's
right of self-determination [is] the cornerstone of informed
consent.'
131
As a practical matter, leaving the decision to disclose HIV status
to the discretion of the health care worker arguably places the medical
professional in a position to serve his own interests above those of his
patients.132 Generally speaking, disclosure of one's HIV-positive sta-
tus is tantamount to ending one's career. 133 Ironically, even though
the medical community does not endorse a patient's absolute right to
know the HIV status of his doctor, presumably because patients are
likely to refuse services from an HIV-positive doctor, numerous in-
stances of doctors refusing to treat HIV-positive patients have arisen
in the courts. 34 These cases serve as a reminder that the risks and
fears of HIV transmission in the health care setting run both ways,
from doctor to patient and patient to doctor.
135
whose status was revealed in the newspaper); K.A.C. v. Benson, 1993 WL 515825 (Minn.
App. Dec. 14, 1993) (concluding that initial fear upon learning that one's doctor had AIDS
is compensable, regardless of whether HIV transmission occurred). Though plaintiffs have
successfully overcome motions to dismiss in suits to recover based on fear of contracting
AIDS, in the subsequent dispositions of both Kerins and K.A.C., the plaintiffs lost on the
merits. See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1995) (holding as a matter of
law that patients who cannot prove actual exposure to the HIV virus are not within the
"zone of danger" for purposes of an emotional distress claim) rev'g 1993 WL 515825
(Minn. App. Dec. 14, 1993); Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 179 (1994) (adjudicat-
ing the final disposition of the Kerins case and ruling that no recovery for emotional dis-
tress is permitted on only the speculative possibility that the plaintiff might develop AIDS).
131. Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, HIV-Infected Health Care Professionals and Informed
Consent, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 299, 308 (1993).
132. See Johnson, supra note 120, at 531-34 (arguing that the CDC Guidelines en-
courage health care workers to conceal their HIV status at the peril of their patients).
133. Judging from Dr. Doe's experience at UMMSC, the assumption appears
warranted.
134. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995) (granting summary
judgment on ADA claim for patient who was refused dental services once doctor learned
of patient's HIV-positive status); United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La.
1995) (granting summary judgment to HIV-positive patients because dentist's refusal to
treat them was not based on significant risk to dentist); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166
(D.N.J. 1995) (granting default judgment to patient on same basis); Woolfolk v. Duncan,
872 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying physician's motion for summary judgment in
part because whether HIV-positive patient was "otherwise qualified" under the Rehabili-
tation Act and the ADA was a material factual dispute); Howe v. Hull, 874 F. Supp. 779
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (allowing patient who was refused admission into hospital based on his
HIV status to proceed with his claim despite doctor's motion for summary judgment).
135. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that while it is not certain that
Dr. Doe, the petitioner in UMMSC, contracted AIDS from a patient, he did test positive
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An issue which is related to informed consent is that of
mandatory AIDS testing. The CDC has expressly rejected the policy
of mandatory HIV testing for all health care workers, 136 though such
proposals have been raised in both Congress and the courts as a way
to minimize the risk of HIV transmission. A bill presented in the
House of Representatives during the height of Kimberly Bergalis's
public struggle with AIDS would have mandated regular HIV testing
of all medical workers, and would have required patient notification if
a health care worker tested positive.
13 7
It is not uncommon for hospitals or agencies providing health-
related services to the public to have an HIV testing policy for their
employees. 38 Although some courts have recognized mandatory HIV
testing or disclosure of MIV status as an invasion of privacy rights or a
violation of the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, 39 some courts
for the virus after a needle stick during his treatment of an HIV-positive patient). Needle
sticks are the most common medium of blood-to-blood contact in the health care setting.
Tokars et al., supra note 38, at 2902. In two cases very similar to UMMSC, surgical health
care workers were terminated based on their HIV status, and both plaintiffs reported in-
curring needle sticks during the course of their employment. Bradley v. Univ. of Tx. M.D.
Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994);
Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (W.D. Mich. 1995). See supra text
accompanying notes 84-87 and infra text accompanying notes 156-58 for discussions of
both these cases. Arguably, health care workers are at a greater risk of contracting HIV
from patients than vice versa because, especially when a surgeon sticks his finger with a
needle tip while performing an invasive procedure, a health care worker is exposed to a
great quantity of the patient's blood, but the patient is only exposed to a bit of the sur-
geon's blood. See Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals and AIDS: The
"Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REv. 12, 21
(1989).
136. CDC Guidelines, supra note 5, at 6.
137. H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 137 CONG. REC. E2376-02 (daily ed. June
26, 1991). The bill, entitled the "Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Providers Protec-
tion Act of 1991," never passed.
138. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (hospital re-
quired AIDS test for all employees whom it felt had a high risk of having AIDS); Glover v.
Eastern Neb. Comm. Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
932 (1989) (municipal retardation service agency required HIV and hepatitis testing for
employees); Local 1812 v. United States Dept. of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987)
(members of foreign service required to undergo AIDS testing as part of medical fitness
requirements); Doe v. City of Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. 111. 1994) (police depart-
ment with mandatory HIV testing as part of job applicant screening); Anonymous Fireman
v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (mandatory AIDS testing re-
quired as part of annual physical exam for all city fire fighters and paramedics).
139. See, e.g., Hill v. Evans, No. Civ. A. 91-A-626-N, 1993 WL 595676, at *5-*9 (M.D.
Ala. Oct. 7, 1993) (not reported in Federal Supplement) (invalidating on Equal Protection
grounds a portion of an Alabama statute allowing doctors to perform unconsented AIDS
tests on patients even when invasive procedures were not being performed); Doe v. Bor-
ough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding a violation of constitu-
tional right to privacy when police officer revealed HIV status of suspect, stating that
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have found these interests are outweighed when balanced against the
risk of a health care worker spreading HIV to patients. n One court
has even found it permissible under the Fourth Amendment for doc-
tors to unilaterally perform AIDS tests on patients and inform them
of neither the fact that the test was performed nor the results of such,
as long as the patient is slated to undergo a procedure where blood-to-
blood contact is a risk.' 41 Notwithstanding such cases, requiring all
health care workers to undergo AIDS testing appears to be an issue
which scholarly writers in both the legal and medical professions agree
is an impracticable overreaction. 142
The Fourth Circuit's apparent sympathy for the hospital may re-
veal another factor underlying the UMMSC decision-the concept
that a hospital provides a necessary public service, and should not be
penalized for erring "on the side of caution in protecting its pa-
tients."'1 43 In dicta, the UMMSC court took special notice of the hos-
"[t]he right to privacy in this information [even] extends to members of the AIDS patient's
immediate family").
140. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1990) (con-
cluding hospital's required AIDS test for employees it felt had a high risk of having AIDS
was neither a violation of Fourth Amendment right to privacy nor Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause, because of concerns about infection control); Anonymous Fire-
man v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 418 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding that while
mandatory AIDS testing for city fire fighters and paramedics did constitute a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure, it was not unreasonable considering the compelling inter-
est the city had in ensuring its firefighters were free of AIDS). But see Glover v. Eastern
Neb. Comm. Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461,463 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932,
(1989) (concluding HIV and hepatitis testing for employees of a municipal retardation ser-
vice agency constituted unreasonable Fourth Amendment search and seizure because risk
of transmission was minuscule); Doe v. City of Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 1126, 1139 (N.D. Il1.
1994) (finding that police officers adequately stated a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
police department's mandatory HIV testing requirements).
141. Hill v. Evans, No. Civ. A. 91-A-626-N, 1993 WL 595676, at *13 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 7,
1993) (not reported in Federal Supplement) (upholding against a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge a portion of an Alabama statute which allowed unconsented HIV testing of patients
in order to protect health care workers, and finding that patient consent was implied "on
the basis of necessity"). The Hill case demonstrates the points raised supra at notes 134-35
and the accompanying text. Patients are not the only ones afraid of contracting AIDS in
the health care setting; the risks apply to health care workers as well.
142. See American Bar Association AIDS Coordinating Committee, Eric N. Richard-
son & Salvatore J. Russo, eds., Calming AIDS Phobia: Legal Implications of the Low Risk
of Transmitting HIV in the Health Care Setting, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 733, 795-96 (1995)
(arguing that the costs of mandatory AIDS testing, in terms of money, personal privacy,
and the risk that HIV positive medical workers will conceal their status, is too prohibitive
to justify implementation of such a plan); see also William E. Chavey et al., Cost-Effective-
ness Analysis of Screening Health Care Workers for HIV, 38 J. OF FAM. PRACrICE 249, 252
(1994) (estimating that the cost for a large hospital to test all health care workers would
exceed nine million dollars for each transmission prevented, an extraordinary expenditure
of health care resources).
143. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1266.
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pital's actions regarding its termination of Dr. Doe, finding that
UMMSC "acted with great sensitivity to the extremely difficult situa-
tion faced by Dr. Doe."'144 The court may have recognized that the
hospital itself was facing an "extremely difficult" dilemma. The pros-
pect of litigation looms large when a hospital discovers one of its em-
ployees is HIV-positive. 145 A hospital is a likely target in lawsuits
from employees in two ways: if an employee is infected with the virus
while on the job, he may sue for occupational exposure, and if the
hospital terminates the employee or discloses his HIV status, the hos-
pital faces liability under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, 46 as
was the case in UMMSC. A hospital also risks suits from patients who
are exposed to HIV if the hospital allows an HIV-positive health care
worker to continue practicing.' 47 Essentially, " '[i]nstitutions employ-
ing IJV-infected health care workers are.., stuck in a legal quag-
mire.' ,,148 Under these circumstances, the Fourth Circuit concluded:
"there is nothing in the record to indicate that UMMSC acted with
anything other than the best interests of its patients and Dr. Doe at
heart." 1
49
As explained in this Note, a detailed examination of the UMMSC
decision reveals areas where legal and medical opinions conflict. 150
Concerns about informed consent and patient safety may have influ-
enced the court to defer to UMMSC's decision to fire Dr. Doe instead
of strictly adhering to the CDC Guidelines, which the court could
have interpreted to mandate the reinstatement of Dr. Doe's surgical
144. Id at 1266 n.11.
145. Policy-Makers Tend to View HIV-Positive Health Workers as Risk, ABA Forum
Told, 3 Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 879 (June 30, 1994) (hereinafter HIV-Positive
Health Care Workers a Risk].
146. Id.
147. Il; see supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing "fear of AIDS" suits,
whereby patients can proceed under state tort law emotional distress theories).
148. HIV-Positive Health Care Workers a Risk, supra note 145, at 879 (quoting Allyn
Taylor, visiting assistant professor, Widener Univ. School of Law, speaking at ABA forum
on AIDS and the Law, June 17, 1994). Taylor went on to say that a few states have consid-
ered making hospitals immune from all lawsuits stemming from their employment of HIV-
positive health care workers. Id.
The concept of hospital immunity from suit is grounded in the public policy argument
that hospitals provide such a valuable, socially beneficial service that imposing liability on
them might unduly divert their resources away from the main goal of patient care. A
similar argument has persuaded every state, either by statute or case law, to make blood
banks immune from product liability suits based on HIV-tainted blood. See PROSSER &
KEETON ON ToRTs §§104 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing "Blood Shield" statutes which prohibit
strict liability suits against blood banks).
149. UMMSC, 50 F.3d at 1266.
150. See supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
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privileges. 151 Yet, in deciding that a hospital may legally terminate an
1HV-positive surgeon under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the
Fourth Circuit relied as much on the current state of medical knowl-
edge about HIV transmission as it did on legal precedent.152 The his-
tory of AIDS employment decisions under the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA is short but consistent, and it reveals that in situations where
HIV-positive employees pose an ascertainable threat of transmitting
the AIDS virus, courts are likely to uphold termination of their
employment. 53
With the UMMSC decision, the Fourth Circuit has joined the
Fifth Circuit in holding that a hospital may terminate a surgical health
care worker based on the risk of transmitting HIV to patients. 54
When these cases are considered in conjunction with the policy issues
that may have underpinned the UMMSC decision,155 it is reasonable
to think that future cases involving HIV in a surgical setting will be
resolved similarly to UMMSC. This has already happened in Mauro
v. Borgess Medical Center,'56 in which a federal district court found as
a matter of law that an HIV-positive surgical technician had "a conta-
gious infection that pose[d] a direct threat to the health and safety of
others that [could not] be eliminated by reasonable accommoda-
tion.' ' 157 Relying heavily on both UMMSC and Bradley, the Mauro
court held that a surgical technician's removal from practice was not
discriminatory under either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.
158
It would be a mistake, however, to read UMMSC too broadly and
interpret it to authorize the termination of any HIV-positive health
care worker's employment. The CDC has explicitly recognized that
surgical procedures such as those involved in UMMSC, Bradley, and
Mauro create a relatively higher risk that AIDS will be transmitted
151. See supra notes 120-49 and accompanying text.
152. This was the case because School Bd. of Nassau Co. v. Arline requires that a deter-
mination whether an employee is "otherwise qualified" for employment be made in light
of current medical knowledge. 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987); see supra notes 31-34 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Arline holding).
153. See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
154. See Bradley v. Univ. of Tx. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994); see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 120-49 and accompanying text.
156. 886 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
157. Id. at 1354.
158. Id. The court stated that it had "carefully reviewed both [UMMSC and Bradley]
and [found] them materially indistinguishable and properly reasoned.... Because there is
a real possibility of transmission, however small, and because the consequence of transmis-
sion is invariably death, the threat to patient safety ... is direct and significant." Id. at
1353.
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when compared to other activities. 159 Even after these decisions,
courts must "conduct an individualized inquiry and make appropriate
findings of fact"'160 to determine whether the risk of transmitting HIV
is legally sufficient to justify employment termination of HIV-positive
health care workers who are not involved in surgical procedures.
1 6
In the years since Americans first became aware of AIDS, 62 irra-
tional fears about contracting the disease through casual contact have
waned. 163  However, America still remembers the tragedy of
Kimberly Bergalis, who died of AIDS in 1991 after she was apparently
infected by her dentist."6 Although legal and medical experts agree
159. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 5, at 4.
160. School Bd. of Nassau Co. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
161. As Doe v. District of Columbia suggests, it is not a foregone conclusion that all
HIV-positive health care workers are unqualified to perform their jobs because of a health
risk they pose to others. 796 F. Supp. 559, 570 (D.D.C. 1992); see supra notes 94-99 and
accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
163. The example of Earvin "Magic" Johnson, a highly visible person in the center of
the AIDS controversy, helps to demonstrate how public fears of AIDS have subsided. The
L.A. Lakers star retired in 1991 after announcing his HIV-positive status. Susan Brink et
al., Beating the Odds: Fending off the AIDS Virus Isn't Just a Magic Trick, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1996, at 60. After a brief comeback in 1992, he retired again be-
cause "rival players publicly frett[ed] about catching AIDS on the basketball court."
Benched by Fear: Magic Retires Again, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 16, 1992, at 22.
However, when Johnson made a second comeback in 1996 he was greeted with "an ava-
lanche of support." Brink et al., supra at 60. A national poll conducted in February 1995
revealed that 37% of Americans view AIDS as the country's worst health problem. Id. at
68 A similar poll, conducted in 1987, revealed that a much higher percentage-70%-
thought the same thing. Id.
164. According to the CDC, only five people, including Bergalis, are thought to have
contracted AIDS from a health care provider, and all five cases have been traced to the
same Florida dentist, David Acer. Carol Ciesielski et al., Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus in a Dental Practice, 116 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 798, 798 (1992).
In a controversial epilogue to Kimberly Bergalis' story, scientific evidence presented in
1993 challenged the commonly accepted belief that the five cases were indeed caused by
the HIV-positive dentist. One genetic study indicated that the CDC overstated its conclu-
sion that Acer infected his patients. Ronald W. DeBry et al., Dental HIV Transmission?,
NATURE, Feb. 25, 1993, at 691,691. According to the study, it was equally likely that Acer
did not infect Bergalis and the others. Id. The CDC has conceded that it may never be
known precisely how Acer transmitted the virus to his patients. Ciesielski et al., supra at
803.
Besides the scientific evidence, the civil litigation between Acer's HIV-positive pa-
tients and his insurance company yielded some quite unsavory allegations which were in-
tended to prove all the patients could have contracted the disease another way. 60
Minutes: Kimberly's Story (CBS television broadcast, June 19, 1994) (transcript available
on 1994 WL 3763876). For example, in the course of the proceedings, the insurance com-
pany procured deposition testimony and a medical exam which revealed that Bergalis, who
claimed to be a virgin, had been sexually active and had a venereal disease. Id. Similarly,
of the other patients who allegedly contracted AIDS from Acer, the insurance company
produced evidence that several among them had engaged in high-risk activity such as intra-
venous drug use, promiscuous sexual activity, and frequenting of prostitutes. Id. Ulti-
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that the risk of transmission from health care worker to patient is min-
imal,'65 the fact remains that such transmission is possible.'6 6 The
legal profession, the medical profession, and the public all aspire to
the same goal: health care without fear of contracting AIDS. The
Fourth Circuit tried to achieve that goal in UMMSC, but one might
wonder if the decision will have the opposite effect. By holding that a
hospital may with impunity fire an HIV-positive surgeon, the Fourth
Circuit may encourage health care workers to conceal their HIV sta-
tus. In other words, instead of "assist[ing] local health officials by
helping remove an important obstacle to preventing the spread of in-
fectious diseases," 67 the UMMSC decision may have erected a
roadblock.
ANNE WHITFORD STUKES
mately, Acer's insurance company settled out of court with the HIV-positive patients for
close to $10 million. Id.
165. Four 1993 medical studies cast serious doubt on the likelihood that HIV transmis-
sion will occur from surgeon to patient. The studies involved two dentists and two sur-
geons, all of whom voluntarily resigned after learning they were HIV-positive. Former
patients were then contacted to determine if any transmissions occurred before the doctors
resigned. No patient was found to have contracted HIV from any of the infected health
care workers. See Paul M. Arnow et al., Maintaining Confidentiality in a Look-Back Inves-
tigation of Patients Treated by a HIV-Infected Dentist, 108 PUB. HEALTH REP. (BNA) No. 3
at 273, 273-74 (May/June 1993) (testing of 41 patients spanning 31 months of potential
exposure yielded no HIV-positive results); Gordon M. Dickinson et al., Absence of HIV
Transmission From an Infected Dentist to His Patients, 269 JAMA 1802, 1802 (1993) (test-
ing of 1,192 patients spanning nearly 6 years of potential exposures from dentist yielded 5
HIV-positive patients, but none had same strain of virus as dentist, indicating he did not
infect them); Audrey Smith Rogers et al., Investigation of Potential HIV Transmission to
the Patients of an HIV-Infected Surgeon, 269 JAMA 1795, 1795 (investigation of 1,131 pa-
tients spanning six years of potential exposure yielded no cases of surgical transmission); C.
Fordham von Reyn et al., Absence of HIV Transmission From an Infected Orthopedic Sur-
geon: A 13-Year Look-Back Study, 269 JAMA 1807, 1807 (1993) (testing of 1,174 patients
spanning 13 years of potential exposures yielded no cases of transmission by surgeon). All
four studies concluded that the Kimberly Bergalis case is an anomaly, and that the risk of
transmission is extremely low when practitioners adhere to infection control practices rec-
ommended in the CDC Guidelines.
166. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing study which revealed the
frequency with which surgeons accidentally prick their fingertips during invasive proce-
dures, thought to be the most conducive method of bloodborne pathogen transmission).
167. School Bd. of Nassau Co. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 286 n.15 (1987) (noting that "the
individual's reluctance to report his or her condition" is a dangerous effect of irrational
responses to those with contagious diseases).
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United States v. Burgos: Balanced Blasting for Deadlocked
Juries
This gentleman has been standing alone against us. He
doesn't say the boy is not guilty. He just isn't sure. Well, it's
not easy to stand alone against the ridicule of others, even
when there's a worthy cause. So he gambled for support, and
I gave it to him. I respect his motives. The boy on trial is
probably guilty. But I want to hear more. Right now the vote
is ten to two.'
The dramatic jury deliberations in the 1956 film Twelve Angry
Men centered on one juror's courageous search for truth when facing
eleven other jurors who were certain of the defendant's guilt. Ra-
tional and intelligent debate triumphed in the film, with the jurors ul-
timately returning a unanimous acquittal. No trial judge appeared
among the cast of characters.2
In reality, the decision-making process of a criminal jury often
works less efficiently. Occasionally, juries reach a stalemate, with
neither side willing to change its position. In such situations, the trial
judge frequently intervenes and delivers an instruction known as an
Allen charge,3 admonishing jurors to reconsider their views and exert-
ing pressure on them to reach a verdict.
The jury in United States v. Burgos received such an instruction
when jurors declared that they were deadlocked after four hours of
deliberations.4 After the judge delivered the Allen charge and the ju-
rors resumed discussion, it took them just two hours to return a guilty
verdict, convicting Antonio Luis Burgos of a cocaine conspiracy
charge.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
granted Burgos a new trial, criticizing the coercive nature of the tradi-
tional Allen instruction 6 and prescribing the language judges in the
jurisdiction should use in instructing deadlocked juries. The court
emphasized that it was issuing a "mandate" to judges. In giving an
1. REGINALD ROSE, TWELVE ANGRY MEN 225 (1956) (excerpt from screenplay,
stage directions omitted).
2. 1d
3. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896); infra notes 29-32 and accom-
panying text.
4. United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1995).
5. Id. Burgos was sentenced to 210 months in prison. Id.
6. For a discussion of the potentially coercive effects of an Allen charge, see infra
notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
7. Burgos, 55 F.3d at 940-41.
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Allen instruction, the judges must incorporate into the charge a spe-
cific reminder to jurors siding with the majority and jurors voting with
the minority to reconsider their positions in light of the other side's
views.8 Thus, the Fourth Circuit officially abolished the use of the
"pure" Allen charge,9 and adopted a less coercive, more balanced
instruction. 10
This Note begins with a description of the facts in Burgos"' and
then discusses the Burgos opinion and Fourth Circuit cases leading up
to Burgos.2 Next, it analyzes the Burgos decision by comparing the
Fourth Circuit's treatment of the Allen charge with its use in other
circuits.13 The Note asserts that given the long-standing tradition of
the Allen charge and the need for juries to reach a verdict whenever
possible to minimize expenses and ease the clogged machinery of the
criminal justice system, elimination of the instruction would be unreal-
istic. 4 In support of this assertion, the Note discusses past empirical
studies that evaluated the impact of the Allen charge on juries.' 5 Fi-
nally, the Note concludes that the Fourth Circuit has reached a pru-
dent compromise, which should sufficiently limit undue coercion
exercised by trial courts through use of the Allen instruction.' 6
In May 1993, a South Carolina postal inspector discovered co-
caine base in a package mailed from Brooklyn, New York, and ad-
dressed to John Pringle in Sumter, South Carolina. 7 An investigation
revealed that during the previous two months either John Pringle or
Matthew Mack had received five other packages from the same
Brooklyn address.' 8 Mack told authorities that Burgos had been ar-
ranging drug sales for him in Brooklyn and that he had received co-
caine from Burgos and sent cash to other New York suppliers at
Burgos's request.' 9 Pringle corroborated Mack's claim, stating that he
8. Id. at 941.
9. Several other circuits have similarly rejected the Allen charge and adopted alterna-
tive instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 141-42 (8th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Vachon, 869 F.2d 653, 659 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Fioravanti, 412
F.2d 407, 420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
10. See infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 29-114 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 115-43 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 144-76 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 147-55, 161-72 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 177-92 and accompanying text.
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had occasionally bought crack cocaine from Burgos.20 A grand jury
indicted Burgos on two counts, charging him with conspiracy to pos-
sess with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession with intent
to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base.21
After four hours of deliberation, the Burgos jury informed the
court that it was unable to reach a verdict.22 The judge, on his own
motion, then delivered an Allen charge to the jury.23 The jury recon-
20. Id. Pringle's mother and sister also testified at trial, saying they learned of Burgos'
involvement with drugs in April 1993, when the mother opened a package of cocaine ad-
dressed to John Pringle. Id. at 935. The mother and sister testified that Burgos had come
to their house and apologized for having the cocaine sent there. Id. During the investiga-
tion, Pringle's mother and sister identified Burgos, who is Hispanic, from a photographic
spread of Burgos and seven African-American men. Id. This photo identification gave
rise to Burgos's second assignment of error on appeal. Id. at 941. Burgos argued that the
trial court should have suppressed the women's in-court identification of Burgos, since the
women had seen the suggestive photo display. Id. at 934, 941-43. The appellate court
found no prejudice to Burgos on this ground, since the women were well acquainted with
him and would have been able to identify him without the photos. Id. at 942-43.
21. Id at 935. The court impaneled a jury on January 10, 1994, and the trial began on
January 18, 1994. Id. The jurors began their deliberation the afternoon of January 19th.
Id
22. Id.
23. The charge provided in its entirety:
I have observed you during the course of the trial. It has not been a lengthy
trial. I believe that this jury is comprised of very intelligent and very dedicated
people. And I don't believe we are going to find a jury better equipped than you
to decide this matter.
If you don't decide it, then, of course, we have got to convene another 12
persons. And I tell you, I don't believe there are another 12 people who exceed
you in intelligence and the ability to decide this case.
Now, you have not had it long. You have had it since 12:30 today. You had
your lunch brought in. It is now 5:25 by this clock. That clock is a little fast.
That's not an awfully long period of time.
There's a jury out in California that as of last night the last time I heard they
had the case-their case nearly three weeks. We have had juries in this building
to deliberate for several days. So it is not unusual for the jury after a few hours in
a case that's considered close-I don't know whether-I don't know how close
you view the case-but we have had juries who were not able to see the case
exactly alike.
There is, of course, a duty on jurors to review the evidence, to deliberate with
each other to consider the reasonable view of others. You know, it is not easy to
back away from an opinion that has earlier been expressed. If I have taken a
possession [sic] [position] amongst a group of people, sometimes my pride doesn't
allow me to revisit and to later say in light of what somebody else has said that
maybe yours is the better point of view.
Now, I'm not asking anybody-let me make this clear, I'm not asking any-
body to give up a firmly held belief. You don't have to do that. But I do ask you
to think about it.
I have had juries to proceed into the evening. In fact, we have had some-
we have had juries to stay in here until past midnight, two and three in the morn-
ing. I'm not-I don't impose that requirement on any jury. I give you the right to
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vened two days later and deliberated for approximately two hours
before returning a verdict of guilty.24
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the "often meandering
[and] somewhat confusing charge"' the trial court had given to the
Burgos jury could have led jurors in the minority to conclude the
court was asking them to think about giving up their firmly held be-
decide your schedule, whether you would like to work additionally this evening,
in which event we make a meal available to you, or whether you would like to
take a break and come back in the morning.
Some judges do it the other way. They send the jury in and say you stay in
until you decided. [sic] I don't do it that way. I recognize that you have got per-
sonal responsibilities, and you have matters that compete for your time and your
attention, family responsibilities.
In any event, I am going to ask you to give some further consideration to this
matter. And in the meantime, if you feel that you would like to hear the testi-
mony of anyone [sic] or more witnesses who have testified, or in the event that
you would like to hear me talk some more of an instruction, I doubt that, I al-
ready know that I've talked too long. In any event, I'm willing to try again to
clarify any issues that may be a problem for you.
Remember, in the final analysis, that the Government has the burden to
prove by evidence the guilt of the accused on both of the counts. If the evidence
offered by the Government has not convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the defendant, it is your duty to find him not guilty. If the evidence,
on the other hand, does convince you, the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, it is your duty to find him guilty.
Now I'm sure there are some things that you haven't been able to agree
upon. Once again, it is never my intention-it is not my duty to try and coerce
you. The case is in your hands now. You are the judges of the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony. You are the judges of the bot-
tom line.
Now, having said all of that, Mr. Foreman, I am going to ask you to go back
into the room and give some further thought to the question, whether given some
further time for discussion into this evening, you might be able to resolve this
matter; or whether by reason of, you know, any anxieties over personal matters
that might arise, you want to go home, come back in the morning. And whether
there is any testimony-I don't know whether you would want to consider that.
If you decide that you want to recess for the evening, you might in the morning
decide or overnight give some thought to whether-let's hear the testimony of
thus and such witness again. Or you might decide, let's ask that judge to describe
whatever principles it is that may have you in a quandary once again. So, I leave
it to you. You can decide to work on into the evening. If you do, I am going to
ask you what you want to do about an evening meal, because we owe you that
courtesy, or whether you want to call it a night and come back in the morning.
And also remember my offer to provide for you any assistance that the court can.
Best of luck to you. I don't envy you your job. It is a difficult one. We
appreciate you very much. We couldn't operate without you. I know we won't
find 12 jurors better equipped to decide this case than you are.
Id. at 938-39 (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 935.
25. Id. at 938.
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liefs.26 The court of appeals concluded that the charge was not suffi-
ciently balanced to avoid coercing the minority into joining the
majority.2 7 In granting Burgos a new trial, the court wrote: " 'A deci-
sion so arrived at is not the unanimous verdict of each juror, but sim-
ply the decision of a majority of the twelve.' "28
The Allen charge-also known as the dynamite charge, the shot-
gun instruction, the third degree instruction, the nitroglycerin charge
and the hammer instruction 29-- got its original name from the 1896
Supreme Court case, Allen v. United States.31 In that case, a jury con-
sidering a homicide charge asked the court for further instructions.
Summarizing the lengthy instruction, the Court wrote:
in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be
expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of
each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the
conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the ques-
tion submitted with candor and with a proper regard and
deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty
to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that
they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each
other's arguments; that, if much the larger were for convic-
tion, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt
was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the
minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent
with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they
might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment
which was not concurred in by the majority. 3
1
In approving this instruction, the Supreme Court stated: "It cer-
tainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with defer-
ence to the arguments and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he
finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case."
'32
26. IL at 940.
27. Id. at 940-41.
28. Id at 940 (quoting United States v. Martin, 756 F.2d 323, 326 (4th Cir. 1985)).
29. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECrIVES 193 (1988).
30. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
31. Id. at 501. The trial court took its instructions in Allen from instructions that the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts approved in Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.)
1 (1851).
32. Allen, 164 U.S. at 501. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the propriety of the Allen
charge in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988). In Lowenfield, the petitioner sought
reversal of his sentence on the grounds that the trial court's supplemental instructions and
inquiries during the sentencing phase of his trial coerced the jury into returning a death
sentence. Id. at 233. Two days into the sentencing phase of deliberations, the Lowenfield
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In the years since Allen, the instruction has assumed many forms,
some emphasizing the importance of "openmindedness and conces-
sion" and some the "importance of a verdict to the parties, the public,
and the court."33 The Fourth Circuit addressed the "increasing criti-
cism" of Allen instructions more than twenty-five years ago in United
jury sent the trial court a note stating that it was having difficulty reaching a unanimous
decision. Id. at 234. Despite the state law provision permitting the court, in the event of a
hung jury at the sentencing phase, to impose a life sentence in lieu of the death penalty, the
judge delivered an Allen charge to the jury. Id. at 235. Thirty minutes later jurors returned
with a verdict sentencing petitioner to death. Id.
The petitioner argued that, since there would have been no retrial had the jury hung,
one of the primary purposes of the Allen charge, "the avoidance of societal costs of re-
trial," was absent. Id. at 238. Therefore, he asserted that the delivery of an Allen charge
under these circumstances violated his rights under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth
Amendment. kd The Court dismissed the petitioner's argument and stated that the valid-
ity of its observations in Allen were "beyond dispute." Id. at 237-38. It examined and
approved the supplemental instructions under the standard of review set forth in Jenkins v.
United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (per curiam), which considers the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" surrounding the administration of an Allen charge to determine whether
statements by the trial judge constituted coercion. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237 (citing Jen-
kins, 380 U.S. at 446). For a discussion of Jenkins, see infra notes 182-89 and accompanying
text. The Lowenfield Court found that even though a hung jury would not have resulted in
a retrial, Louisiana had a strong interest in "having the jury 'express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life or death.' " Id. (quoting Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
33. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 29, at 193. These authors concluded that
the modified Allen charge proposed by the American Bar Association (ABA) is the best
alternative. Id. at 195. The ABA recommendation states:
5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction
which informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate
with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without vio-
lence to individual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an
impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to
reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is
erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court
may require the jury to continue their. deliberations and may give or re-
peat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not
require or threaten to require a jury to deliberate for an unreasonable
length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it
appears there is no reasonable possibility of agreement.
ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, STANDARDS RELATING TO
TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4, at 145-46 (Approved Draft 1968).
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States v. Sawyers,34 a trial of six defendants for conspiracy to commit
bribery.35 The indictment charged that two of the defendants had
promised extensive state government contracts to various business
firms in exchange for money.36 These two defendants then channeled
the money into small corporations that they owned and controlled.37
Finally, a larger corporation, owned equally by all six defendants,
would take over the smaller corporations and divide the money
among all of the owners.3
The Sawyers jury deliberated for about fifteen hours before send-
ing a note to the court that said:
We have a juror that stated: "the judge will get all over those
that vote not guilty."
This juror has cursed, -made slanderous remarks along with
another juror throwing chewings [sic] gum. These two jurors
ate sister-in-law [sic] and want to go home. The vote is 10
guilty & 2 not guilty.
It is a solid-vote and no one will give. 9
After receiving the note, the trial judge delivered a lengthy Allen
charge, encouraging those in the minority and those in the majority to
reconsider their positions.40 The judge told the jurors there was "no
reason to believe" that the case would ever be submitted to more
competent jurors or that better evidence would be presented. 41 After
34. 423 F.2d 1335, 1340 (4th Cir. 1970).
35. Id. at 1336.




40. Id. at 1337-38 & n.4.
41. Id. at 1338 n.4. The trial judge included the following statements in his instruction:
The trial has been expensive to both the prosecution and the defense. If you
should fail to agree on a verdict, the case is left open and undecided. Like all
cases, it must be disposed of sometime. There appears no reason to believe that
another trial would not be equally expensive to both sides. Nor does there ap-
pear any reason to believe that the case can be tried again better or more exhaus-
tively than it has been, on either side. Any further jury must be selected in the
same manner and from the same source as you have been chosen. So there ap-
pears no reason to believe that the case would ever be submitted to twelve men
and women more intelligent, more impartial, or more competent to decide it, or
that more or clearer evidence could be produced on behalf of either side.
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one further clarification, 42 the jury deliberated for about one-and-a-
half hours before convicting four of the defendants.43
The appellants objected to the supplemental instructions on four
grounds.' First, appellants argued the court should have reminded
the jury of the burden of proof during the instruction.4 5 Second, ap-
pellants contended that the judge's statement that no better or more
exhaustive evidence could be produced at a retrial was improper since
the defense rested at the end of the prosecution's case without pro-
ducing evidence.46 The appellants' third contention was that since the
instruction was given in response to the jury's note, it confirmed ju-
rors' beliefs "that the judge would 'get all over those that vote not
guilty.' "47 Finally, the appellants argued that the judge's statements:
"You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion re-
quires" and "you shall take all the time which you may feel is neces-
sary"'4  were "coercive in view of the approaching Labor Day
weekend.
49
The Fourth Circuit held that the supplemental charges in Sawyers
were not so coercive as to warrant a new trial.50 The court reasoned
that since a defendant has the "double opportunity" of winning ac-
quittal (because the jury believes her innocent or because the prosecu-
tion fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt), some
"reasonable degree of encouragement to arrive at a verdict" is not
unfair to the defendants. 51 The court also reasoned that for the trial
judge to comment that a retrial would not be better or more exhaus-
tive was not unfair, since the judge had no cause to believe defendants
would change their strategy or offer different evidence if the case were
tried again.52
42. Id. at 1339. About 15 minutes after the Allen charge was delivered, the jury sent
the court a second note asking what would happen if two or more of the defendants, but
not all, were found guilty. Id. The judge told the jury that it could convict some defend-
ants and acquit others, but because of the nature of the charge, more than one defendant





46. Id. (quoting the jury's note).
47. Id. at 1339.
48. Id. at 1338 n.4.
49. Id. at 1339.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1339-40. The court dismissed the defendants' third and fourth objections as
mere restatements of their argument that the charge was coercive. Id. at 1340.
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In addition, the Sawyers court specifically recognized the "bal-
ance" present in the trial judge's instruction.53 The judge twice told
the jurors not to surrender their conscientious convictions because of
other jurors' opinions or for the sole purpose of returning a verdict.
5 4
The court found nothing in the judge's words or mannerisms that re-
flected impatience with minority jurors. 5 Finally, the court consid-
ered the complexity of the trial and the length of deliberations, and
concluded that the judge would have abandoned his duty to "keep the
criminal dockets current" if he had accepted the jury's first assertion
that all jurors could not agree. 6
In addition, the Fourth Circuit addressed general criticism of the
Allen instruction,57 which it said arose from two faulty premises: first,
that a trial judge is in effect coercing a verdict by persuading a retired
jury to deliberate longer, and, second, that defendants have a right to
a hung jury.58 The court did not agree with the appellant that urging
the jury to deliberate further in an attempt to reach a verdict was co-
ercion.59 The court found that a trial judge's "calmly dispassionate
balanced effort.., to induce a verdict ' 60 did not invade the jury's
province as decision-maker.61 The court further reasoned that the
right to a hung jury was simply part of the right to a verdict of acquit-
tal when the jury could not ascertain the facts upon which guilt would
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The court recognized that the judge's knowledge of the jury's numerical divi-
sion was relevant in determining his motive for giving an Allen instruction under Brasfield
v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926). The Brasfield Court reversed the defendant's
conviction after the trial judge inquired into how the hung jury was divided numerically.
The Court "deem[ed] it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial, that the
inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal." Id In Sawyers, the Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, said that such knowledge was not relevant in determining the potential im-
pact of the instructions on minority jurors. United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1340
(4th Cir. 1970). The court wrote: "They always know their minority status, and if fearfully
inclined, may presumably suspect a disgruntled judge can find them out." Id.
56. Sawyers, 423 F.2d at 1340.
57. See ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, STANDARDS RE-
LAnNG TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (b) commentary at 155 (Approved Draft 1968).
58. Sawyers, 423 F.2d at 1340.
59. Id. at 1341.
60. Id. (emphasis added). See infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Burgos mandate for a balanced charge.
61. United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1341-42 (4th Cir. 1970). The court asked,
rhetorically:
Why is the trial judge in the federal system given the power to comment on the
evidence, and to place the burden of proof, and to advise [jurors] that it is their
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depend.6' The court thus concluded that a defendant could not assert
the right to a hung jury, but could claim the right to have the jury
speak without coercion.63
Although the Sawyers court did not agree with the defendants
that the use of the traditional Allen charge was per se reversible error,
it "strongly recommended" that trial courts employ a modified version
of the instruction, one that instructed jurors in the minority and in the
majority to consider the other side's views.
6 4
62. Id. at 1340-41. The court stated:
The so-called "right" to a hung jury is at most no greater than the right to an
irrational verdict. With respect to either "right," it is clear that a defendant may
not insist upon a jury instruction advising jurors they may irrationally acquit and
that any one of them may deliberately hang the jury. Yet the power of jurors to
do both is beyond question.
Id. at 1341 (citations omitted). But cf. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3rd.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969) (arguing that "[t]he possibility of a hung jury is as
much a part of our jury unanimity schema as are verdicts of guilty or not guilty"); infra
notes 115-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Fioravanti decision); infra note 153
and accompanying text (discussing the role deadlocked juries play in a system of unani-
mous verdicts).
63. Sawyers, 423 F.2d at 1341.
64. Id. at 1342. The Sawyers court cited with favor the instruction recommended by
the Judicial Conference of the United States Courts:
5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction
which informs the jury:
(I) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
(II) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliber-
ate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without
violence to individual judgment;
(III) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an
impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(IV) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to
reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is
erroneous;
(V) that each juror who finds himself in the minority shall reconsider his
views in light of the opinions of the majority, and each juror who
finds himself in the majority shall give equal consideration to the
views of the minority[;]
(VI) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the
weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court
may require the jury to continue [its] deliberations and may give or re-
peat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not
require or threaten to require a jury to deliberate for an unreasonable
length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
Sawyers, 423 F.2d at 1342 n.7 (citing SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE
OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
2 (1969)). The Judicial Conference charge is the same instruction recommended by the
ABA, with the addition of the emphasized paragraph and the deletion of the last para-
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In his dissent, Judge Sobeloff argued that the court should con-
sider the appropriateness of the Allen instruction in relation to the
jury's first note (in which the jury advised the judge of its numerical
division and of conflict in the deliberation room) 65 since jurisdictions
that permitted use of the dynamite charge did so only when neither
the charge's language, nor the circumstances, rendered the charge co-
ercive.66 Judge Sobeloff contended that special hazards of coercion
existed after a judge learned of the jury's numerical split.67 Only when
the judge does not know the breakdown of votes, he reasoned, will
jurors view an Allen charge as addressed to the entire panel.68
The dissent concluded that the trial judge's "bland boiler-plate
language about the majority also considering the views of the minor-
ity" was insufficient to relieve minority jurors of the sense that they
alone were under the judge's watchful eye.69 Judge Sobeloff con-
tended that jury members' fears that the judge would " 'get all over
those that vote not guilty' "called for reassurance that the judge was a
neutral party.7" The dissent concluded that when the judge provided
no such reassurance in his charge, jurors may have felt that the judge
impelled them to convict.71 Judge Sobeloff dramatically warned that
" '[d]ynamite,' it must not be forgotten, is dangerous and should be
handled with care."72
graph in the Bar Association instruction. See supra note 33 for the text of the ABA
instruction.
65. Sawyers, 423 F.2d at 1344-45 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying
note 39. Judge Sobeloff said the chief question for consideration was whether the judge's
ensuing instruction, which did not mention the jury's note, was a proper response to the
circumstances. Sawyers, 423 F.2d at 1345 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting). Though Judge Sobeloff
wrote that the case at hand did not call upon the court to determine the propriety of the
Allen charge in all circumstances, he expressed his misgivings about the use of the charge.
Id. at 1347-48 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
66. Sawyers, 423 F.2d. at 1347 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1348 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1349 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Sobeloff, J., dissenting). The dissent hypothesized that jurors may have rea-
soned as follows:
(1) [T]he judge has been told the precise division and he knows about the state-
ment made in the jury room that a verdict of not guilty would incur his displea-
sure; yet (2) he has said nothing in reply to assure us of his neutrality; but instead
(3) he has stressed the importance of reaching a verdict; therefore, (4) to avoid
the judge's disfavor, I will vote guilty.
Id at 1349-50 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1347 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
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Three years later, the Fourth Circuit reviewed a "mild" Allen
charge in United States v. Davis.73 Judge Sobeloff, writing for the ma-
jority in Davis, upheld the defendant's conviction, holding that the
charge conformed to accepted Fourth Circuit standards.74 The court
reiterated its suggestion from Sawyers that trial courts use the Judicial
Conference version of the American Bar Association charge.75 In
United States v. Hogan,76 however, the court once again upheld the
convictions of two defendants after, in each case, a judge delivered an
Allen charge that did not comport with the American Bar Association
charge.77
What originated in Sawyers as a recommendation to trial judges
to administer a balanced Allen charge,78 became a reprimand in
United States v. Stollings.79 In Stollings, the defendant appealed his
conviction on perjury charges, arguing that the Allen charge was ob-
jectionable on two grounds." First, Stollings asserted that the charge
was not in the form of the American Bar Association charge that the
Fourth Circuit had strongly recommended in Sawyers, Davis and Ho-
gan.8' Second, Stollings contended that the circumstances surround-
ing the Allen instruction made it unduly coercive in this case.8
2
73. 481 F.2d 425 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 977 (1973). In Davis, a defendant
convicted on bank robbery charges claimed the trial court erred in issuing the charge when
the jury returned a note four hours into deliberations stating it had reached an impasse. Id.
at 426, 428.
74. Id. at 429. The Allen charge given by the judge in Davis made no reference to a
minority or majority position of the jurors and encouraged all jurors to listen with defer-
ence and regard to others' opinions. Id. at 428 n.2. Judge Sobeloff wrote that his position
in Davis was not inconsistent with his dissent in Sawyers, explaining that the circumstances
in Sawyers, and not the charge itself, made use of the charge prejudicial and unfair to
Sawyers. Davis, 481 F.2d at 429 n.3. Judge Sobeloff added that he personally thought that
the Fourth Circuit should abandon altogether the pure Allen charge and adopt in its place
the ABA standard. Id. "The questionable benefits of the charge do not, in my judgment,
justify the unending litigation and confusion it breeds. But since my brethren disagree, the
standard of our circuit remains unchanged." Id.
75. Id. at 429.
76. 486 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974).
77. Id. at 223.
78. See Burgos, 55 F.3d at 941.
79. United States v. Stollings, 501 F.2d 954 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974);
see Burgos, 55 F.3d. at 941.
80. Stollings, 501 F.2d at 956.
81. Id.
82. Id. Stollings' trial lasted five days. After the jury had been deliberating for about
two-and-a-half hours, the district judge called the jurors back to the courtroom and asked
if they had reached a verdict. Id. The jury said it had not and the judge asked it to return
to deliberations. Id. One hour later, the judge sent for the jury again and asked if it was
"hung." When the foreman said it was, the judge then issued the dynamite charge, encour-
aging those in the minority to reconsider their position. Id. at 955.
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The Fourth Circuit affirmed Stollings' conviction, noting that the
court had not reversed convictions in Sawyers, Davis or Hogan for use
of the same charge used in Stollings.13 However, the court noted that
neither Davis nor Hogan had been decided at the time of Stollings'
trial.' It cautioned that in subsequent cases it would "feel free" to
treat use of Allen charges, other than the balanced charge that it had
recommended in Sawyers, as reversible error.8 5
With regard to Stollings' second assignment of error, the court
agreed with the appellant that the trial judge had acted prematurely
when he delivered the Allen charge. 6 The court concluded, however,
that the judge did not exceed his discretion for three reasons: the
legal issues were simple, the jury deliberated for a "not insignificant
period of time" after the charge was given, and the crime, perjury in
connection to a fraudulent election committed by a politically active
deputy sheriff, was likely to "raise the spectre of possible improper
influence on the jury if the opportunity were afforded." 7
True to its warning in Stollings,8 the Fourth Circuit reversed the
defendants' convictions in United States v. Mitchell9 on the basis of
impermissible Allen instructions.90 The court noted that it had never
found the use of a "pure" Allen charge (one using the language from
Allen itself) to be reversible error.9 In this case, however, the judge
strayed from the original Allen language in telling jurors to" 'open up
[your minds] and reevaluate [your] opinions ... [and] reconsider the
opinions and statements of your fellow jurors, and do it open-
mindedly, not stubbornly, but open-mindedly in the spirit of coopera-
83. Id at 956. The charge that the trial court used in this case, and which the Fourth
Circuit disapproved, had earlier been approved in Orton v. United States. 221 F.2d 632
(4th Cir. 1955).
84. Stollings, 501 F.2d at 956.
85. Id.
86. Id
87. Id. This final justification for the judge's behavior is curious. One has difficulty
discerning what benefit an Allen charge would confer on a situation ripe for improper
influence. The court apparently was trying to force a verdict before an improper influence
pervaded jury deliberations. This runs counter to the idea that an Allen charge is not
supposed to force a verdict for the sake of obtaining a verdict. See United States v. Fiora-
vanti, 412 F.2d 407, 420 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
88. Stollings, 501 F.2d at 956; see supra text accompanying note 85.
89. 720 F.2d 370 (4th Cir. 1983).
90. Id at 371-72. The court warned in Stollings that it would "feel free" to reverse a
conviction if the Allen charge was given in a form other than that recommended in Saw-
yers. Stollings, 501 F.2d at 956. The Mitchell defendants' convictions, however, were not
reversed on the grounds that the trial court did not give the Sawyers-version of the instruc-
tion. Mitchell, 720 F.2d at 372. Instead, the Mitchell court found the instructions in that
case "expanded impermissibly upon Allen." Id
91. Id. at 371.
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tion.' "92 The court disapproved of this wording, particularly the use
of the word "stubbornly."93 In addition, the court objected to the
judge's intimation that the defendants would be unlikely to plead
guilty if a mistrial resulted, thereby requiring an entirely new trial.94
The court said jurors could have taken the latter statements to mean
the trial court thought the defendants were guilty, and it thus con-
cluded that the prejudice was plain.95
In United States v. West96 the trial court issued an Allen instruc-
tion including an explicit reference to the expense that would be in-
curred in holding another trial. 7 The court upheld the defendants'
conviction on drug charges, stating that the reference to the cost of a
new trial was improper but was not reversible error.98 The court
noted that the version of the charge it had approved in Sawyers did
not refer to the social costs of a hung jury, but found that the West
instruction as a whole did not unduly emphasize the cost factor.9 9 The
court reiterated the Stollings warning that using an Allen charge in a
form other than the one that it had approved in Sawyers could consti-
tute reversible error.
100
Finally, in Burgos, the court wrote that the modified Allen charge
approved in Sawyers would operate as a mandate, rather than simply a
recommendation, for courts seeking to blast juries out of deadlock.' 0'
The court noted that it had traditionally upheld an Allen charge as
long as it was " 'fair, neutral and balanced,' "102 stating that, "[a]t the
heart of our Allen charge jurisprudence is the basic principle that a
defendant has 'the right to have the jury speak without being co-
erced.' 1103 The court noted that a tension existed between the simple
rule of Sawyers and Stollings, and the fact that a conviction had never
been overturned for failure to give the recommended version of the




96. 877 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1989).
97. Id at 290 n.6.
98. Id. at 291.
99. Id.
100. Id. However, in United States v. Russell, the court again refused to overturn a
defendant's conviction on the grounds that the trial court had issued a "pure" and not a
Sawyers-version modified Allen charge. 971 F.2d 1098, 1107 n.19 (4th Cir. 1992).
101. Burgos, 55 F.3d at 941.
102. Id. at 936 (quoting Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1101 (1995)).
103. Id. (quoting United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1341 (4th Cir. 1970)).
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charge. 1' 4 Since the trial court's instruction in Burgos struck "at the
very heart of Sawyers' concerns,"'1 5 the court took the opportunity to
apply a straightforward rule that district courts giving an Allen charge
must specifically remind jurors in the minority and jurors in the major-
ity to reconsider their positions with the other side's arguments in
mind.10 6 The court did not specify what additional language the
charge could include,10 7 but warned that failure to incorporate the bal-
anced reminder would result in automatic reversal. 08
The Burgos court wrote that the most egregious mistake a judge
could make in giving an Allen instruction was to suggest that jurors
surrender their conscientious convictions.10 9 The court found that the
judge's qualified assertion that he was not "asking anybody to give up
a firmly held belief," followed by the statement, "[b]ut I do ask you to
think about it," could have led jurors to believe they should consider
giving up their firmly held beliefs." 0 The court reasoned that these
phrases, when heard with the preceding remarks about pride prevent-
ing one from reconsidering his position, may have led minority jurors
to conclude the remarks were directed more at them than the
majority.1
1 1
The Burgos court explained that courts must evaluate a suspect
Allen charge at least in part from the perspective of a minority juror
because such jurors may be more fearful a judge will disapprove of
their positions and be able to discover their identities. 1 2 The court
found that nothing in the judge's instruction made it clear that the
majority and minority positions were equally credible. 13 In consider-
ing the way jurors may have viewed the judge's remarks, the court
104. Id. at 937-38 (citing United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1107 n.19 (4th Cir.
1992)).
105. Id. at 938.
106. ld. at 941.
107. Id. at 941 n.9. The court said that it did not intend to limit the ability of trial judges
to tailor Allen instructions for particular juries. Id. It left judges with the responsibility of
formulating the entire instruction, with the understanding that the balancing language
would be included. Id
108. l at 941.
109. Id. at 939.
110. Id. at 940. For the full text of the instruction in Burgos, see supra note 23.
111. Burgos, 55 F.3d at 940. The court also noted its disapproval of the "parade of
horribles" that the judge presented, which included tales of juries deliberating until the
early hours of the morning. Id. at 939 n.6. The judge followed these illustrations with the
statement, "I don't do it that way." Id. The court wrote that if the judge had no intention
of treating jurors this way, the use of statements that could potentially scare jurors into
reaching a judgment was needless. Id.
112. Id. at 940.
113. Id. at 940-41.
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concluded that qualifying statements, such as "it is not my duty to try
and coerce you," did not remedy the harm done by his instruction." 4
Other circuits have also objected to Allen charges that single out
minority jurors. Writing for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Fioravanti"5 nearly thirty years ago, Judge Aldisert
lambasted use of the instruction, failing to find any sound basis for the
hypothesis that it generated verdicts and eliminated hung juries." 6
The Fioravanti court objected most strongly to the trial court's state-
ment that a juror should " 'listen with deference to arguments of fel-
low jurors and distrust of his own judgment if he finds a large majority
of the jury taking a different view of the case from [his own].' "117
Judge Aldisert ridiculed the idea of the balanced approach taken later
in Burgos, asserting that nothing would be achieved by admonishing
the majority to distrust its position in the same way as the minority."' 8
Curiously, the court did not overturn Fioravanti's conviction, de-
spite its vehement objection to the instruction. 119 The court justified
its decision on two grounds. First, it allowed the conviction to stand
because the judge had delivered the Allen charge as part of the main
body of jury instructions and not as a supplemental charge to blast the
jury from deadlock. 20 Second, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court because the circuit had previously approved use of the Allen
charge "albeit grudgingly and in a somewhat restricted form."''
The court announced that in cases tried after the Fioravanti deci-
sion, it would "not let a verdict stand which may have been influenced
in any way by an Allen Charge." 22 Specifically, it prohibited trial
judges from giving an instruction that directed minority jurors to dis-
114. Id. at 940. The Burgos court cited with approval a charge given in United States v.
Martin though the charge was not as strong as the one approved in Sawyers. Burgos, 55
F.3d at 940-41 (citing United States v. Martin, 756 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). In
Martin, the trial judge told jurors:
As I said, you haven't got to give up a firm conviction just to go with the crowd,
however, if you've got a firm conviction about the case one way or the other, that
doesn't mean you shouldn't listen to reason and think with the others and reason
with the others and see if those of you who, as I said, if you are in the minority on
the Jury, listen to the views of the majority; and if you're on the majority on the
Jury, you listen to the views of the minority. And don't get yourselves in a posi-
tion where you turn your back and say do what you want, I'm through.
756 F.2d at 325.
115. 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
116. Id. at 415-17.
117. Id. at 415.
118. d at 417.
119. Id. at 419.
120. Id.
121. Il
122. Id at 420.
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trust their judgment. 23 Thus, the Third Circuit, despite its rhetoric
condemning the dynamite charge, tacitly approved use of an instruc-
tion much like that which Burgos mandated. 24
The First Circuit has intentionally refrained from suggesting spe-
cific wording for an Allen charge but does insist that the instruction
meet three requirements."2 First, the charge must make clear that
jurors in the minority and in the majority are to reexamine their posi-
tions.12 6 Second, the jury must be informed that it need not reach a
verdict.2 7 Finally, the instruction also must reemphasize the burden
of proof.'
28
The Eighth Circuit similarly requires trial courts to use a bal-
anced instruction. 29 It specifically considers four factors in determin-
ing whether an Allen charge was coercive: the content of the
instructions; the time spent deliberating after hearing the charge; the
total time of deliberation; and indicia in the record of coercion or
pressure on the jury. 3
The D.C. Circuit is among those that explicitly restrict use of the
dynamite instruction. It requires use of the supplemental instruction
123. Id.
124. See id.; cf Burgos, 55 F.3d at 941 (mandating a balanced instruction); United
States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1343 (4th Cir. 1970) ("What appears to be withdrawn
from the discretion of the district judges in the main body of [the Fioravantij opinion is all
but restored in final footnote 32."). Footnote 32, at the end of the Fioravanti opinion,
permits trial courts to give the following supplemental instruction:
"It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another, and to deliberate with a
view to reaching an agreement[,] if you can do so without violence to individual
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an
impartial consideration of the evidence in the case with your fellow jurors. In the
course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine your own views, and
change your opinion, if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your
honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence[,] solely because of the
opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict."
Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 420 (quoting Hon. William C. Mathes & Hon. Edward J. Devitt,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 79.01, at 440 (1965)); see also United
States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682, 684 n.4 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing the "Aldisert charge" with
approval and indicating that its "distinction [from the Allen charge] is that the 'Aldisert'
version calls upon every juror to reflect upon the correctness of his preliminary appraisal of
the evidence, not just the minority."). But see Sawyers, 423 F.2d at 1346 n.7 (Sobeloff, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's interpretation of Fioravant); Fioravanti, 412 F.2d
at 419 ("Our refusal to reverse this conviction should not be taken to mean that we have
tacitly approved of the Charge.").




129. United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 141 (8th Cir. 1991).
130. Id. at 141-42.
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endorsed by the American Bar Association, which makes no mention
of majority or minority status. 3'
Even if the form of an Allen instruction is acceptable, other re-
strictions on its use may apply. 32 For instance, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction in United
States v. Seawell 33 after the trial judge twice delivered a permissible
Allen instruction to the jury.' The jury deliberated for about one-
and-a-half hours before notifying the judge that the jurors could not
agree. 35 The judge gave a balanced Allen charge and sent the jurors
back for further deliberations. 136 Three-and-a-half hours later, the ju-
rors again announced they were deadlocked and the judge repeated
the instruction. 37 Less than an hour later, the jurors returned with a
guilty verdict.13 The Ninth Circuit indicated that repeating the charge
was tantamount to telling the jury that since it had failed to reach a
verdict, it had not followed the instruction the first time it was given:
"Given a second time, . . . the charge no longer serves as an instruc-
tion; no matter how it may be softened it becomes a lecture sounding
in reproof.' '1
39
The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits, how-
ever, have recently reaffirmed their support for the "pure" Allen
charge. Last year, the Second Circuit explicitly approved of the trial
court's use of the original Allen instruction in United States v.
Melendez, 40 specifically disagreeing with the defendants' assertion
that the judge had a duty to admonish those in the majority to con-
sider the arguments and opinions of the minority.' 4 ' In 1993, the Fifth
Circuit expressed enthusiastic support for the charge in United States
131. See United States v. Dorsey, 865 F.2d 1275, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1989); supra note 33
(containing the text of the ABA recommendation).
132. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "totality of
the circumstances" test defined in Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (per
curiam).
133. 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977).
134. Id. at 1163.
135. Id. at 1160-61.
136. Id. at 1161 & n.2.
137. Id. at 1161-62.
138. Id. at 1162.
139. Id. at 1163.
140. 60 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 1995).
141. Id. The Melendez court further held that it would not consider the amount of time
spent deliberating after an Allen charge in determining whether the instruction was coer-
cive. Id. at 51.
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v. Straach,'142 writing that "Allen's age-old wisdom was intelligently
applied in this case."' 43
The "wisdom" of the Allen charge is that it apparently succeeds in
jarring juries out of deadlock.144 The desirability of this effect de-
pends upon whether the instruction is blasting irrational jury members
into agreement with reasoned jurors or forcing legitimate dissenters to
succumb to the majority position.145 Research suggests both situa-
tions occur.
146
The University of Chicago's Jury Project, an extensive study of
juries in criminal trials in the 1950s, provided some indication of the
way dynamite charges may affect the decision-making process. 47 The
study indicated that about five percent of all criminal trials end in
hung juries.148 Of the juries that do hang, nearly half (forty-two per-
cent) are hung by one or two minority jurors.' 49 Furthermore, juries
are twice as likely to deadlock in close cases, 50 with most jurors' dis-
agreements based on their views of evidentiary matters and not over
their feelings toward the defendant.' 5' This data may lend support to
Judge Aldisert's assertion in Fioravanti that hung juries are a critical
part of the system of unanimous verdicts.15  If one views the initial
split in jurors' positions as an indicia of the closeness or ambiguity of
the case, then juries deadlock on precisely the cases that are too mud-
dled to warrant criminal verdicts.153
142. 987 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1993).
143. Id. at 243.
144. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 29, at 194 ("Even in the absence of hard
data, 90 years' worth of anecdotes seems to compel the tentative conclusion that [the dyna-
mite charge is as effective as its reputation suggests] it is.").
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 453-91 (1966).
The authors studied data from 3,576 criminal jury trials in 1954, 1955 and 1958. Id. The
University of Chicago Jury Project is one of the earliest and best known attempts to study
jurors from the perspectives of law and social science. Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The
American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 323, 324 (1991). Hans and
Vidmar call for the replication of the study to reflect changes in jury composition and
functioning over the last four decades. Id. at 347-49.
148. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 147, at 453. The authors generalized that juries
beginning with an overwhelming majority for either conviction or acquittal are unlikely to
hang. Id. at 462.
149. Id. at 461.
150. Id at 457.
151. Id. at 456.
152. See United States v. Foravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
837 (1969).
153. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 29, at 194. Allen charges have occasion-
ally been criticized as presenting a threat to the requirement that a jury find a defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf Burgos, 55 F.3d at 940 (explaining the potentially
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Research also has shown that the more time a jury spends delib-
erating, the greater the chances are that it will not reach a unanimous
verdict. 54 If more time in the jury room increases the chance of dead-
lock, it is a special cause for suspicion when a jury in disagreement
reaches a unanimous verdict after receiving an Allen instruction and
being told to deliberate further. Thus, each time an Allen instruction
generates a verdict from a deadlocked jury it must be affecting the
deliberation process in some way.155 The question remains whether
such influence equals coercion.
The Fourth Circuit in Burgos attempted to strike a balance be-
tween the benefits of giving a jury-prodding instruction' 5 6 and the po-
tential harm it could bring to the verdict's integrity. 57 The court's
analysis in Burgos is sound.158 In reviewing the instruction at issue in
coercive effects of an unbalanced Allen charge); United States v. Martin, 756 F.2d 323,326
(4th Cir. 1985) ("A decision so arrived at is not the unanimous verdict of each juror, but
simply the decision of a majority of the twelve."); Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 417-18 ("The
requirement of a unanimous jury verdict for criminal cases in the federal courts and in all
but a handful of states is eloquent testimonial that something more than a majority vote is
desired." (footnotes omitted)). Since a jury may not convict a defendant unless each indi-
vidual juror considers him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, if a guilty verdict results from
majority influence rather than from each juror's subjective belief that this standard has
been met, the Allen charge may result in the doubt of a single juror being per se unreasona-
ble. Id. at 419; see also Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100, 119
(1968) (arguing that most verdicts represent the convictions only of a majority of critical
size, not unanimity) [hereinafter Note, Deadlocked Juries]. However, Kalven and Zeisel
found that the likelihood that a guilty minority will hang a jury is about as great as the
likelihood that an acquittal minority will hang the jury. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 142,
at 461. If Allen charges are coaxing verdicts from deadlocked juries, therefore, they are just
as likely to be generating acquittals as convictions. But see Janet E. Findlater, Retrial After
a Hung Jury: The Double Jeopardy Problem, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 701,734-35 (1981) (specu-
lating that hung jury cases involve "in all probability" a higher percent of innocent defend-
ants than other cases).
154. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 147, at 459-60; see also Note, Deadlocked Juries,
supra note 153, at 108 ("[A]s deliberations progress, the two sides take more and more
radical positions, their arguments increasing in violence and irrationality." (citations
omitted)).
155. For a commentary distinguishing improperly hung juries from properly deadlocked
ones and postulating that the law's aim is to bring the former to agreement, while allowing
the latter to remain at an impasse see Note, Deadlocked Juries, supra note 153, at 129.
156. The main benefit bf dynamite instructions is that they sometimes prevent mistrials,
saving time, money and the need for a new trial. See KASSIN & WRIGrrSMAN, supra note
29, at 193.
157. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 29, at 194.
158. The next logical step for the Fourth Circuit was to transform its previous recom-
mendations into a mandate. However, considering the trial judge in Burgos employed
none of the objectionable language, the case was not only an unlikely candidate for rever-
sal based on Sawyer and Stollings, but also an unlikely vehicle for the emergence of this
strict mandate. For the full text of the instruction given by the trial judge in Burgos, see
supra note 23.
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Burgos, the court examined the charge from the perspective of minor-
ity jurors. 159 The court reasoned that if jurors understood the trial
court's instruction to mean they should reconsider their firmly held
beliefs, which would be a reasonable conclusion based on the wording
of the charge, minority jurors would be more likely to believe that
they were the targets of such an instruction. 60
Psychology Professor Saul Kassin conducted an experiment that
supports the proposition that Allen charges exert particular pressures
on minority jurors."' Subjects in the experiment read about a crimi-
nal case, thinking they were to participate in a mock jury.162 Mock
jurors then "deliberated" by passing notes, with each subject receiving
one or two (of a total of three) notes which disagreed with his posi-
tion.163 For the subjects who did not change their votes; the divisions
persisted.164 The experimenter-judge then delivered two different sets
of instructions to separate juries.' 65 One group heard a traditional Al-
len instruction, while the other group received no instruction, with the
judge simply informing them that verdicts had to be unanimous and
they should continue in their deliberations. 66  Minority jurors
changed their votes more often than majority jurors after receiving
the Allen charge, but minority jurors who received no instruction did
not.167 Minority jurors who heard the dynamite charge also reported
feeling more pressure from the experimenter than jurors in the no-
instruction group. 68 Professor Kassin found that immediately after
receiving the Allen instruction, majority jurors used fewer informa-
tional influence strategies, such as citing facts and laws relevant to the
case.' 69 Instead, majority jurors increased the normative social pres-
sure on those in the minority by criticizing dissenting jurors and refus-
159. Burgos, 55 F.3d at 940.
160. Id. For support of this view, see Note, Deadlocked Juries, supra note 153, at 139.
The author explained: "If [the judge] addresses his remarks primarily to dissenters, the
judge will appear to support the majority, even though what he says goes no further than to
ask the minority to participate in the discussions and to allow the persuasion mechanisms
to operate." Id.
161. See Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 687, 703-07 (1990). However, since the subjects in the experiment deliber-
ated by passing notes, Professor Kassin cautioned that data gleaned from these studies
should be considered tentatively with regard to real trials. Id. at 707.






168. Id. at 706-07.
169. Id. at 707.
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ing to reconsider their positions. 7 ° Professor Kassin concluded that
the dynamite charge had tipped the forces operating over the mock
jurors in an undesirable direction, empowering the majority and hand-
icapping the minority. 171 He wrote that the effectiveness of alterna-
tive instructions in eliciting verdicts from deadlocked juries through
informational rather than normative influences remained to be
seen.
172
One commentator has argued that in order to avoid coercing ju-
rors, Allen instructions should state that a hung jury is an alternative
to verdicts of guilty or not guilty.' 73 Requiring a trial court to instruct
juries that deadlock is an acceptable outcome, however, would defeat
the purpose of the dynamite charge in emphasizing the importance of
reaching a consensus if at all possible. Furthermore, juries generally
appear to be aware of the possibility that they may fail to reach a
verdict and a mistrial will result.174 Many Allen charges result in re-
sponse to jurors' assertions that they are a hung jury. An instruction
informing jurors that deadlock is an option may be appropriate in the
limited context in which jury members ask the court what their op-
tions are if they fail to disagree, as jurors did in United States v.




173. David M. Stanton, Note, United States v. Arpan: How Does the Dynamite Charge
Affect Jury Determinations?, 35 S.D. L. REv. 461, 474-75 (1990). Stanton made this argu-
ment in response to the Eighth Circuit's holding that the defendant did not have a right to
an initial instruction on the option of a hung jury, and that accurate answers to jury ques-
tions were supported by law. See United States v. Arpan, 887 F.2d 873, 876-77 (8th Cir.
1989) (en banc). The Arpan jury had asked the court how it was to record a split decision.
The trial court told the jury that only unanimous verdicts were recordable. Id. at 875. A
second note from the jury stated that it had only been able to agree on one count and
asked what would happen if it left a blank space on the verdict form. Id. The trial court
then delivered an Allen charge. Id. Finally, the jury announced it had reached a verdict on
two of four counts and asked how its deadlock on the two remaining counts would affect
the verdicts. Id. The court told jurors they could return the unanimous verdicts and con-
tinue deliberations on the other counts. Id. at 876.
174. See, e.g., Burgos, 55 F.3d at 935 (stating that the jury informed the trial court it
could not reach a verdict); United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1107 (4th Cir. 1992)
(same); United States v. Stollings, 501 F.2d 954, 955 (4th Cir.) (stating that jury foreman
answered affirmatively when judge asked if jury was "hung"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941
(1974). But see CATHY E. BENNETT & ROBERT B. HIRScHHoRN, BENNETT'S GUIDE TO
JURY SELECTION AND TRIAL DYNAMICS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION § 16.36, at
308 (Eda Gordon ed., 1993) ("In post trial interviews jurors routinely say that the Allen
Charge is misinterpreted to mean that they must make a decision."). Bennett and
Hirschhorn suggest that attorneys for both sides should request five minutes of argument
to clarify the meaning of an Allen instruction. Id.
175. Arpan, 887 F.2d at 875.
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such a requirement given that the Burgos jury informed the court it
could not reach a verdict. 76 Since jurors told the trial court they
could not agree, they arguably considered deadlock to be a legitimate
outcome.
Whether the modified instruction mandated in Burgos eliminates
the coercive effect of an Allen charge is not clear. But, by requiring
trial courts to admonish majority and minority jurors to consider the
other faction's views, the modified dynamite instruction ideally oper-
ates to dislodge obstinate, irrational dissenters from their minority
stance, while allowing legitimate dissenters to feel as secure in their
position as majority jurors do in theirs.
Important policy reasons justify encouraging juries to reach a ver-
dict.' 77 New trials are expensive, and the criminal justice system is
backlogged with cases. 7 If Allen-type instructions work without co-
ercing jurors into consensus, eliminating them from an already over-
loaded system is neither desirable nor wise. Rather than altogether
eliminating a charge that is well ingrained in American jurispru-
dence, 179 and possibly increasing the occurrence of mistrials due to
hung juries, the Fourth Circuit has attempted to minimize the charge's
coerciveness without disabling it completely.180 The Fourth Circuit's
decision to allow the trial judge to tailor the instruction for individual
juries also may enable the charge to operate more effectively by al-
lowing judges to depart from the impersonal, boiler-plate language
that.appears in many jury instructions.'8
Other checks besides the Burgos mandate restrain coercive jury
instructions. In United States v. Jenkins,"8 the jury sent the judge a
176. See Burgos, 55 F.3d at 935.
177. See B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights": Creating Edu-
cated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1270 (1993) (noting the "substantial direct
and indirect economic, human and social costs" of retrials resulting from hung juries).
178. The time that elapses between arrest and adjudication in criminal trials and the
sheer number of prosecutions illustrate this backlog. In 1992, an average of 300 days
passed between arrest and sentencing in felony cases tried by juries in state courts. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATIsTICs-1994, at 492 tbl. 5.57 (1994). In 1990, 60,521 defendants were prose-
cuted in United States District Courts. Id. at 449 tbl. 5.18.
179. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
180. For another suggestion on how to reduce the risk of mistrial due to deadlocked
juries, see Dann, supra note 177, at 1269-79. The author, a Superior Court Judge in Ari-
zona, suggests that trial judges give jurors the option of telling the judge and lawyers which
issues continue to divide them. Id. at 1271. The court may then decide to clarify instruc-
tions, give further instructions, direct further argument by counsel, or allow further presen-
tation of evidence. Id. at 1269.
181. For support of the view that jury instructions should be as case-specific as possible,
see Dann, supra note 177, at 1257.
182. 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (per curiam).
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note stating it was unable to reach a verdict because of insufficient
evidence in a robbery case.183 The judge called jurors into the court-
room and, as part of his response, stated: " 'You have got to reach a
decision in this case.' "18 The Supreme Court, in a short, per curiam
opinion, reversed the conviction, finding that under all of the circum-
stances the charge was coercive. 185 The Supreme Court and lower
courts have applied a Jenkins "totality of the circumstances" analysis
in reviewing allegedly coercive instructions and comments by the trial
court.186 In Ellis v. Reed,'87 the Fourth Circuit applied the Jenkins test
in refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that a state
trial judge inquired about a jury's numerical division.188 The defend-
ant also raised the issue of the propriety of the Allen charge on ap-
peal, but the Fourth Circuit did not scrutinize that issue under the
Jenkins test.189 Presumably, if an Allen instruction incorporated the
language required in Burgos but also included potentially coercive
language, the Fourth Circuit would evaluate the instruction's coercive-
ness under a Jenkins test.
While hung juries may be viewed as an assurance of the jury sys-
tem's integrity rather than as a sign of its failure, 9 ' in many cases
deadlock clearly can lead to undue delay and wasted resources.191
Given the dynamics of the jury as a decision-making body, it is a
group subject to influence and pressure from many sources.' 92 Cer-
tainly, the justice system does not seek to eliminate all nonevidentiary
influences which act upon jury members. For instance, instructions
from the judge that jurors take their duties seriously, that they con-
sider and weigh all the evidence, and that they make their decisions
conscientiously and rationally are admonitions designed to shape ju-
rors' behavior. At the same time, other sources of coercion, including
the appearance of partiality by the judge and improper pressure from
stubborn, inflexible jurors, must be minimized if not eradicated. The
Fourth Circuit in Burgos wisely recognized that the Allen charge can
fall within either camp of influences, sometimes functioning as a posi-
183. Id. at 446.
184. Id.
185. 1& The Supreme Court based its ruling in Jenkins on its supervisory power over
the federal courts, not the Constitution. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,239 n.2 (1988).
186. See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237-39 (discussed supra note 32); Ellis v. Reed, 596
F.2d 1195, 1199 (4th Cir. 1979).
187. 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1979).
188. Id- at 1199-1200.
189. Id. at 1196-97.
190. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 147, at 453.
191. See United States v. Melendez, 60 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 1995).
192. See Kassin, supra note 161, at 706.
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tive force in jury deliberations, while at other times exerting improper
influence. The charge mandated by Burgos strikes the necessary bal-
ance by blasting all jurors into further deliberations and furthering the
purpose of judicial resolution.
LESLIE SHEA RIGGSBEE
State v. McCarver: The Role of Jury Unanimity in Capital
Sentencing
As of January 1996, thirty-eight states in America allow capital
punishment.' Most of these states, including North Carolina,2 give the
jury in a capital case the responsibility of determining whether a con-
victed murderer will be sentenced to die,3 in the belief that in pro-
nouncing sentence on the defendant a jury expresses the moral
judgment of the community, doing so more accurately than a judge
would.4 However, jury sentencing has created difficulties in adminis-
tering the death penalty throughout its history.5 The problem in giv-
ing a jury unlimited discretion to impose a death sentence is that it
gives twelve human beings free rein to introduce all of their human
frailties, passions, and prejudices into a literal life-and-death decision.
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent dangers of
unlimited jury discretion in capital sentencing, and in a series of
landmark cases interpreted the Eighth Amendment to require limits
on that discretion.6 As may be expected, the solution is not perfect.
Courts have struggled for almost twenty-five years with the problem
of how best to channel a jury's sentencing discretion to achieve a re-
sult consistent with constitutional and traditional notions of justice.
This problem confronted the North Carolina Supreme Court last
September. During the sentencing phase of a capital trial, a jury was
given a standardized jury instruction form that asked several questions
1. DEATH Row USA (NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York,
N.Y.), Winter 1995, at 1.
2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Supp. 1994).
3. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of
Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1045-50 (1995). A few anomalous states, notably Ari-
zona and Idaho, give the trial judge the final sentencing authority. See id. at 1049 n.30;
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994-95); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515
(1987).
4. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) ("[A] jury that must
choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must do
nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of
life or death.").
5. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-53 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(relating history of discriminatory application of the death penalty); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361-70 (1995). See generally
WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1991) (outlining the modem system of capital
punishment).
6. See infra notes 39-62 and accompanying text.
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designed to guide their sentencing discretion.7 One of these questions
asked whether the jury "unanimously" found that the mitigating cir-
cumstances were insufficient to outweigh any aggravating circum-
stances.8 The trial judge instructed the jury that their decision would
have to be unanimous for a "no" answer as well as for a "yes" an-
swer.9 The defendant appealed, claiming that this instruction consti-
tuted reversible error.10 In State v. McCarver," the North Carolina
Supreme Court not only upheld the instruction, but went further, stat-
ing that every "outcome determinative" sentencing question in a capi-
tal case requires a unanimous answer by the jury.
12
This Note discusses the McCarver majority's holding requiring
jury unanimity for "outcome determinative" capital sentencing ques-
tions. 13 After briefly explaining the facts of the case, 4 the Note dis-
cusses the jurisprudence of capital sentencing, 15 both in the United
States Supreme Court 16 and in North Carolina.17 It then analyzes the
decision in McCarver,18 and concludes that although the holding rep-
resents one possible interpretation of the jury instruction at issue, it is
an indefensible one, inconsistent with the North Carolina Constitu-
tion, the North Carolina death penalty statute, the United States
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence, and the realities of
modern jury decision-making.' 9
7. State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 390-92, 462 S.E.2d 25, 39-41 (1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1332 (1996). See infra text accompanying notes 22-25 for the complete text of
the instructions.
8. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 391, 462 S.E.2d at 39. "Mitigating factors" are circum-
stances regarding the crime, the defendant, etc., put into evidence by a capital defendant
that tend to weigh against the imposition of the death penalty in a given case. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f) (Supp. 1994). Aggravating factors consist of similar evidence
presented by the prosecution that weighs in favor of the imposition of the death penalty.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (Supp. 1994).
9. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 389, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
10. ld. at 388, 462 S.E.2d at 38.'
11. 341 N.C. 364, 462 S.E.2d 25 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1332 (1996).
12. 111 at 390, 462 S.E.2d at 39. "Outcome determinative" questions, according to the
McCarver majority, are those to which a "no" answer mandates a life sentence for the
defendant. Id. at 393, 462 S.E.2d at 41. Justice Frye, joined by Justice Whichard, dissented
only as to this aspect of the majority's holding. Id. at 409, 462 S.E.2d at 51 (Frye, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). The justices were unanimous as to the rest of the
decision. ld. at 373, 462 S.E.2d at 26.
13. See infra notes 20-152 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 20-38 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 39-92 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 39-78 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 93-147 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
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On September 8, 1992, a Cabarrus County jury convicted Ernest
Paul McCarver of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous
weapon.20 In accordance with North Carolina's death penalty stat-
ute,21 the trial judge gave the jurors the following form, titled "Issues
and Recommendation as to Punishment," to direct their sentencing
decision:
ISSUE ONE
Do you unanimously find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the existence of one or more of the follow-
ing aggravating circumstances?[]
If you answered Issue One "No," skip Issues Two,
Three, and Four, and indicate Life Imprisonment under
"Recommendation as to Punishment," on the last page of
this form.
If you answered Issue One "Yes," proceed to Issue Two.
20. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 373-74, 462 S.E.2d at 30.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Supp. 1994).
22. The North Carolina death penalty statute contains a list of statutory aggravating
factors which constitute the only aggravating factors a capital jury may consider in its sen-
tencing decision. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (Supp. 1994). These aggravating factors
are:
(1) The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated.
(2) The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony ....
(3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use
or threat of violence to the person ....
(4) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting escape from custody.
(5) The capital felony was committed ... in the commission of... any homicide,
robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or
the unlawful [use] of a destructive device or bomb.
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(8) The capital felony was committed against a [law enforcement officer, officer
or the court, or witness against the defendant] while engaged in the performance
of his official duties or because of the exercise of his official duty.
(9) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to
the lives of more than one person.
(11) The murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of
conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by
the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons.
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ISSUE TWO
Do you find from the evidence the existence of one or
more of the following mitigating circumstances?[F3]
If you answered Issue Two "Yes," then answer Issue
Three.
If you answered Issue Two "No," then skip Issue Three
and answer Issue Four.
ISSUE THREE r4 ]
Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found by
one or more of you is, or are, insufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances found unani-
mously by you in Issue One?
If you answer Issue Three "No," then indicate Life Im-
prisonment under "Recommendations as to Punishment."
If you answer Issue Three "Yes," then proceed to Issue
Four.
ISSUE FOUR
Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the aggravating circumstances or circumstances found
unanimously by you in Issue One is, or are, sufficiently sub-
stantial to call for the imposition of the Death Penalty when
considered with the mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances found by one or more of you?
23. The death penalty statute also contains a list of mitigating factors. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(f) (Supp. 1994). The primary difference between aggravating factors
and mitigating factors is the presence of mitigating factor number 9: "Any other circum-
stance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value." Id. This
section of the statute allows the jury to consider any mitigating evidence not mandated by
statute that the defendant wishes to put forth, as required by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604-05 (1978) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982). See infra notes 56-62
for further discussion of Lockett and Eddings.
24. Issue Three as given by the trial court differed slightly from that in the North
Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions, which read:
If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating cir-
cumstances found are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances
found, you would answer Issue Three, "Yes." If you do not so find, or have a
reasonable doubt as to whether they do, you would answer Issue Three, "No." If
you answer Issue Three, "No," it would be your duty to recommend that the
defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment.
Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 83-84, State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 462 S.E.2d 25




If you answer Issue Four "No," indicate Life Imprison-
ment under "Recommendation as to Punishment" on the
Last Page of this form.
If you answer Issue Four "Yes," indicate Death under
"Recommendation as to Punishment." 25
After nearly four hours of deliberation, the jury presented a writ-
ten question to the judge regarding Issue Three, which read: "Must
there be twelve votes, 'Yes,' or twelve votes, 'No,' to reach a unani-
mous decision? 12 6 After conferring with counsel, the trial judge in-
structed the jury: "The answer to that is, Yes, it must be a unanimous
twelve person decision as to any answer you reach to that issue,
whether it be Yes or whether it be No."'27 McCarver's counsel ob-
jected, stating that by the plain language of the form, a failure to an-
swer "yes" unanimously should be regarded as a "no" vote.28 The
trial judge, although noting the possible ambiguity in the wording of
the question, overruled the objection.29 McCarver was subsequently
sentenced to death,30 and appealed as of right to the North Carolina
Supreme Court.31 Among the assignments of error made in his appeal
brief, McCarver charged that the trial court erred in instructing the
jury that it must be unanimous to answer "no" to Issue Three, and
that this instruction lowered the state's burden of proof, improperly
coerced a verdict, and deprived him of his federal and state constitu-
tional rights.32
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Mitchell, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court rejected McCarver's claims, affirming both the
guilty verdict and the death sentence.33 As to McCarver's charge that
the trial court had erred in instructing the jury regarding Issue Three,
the court upheld the instruction, holding that not only Issue Three but
"any issue which is outcome determinative as to the sentence a defend-
25. Appeal Record at 120-27, State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 462 S.E.2d 25 (1995)
(No. 384A92).
26. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 389, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
27. Id
28. Id. at 414, 462 S.E.2d at 54 (Frye, J., concuirring in part and dissenting in part).
29. d (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 374, 462 S.E.2d at 30. Although the jurors found fourteen mitigating circum-
stances and only two aggravating circumstances, they answered "yes" to Issues Three and
Four on the "Issues and Recommendation" form, thereby recommending a sentence of
death. Appeal Record at 120-27, State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 462 S.E.2d 25 (1995)
(No. 384A92).
31. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 373, 462 S.E.2d at 29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a) (Supp.
1994) provides for an appeal of right to the North Carolina Supreme Court for all death-
sentenced defendants.
32. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 388, 462 S.E.2d at 38.
33. Id. at 409, 462 S.E.2d at 51.
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ant in a capital trial will receive-whether death or life imprison-
ment-must be answered unanimously by the jury. ' 3n Chief Justice
Mitchell explained that any other reading of the "Issues and Recom-
mendations" form would force juries to recommend life imprisonment
when they were not unanimous, in violation, he claimed, of both the
North Carolina Constitution and the death penalty statute.35 He also
cited policy reasons favoring a unanimity requirement, stating that
such a requirement both would prevent juries from abdicating their
responsibility to decide upon a sentence and would guard against arbi-
trary and capricious sentences.36
Justice Frye, joined by Justice Whichard, concurred in part but
dissented as to the majority's assessment of the necessity of a unanim-
ity requirement.37 Although Justice Frye did not address the major-
ity's policy concerns, he claimed that neither the North Carolina
Constitution nor the death penalty statute required a unanimous deci-
sion to answer "no" to Issue Three, and that absent a constitutional or
statutory command the plain reading of the question should prevail.38
The seemingly simple basis of the dispute between the justices
belies the complexities beneath. For more than twenty years, courts
have attempted to place guidelines on jurors' sentencing discretion in
capital cases in order to assure a just application of this nation's most
extreme sanction. The impetus for this campaign was provided by the
Supreme Court's 1972 landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia.3 9 In
Furman, the Court held that the unlimited sentencing discretion given
to juries by Georgia's capital sentencing scheme created an impermis-
sible risk of arbitrarily imposed death sentences, and was therefore
unconstitutional.4 " In so holding, the Court set forth a core principle
of its death penalty jurisprudence which still guides its decisions: To
comply with the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment, a state must eliminate substantial risks that the
34. l at 390, 462 S.E.2d at 39. Drawing upon Justice Scalia's dissent in McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 463 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), the McCarver majority
declared that Issues One, Three, and Four were outcome-determinative. McCarver, 341
N.C. at 393, 462 S.E.2d at 41.
35. Id at 392, 462 S.E.2d at 41. This Note asserts that the Chief Justice erred in his
assertion. See infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
36. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 389-90, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
37. Id at 409-16, 462 S.E.2d at 51-55 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
38. See id (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
40. See iL at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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death penalty will be inflicted arbitrarily or capriciously 4 ' Unfortu-
nately, the Furman decision created additional difficulties. Most
states employing the death penalty at that time allowed unlimited jury
sentencing discretion; therefore, the Furman holding represented a de
facto invalidation of the death penalty across the United States.4'
However, the Furman Court stopped short of providing a solution to
the arbitrariness introduced by jury discretion, merely holding that
such arbitrariness was unconstitutional.4 3 State legislatures were thus
left to their own devices to come up with a response to the Supreme
Court's directive to reduce discretion-based arbitrariness, and came
up with a variety of solutions. When viewed broadly, these methods
may be divided into two categories. 44
Some states, notably Georgia,4 5 Florida,46 and Texas,47 chose to
guide capital juries' discretion. The "guided discretion" statutes gen-
erally provided for a bifurcated capital trial in which a defendant's
41. The legal principles underlying the Furman holding are not easily discerned. The
actual opinion of the court was delivered in a two-paragraph per curiam opinion holding
the Georgia statute at issue to be unconstitutional. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (1972) (per
curiam). All nine Justices filed separate opinions-Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
White, and Marshall concurring and Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, Justice Pow-
ell, and then-Associate Justice Rehnquist dissenting. Id. at 240. "The interpretation ad-
vanced in the text is the one most frequently cited. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
601 (1978) ("[T]o comply with Furman, sentencing procedures should not create 'a sub-
stantial risk that the death penalty [will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner.' " (citations omitted)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) ("Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing,
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action."); Gary Goodpaster, The Trial For Life: Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 307 n.39 (1983)
("[Wihile Furman's immediate concern is standardless jury discretion to impose the death
penalty, its ultimate concerns are arbitrariness and its consequences."); Raymond J. Pas-
cucci et al., Special Project: Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fair-
ness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1136 (1984) ("Furman and its progeny
held that the state must suitably direct and limit discretion in the capital sentencing process
in order to minimize the risk of arbitrary or capricious action .... ").
42. Indeed, Justice Blackmun called attention to this implication of the Furman hold-
ing in his dissent: "Not only are the capital punishment laws of 39 states and the District of
Columbia struck down [by Furman], but also [all of the] provisions of the federal statutory
structure that permit the death penalty apparently are voided." Furman, 408 U.S. at 411
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. See supra note 41 for an explanation of the Court's reticence on this point.
44. See Bowers, supra note 3, at 1045; Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the
Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. Rnv. 323,
363-64 (1992).
45. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1976).
46. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1976).
47. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-69 (1976).
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sentence was determined independently from his guilt.48 In the sen-
tencing proceeding, jurors were directed to answer a number of ques-
tions regarding the defendant and the nature of the crime designed to
channel the sentencing process toward a more "appropriate" sentence
in each case.49 Other states chose a different approach. Rather than
guide juror discretion, their legislatures chose to eliminate it entirely,
making the death penalty mandatory for certain crimes. North Caro-
lina"° and Louisiana,5 for example, enacted statutes of this nature.
In 1976, just two days before the nation's Bicentennial, the
Supreme Court finished its evaluation of the two approaches, handing
down a set of opinions that would determine the future course of the
death penalty nationwide. In Woodson v. North Carolina,5" the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment "requires consideration of the char-
acter and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death," and held the mandatory
death penalty statutes unconstitutional because they did not allow for
48. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-68 (describing Georgia's guided discretion statute);
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-51 (describing Florida's guided discretion statute); Jurek, 428 U.S.
at 273-74 (describing Texas' guided discretion statute). The Florida statute differed from
the Georgia and Texas statutes in that the jury's sentencing recommendation was not bind-
ing upon the trial judge, who imposed the final sentence. See Proffit, 428 U.S. at 248-49.
49. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 267.
50. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976) (describing North Caro-
lina's mandatory death penalty statute). The North Carolina statute made the death pen-
alty mandatory for first-degree murder. Id.
51. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329 (1976) (describing Louisiana's
mandatory death penalty statute). The Louisiana statute also mandated the death penalty
for first-degree murder, the Louisiana definition of which approximated modem statutory
definitions of felony murder. Id.
52. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Like Furman, Woodson was a "fractured" decision. The
Court announced its decision in an opinion written by Justice Stewart and joined by Jus-
tices Powell and Stevens. Id. at 282 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Justices
Brennan and Marshall each wrote separate opinions concurring in the judgment. Id. at 305
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment).
The Court has offered some guidance in discerning the precedential effect of divided
decisions like Woodson: "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds ....... Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). Thus, in Woodson, the Stewart-Powell-Stevens
opinion may be viewed as the Court's holding, as both Justice Brennan and Justice Mar-
shall's opinions were based on the premise that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 306 (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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such consideration.5 3 Conversely, the Court upheld the "guided dis-
cretion" statutes contested in Gregg v. Georgia54 and its companion
cases because the statutes allowed jurors to assess the moral appropri-
ateness of the death penalty in each individual case, thus providing the
necessary constitutional safeguards.'
Two years later, the Court applied the Woodson doctrine specifi-
cally to mitigating circumstances in Lockett v. Ohio.56 Sandra Lockett
was the "getaway" driver in an attempted robbery that had gone awry,
resulting in the murder of a pawnshop owner.5 7 She was charged as
an accessory to murder and subsequently sentenced to death.5 8 At
her sentencing hearing, Lockett attempted to introduce evidence of
"her character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death,
and her relatively minor part in the crime," but the Ohio death pen-
alty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating factors:
(1) whether the victim had induced or facilitated the crime, (2)
whether the defendant acted under coercion or duress, and (3)
whether the crime was primarily a product of the defendant's adverse
mental condition. 9 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of the
Court, found the Ohio death penalty statute unconstitutional on its
face, explaining:
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer... not be precluded from consid-
ering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's char-
acter or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death....
53. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Although
only this aspect of the Woodson decision is significant to this Note, the Court listed several
other reasons for its holding. First, North Carolina had abolished a mandatory death pen-
alty in 1949, and subsequent pre-Furman attempts to reinstate it had failed. Id. at 299-300.
Second, the Court believed that the mandatory sentencing statutes represented efforts to
comply with Furman rather than societal consensus on a mandatory death penalty. Id. at
298. Finally, the Court indicated its displeasure with the mandatory statutes, accusing the
states of merely "paper[ing] over the problem of unguided and unchecked jury discretion."
Id. at 302.
54. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Another "famously fractured" opinion, the holding in Gregg
was announced by the same troika (Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) that wrote the
controlling opinion in Woodson. Id. at 158 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
See supra note 52 for an explanation of the precedential value of plurality decisions.
55. 428 U.S. at 196-207 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
56. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
57. Id. at 589-91.
58. It at 591, 594.
59. Id. at 597, 593-94 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-2929.04 (Anderson
1975)).
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... [A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital
cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects
of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances
of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the
death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may
call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between
life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible
with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.60
Four years later, Eddings v. Oklahoma61 expanded Lockett's reach to
include evidence beyond that relating to the defendant's character and
record or the circumstances of the offense, holding that a sentencer
may not refuse to consider any relevant evidence offered in mitigation
of a death sentence.62
In Mills v. Maryland63 the Court considered the application of the
Lockett doctrine to a requirement of jury unanimity.6' At issue in
Mills was a capital jury sentencing instruction similar to North Caro-
lina's Issue Two.65 The instructional form read in pertinent part:
"Based on the evidence we [the jury] unanimously find that each of
the following mitigating circumstances which is marked 'yes' has been
proven to exist by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
and each mitigating circumstance marked 'no' has not been proven by
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. ' 66 Mills claimed
that a jury could read this instruction as precluding consideration of
any mitigating evidence unless all twelve jurors agreed on the exist-
ence of a particular mitigating circumstance. This interpretation, Mills
argued, created the possibility of a situation in which one holdout ju-
ror could force the other eleven members of a jury into imposing a
death sentence by refusing to find the existence of any mitigating cir-
cumstances that would call for a sentence less than death.67 Citing
60. Id. at 604-05 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted).
61. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
62. Id. at 113-14.
63. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
64. Id. at 373-75.
65. Id See supra text accompanying note 23 for the text of Issue 'Iwo of the North
Carolina sentencing instructions.
66. 486 U.S. at 387 (appendix to the opinion of the Court).
67. Id at 373-74. The Mills majority, echoing the concerns of the Maryland Supreme
Court judge who dissented from the opinion affirming Mills' death sentence, came up with
another situation seemingly inconsistent with Lockett:
All 12 jurors might agree that some mitigating circumstances were present, and
even that those mitigating circumstances were significant enough to outweigh any
aggravating circumstance found to exist. But unless all 12 could agree that the
same mitigating circumstance was present, they would never be permitted to en-
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Lockett,68 the Mills majority invalidated the instruction in question
and remanded the case for re-sentencing, 69 stating that "[a] jury fol-
lowing the instructions set out in the verdict form could be 'precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, [an] aspect of a defendant's
character or record [or a] circumstanc[e] of the offense that the de-
fendant proffer[ed] as a basis for a sentence less than death.' "70
Less than two decades after Woodson, North Carolina's capital
punishment system again came under constitutional attack in McKoy
v. North Carolina.71 At the time of McKoy, North Carolina capital
juries were given a form with an instruction similar to the one at issue
in Mills.72 The form included the question, "[Issue Two:] Do you
unanimously find from the evidence the existence of one or more of
the following mitigating circumstances?" 73 The judge at McKoy's trial
had further instructed the jury, " 'If you do not unanimously find this
mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence, so indi-
cate by having your foreman write "No," in that space' on the verdict
form."74 In upholding the statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court
distinguished McKoy's case from Mills, stating that Issue Four in the
North Carolina scheme, which asked jurors to consider whether the
aggravating circumstances were sufficient to call for the death penalty,
allowed individual jurors to include mitigating evidence that had pre-
viously been excluded.
75
The United States Supreme Court, however, declined to validate
"the state court's inventive attempts to distinguish Mills," and struck
down the contested jury instruction.76 As it had in Mills, the Court
hypothesized that the North Carolina instruction could produce a situ-
gage in the weighing process or any deliberation on the appropriateness of the
death penalty.
Id. at 374 (citing Mills v. State, 527 A.2d 3, 25-26 (Md. 1987) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting)).
68. Id. at 374-75.
69. Id. at 384.
70. Id. at 380 (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)).
71. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
72. See id. at 435-36.
73. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 436.
75. State v. McKoy (McKoy 1), 323 N.C. 1, 40, 372 S.E.2d 12,33 (1988). Justice Which-
ard, who joined Justice Frye's dissent in McCarver, see supra note 12 and accompanying
text, wrote the majority opinion in McCoy L Id. at 6, 372 S.E.2d at 14. His apparent
change of heart is puzzling-if he was in favor of a unanimity requirement to find mitigat-
ing circumstances, it seems that he likewise would favor a unanimity requirement in bal-
ancing them.
76. McKoy, 494 U.S. at 439, 444. The Court also rejected the argument that the una-
nimity requirement was valid as a parallel to the requirement of unanimity to find aggra-
vating factors. Id. at 443.
1996] 2071
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ation in which one holdout juror could prevent the rest of the jury
from considering any mitigating circumstances, or in which all jurors
could find some mitigating circumstances, but none unanimously.
77
As such, the Court reasoned that the requirement "impermissibly
limit[ed] jurors' consideration of mitigating evidence," and was there-
fore unconstitutional.7 8
The majority of North Carolina case law on the topic of jury una-
nimity in capital sentencing has focused on the issue discussed in
McKoy v. North Carolina-whether a jury must be unanimous to find
the existence of mitigating circumstances. Nonetheless, some of these
decisions have given insight into the general philosophy of the North
Carolina courts on the issue of the jury's role in capital sentencing,
and as such are useful for discussion here. In 1983, in State v. McDou-
gall,79 the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the importance
of properly instructing juries on sentencing in capital cases, and for-
malized the issues to be submitted to the jury, placing them in a for-
mat substantially similar to that used later by McCarver's jury.80
However, the McDougall instructions were silent as to a requirement
of unanimity.8'
The question of unanimity, at least as to the finding of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances, was resolved that same year in State
77. Id at 438-40. Justice Marshall, who wrote the majority opinion, stated that
McKoy's case "present[ed] an even clearer case for reversal than Mills v. Maryland." Id. at
444 n.8. He pointed out that the issue in Mills was whether or not the jury could interpret
the instruction in an unconstitutional manner, and that even the dissent in Mills had agreed
that an interpretation of the Mills instruction requiring jury unanimity to find mitigating
circumstances was unconstitutional. Id. (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 391-95
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)). By contrast, the instruction in McKoy expressly set
forth a requirement of jury unanimity to find the existence of mitigating factors. Id.
78. Id. at 444.
79. 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983).
80. Id. at 32-33, 301 S.E.2d at 327. The format suggested by the McDougall court was:
(1) Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of
one or more of the following aggravating circumstances?
(2) Do you find from the evidence the existence of one or more of the following
mitigating circumstances?
(3) Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstance or
circumstances you have found is, or are, insufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances you have found?
(4) Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances found by you is, or are, sufficiently substantial to call for the impo-
sition of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or
circumstances found by you?
Id.
81. See supra note 80 for the text of the McDougall instructions.
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v. Kirkley. The Kirkley court imposed a requirement of unanimity
to find the existence of aggravating circumstances, noting that both
the North Carolina Constitution and the North Carolina statute per-
taining to sentencing in capital cases required a unanimous vote to
impose a death sentence; further, said the court, it had held in prior
cases that imposition of the death penalty in a capital case must be
made by a unanimous vote of the twelve jurors.8 3 At the same time,
the Kirkley court imposed a requirement of unanimity to find mitigat-
ing circumstances, stating that "consistency and fairness dictate [such
a requirement].... [W]e see no reason to distinguish the method a
jury must use in finding the existence or nonexistence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances during the sentencing procedure." 84
Despite a large number of challenges, the North Carolina
Supreme Court consistently upheld the Kirkley unanimity require-
ment throughout the 1980s.85 So, when Dock McKoy challenged the
unanimity requirement in 1988 on the grounds that it violated the
then-recent United States Supreme Court decision in Mills v. Mary-
land,16 it came as no surprise that the North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected his claim' as well. However, after the Supreme Court re-
versed that decision in McKoy v. North Carolina,88 the North Carolina
court had to decide whether the unconstitutional jury instruction rep-
resented a fatal deficiency in North Carolina's death penalty statute.89
The court opted to save the statute, claiming that the unanimity re-
quirement was merely a judicially imposed rule and not a necessary
part of the statutory scheme:90
We are confident that [McKoy v. North Carolina] did not in-
validate North Carolina's capital sentencing statute or any
82. 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983), overruled in part by State v. Shank, 322 N.C.
243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988), overruled in part by State v. Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 451 S.E.2d 543
(1994).
83. Id at 218,302 S.E.2d at 156-57 (citing State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86,257 S.E.2d 551
(1979)).
84. Id. at 218-19, 302 S.E.2d at 157.
85. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 327 N.C. 1, 29, 394 S.E.2d 434, 451 (1990); State v. Huff,
325 N.C. 1, 62, 381 S.E.2d 635, 670 (1989); State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 159, 362 S.E.2d
513, 534 (1987); State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 216-17, 358 S.E.2d 1, 25-26 (1987); State v.
Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 24, 320 S.E.2d 642, 656 (1984); State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 33, 316
S.E.2d 197, 214 (1984); State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 353, 307 S.E.2d 304, 322-23 (1983).
86. 486 U.S. 367 (1988); see supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
87. State v. McKoy (McKoy I), 323 N.C. 1, 44, 372 S.E.2d 12, 35-36 (1988). See supra
notes 74-75 and accompanying text for further discussion of McKoy L
88. 494 U.S. 433 (1990); see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
89. State v. McKoy (McKoy II), 327 N.C. 31, 37, 394 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1990).
90. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text for further discussion of this aspect
of the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in McKoy IL
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part thereof At most the decision invalidated only our jury
instructions requiring unanimity on mitigating circumstances
in a capital sentencing proceeding....
... [D]efendant argues [that] McKoy [v. North Carolina]
in effect invalidates the entire [capital punishment] scheme,
including the statute.... [W]e find no reference in McKoy to
the facial validity of our statute. The entire discussion cen-
ters on the challenged jury instructions, which became part
of our capital sentencing scheme under this Court's decision
in [State v.] Kirkley[r]....
... Kirkley did not hold that unanimity in finding miti-
gating circumstances is necessarily mandated either by
N.C.G.S. §15A-2000 or our constitution. Rather .... Kirkley
upheld the unanimity jury instruction as a matter of appro-
priate trial procedure in the interest of "consistency and fair-
ness." ... Kirkley regarded the unanimity requirement as a
judicially imposed rule governing trial procedure and not a
necessary product of the capital sentencing statute.'
Although several North Carolina Supreme Court cases after
McKoy I1 tangentially discussed the issue of jury unanimity in other
areas of capital sentencing,93 the question of whether a negative an-
swer to Issue Three must be unanimous was open for the McCarver
court to decide. In McCarver, Chief Justice Mitchell cited two bases
of support for a unanimity requirement: textual provisions of the
North -Carolina Constitution and the death penalty statute, and policy
considerations favoring a unanimity requirement. 94
Chief Justice Mitchell noted that "the sentence recommendation
...must be unanimous under constitutional and statutory provi-
91. 308 N.C. 196,302 S.E.2d 144 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v.
Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds by State v.
Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 451 S.E.2d 543 (1994).
92. McKoy 11, 327 N.C. at 37, 39, 38, 394 S.E.2d at 429, 430 (emphasis added).
93. See, eg., State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 137,451 S.E.2d 826,836 (1994) (holding that
the court may not inform the jury that a life sentence will be imposed if it does not reach a
unanimous sentence recommendation); State v. Keel, 337 N.C. 469,493-94,447 S.E.2d 748,
761-62 (1994) (rejecting contention that language of Issue Three permits the jury to recom-
mend death if it feels that mitigating circumstances are of equal weight to aggravating
circumstances); State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 174-75,443 S.E.2d 14, 33-34 (1994) (rejecting
contention that "unanimity" language of Issue Three permits jurors to ignore mitigating
factors); State v. Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 454,412 S.E.2d 31,36 (1992) (holding that require-
ment of unanimous sentence recommendation is not required by the North Carolina
Constitution).
94. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 389-90, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
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sions."95 However, the entire text of Article I, Section 24 of the North
Carolina Constitution, the provision cited by the Chief Justice as sup-
port, reads as follows: "Right of jury trial in criminal cases. No per-
son shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a
jury in open court. The General Assembly may, however, provide for
other means of trial for misdemeanors, with the right of appeal for
trial de novo.' '9 6 As Justice Frye pointed out in his dissent,97 this pro-
vision speaks only to convictions, not sentences, and as such would
seem inapplicable to Ernest McCarver's case.
Unlike the North Carolina Constitution, the death penalty statute
does contain a requirement of unanimity for the sentence recommen-
dation, stating that "[t]he sentence recommendation must be agreed
upon by a unanimous vote of the 12 jurors. '98 However, the statute is
not nearly as explicit as to the steps the jurors must take before they
make their recommendation. In fact, the only part of the statute that
specifically mentions the weighing of mitigating and aggravating fac-
tors does not mention unanimity, requiring only that "[w]hen the jury
recommends a sentence of death, the foreman of the jury shall sign a
writing on behalf of the jury which writing shall show ... [t]hat the
mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found." 99
The McCarver majority's claims of constitutional and statutory
support not only lack explicit textual corroboration but are contra-
dicted by North Carolina case law. The North Carolina Supreme
Court expressly disavowed any state constitutional requirement of
jury unanimity in capital sentencing procedures in State v. Baldwin,'
stating: "Never has this Court construed Article I, Section 24 or any
other provision of the North Carolina Constitution as requiring that a
95. Id. at 390, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
96. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 24.
97. Justice Frye stated in his dissent:
[N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24] requires a unanimous verdict of a jury in open court in
order to convict a person of a crime. In this case, as in all capital cases in North
Carolina, we do not get to a capital sentencing proceeding until after a jury has
convicted the defendant of the capital crime by a unanimous verdict in open
court. The majority's proposition relates to any sentencing recommendation, not a
conviction.
McCarver, 341 N.C. at 410, 462 S.E.2d at 51 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b)(3) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
99. A. § 15A-2000(c)(3). In any case, this section would seem to provide little support
for a generalized requirement regarding mitigating circumstances; the jury is only required
to produce the writing required by this section when they recommend a sentence of death.
Id
100. 330 N.C. 446, 412 S.E.2d 31 (1992).
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defendant's sentence be based upon a unanimous recommendation of
a jury."' 1 In a footnote, the court further explained:
In State v. Kirkley... we stated that "a verdict of death in a
capital case must be by unanimous vote of the twelve jurors."
We note, however, that our holding in [State v.] Cherry and
our subsequent statement in Kirkley concerned the sentenc-
ing procedure established by the legislature in N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2000. Neither of these cases in any way intimated that
the unanimity required in a jury's sentencing recommenda-
tion is constitutionally mandated.102
In addition to explicitly declaiming any sort of state constitutional
mandate for the issues in the instructional form, North Carolina case
law implicitly separates the instructional form from the statutory re-
gime. In State v. McKoy (McKoy II),03 Dock McKoy, fresh from his
victory in the United States Supreme Court, claimed that the jury in-
structions invalidated by the Court were an integral part of the statu-
tory regime, and as such the entire statute was unconstitutional. 10 4 In
an effort to save the death penalty statute, the McKoy 11 court took
great pains to separate the sentencing instructions from the statute,
characterizing the sentencing form as "only our jury instructions" and
"not a necessary product of the capital sentencing statute."' 1 5 This
would seem to lead to the conclusion that the instructions bear little
relation to the statutory scheme. Yet, in McCarver the court lauded
the importance of the instructions to the administration of the statu-
tory regime, stating that they "ensure[ ] that the jury properly fulfills
its duty to deliberate genuinely for a reasonable period of time," and
that "[t]he legislature intended such a unanimity requirement.
'10 6
The two approaches are inconsistent; either the instructions are a nec-
essary part of a sentencing scheme that therefore should have been
ruled unconstitutional in McKoy II, or they are not necessary to the
statute and were not intended by the legislature to be so
considered. 0 7
101. Id. at 454, 412 S.E.2d at 36.
102. Id. at 454 n.1, 412 S.E.2d at 36 n.1 (citation omitted).
103. 327 N.C. 31, 394 S.E.2d 426 (1990).
104. See id at 37, 394 S.E.2d at 429.
105. McKoy II, 327 N.C. at 37, 38, 294 S.E.2d at 429, 430. See supra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text for further discussion of this aspect of McKoy I.
106. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 392-93, 462 S.E.2d at 41 (emphasis in original).
107. There is a third alternative, albeit a rather facile one: that the legislative intent
behind § 15A-2000 somehow supports instructions like Issues One, Three and Four as
"outcome determinative" integral parts of the statutory scheme, but that Issue Two is en-
tirely a consistency- and fairness-based creation of the judiciary, completely ancillary to the
legislative intent and the statutory scheme itself.
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Although the North Carolina Constitution and the death penalty
statute support a unanimity requirement only for an actual sentencing
recommendation, Chief Justice Mitchell made a rather circuitous ar-
gument for treating the "outcome determinative" pre-sentencing is-
sues in the same fashion. The Chief Justice reasoned in McCarver that
a "no" response to whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigators is
in fact a "sentence recommendation" because the jury must impose a
life sentence as a result.'1 8 He then took the next logical step, impos-
ing a unanimity requirement for all such "outcome determinative" is-
sues. However, in making this generalization he failed to distinguish
between an actual sentence recommendation and the jury's decisions
en route to that final decision.10 9 This is not a mere semantic distinc-
tion, for the nature of the decision a jury must make is different in
each instance.
The only time in the sentencing process when the jurors are
"charged with the heavy responsibility of subjectively.., assessing the
appropriateness of imposing the death penalty upon a particular de-
fendant for a particular crime" 1 0 is at the very end of the sentencing
process. At this point, the jury is acting as the "conscience of the com-
munity," actually handing down a sentence, and the provision in the
death penalty statute requiring unanimity reflects the gravity of their
decision.
In contrast, answering the preliminary questions on the jury in-
struction sheet merely requires the jury to decide whether to preemp-
tively remove the defendant from consideration for the death penalty.
When answering these questions, the jury does not choose between
life imprisonment and death, but between life imprisonment and fur-
ther consideration of the death penalty's propriety in that case. A
"no" answer to Issue Three does not "save" the defendant from death,
because a "yes" answer does not equal a death sentence. Therefore,
this decision does not merit the heightened procedural protection of a
unanimity requirement, as does the actual sentencing stage."' In any
108. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 393-94, 462 S.E.2d at 41-42.
109. In fact, the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions, which McCarver's trial judge
did not use, explicitly separate the pre-sentencing question from the sentence recommen-
dation itself, stating that once the jury answers "no" to Issue Three, it is then their duty to
recommend a life sentence. NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCrIONS-CRIMINAL
§ 150.10 (1993). See supira note 24 for the pertinent text of the instructions.
110. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 34, 257 S.E.2d 569, 590 (1979).
111. This Note also disputes the majority's claim that allowing the exercise of discre-
tionary mercy by a jury prior to the sentencing recommendation would render a death
penalty regime unconstitutionally arbitrary, and cites the Supreme Court's approval of dis-
cretionary mercy in response to the majority's claims. See infra notes 113-19 and accompa-
nying text.
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event, a requirement of unanimity for pre-sentencing questions,
whether "outcome determinative" or not, is neither explicitly nor im-
plicitly supported by the death penalty statute or the North Carolina
Constitution, the claims of the McCarver majority notwithstanding."
12
However, Chief Justice Mitchell also relies upon "policy reasons"
for his decision. His first claim is that the unanimity requirement will
eliminate unconstitutional arbitrariness from the capital sentencing
process by preventing a jury from exercising mercy on a wholly discre-
tionary basis. 1 3 This assertion appears to reflect a misreading of the
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The McCarver
majority casts discretionary mercy as an evil to be eliminated, but its
true role is as an essential part of a valid death penalty scheme under
the Eighth Amendment."
4
Presumably drawing from Mills and McKoy, Chief Justice Mitch-
ell hypothesized a situation in which a single juror voting "no" to Is-
sue Three could force a jury to impose a life sentence instead of the
death penalty." 5 He claimed that this is the kind of "arbitrariness"
that the unanimity requirement will prevent." 6 In Gregg, however,
the United States Supreme Court spoke to just this concern:
The petitioner ... argues that the requirements of Furman
[i.e., to minimize arbitrariness] are not met here because the
jury has the power to decline to impose the death penalty
even if it finds that one or more statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances are present in the case. This contention misinter-
prets Furman....
112. In his dissent, Justice Frye recognized that there was a difference between the sen-
tencing recommendation and the consideration of matters leading to that recommenda-
tion, but rested his argument on a strict construction of the death penalty statute and the
North Carolina Constitution, and not the reasons behind their requirements. See Mc-
Carver, 341 N.C. at 409-11, 462 S.E.2d at 51-52 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Frye also alluded to a fundamental inconsistency behind the majority's
holding as it concerned Issue One: As the state bears the burden of proving aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, then requiring the jury to vote unanimously to
answer "no" to this issue would represent a fundamental contradiction to the notion of
burden of proof. Id at 415 n.1, 462 S.E.2d at 54 n.1 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); cf. State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 219, 302 S.E.2d 144, 157 (1983) ("Each
circumstance must be established by the party who bears the burden of proof and if he fails
to meet his burden of proof on any circumstance, [it] may not be considered in that case.").
113. See McCarver, 341 N.C. at 390, 393-94, 462 S.E.2d at 39, 42.
114. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
115. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 393, 462 S.E.2d at 41.
116. Id at 393-94, 462 S.E.2d at 42; cf. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1988)
(positing a similar hypothetical situation); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439-40
(1990) (citing Mills hypothetical).
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Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to
afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitu-
tion. Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk
that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously
selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to
be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority
would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime
and the defendant.
117
Thus, Gregg flatly contradicts the McCarver majority's implica-
tion that allowing the jury to have discretionary mercy would render
North Carolina's death penalty unconstitutionally arbitrary. In fact,
the Court has implied that a system without the possibility of discre-
tionary mercy might very well be unconstitutional, stating that " 'the
power to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate,' . . . but a
capital punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of
leniency 'would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice.' "118
To put it simply, the Eighth Amendment forbids "cruel and unusual"
punishments." 9 There is nothing cruel or unusual about a punishment
that allows for more leniency than the circumstances might warrant.'
Chief Justice Mitchell's second policy rationale for requiring una-
nimity on Issue Three is that unanimity will encourage a meaningful
and deliberative sentencing process more in accord with the impor-
tance of a capital jury's decision.' 20 This is a valid concern, and in-
deed, North Carolina case law reflects the high regard in which the
court has held jurors' duties in this situation.' 2 ' However, Justice
Mitchell's beliefs regarding the salutary benefits to be gained by re-
quiring unanimity are not grounded in the reality of how capital juries
actually make their decisions.
Quite recently, a consortium of criminologists, social psycholo-
gists, law school faculty members, and other researchers embarked
upon a multi-disciplinary study of how capital jurors make their life or
117. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203, 199 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis added); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 666 (1990) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he size of the class [of death-eligible defendants] may be .nar-
rowed to reduce sufficiently [the] risk of arbitrariness, even if a jury is then given complete
discretion to show mercy when evaluating the individual characteristics of those who have
been found eligible.").
118. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (citations omitted).
119. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
120. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 390, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
121. See, e.g., State v. Hucks, 323 N.C:574,584,374 S.E.2d 240,246 (1988) (recognizing
"[t]he uniqueness of the jury's life-or-death function in a capital sentencing proceeding");
State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 710, 292 S.E.2d 264, 276 (1982) (emphasizing the importance
of the capital jury's responsibility to hand down a sentence).
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death decisions, titled the Capital Jury Project (CJP). 12 2 The CJP is
now underway in fourteen states, 23 including North Carolina, and the
early findings, drawn from full capital trials conducted after 1988, re-
veal some startling facts about the decision-making processes of capi-
tal jurors. Although the CJP's findings have ramifications far beyond
North Carolina's jury instructions, for purposes of this Note, they sug-
gest that the McCarver majority's claim that a unanimity requirement
will produce positive effects in capital sentencing is erroneous because
it is based on a misconception of how capital juries make their
decisions.
Chief Justice Mitchell asserted that the McCarver unanimity re-
quirement will have three positive effects upon capital sentencing:
First, it will ensure "real and full deliberation" by capital juries.
124
Second, it will prevent juries from shirking their responsibility to
make sentence recommendations and thereby act as the community's
proxy in capital cases.' 25 Finally, the combination of the above two
effects will tend to prevent arbitrary and capricious death sentences
violative of the Eighth Amendment.
26
The first assertion, that a unanimity requirement will encourage
deliberation, is not supported by the CJP findings. The reality of capi-
tal sentencing seems to be that a majority of capital jurors have made
up their minds regarding their sentencing decision before the sentenc-
ing phase of the trial even begins. In the 634 cases collected, 50.2% of
the jurors had chosen between a life and death sentence soon after
finding the defendant guilty.12 7 Of these jurors, 64.6% described
themselves as "absolutely convinced" of their decision, while another
122. See generally Bowers, supra note 3 (introducing the Capital Jury Project and sum-
marizing early findings). The stated objectives of the CJP are:
1. To examine and systematically describe jurors' exercise of capital sentencing
discretion;
2. To identify the sources and assess the extent of arbitrariness in jurors' exercise
of capital discretion; and
3. To assess the efficacy of the principal forms of capital statutes in controlling
arbitrariness in capital sentencing.
Ia at 1077.
123. The participating states, selected to represent a nationwide cross-section of guided
discretion capital punishment statutes, are Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, Texas, and Virginia. Id. at 1079.
124. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 389, 462 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433, 452 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 390, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
127. Bowers, supra note 3, at 1089.
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30.5% described themselves as "pretty sure.' 1 28 Even more alarm-
ingly, 74.1% of all jurors surveyed believed that the judge's sentencing
instructions simply provided a framework for a decision that most ju-
rors had already made. 29
While further jury deliberation prompted by a unanimity require-
ment would seem to combat this phenomenon, the results from the
CJP researchers in Kentucky reveal an alarming underside to this ar-
gument. The Kentucky researchers published their observations on
"cross-over" jurors, jurors who made their sentencing decisions prior
to the sentencing phase and then changed their minds prior to impos-
ing a sentence. 30 The consistent theme that emerged from the Ken-
tucky study was that most jurors who changed their minds did so not
because of "real and full deliberation" of the aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors, but through a desire to avoid a retrial stenming from a
hung jury.' An earlier non-CJP study of Florida jurors was even
more alarming; 64.8% of the jurors surveyed stated that the statutory
aggravating and mitigating guidelines had "little or no influence" on
their sentencing decisions.'32 Thus, observations of actual capital ju-
ries suggests that additional deliberation leads at best to artificial una-
nimity based on motivations outside of the sentencing procedure, and
at worst to a decision in which jurors have had longer to concentrate
on completely erroneous sentencing factors.
In addition to having practical shortcomings, Chief Justice Mitch-
ell's first contention stands on shaky theoretical ground. His reason-
ing confuses the jury's objective determination of a defendant's guilt
or innocence with its subjective decision as to the appropriate sen-
tence. Lengthy deliberation certainly could benefit a jury divided on
the objective question of a defendant's guilt, giving more time to sift
facts, review testimony, assess the credibility of witnesses, and the
like. A sentencing decision, however, is almost entirely subjective, de-
pending upon the jurors' respective moral beliefs.' 33 It is difficult to
128. Id. at 1090.
129. Id. at 1093.
130. See Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs--Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About
the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1188 (1995).
131. Id. at 1206.
132. William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Oper-
ative Factors in Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 24 (1987-88).
133. Justice Powell pointed out this distinction in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,
450 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting):
Underlying the question of guilt or innocence is an objective truth: the defend-
ant, in fact, did or did not commit the acts constituting the crime charged.... In
contrast,. .. [t]he sentencer's function is not to discover a fact, but to mete out
just deserts as he sees them.
1996] 2081
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
imagine why a few hours' additional deliberation would prompt a ju-
ror to change her deeply-held moral beliefs, and equally difficult to
find a reason that the criminal justice system would ask her to do
so. 134 A community is made up of many discrete individuals with dif-
fering values and convictions; a sentencing decision designed to "re-
flect the conscience of the community"'135 should likewise reflect these
dissimilarities and should not be subjected to external pressures to
conform in the name of unanimity.
Chief Justice Mitchell also claimed that a requirement of unanim-
ity would prevent the jury from evading its responsibility to pro-
nounce the judgment of the community upon a capital defendant.
136
However, the CJP's survey of capital jurors indicates that most jurors
have jettisoned any sense of duty before even entering the courtroom.
The researchers asked capital jurors:
When you were considering the punishment, did you think
that whether the defendant lived or died was... [1] Strictly
the jury's responsibility and no one else's... [2] Mostly the
jury's responsibility, but the judge or appeals courts take
over responsibility whenever they overrule or change the
jury's decision ... [3] Partly the jury's responsibility and
partly the responsibility of the judge and appeals courts who
review the jury's sentence in all cases ... [4] Mostly the re-
sponsibility of the judge and appeals courts; we make the
first decision but they make the final decision.
137
Only 27.2% of the jurors felt that it was strictly the jury's responsibil-
ity; 18.6% felt that it was mostly the responsibility of the trial judge
and the appeals courts. 38 If a juror does not feel responsible for
whether the defendant lives or dies, no amount of additional time is
id.
134. In fact, the Fourth Circuit recently stated that "[t]he most egregious mistake that
can be made [in instructing a deadlocked jury] is for a.. . court to suggest, in any way, that
jurors surrender their conscientious convictions." United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 989
(4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1108 (4th Cir. 1992)). For an
in-depth discussion of Burgos, see Shea Riggsbee, Note, United States v. Burgos: Balanced
Blasting for Deadlocked Juries, 74 N.C. L. REv. 2036 (1996).
135. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 389, 462 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433, 452 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
136. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 389, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
137. Bowers, supra note 3, at 1096.
138. Id at 1096-97. Of the 655 jurors, 155 came from states, unlike North Carolina, in
which the jury's sentence recommendation is not binding, and the trial judge can override
the jury's sentencing decision. Id. at 1095 n.233 (table). This distribution, of course, could
skew the results away from feelings of jury responsibility. However, when asked to rank
various actors in the process in terms of responsibility for the sentence, the difference be-
tween "judge override" and "jury binding" states was slight: In the "judge override" states,
10.3% of the jurors felt that either the individual jurors or the jury collectively was most
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going to make the juror assume a duty which has already been
shirked. 39
The Chief Justice's third contention was that a unanimity require-
ment in the sentencing instructions will tend to prevent arbitrary or
capricious sentencing. 140 However, observations of capital juries indi-
cate that jury instructions have much less impact upon the jury's deci-
sion than Chief Justice Mitchell attributes to them, and may even
increase the arbitrary nature of the decision. A number of studies in-
dicate that jurors' comprehension of instructions is marginal at best.
14 1
In fact, the CIP's North Carolina researchers focused on this aspect of
the capital sentencing process in the published report of their find-
ings,'142 revealing that a startling percentage of North Carolina jurors
incorrectly understood various aspects of the capital sentencing
instructions. 143
The North Carolina jurors surveyed inadequately comprehended
a number of aspects of the instructions, including the domain from
which aggravating and mitigating factors could be drawn, the required
burden of proof, and significantly, the very presence or absence of a
unanimity requirement. 44 The jurors were asked questions about
what the sentencing instructions required them to do. 45 In all, less
responsible for a defendant's punishment; the figure was only 16.9% in the "jury binding"
states. Id.
139. Indeed, one commentator suggests that statutory guidelines actually replace jurors'
sense of responsibility with the authority of law. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death,
1983 Sup. Or. REv. 305, 373.
140. McCarver, 341 N.C. at 390, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
141. See, e.g., Susie Cho, Capital Confusion: The Effect of Jury Instructions on the Deci-
sion to Impose Death, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 532 (1994); Theodore Eisenberg &
Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L.
REv. 1 (1993); James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of Judges' Instructions in the Penalty
Phase of a Capital Trial, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 203 (1992); Matt Nichols, Note, Victor v.
Nebraska: The "Reasonable Doubt" Dilemma, 73 N.C. L. Rav. 1709, 1709 n.3 (1995) (col-
lecting sources).
142. James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions:
Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1161 (1995).
143. For example, 42% of the North Carolina jurors surveyed thought that all jurors
had to agree on a mitigating circumstance before it could be considered. Id. at 1166. This,
of course, is in direct opposition to McKoy v. North Carolina, in which the United States
Supreme Court held that such a unanimity requirement would be unconstitutional. See
supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. A startling 48% of jurors felt that they could
choose between life and death if they found one or more mitigating factors and no ag-
gravators, Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 142, at 1172, even though the death penalty
statute expressly forbids the death penalty in such a case. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(b), (c) (Supp. 1994).
144. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 142, at 1167.
145. Id at 1165-66. For example, the jury was asked: "1. Among factors in favor of a
death sentence, could [you] consider: a. any aggravating factor that made the crime
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than fifty percent of the North Carolina jurors answered more ihan
one-half of the survey questions correctly; only four percent answered
all six of the questions correctly. 146 This prompts the question: How
will adding a unanimity requirement to the sentencing instructions ef-
fect any change in jurors' decisions if jurors do not understand the
sentencing instructions in the first place? The Chief Justice's hypothe-
sis that a unanimity requirement will have beneficial effects on capital
sentencing loses all credibility when viewed in the light of actual re-
search of capital juries.
It would be easy to dismiss the McCarver holding as a fit of pique
or mean-spiritedness, but the McCarver majority did not break any
jurisprudential rules in holding that a jury must answer all "outcome
determinative" questions unanimously. In interpreting the jury in-
struction at issue, Chief Justice Mitchell turned to the death penalty
statute, the North Carolina Constitution and case law, and even
weighed public policy considerations in an attempt to find a just inter-
pretation.1 47 However, while the Chief Justice's methodology is
sound, unfortunately his reasoning is not.
The McCarver majority lists two rationales behind its holding:
148
First, that the unanimity requirement is mandated by both the North
Carolina Constitution and by North Carolina's death penalty stat-
ute,149 and second, that "overwhelming policy reasons" favor a una-
nimity requirement. 50 Neither of these theories, however, holds up
under closer analysis. The claim of state constitutional and statutory
support is contrary both to the text of the documents and to North
Carolina case law on the subject, 15 1 while the Court's policy reasons
are contrary to the United States Supreme Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence and moreover do not reflect how capital juries ac-
worse[;] b. only a specific list of aggravating factors mentioned by the judge[; or] c. don't
know/no answer[?]" Id. at 1165.
146. Id at 1168. To answer a question "correctly," a juror had to give the legally cor-
rect response, for example, answering "no" if asked whether all jurors had to agree on a
mitigating factor for it to be considered. Id at 1166-67.
147. See supra notes 94-121 and accompanying text.
148. The Court stated:
Since the sentence recommendation, if any, must be unanimous under constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, and particularly in light of the overwhelming pol-
icy reasons for a unanimity requirement, we conclude that any issue which is
outcome determinative as to the sentence a defendant in a capital trial will receive-
whether death or life imprisonment-must be answered unanimously by the jury.
McCarver, 341 N.C. at 390, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
149. See id at 392-93, 462 S.E.2d at 41.
150. See id. at 389, 462 S.E.2d at 39.
151. See supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
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tually make their decisions.152 The holding in McCarver is therefore
flawed, and further disfavors a group that already has few defenders
in our society: convicted capital defendants. The purpose behind the
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence was to prevent
society's bias against these outcasts from entering the jury box, and to
encourage the exercise of mercy by capital juries to mitigate any bias
that remained. The impact of the McCarver holding is clear: It will
now be more difficult for North Carolina jurors to exercise their
power of discretionary mercy, further dampening any hope for the fair
and just application of the death penalty in North Carolina.
ROBERT C. STACY II
152. See supra notes 113-46 and accompanying text.
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Over the Edge: The Fourth Circuit's Commercial Speech
Analysis in Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch
In August of 1995, President Clinton proposed regulations
designed to curtail cigarette use by minors.' Included in the regula-
tions was a prohibition on outdoor advertising of tobacco products
within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds. 2 The proposal sparked
sharp criticism from cigarette manufacturers and politicians from to-
bacco-producing states.' It also prompted immediate legal challenges,
including a free speech challenge.4
Later that same month, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit decided a case involving a challenge to a local gov-
ernment's prohibition on outdoor advertising of cigarettes. 5 The City
of Baltimore, Maryland enacted an ordinance outlawing the advertis-
ing of cigarettes in some "publicly visible location[s]" in an effort to
reduce the consumption of cigarettes by minors.6 A Baltimore adver-
tising company disputed the constitutionality of the ordinance,7 but
1. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, & 897)
(proposed Aug. 11, 1995). "The goal of the proposed rule is to help the country ... reduce
the number of children and adolescents who use tobacco products by roughly one half by
the year 2000." Id.; see also Ann Devroy & John Schwartz, Clinton Moves To Limit Teen-
age Smoking, Tobacco Firms Sue To Bar Restrictions On Ads and Sales, WASH. POST, Aug,
11, 1995, at Al.
2. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,315.
3. See, e.g., Ann Devroy & John Schwartz, FDA Given Power For Cigarette Rules,
Clinton Seeks To Curb Teenage Smoking, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1995, at Al. In particular,
North Carolina Governor Jim Hunt stated that the proposal "would produce 'a big fight.'"
Id.
4. See, e.g., Devroy & Schwartz, supra note 1, at A]; Scott Higham, Suits May Stall
Smoking Fight For Years, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 11, 1995, at 1A. More recently, however,
one North Carolina cigarette manufacturer has pledged not to oppose the President's pro-
posed advertising restrictions as part of the settlement of a different lawsuit. Steve Sakson,
Cigarette Settlement: Who Wins, And Why, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 14,
1996, at 16A; see also Jennifer M. Wilson, Tobacco Lawsuit No-Go, DAILY TAR HEEL
(Chapel Hill, N.C.), Mar. 28, 1996, at 1 ("All states except Minnesota dropped their suits
against Liggett in March after the company agreed ... [among other things] to observe
limits on advertising, promotion and sales, as proposed last August by the FDA.").
5. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th
Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 64 U.S.L.W. 3868 (U.S. July 1, 1996).
6. BALTIMORE, MD., CrrY CODE art. 30, § 10.0-1(1) (1994).
7. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1321-22. The ordinance was scheduled to take effect
in April of 1994, but enforcement was stayed while the ordinance was challenged. Id. The
source of the constitutional conflict is, of course, the First Amendment, as it applies to state
and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. The First Amendment pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend I.
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the Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,8 permitted the restrictions to
stand.9 Since the legal challenge to President Clinton's proposal was
also brought in the Fourth Circuit, 10 the Baltimore advertising deci-
sion appeared to have significant implications for the constitutionality
of the federal regulations.-' However, on July 1, 1996, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision in
the advertising case.' 2
In addition to vacating the Fourth Circuit's opinion, the Supreme
Court remanded the case for further consideration 3 in light of its re-
cent decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.4 In Liquormart,
a complex eight-part opinion with three separate concurrences, the
Court invalidated -state restrictions on the advertising of alcoholic bev-
erage prices.15 Though 'all nine Justices concurred in the judgment
and six joined the portion of the opinion that held that the Twenty-
first Amendment does not allow states to abridge First Amendment
rights, 6 Liquormart failed to attract a majority of the Court to any
Neither the protections afforded by the First Amendment nor the rest of the Bill of
Rights originally applied to state and local governments. For example, in Barron v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), a plaintiff claimed that the city's
drainage project ruined his wharf, and demanded compensation under the Fifth Amend-
ment. ld. at 244, 246. However, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Baltimore, stating
that "[t]hese amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to
the state governments." Id. at 250.
8. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). In Edge Broadcasting, the Supreme Court overturned a
Fourth Circuit decision that had invalidated restrictions on advertising. Id. at 436. Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court sternly rebuked the Fourth Circuit for the manner of its deci-
sion in Edge. Id. at 425 n.3 ("We deem it remarkable and unusual that... the Court of
Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress was unconstitutional ... in an un-
published per curiam opinion.").
9. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1326.
10. See, e.g., Glenn Collins, FDA Cigarette-Regulation Suit Assigned To Judge With
Some Pro-Tobacco History, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Aug. 16, 1995, at 7B; Higham, supra
note 4, at 1A; Wade Lambert & Milo Geyelin, FDA's Planned Tobacco-Ad Rules Spur
Suits Over Agency's Powers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1995, at B6.
11. See, e.g., Milo Geyelin, Court Rules Cigarette Billboards Can Be Limited to Protect
Minors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1995, at B2; Major Areas of Tobacco-Health Legal Brawling,
NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 14, 1996, at 16A. But see Mark R. Ludwikowski,
Comment, Proposed Government Regulation of Tobacco Advertising Uses Teens To Dis-
guise First Amendment Violations, 4 CoMMLAW CONspEcrus, Winter 1996, 105, 115 (1996)
(drawing a distinction between the proposed regulations and Baltimore's ordinance).
12. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Schmoke, 64 U.S.L.W. 3868 (U.S. July 1, 1996).
13. Id. at 3868.
14. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
15. Id. at 1501.
16. Id. at 1515 (Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter and Thomas).
While the Twenty-first Amendment is best known as the repeal of prohibition, it also be-
stowed constitutional stature on state regulation of alcohol. U.S. CONST. amend XXI.
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portion of the opinion that dealt with commercial speech doctrine. 17
Given the ambiguous nature of the Supreme Court's holding, its sub-
sequent decision to remand the Baltimore case with instructions to
reconsider in light of Liquormart is puzzling.
This Note argues, however, that the Fourth Circuit's original
opinions in Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore'8 and the
companion case of Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 19 both of which
involved governmental restrictions on commercial speech,20 violated
the commercial speech doctrine as it stood prior to the inconclusive
Liquormart decision. After separately reviewing the issues unique to
each case,2' the Note examines the Fourth Circuit's application of the
then existing commercial speech doctrine in both cases.22 In particu-
lar, the Note focuses on the Fourth Circuit's application of the third
and fourth prongs of the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.23
17. Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1501. Nonetheless, over the course of the opinion, four
Justices supported strengthening the protection afforded commercial speech, id. at 1507
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion), 1520 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (joined by Jus-
tices Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg), while other Justices supported the current
level of protection. Id. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer)
18. 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 64 U.S.L.W. 3868 (U.S. July 1,
1996).
19. 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996). These
two cases are inextricably intertwined. Prior to enacting the cigarette advertising ban, Bal-
timore enacted Ordinance 288, which placed restrictions on the outdoor advertising of al-
coholic beverages. 1d. at 1308. Anheuser-Busch filed a lawsuit challenging the ordinance,
and Penn Advertising filed a similar suit a week later. Id. at 1309. Judge Hargrove of the
District of Maryland consolidated these two actions. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore City, 855 F. Supp. 811, 812 (D. Md. 1994), affd sub nom.,
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116
S. Ct. 1821 (1996). Although the alcohol advertising suit was conducted separately from
the challenge to the cigarette advertising ordinance, Judge Murray's decision in the ciga-
rette advertising case drew heavily on Judge Hargrove's earlier decision in the alcohol
advertising case. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of the City of Baltimore,
862 F. Supp. 1402, 1408-14 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and
remanded, 64 U.S.L.W. 3868 (U.S. July 1, 1996).
The appeals from both cases were heard on the same day by the same panel (March 6,
1995) and the appellate decisions were handed down at the same time (August 11, 1995).
Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1318; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1305. As in the lower court
decision, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in the cigarette advertising case contained minimal
explanation and frequently deferred to the decision in the alcohol advertising case on the
commercial speech issues. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325 ("These same issues were
resolved in favor of Baltimore in the related case of [Anheuser-Busch]." (emphasis added)).
20. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1312.
21. See infra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.




After a brief discussion of the test as developed in Central Hudson
itself, 4 the Note tracks the development of the third15 and fourth
6
prongs, respectively, in subsequent cases in which the Supreme Court
applied the Central Hudson test. In conclusion, the Note argues that
in upholding Baltimore's ordinances in the Penn Advertising and
Anheuser-Busch decisions, the Fourth Circuit allowed regulation of
commercial speech that exceeds the limits set by even the most per-
missive of Central Hudson's progeny
2 7
Baltimore City Ordinances 288 and 307, enacted in 1994, contain
general prohibitions on the outdoor advertising of alcoholic beverages
and cigarettes, respectively, subject to a number of specified excep-
tions? 8 The key provision of each reads: "No person may place any
sign, poster, placard, device, graphic display, or any other form of ad-
vertising that advertises [the respective product] in a publicly visible
location. In this section, 'publicly visible location' includes outdoor
billboards, sides of building[s], and free standing signboards. '2 9 The
preamble of each ordinance cites numerous studies concluding that
advertising plays a significant role in stimulating the illegal consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes by minors.
3 0
Before the ordinances took effect, the Anheuser-Busch Company
filed suit in federal district court challenging the alcoholic beverage
law (Ordinance 288)31 and the Penn Advertising company similarly
contested the cigarette law (Ordinance 307).3 In response to both
complaints, the City of Baltimore filed motions to dismiss. 33 In both
cases, however, the district court judges converted the motions into
24. See infra notes 63-86 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 87-128 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text.
28. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1321. "[T]he prohibition against cigarette advertising
in Ordinance 307 mirrors Ordinance 288's exceptions permitting such advertising on buses,
taxicabs, commercial vehicles used to transport cigarettes, and signs at businesses licensed
to sell cigarettes, including professional sports stadiums." It.; see also Anheuser-Busch, 63
F.3d at 1308-09 (discussing these same exceptions).
29. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1321 n.1; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1308 n.2. There
are inconsequential differences in the plural forms of the word "location" in these two
cites-the quotation used in the text is the one from Penn Advertising.
30. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1321; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1309.
31. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 855 F. Supp.
811, 813 (D. Md. 1994), affid sub nom., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305
(4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996).
32. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of the City of Baltimore, 862 F.
Supp. 1402, 1404 (D. Md. 1994), af-'d, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded,
64 U.S.L.W. 3868 (U.S. July 1, 1996).
33. Id.; Anheuser-Busch, 855 F. Supp. at 812.
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motions for summary judgment and subsequently granted judgment in
Baltimore's favor.34
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed both decisions35 despite
the appellants' assertions that the limited nature of the record in each
case precluded summary judgment.3 6 The appellants in Penn Adver-
tising contended that the district court erred in not allowing a greater
opportunity for discovery before reaching a decision.37 The Fourth
Circuit disagreed, insisting that the issues were questions of law and
that "an understanding of the ordinance's factual impact on particular
parties [was] not necessary to the inquiry."38 In Anheuser-Busch, the
court agreed with the appellants that summary judgment was inappro-
priate,39 but upheld the lower court on the basis of Baltimore's motion
to dismiss.4° The court maintained that it was permissible to look be-
yond the pleadings to the legislative history and still meet the 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss criteria." Thus, despite significant procedural dif-
ferences, the limited record before the Fourth Circuit in each case was
quite similar.42
34. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1421. Both district court judges commented that
they made a conversion to summary judgment because they had considered matters
outside of the pleadings. Penn Advertising, 862 F. Supp. at 1404 n.1; Anheuser-Busch, 855
F. Supp. at 812; see FED. R. Clv. P. 12(b) ("If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered
(6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment .... ).
35. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1326; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1318.
36. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1322; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1310-11.
37. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1322.
38. Id. at 1323 (citing Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1311-12). One reason that the court
gave for its willingness to rule on a limited record was that it considered the lawsuit to be
solely a "facial" challenge to the ordinance. Id. at 1322 ("[A] facial challenge to an ordi-
nance restricting commercial speech may be resolved as a question of law .... "). But see
P. Cameron DeVore, Summary of Major 1995 Commercial Speech Developments, in 3
COMMUNICATIONS LAW: 1995, at 7, 34 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3945, 1995) ("[T]he court mischaracterized the
appellant's challenge [in Anheuser-Busch] as solely 'facial.' ").
39. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1311. However, the reason the district court's conver-
sion of the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment was inappro-
priate was that it was made without notice to the parties and, therefore, deprived them of a
chance to respond. Id; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) ("If ... the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,... all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.").
40. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1312, 1318.
41. Id at 1312. But see DeVore, supra note 38, at 37 (describing this procedural struc-
ture as "unique and unprecedented").
42. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1312. For instance, Baltimore filed and the district
court considered "a transcript of the hearings before the City Council, and four studies that
the City Council considered as support for the ordinance." Id. at 1311.
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There was one major substantive difference between the cases.43
Because the ordinance in Penn Advertising regulates cigarette adver-
tising, the appellants advanced the argument that the ordinance was
preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA)4 and portions of the Maryland state code.4 5 The pertinent
part of the FCLAA states that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect
to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
4 6
The Fourth Circuit decided that the Baltimore ordinance was not pre-
empted by the FCLAA because the Baltimore law limited only the
location of the cigarette advertisements and not their content.47 Simi-
larly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Ordinance 307 was not pre-
empted by Maryland state law.'
43. One minor substantive distinction exists between the cases. In Anheuser-Busch,
Baltimore submitted an alternative argument that the ordinance would be constitutional
under the Twenty-first Amendment even if it failed to pass muster under the First Amend-
ment. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 855 F. Supp. 811,
814 n.3 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd sub nom., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th
Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996). This argument was exactly the
same as the one the Supreme Court subsequently found lacking in Liquormart. See supra
note 16 and accompanying text. In the instant case, however, the district court did not
reach this argument, Anheuser-Busch, 855 F. Supp at 814 n.3, and the Fourth Circuit's
opinion was confined to commercial speech issues, Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1308. This
situation makes the Supreme Court's decision to remand Anheuser-Busch for reconsidera-
tion in light of Liquormart seem even more unusual. See supra text accompanying note 17.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
45. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1323, 1324.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
47. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1323-24. Since the ordinance did not regulate the
content of the message communicated, the Fourth Circuit found that the ordinance had
only a general relationship to smoking and was not, therefore, specifically based on smok-
ing and health. ld. at 1324. The district court, on the other hand, relied on the express
purpose of Ordinance 307, as declared in the preamble, which was to effectuate the existing
state law prohibiting cigarette sales to minors. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor & City
Council of the City of Baltimore, 862 F. Supp. 1402, 1415-20 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d
1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 64 U.S.L.W. 6863 (U.S. July 1, 1996). In sum-
marizing, the lower court stated that "Ordinance 307 is clearly focused on illegality." Id. at
1420.
Both courts relied heavily on the Supreme Court's analysis in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). There, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he appropriate
inquiry is not whether the claim challenges the 'propriety' of advertising and promotion,
but whether the claim would require the imposition under state law of a requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to advertising or promotion." Id. at
525. For an expansive application of this test, see Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New York,
34 F.3d 68, 72-75 (2nd Cir. 1994).
48. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1324.
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The dominant substantive issue in both cases was the ordinances'
restriction on the right to advertise.49 Governmental regulation of
commercial speech is scrutinized using a four-part test.50 As ex-
pressed in Anheuser-Busch, the test is as follows:
[I]n order to be entitled to any First Amendment protection,
the speech must (1) concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading. If the commercial speech meets that threshold
prong, it may nevertheless be regulated if the government
(2) asserts a substantial interest in support of its regulation;
(3) demonstrates that the regulation "directly advances the
governmental interest asserted"; and (4) demonstrates that
the regulation is "narrowly drawn," i.e. "not more extensive
than is necessary" to serve the governmental interest.5 1
In both Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch, the Fourth Circuit
found that the principal disputes centered on the third and fourth
prongs of the test.
52
In applying the third prong of the test, the Fourth Circuit made it
clear that it was not necessary for the government to develop an ex-
tensive factual record regarding the effectiveness of the advertising
restrictions in reducing illegal consumption of alcoholic beverages and
cigarettes by minors. The court stated that " 'it is not necessary, in
satisfying [the] third prong, to prove conclusively that the correlation
in fact exists, or that the steps undertaken will solve the problem.' ,53
Indeed, if the legislature reasonably believed that its goals would be
furthered by the regulation, that was sufficient for the court.54 In both
cases, the court noted, the Baltimore City Council made specific find-
ings before enacting the ordinances that advertising increased the de-
mand by minors for the respective products.5
In Anheuser-Busch, the court seemed to indicate that it might
have found the third prong satisfied even without the City Council's
findings. It stated: "We simply do not believe that the liquor industry
spends a billion dollars a year on advertising solely to acquire an ad-
49. Id. at 1325; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1311.
50. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980); see also Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1313 (explaining that the Central Hudson test is
still being utilized). For the pertinent text from the Central Hudson opinion, see infra note
71 and accompanying text.
51. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1313 (internal citations omitted). The test is articu-
lated in almost identical fashion in Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325.
52. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1313.
53. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1314).
54. Id.; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1313, 1314-15.
55. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1321; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1309, 1314.
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ded market share at the expense of competitors. '5 6 The Fourth Cir-
cuit noted that it could justifiably have taken judicial notice of the link
between advertising and consumption.
57
Elaborating on the fourth prong, the court explained that the fit
between a legislative body's means and ends had to be reasonable, not
perfect.5" Furthermore, given the pervasive nature of the problem
that Baltimore was attempting to confront, it was entitled to "some
reasonable latitude. '59 Applying the test to the alcoholic beverage or-
dinance, the court conceded that the restrictions on outdoor advertise-
ments prevented such ads from being seen by adults as well as
minors.60 However, it decided "that no less restrictive means may be
available to advance the government's interest"'" and upheld the
prohibition.62
The four-part test utilized in Penn Advertising and Anheuser-
Busch has been a mainstay of the Supreme Court's commercial speech
jurisprudence for only the past fifteen years.63  As explained in
Anheuser-Busch, advertising and other forms of commercial speech
do not enjoy the same level of First Amendment protection as does
speech generally.64  Commercial speech has been described as "ex-
pression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience. 65 Until the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Virginia State
56. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738,
750 (5th Cir. 1983)).
57. Id.
58. Id (citing Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 469
(1989)).
59. Id. at 1316; see also Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Anheuser-Busch,
63 F.3d at 1316). As to the pervasiveness of the problem, the court noted that
Baltimore was faced with statistics showing that fully one-half of all deaths of
minors were alcohol-related, and 40 to 50% of juveniles who drowned or had
diving accidents had consumed alcohol immediately prior to the incident. The
City Council ... pointed to data which showed that over half of all twelfth grad-
ers, 40% of tenth graders, and over a quarter of eighth graders reported that they
consumed alcohol within the past 30 days ... [N]early 40% of all youths in adult
correctional facilities reported drinking alcohol before committing their crime.
Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1316.
60. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1316.
61. Id.; see also id. at 1317 ("[N]o ordinance of this kind could be so perfectly tailored
as to all and only those areas to which children are daily exposed.").
62. Id. at 1316.
63. Central Hudson was decided in 1980. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
64. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1313.
65. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. The Court had previously described
commercial speech as "speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion.' " Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
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Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,66
commercial speech was not considered a protected form of expression
at all.67 However, in that opinion, the Court elevated the status of
commercial speech, stating that "the particular consumer's interest in
the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not
keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political de-
bate. ' 68 Similar decisions soon followed69 and the protected status of
commercial speech quickly became entrenched.70
After several years of refining the new doctrine, the Supreme
Court completely restated the commercial speech doctrine in terms of
the four-part test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission.7 At issue in Central Hudson was a New York
376, 385 (1973)). For a discussion of the difficulty in defining commercial speech, see
David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REv.
359, 382-90 (1990).
66. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
67. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). The Valentine Court
stated that the Supreme Court
has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that,
though the state and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in
the public interest, they may not unduly burden or prescribe its employment in
these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.
Id. (emphasis added).
68. Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. In Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy, the Court struck down a Virginia law forbidding pharmacists from advertising the
price of prescription medications. Id. at 749-50. Though the intent of the statute was to
maintain the integrity of the profession, the Court emphasized that "society also may have
a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information." Id. at 764. Indeed, the Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy lawsuit was initiated by consumer groups. Id. at 753.
69. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (overturning a prohibition on
attorney advertising); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (overturn-
ing a prohibition on residential "For Sale" signs).
70. For the history of the commercial speech doctrine before Central Hudson, see ED.
WIN P. RoME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 3-80
(1985); Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A
Rational Basis Wolf In Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1931, 1933-40
(1992); McGowan, supra note 65, at 361-71. For the history of restrictions on attorney
advertising in particular, see Todd Mitchell, Note, Privacy and Popularity: The Supreme
Court Attempts to Polish the Public Image of the Legal Profession in Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 74 N.C. L. REv. 1681, 1695-1700 (1996).
71. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see also ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 70, at 82 (describing
Central Hudson as "a full-scale restatement.., of the rationale for the commercial speech
doctrine"). The test, as first expressed in the case, is as follows:
If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity,
the government's power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substan-
tial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the
regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on
expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal. Compliance
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State regulation enacted to facilitate energy conservation by banning
the promotional advertising of electric utilities.72 The Supreme Court
readily acknowledged that the ban satisfied the first two prongs of its
new test,73 and found with respect to the third prong that the govern-
ment's interest was directly advanced because of the "immediate con-
nection between advertising and demand."'7 However, the Court also
found that the advertising prohibition was not tailored narrowly
enough because it affected "all promotional advertising, regardless of
the impact of the touted service on overall energy use."75 Since the
restriction did not satisfy the fourth prong, the Court held it
unconstitutional. 
76
The four-part test is actually summarized in two different places
in the Court's opinion.77 The threshold requirement (that the speech
in question be about lawful activity and not be misleading) and the
second requirement (that the asserted government interest be sub-
stantial) are expressed in the same fashion in both summaries.78 How-
ever, the earlier summary contains language, especially with regard to
the third prong, that the latter summary does not;79 this additional
with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must
directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if
it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose. Sec-
ond, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited re-
striction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
72. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558, 569.
73. Id. at 566-69.
74. Id. at 569.
75. Id. at 570.
76. Id. at 571-72.
77. IL at 564, 566. The earlier summary is quoted in note 71. The latter summary is
the one utilized by the Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch courts. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
78. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, 566.
79. With respect to the third prong, the earlier summary states that "the restriction
must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it
provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose." Id. at 564 (em-
phasis added). Interestingly, most of the subsequent Supreme Court cases cite the abbrevi-
ated latter summary (as do Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch; see supra note 49). See,
e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1589 (1995); United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 424 (1993); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475
(1989); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986); Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,507 (1981). Notably, however, Edenfield
v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993), generally regarded as one of the most pro-free speech deci-
sions, cites the more expansive first summary, id. at 767; see also P. Cameron DeVore &
Robert D. Sack, Advertising and Commercial Speech, in 3 COMMUNICATIONS LAW: 1995, at
51, 95 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course Handbook Se-
ries No. G4-3945, 1995).
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language arguably places a slightly higher burden on the government
to justify commercial speech restrictions.
After the Central Hudson decision, judicial review of commercial
speech restrictions was commonly characterized as intermediate scru-
tiny.80 Though lacking a precise definition,8' a law will generally sur-
vive intermediate scrutiny if it is " 'substantially related to an
important governmental objective.' "8 In order for a restriction on
commercial speech to survive the third prong of the Central Hudson
standard, "[t]he State must assert a substantial interest" and the "reg-
ulatory technique" must "directly advance the state interest in-
volved. ' 8 3 While these two standards appear to be closely related, the
outcomes of post-Central Hudson cases call into question whether
commercial speech regulations are truly scrutinized at an intermediate
levelY4 Ambiguity in the commercial speech doctrine has only be-
come more exaggerated over the years.8 5 But, by separately assem-
bling and comparing the third prong and fourth prong analyses found
80. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1995).
81. See, e.g., ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 70, at 118-19. Rome and Roberts explain
that "[i]n fashioning a standard of judicial review for commercial speech, the Supreme
Court did not start afresh with an untried doctrinal system. Instead, the Court made use of
the existing law concerning judicial review of legislation." It at 117. That existing system
was comprised of three levels: rational relationship, under which legislation must be ar-
guably related to a legitimate governmental purpose; strict scrutiny, under which the legisla-
tion must be necessary to promote a compelling governmental purpose; and intermediate
scrutiny, which falls somewhere in between. Id. at 117-18.
82. Id. at 118 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977)).
83. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980). Rome and Roberts describe the Central Hudson standard as "a hybrid between the
rational relationship standard and the strict scrutiny standard, with the least restrictive
means requirement added on." ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 70, at 119.
84. See Mauro, supra note 70, at 1951-52 (positing that commercial speech had been
relegated to rational basis protection under the standards set by some of the post Central
Hudson cases). But see Robert T. Cahill, Jr., Note, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc.: Towards Heightened Scrutiny For Truthful Commercial Speech?, 28 U. RICH. L.
REv. 225, 251 (1994) (suggesting that the Court was moving toward heightened scrutiny for
commercial speech); Martin B. Marguiles, Free Speech: The Status of the First Amendment,
11 Tougo L. Rv. 341, 355 (1995) (contending that the level of scrutiny applied in com-
mercial speech cases has risen again because of cases decided in 1993).
85. See P. Cameron DeVore, The Two Faces Of Commercial Speech Under The First
Amendment, 12 COMMUNICATIONS LAvYER, Spring 1994, at 1 ("In three 1993 decisions,
the United States Supreme Court once again demonstrated its unpredictable approach to
First Amendment protection of commercial speech."). Those three decisions were United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993), Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761
(1993), and City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). See gener-
ally Denise D. Trumler, Note, Perpetuating Confusion In The Commercial Speech Area:
Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1193, 1213-14 (1993) ("The analysis in
Coors reflects the confusion in the commercial speech area.").
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in post-Central Hudson decisions, the Fourth Circuit's decisions in
Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch can be clearly evaluated.86
The third prong of the Central Hudson test involves two closely
related issues. The first concerns the degree to which the regulation
must "directly advance" the state's interest (labeled herein the "effec-
tiveness" issue). The second concerns the evidentiary standard that
the government must meet to establish that its regulation advances its
interest (labeled herein the "evidence" issue). The manifestations of
both of these third prong issues in post-Central Hudson cases are dis-
cussed in turn.87
The starting point for the effectiveness issue is the Court's state-
ment in Central Hudson that "the regulation may not be sustained if it
provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's pur-
pose."8" Several subsequent cases, however, have made it clear that
the regulation need not effectuate the government's purpose entirely.
For instance, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,8 9 a prohibition
on off-site advertising and signs for the purpose of improving traffic
safety and aesthetics did not fail the third prong of the test even
though on-site advertising and signs were still permitted.90 Similarly,
in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. ,Tourism Co.,91 involving a Pu-
erto Rican statute prohibiting casino advertising for the purpose of
limiting local (as opposed to tourist) demand for gambling,92 the
Court stated that "[w]hether other kinds of gambling are advertised in
Puerto Rico or not, the restrictions on advertising of casino gambling
'directly advance' the legislature's interest in reducing demand for
games of chance. ' 93 Clearly, the support that advertising bans lent to
the government's interest was not to be evaluated by the govern-
ment's eventual success or failure in achieving its stated goal.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 87-128 (concerning the third prong); infra text
accompanying notes 129-45 (concerning the fourth prong).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 88-106 (concerning the effectiveness issue); infra
text accompanying notes 107-28 (concerning the evidence issue).
88. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added); see also id. at 569
("[C]onditional and remote eventualities simply cannot justify silencing appellant's promo-
tional advertising.").
89. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
90. Id. at 510-11. But cf Bolger v. Young's Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)
(stating that "limited incremental support" was not sufficient to show direct advancement
of the government's interest).
91. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
92. Id. at 341.
93. Id. at 342 (citation omitted).
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Likewise, in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,94 the Court
upheld a statute prohibiting a North Carolina radio station from car-
rying advertisements for the Virginia lottery even though the station's
audience was " 'inundated' by the Virginia media carrying lottery ad-
vertisements."95 The Court remarked that it did not "require that the
Government make progress on every front before it can make pro-
gress on any front. If there is an immediate connection between ad-
vertising and demand, and the federal regulation decreases
advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of decreasing demand
for gambling is correspondingly advanced. ' 96 Furthermore, the Court
indicated that it would have upheld the regulation even if it resulted in
an "only marginal advancement of the state's interest. '97
By contrast, the Court set a far more rigorous standard in Eden-
field v. Fane.98 Explicitly addressing the effectiveness issue, the Court
opined that "a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the-harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material de-
gree."9 9 Although the language was undoubtedly intended to fortify
the Central Hudson test,100 "material degree" was neither defined nor
illustrated anywhere in the decision.
The Court's most recent comment on the effectiveness issue came
in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.'01 At issue was a portion of the Fed-
eral Alcohol Administration Act °2 prohibiting the disclosure of the
alcohol content of beer on labels or in advertising. 10 3 The govern-
ment's interest in the ban was preventing "strength wars" between
brewers,1°4 but in the same act the government also required the dis-
closure of alcohol content on wines and distilled spirits."°5 Conse-
quently, the Court "conclude[d] that § 205(e)(2) cannot directly and
94. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
95. Id. at 433.
96. ld. at 434.
97. led at 429 (emphasis added).
98. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
99. Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
100. The "material degree" language came just a few sentences after the Court quoted
the "ineffective or remote support" section of Central Hudson. Id.
101. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
102. 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-219a (1994).
103. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1588; see also 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1994) (statements of alco-
holic content on malt beverage labels prohibited unless required by state law); 27 C.F.R.
§ 7.26(a) (1994) (statements of alcoholic content on beer labels prohibited).
104. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1588.
105. Id. at 1590; see also 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1994) (statements of alcoholic content




materially advance its asserted interest because of the overall irration-
ality of the Government's regulatory scheme."' °6 Thus, the effective-
ness of the regulation was not judged in isolation from other factors
also affecting the government's interest.
Turning to the evidence issue, it is settled law that the govern-
ment always bears the burden of establishing that the regulation in
question advances its interest.10 7 However, it is far less clear what the
government must do to meet this burden. 0 8 The Posadas case, in par-
ticular, created confusion in this area. 09 There, the Court stated that
"[t]he Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed.., that advertising
of casino gambling ... would serve to increase the demand for the
product advertised. We think the legislature's belief is a reasonable
one.. ."10 The Court appeared to allow the regulation to stand based
on nothing more than common assumptions about the effect of
advertising."'
In Edge, the Court echoed the position it took in Posadas when it
determined that a regulation prohibiting lottery advertising from air-
ing on radio stations in non-lottery states was permissible.'12 It stated:
"Congress plainly made the commonsense judgment that each North
Carolina station would have an audience in that State ... and that
enforcing the statutory restriction would... advance the governmen-
tal purpose of supporting North Carolina's laws against gambling.""13
106. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1592 (emphasis added). Though the Court clearly classified
this analysis as an application of the third prong, id. at 1591, its language quoted here
seems to equally implicate a failure by the government to'satisfy the second ("substantial
interest") prong. See DeVore, supra note 38, at 10-11.
107. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993); Bolger v. Young's Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983).
108. See Lloyd B. Snyder, Rhetoric, Evidence, and Bar Agency Restrictions on Speech
by Attorneys, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 357, 358-60 (1995) (arguing that commercial speech
restrictions have been upheld despite a lack of evidentiary support).
109. See DeVore, supra note 38, at 10 ("The Court's 1986 Posadas Puerto Rico casino
gambling decision had ... lent support to regulators who argued for substantial deference
to restrictions on commercial speech about possibly harmful products.").
110. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986). Note,
however, that this portion of the Posadas opinion was severely undercut, though not tech-
nically overruled, in Liquormart. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495,
1511 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 1522 (O'Connor J., concurring in the
judgment) (1996).
111. Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) ("We likewise
hesitate to disagree with the accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers
.... There is nothing here to suggest that these judgments are unreasonable." (footnote
omitted)).
112. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 435-36 (1993).
113. Id. at 428 (emphasis added). But cf id. at 430-32 (recognizing, in the as-applied
challenge, that enforcing the regulation would result in 11% of total radio time in the area
being free of such advertisements).
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Here again, the evidentiary standard the government was required to
meet consisted of little more than simple logic concerning the likely
impact of commercials on the lottery.
In the second of the Court's two 1995 commercial speech deci-
sions,114 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.," 5 the evidence issue received
more extensive treatment. Refuting the claims of a blistering dis-
sent," 6 the majority opinion stated that
we do not read our case law to require that empirical data
come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background informa-
tion. Indeed, in other First Amendment contexts, we have
permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference
to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales alto-
gether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify
restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and "simple
common sense."
117
Though the majority appeared willing to accept common sense
conclusions, the results of several studies conducted by the Florida
Bar Association were in the record." 8 Nevertheless, the evidentiary
standard that the majority espoused as sufficient would have allowed
them to affirm without relying on such evidence." 9
As with the effectiveness issue, Edenfield v. Fane'2 0 is the primary
example of a more stringent third prong evidence standard. In that
case, the Court struck down a Florida Board of Accountancy rule
prohibiting Certified Public Accountants from soliciting business in
person.' 2 ' Elaborating on the requirements of the third prong of the
Central Hudson test, the Justices opined that the State's "burden is
not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmen-
tal body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.' 22 The primary evi-
dence presented by the Florida Board of Accountancy was an affidavit
114. The first 1995 decision was Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
See DeVore, supra note 38, at 9.
115. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
116. See id at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Our cases require something more than
a few pages of self-serving and unsupported statements by the State to demonstrate that a
regulation directly and materially advances the elimination of a real harm.").
117. Il at 2378 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 2377.
119. In fact, the statistical support provided by the studies is subject to question. See
Mitchell, supra note 70, at 1711-12.
120. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
121. Id. at 767.
122. Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added).
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consisting of "conclusory statements that add little if anything to the
Board's original statement of its justifications. "123 Thus, Edenfield ap-
peared to substantially heighten the evidentiary burden the govern-
ment must meet.124
The Coors Court cited the Edenfield evidence standard verbatim
and reinforced it by stating that the-requirement that the government
meet that standard was "vital."'" Additionally, the Coors Court went
out of its way to refute the notion that Posadas and Edge, in particu-
lar, had established a lower burden for the government to meet, not
just with respect to the evidence standard, but with respect to the Cen-
tral Hudson test as a whole. The Court stated: "[T]he government
suggests that legislatures have broader latitude to regulate speech that
promotes socially harmful activities, such as alcohol consump-
tion.... Neither Edge Broadcasting nor Posadas compels us to craft
an exception to the Central Hudson standard, for in both of those
cases we applied the Central Hudson analysis."' 2 6 Hence, Coors, one
of the Court's two 1995 commercial speech cases, 127 supports greater
protection for commercial speech on both third prong issues-evi-
dence and effectiveness.
128
In contrast to the implicit variations of the third prong, the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson test was expressly revised in subsequent
cases. 129 As described in Central Hudson, the test was first thought to
be a "least restrictive means" requirement similar to that applied in
strict scrutiny review.130 Indeed, 'Central Hudson itself declares that
"[i]f the governmental interest could be served as well by a more lim-
ited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions can-
not survive.'
131
123. Id at 771.
124. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)
("Moreover, since the State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, it must affirma-
tively establish the reasonable fit we require." (citation omitted)); DeVore & Sack, supra
note 79, at 150.
125. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1592 (1995).
126. Id at 1589 n.2. Note, however, that both the plurality and a concurring opinion in
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (plurality opinion), representing
eight of the Justices, disparaged the reasoning of Posadas. See, 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at
1511-12; id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
127. The other is Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995). See DeVore,
supra note 38, at 9.
128. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
129. See Mauro, supra note 70, at 1953.
130. ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 70, at 119.
131. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
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Though subsequent commercial speech decisions feigned compli-
ance with this strict standard, 3 ' the Court recognized in Board of
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox 33 that actual ad-
herence to this standard simply had not taken place. The Court ob-
served that its "decisions upholding the regulation of commercial
speech cannot be reconciled with a requirement of least restrictive
means."' 34 Instead, the Court required a reasonable fit between the
ends and the means chosen by the legislature. 35 Therefore, an ordi-
nance will be struck down only when it is "substantially excessive, dis-
regarding 'far less restrictive and more precise means.' 136
Commercial speech cases decided since Fox have uniformly referred
to this standard.
137
To determine whether or not a statute is "substantially exces-
sive," the Court has resorted to consideration of the availability of
alternatives (or lack thereof). In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc.,38 the Court concluded that "if there are numerous and
obvious less burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial
speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining
whether the 'fit' between ends and means is reasonable.' 1 39 Using
this approach, the Coors Court found that the government had not
shown a reasonable fit between its labeling restriction and its interest
132. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 343 (1986) ("We
also think it clear beyond peradventure that the challenged statute and regulations satisfy
the fourth and last step of the Central Hudson analysis, namely, whether the restrictions on
commercial speech are no more extensive than necessary to serve the government's inter-
est."); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981) ("The city has gone
no further than necessary in seeking to meet its ends.").
133. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
134. l at 479; see also id. at 480 ("[W]e have not gone so far as to impose ... that the
manner of restriction [be] absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end.").
135. Ld. at 480; see also Tara L. Lavery, Note, Commercial Speech Suffers A First
Amendment Blow In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 549,
550 (1994).
136. Fox, 492 U.S. at 479 (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 U.S. 468, 476
(1988)); see Mark A. Conrad, Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox-The Dawn of a New Age of Commercial Speech Regulation of Tobacco and Alcohol,
9 CARDOZO ARTS & Ewr. L.J. 61 (1990); Todd J. Locher, Comment, Board of Trustees of
the State University of New York v. Fox: Cutting Back on Commercial Speech Standards,
75 IowA L. REv. 1335 (1990); David Rownd, Comment, Muting the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 38 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 275 (1990).
137. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2380 (1995); United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discov-
ery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 n.11 (1993).
138. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
139. 1d. at 417 n.13. However, the unique facts of Discovery Network may limit the
applicability of this holding. See DeVore, supra note 85, at 24.
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in preventing strength wars. 140 The Court stated: "[T]he availability
of these options, all of which could advance the Government's as-
serted interest in a manner less intrusive to respondent's First Amend-
ment rights, indicates that [the statute] is more extensive than
necessary.'
14 1
However, because evaluating alternatives necessarily requires
dealing with the hypothetical, this approach provides ample basis for
disagreement among the Justices.142 For example, the Court split five
to four in its Florida Bar decision,143 and the contrast between the
majority and the dissenting opinions is quite clear with regard to the
fourth prong. The majority stated that it did "not see 'numerous and
obvious less-burdensome alternatives' to Florida's short temporal
ban."'" The dissent, however, concluded that "it should not be hard
to imagine the contours of a regulation that satisfies the reasonable fit
requirement,' '1 45 although it did not propose one. Nonetheless, the
availability of alternatives standard is the only approach articulated by
the Court to date.
Thus, given the variability in the Court's approach to both the
third and fourth prongs, the range of restrictions on commercial
speech that might or might not pass constitutional muster is rather
broad. The Supreme Court's decisions in Posadas (1986) and Fox
(1989) opened the door for ordinances such as Baltimore's to enter
the domain of permissible speech restriction. 46 The 1993 decisions
(Discovery Network, Edenfield, and Edge) sent mixed. messages,147
while the 1995 cases (Coors, Florida Bar) "reaffirmed" those prece-
dents that had "stiffened" the level of scrutiny compelled by Central
140. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593 (1995) ("In response, respon-
dent suggests several alternatives, such as directly limiting the alcohol content of beers,
prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcoh6l strength... or limiting the labeling
ban only to malt liquors.").
141. Id. at 1593-94.
142. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed: "The final part of the Court's test thus leaves
room for so many hypothetical 'better' ways that any ingenious lawyer will surely seize on
one of them." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
599-600 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2373 (1995). Note that the Florida
Bar Court renumbered the four-part Central Hudson test by considering the first prong
(speech concerning lawful activity that was not misleading) a threshold issue to what it
labeled the remaining three-part test. Id. at 2376; see also supra text accompanying note 51
(quoting the four-part Central Hudson test).
144. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993)).
145. Id. at 2385 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
146. See Conrad, supra note 136, at 94; Mauro, supra note 70, at 1933-40.
147. See DeVore & Sack, supra note 79, at 148.
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Hudson.l's Nevertheless, the boundaries of the permissible range of
restrictions are still best exemplified by the 1993 Edenfield and Edge
decisions, Edenfield representing the most protection afforded com-
mercial speech and Edge representing the least. 149 If Baltimore's or-
dinances were judged to meet the higher standard articulated by
Edenfield and similar cases, they would clearly be within the realm of
permissible commercial speech infringement. However, the Fourth
Circuit's decisions in Anheuser-Busch and Penn Advertising are so
lacking in support that they fail to boost the ordinances over even the
lower threshold of Edge.150
In considering what this Note has labeled the effectiveness issue
under the third prong, the Anheuser-Busch court noted that children
would be exposed to alcoholic beverage advertising simply by going
outdoors and that the City Council had pointed to studies correlating
underage drinking to such advertising. 5' Then, however, the court
stated that "it is not necessary... to prove conclusively that the corre-
lation in fact exists, or that the steps undertaken will solve the prob-
lem.' 1 52 Clearly, such a standard differs dramatically from Edenfield's
"alleviate ... to a material degree" test.' 53 It also arguably fails to
meet the "marginal advancement" standard of Edge' 54-it is possible
a legislature could have a reasonable belief even when no correlation
existed in fact. Nonetheless, given the number of cases that accept
without controversy the proposition that advertising bans reduce de-
148. DeVore, supra note 38, at 10.
149. The continued precedential value of Edge was affirmed in Coors: "Neither Edge
Broadcasting nor Posadas compels us to craft an exception to the Central Hudson standard,
for in both of those cases we applied the Central Hudson analysis." Rubin v. Coors Brew-
ing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1589 (1995). Interestingly, despite their differing standards, Edge
and Edenfield were decided within two months of each other: United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 416 (June 25, 1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (April 26,
1993).
150. See DeVore, supra note 38, at 37-38 ("[Tjhe Anheuser-Busch opinion ... exceeds
the pre-Rubin deference to state regulation of allegedly harmful substances under Posadas
and Edge."); Jeffrey S. Edelstein, New Limitations On Commercial Speech, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
20, 1995, at 3 ("It is difficult to reconcile these Fourth Circuit decisions with precedent.");
infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
151. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1314.
152. Id.; see Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325.
153. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71; see supra text accompanying note 99.




mand,'155 Baltimore might well have prevailed as a matter of law even
if the Fourth Circuit used a formulation more like the one in Edge.156
It is with regard to the evidence issue that the Fourth Circuit's
decisions seem particularly suspect. In this area, the Fourth Circuit
abdicated virtually all power of review: "If it appears that the legisla-
tive body could reasonably have believed ...that the legislation
would directly advance a substantial governmental interest, the gov-
ernment's burden of justifying it is met."' 57 By contrast, even though
the Posadas Court accepted the legislature's assumption that advertis-
ing would increase demand for gambling, it still made an independent
evaluation of the legislature's conclusion. 5 ' The Fourth Circuit's dis-
posal of the Anheuser-Busch case on a 12(b)(6) motion seems very
questionable; none of the major precedents upholding commercial
speech restrictions were decided at such an early phase in the litiga-
tion. 5 9 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's action contradicts the
Supreme Court's edict that courts are to use intermediate scrutiny
when reviewing commercial speech restrictions. 60 One commentator
155. See Edge, 509 U.S. at 434; Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328, 342 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
569 (1980).
156. Indeed, the "as a matter of law" standard is precisely what the court used.
Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d
490 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691 (1984)). The Anheuser-Busch court stated: "[W]e hold, as a matter of law,
that prohibitions against the advertising of alcoholic beverages are reasonably related to
reducing the sale and consumption of those beverages and their attendant problems." Id.
(emphasis added). Note, however, that the Tenth Circuit found "reasonable relation," not
"direct and material advancement." Id.
For an argument that cigarette advertising restrictions should not be readily found to
advance a governmental interest in reducing teenage smoking, see Ludwikowski, supra
note 11, at 113 ("Whether or not tobacco advertising intends or actually causes increased
consumption, a problem remains in establishing the nexus between advertising and con-
sumption of tobacco products by minors, particularly because minors are prohibited by law
from purchasing tobacco products.").
157. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1311; see Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1323. Moreover,
litigants "cannot subject legislative findings themselves to judicial review under a clearly
erroneous standard or otherwise." Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1323; Anheuser-Busch, 63
F.3d at 1312.
158. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986) ("We
think the legislature's belief is a reasonable one.").
159. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2374 (1995) (summary judgment
for plaintiff at district court level); Edge, 509 U.S. at 424-25 (judgment for defendant at
district court level); Board of Trustees of the University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
472 (1989) (judgment for defendant after a trial at district court level); Posadas, 478 U.S. at
336-37 (judgment for defendant at trial court level); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 497 (1981) (summary judgment for plaintiff at trial level after extensive
discovery).
160. See, eg., Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2375.
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warned that-if courts upheld such speech constraints "without scruti-
nizing the basis and extent of the restrictions, the Central Hudson test
may well become illusory."'
161
Finally, a strong argument can be made that the Fourth Circuit's
decision also fails to square with prior interpretations of Central Hud-
son's fourth prong. The court admits that other "approaches might
indeed prove beneficial in reducing underage drinking," but they do
not regard these approaches as "numerous and obvious less burden-
some alternatives" because they do not address "curbing the entice-
ment to consume alcoholic beverages."'162 This narrow analysis is
directly contradicted by Coors, a precedent that the Fourth Circuit
virtually ignored. 163 In Coors, the availability of other options that
met the government's goal without intruding on First Amendment
rights was fundamental to the Court's decision to overturn the restric-
tion.164 Other options that Baltimore could pursue include waging an
aggressive anti-smoking/anti-drinking campaign in schools, imposing a
higher tax on cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, and increased en-
forcement of existing laws prohibiting sales of such items to minors.165
The approach taken in the Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch
decisions does not find adequate support anywhere in the existing
commercial speech doctrine. Even by the lax standards of Edge, satis-
faction of the third prong of the Central Hudson test requires that a
court actively find that the restriction directly advances a substantial
government interest, not that the court simply defer to the legisla-
ture's judgment. Similarly, satisfaction of the fourth prong requires
that the court make an honest assessment of other, non-speech im-
pinging alternatives. By failing to perform either of these obligations,
the Fourth Circuit added insult to injury and arrived at a decision that
overstepped the limits of the commercial speech doctrine. Indeed, it
161. Edelstein, supra note 150, at A12; see also DeVore, supra note 38, at 36-37 (label-
ing the Fourth Circuit's approach an "evasion of application of a First Amendment eviden-
tiary burden of proof" and a negation of courts' constitutional duty to audit legislative
regulation of speech).
162. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1316 (emphasis added).
163. The Coors case, handed down after oral arguments in Penn Advertising and
Anheuser-Busch, but before publication of those decisions, is mentioned by the Fourth
Circuit only once in passing. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1315 n.5. A similar oversight
occurred with respect to President Clinton's proposed regulations. See supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text. "A First Amendment analysis apparently prepared by FDA staff in
support of the proposal relied heavily on Posadas and Edge Broadcasting,. . . cited [Coors]
only with regard to Central Hudson part four, and made no reference to [Coors'] specific
limitations on Posadas and Edge." DeVore & Sack, supra note 79, at 548.
164. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593-94 (1995).
165. See Ludwikowski, supra note 11, at 116.
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is likely that it was for these reasons and not for any advancement of
the doctrine in Liquormart that the Supreme Court instructed the
Fourth Circuit to reconsider.
THOMAS D. BLUE, JR.
State v. Rush: Admissibility of Out-of-Court Spousal
Statements in the Post-Freeman Context of North
Carolina Marital Privilege Law
Be courteous to all, but intimate with few, and let those few be
well tried before you give them your confidence. True friend-
ship is a plant of slow growth, and must undergo and with-
stand the shocks of adversity before it is entitled to the
appellation.'
Consider the following: One day Susan comes home from work
to find a bloody knife on her kitchen counter. Because her husband,
John, sometimes hunts and skins animals for food (and because he
rarely cleans up after himself), she thinks nothing of it and washes the
knife. Before long a police officer knocks on the door, asking Susan if
she has seen a knife, possibly one recently used by her husband. She
gets the knife for the officer and tells him that when she found it cov-
ered in blood, she assumed it had recently been used by John. John is
subsequently arrested for the murder of Pat, who was stabbed to
death earlier that day. Susan asserts the marital privilege to avoid
testifying against her husband. The prosecution wishes to examine the
officer regarding Susan's statements about the knife, but John claims
that this is the equivalent of forcing his spouse to testify against him in
violation of the marital privilege. Without the officer's testimony re-
lating to the recovery of the murder weapon in the home of the de-
fendant, the state's case is fatally weak. Should the prosecution be
allowed to present this evidence against John? The North Carolina
Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Rush2 held that the marital
privilege does not exclude non-confidential out-of-court statements
such as the comments Susan made to the police officer.
This Note examines the impact of the court's holding in Rush on
North Carolina's marital privilege doctrine. It first explains the facts
and procedural history of Rush to the extent that they are relevant to
the case 4 and summarizes the court's resolution of the issue of the
marital privilege doctrine in North Carolina.5 The Note then in-
troduces and explains the various marital privileges and characterizes
1. Letter from George Washington (Jan. 15, 1783), in THE HOME BOOK OF AMERI.
CAN QUOTATIONS, at 171 (Bruce Bohle ed. 1967).
2. 340 N.C. 174, 456 S.E.2d 819 (1995).
3. Id at 182, 456 S.E.2d at 824.
4. See infra notes 10-33 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
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each as an individual doctrine.6 It traces a line of case law that leads
up to the court's decision, as well as the statutory precedent that helps
define the scope of the holding.7 The Note then examines the court's
reasoning and evaluates whether Rush clarifies the law in this area.8
Finally, this Note analyzes the North Carolina law of marital privilege
as it emerges from Rush, encompassing both the rule against adverse
spousal testimony and the confidential communications privilege.9
At the murder trial of Johnny Karl Rush,"° the prosecution
presented evidence that tended to show that the defendant and a
friend, Bryan Bobbitt, left a cookout around midnight and sat in the
road drinking beer." Shortly thereafter, the victim, Strickland, joined
them, and Strickland and Rush began to argue.12 Strickland accused
Rush of always "hiding behind his gun or knife,"'13 and Rush re-
sponded to the comment by handing his gun and pocketknife to Bob-
bitt. 4 Rush then turned and walked home. 5 Ten minutes later, the
prosecution claimed that Rush returned to the road where Strickland
and Bobbitt were still sitting with his wife yelling after him: "Do not
do this. Think about your son."' 6 Rush then pointed a nine-millime-
ter semiautomatic pistol at Strickland and shot and killed him.17
6. See infra notes 52-84 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 85-118 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
10. A detailed recitation of the facts is submitted here because the information is rele-
vant to the court's standard of review. The defendant did not object to the admission of his
wife's statements to the 911 operator, and thus the error was not preserved for appellate
review. Rush, 340 N.C. at 179, 456 S.E.2d at 822. Assignments of error to evidentiary
matters not preserved for appeal are reviewable ohly under the plain error rule. See State
v. Black, 308 N.C. 736,740-41,303 S.E.2d 804,806-07 (1983). According to this standard of
review, the defendant can prevail only if he proves that the trial court committed error,
and that the error most likely caused the jury to reach its decision. See State v. Jordan, 333
N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993). Therefore, the facts are crucial to the ultimate
disposition of the defendant's case, because even assuming error, the court must inquire
into the jury's consideration of all the other evidence. Rush, 340 N.C. at 182-83, 456 S.E.2d
at 824; see infra notes 4347 and accompanying text (explaining the court's application of
the plain error standard of review to the facts of the case).
11. Rush, 340 N.C. at 176, 456 S.E.2d at 820-21.
12. Id. Bobbitt testified that Strickland and the defendant had a history of tension
toward one another. Id. Rush testified that the source of the antagonism was Strickland's
habit of ridiculing his limp, which was the result of an accident he had suffered some time
ago. Id. at 178, 456 S.E.2d at 822. Strickland had been violent toward him in the past, and
because of his enhanced vulnerability, Rush always carried weapons for protection. Id.
13. Id& at 176, 456 S.E.2d at 821.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 183, 456 S.E.2d at 825.
17. Id. at 176-77, 456 S.E.2d at 821.
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The defense claimed that about twenty minutes after arguing with
Strickland and returning home, Rush looked out his window and saw
Bobbitt and Strickland still sitting by the road.'8 Worried that some-
one might pass out in the street, Rush went back outside.19 Although
he already had one gun in his belt, he picked up another on his way
out, as a matter of habit.20 Rush testified that when he told his friend
to go inside, Strickland again became angry, grabbing Rush's lame leg,
and yelling, "I'm going to kill you, mother f- ."1 Rush claimed he
was afraid for his life when he pulled out his gun and shot Strick-
land.22 Rush reported the shooting to a 911 operator, who instructed
him to wait for the police to arrive.2 3 The operator then spoke to the
defendant's wife who said, among other things, to the operator: "How
can he do this?" 24
The jury found Rush guilty of first degree murder and sentenced
him to life imprisonment.2 5 Rush appealed to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina. 6 He assigned as error the admission into evidence of
a tape of the 911 operator's conversation with Ms. Rush,27 as well as
the admission of his wife's statements made shortly before the mur-
der.28 Though he made no objection at trial to the admission of Ms.
18. Id. at 178-79, 456 S.E.2d at 822.
19. Id. According to both the state and the defense, Bobbitt, who was the primary
witness for the prosecution, was highly intoxicated. Id. at 176, 456 S.E.2d at 821. The par-
ties also agreed that while the defendant had been drinking, he was lucid. Id. at 178, 456
S.E.2d at 821.
20. Id. at 179, 456 S.E.2d at 822.
21. Id
22. Id.
23. Id. at 177, 456 S.E.2d at 821.
24. Id. at 179, 456 S.E.2d at 821. Ms. Rush also asked the dispatcher if she would be
required to accompany her husband to the police station. Id.
25. Id. at 176, 456 S.E.2d. at 822.
26. Id. Rush's case was not heard by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, because he
appealed directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-27(a) (1995). Id.
27. Rush, 340 N.C. at 179, 456 S.E.2d at 822.
28. Id at 183, 456 S.E.2d at 825. The court applied different standards of review to the
two sets of statements; the defendant did not object to the admission of his wife's state-
ments to the 911 operator but did object to the prosecution's use of the statements his wife
made before the murder. Id. The court did not apply the "plain error" rule to the admis-
sion of the statements Ms. Rush made before the murder in which she allegedly pleaded
with her husband not to "do this" and to "think about [his] son." Id. During the cross-
examination of the defendant, the prosecutor asked the defendant about these statements.
Id. The defendant objected to the question which was sustained. Id. However, after a voir
dire, the trial court ruled that the prosecutor could pursue the line of questioning. Id. The
defendant excepted "on the grounds that the spouse's statement could not be compelled as
evidence against the defendant." Id
On appeal, the court, assuming the prosecutor's question had been improper, con-
cluded that "the error was not prejudicial ... the test is whether there is a reasonable
[Vol. 742110
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Rush's statements to the 911 operator, Rush maintained that under
section 8-57 of the North Carolina General Statutes2 9 a spouse cannot
be compelled to testify against a defendant spouse,30 and therefore the
trial court had committed reversible error by admitting the statements
to the 911 operator.31 In North Carolina, if evidence is admitted in
violation of a state statute, the error is automatically preserved for
appellate review;32 otherwise, the defendant's failure to object renders
the error reviewable only under a plain error standard.33
In determining that Ms. Rush's statements were admissible, the
court emphasized its holding in State v. Freeman,34 which modified the
common-law rule that prevented adverse spousal testimony in crimi-
possibility that had the error not occurred, the jury would have reached a different result
.... Defendant has failed to carry that burden." Id
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1986) provides:
(a) The spouse of the defendant shall be a competent witness for the defendant
in all criminal actions, but the failure of the defendant to call such spouse as a
witness shall not be used against him. Such spouse is subject to cross-exami-
nation as are other witnesses.
(b) The spouse of the defendant shall be competent but not compellable to testify
for the State against the defendant in any criminal action or grand jury pro-
ceedings, except that the spouse of the defendant shall be both competent
and compellable to so testify:
(1) In a prosecution for bigamy or criminal cohabitation, to prove the fact of
marriage and facts tending to show the absence of divorce or annulment;
(2) In a prosecution for assaulting or communicating a threat to the other
spouse;
(3) In a prosecution for trespass in or upon the separate lands or residence of
the other spouse when living separate and apart from each other by mu-"
tual consent or court order;
(4) In a prosecution for abandonment of or failure to provide support for the
other spouse or their child;
(5) In a prosecution of one spouse for any other criminal offense against the
minor child of either spouse, including any illegitimate or adopted or fos-
ter child of either spouse.
(c) No husband or wife shall be compellable in any event to disclose any confi-
dential communication made by one to the other during their marriage.
30. Rush, 340 N.C. at 179,456 S.E.2d at 822-23. Rush relied specifically on N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-57(b), which provides: "The spouse of the defendant shall be competent but not
compellable to testify for the State against the defendant in any criminal action." Id. at 181,
456 S.E.2d at 823; see also supra note 29 (citing the full text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57).
31. Rush, 340 N.C. at 179-80, 456 S.E.2d at 822-23.
32. See State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 39, 331 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1985) (stating that when a
trial court errs in contravention of a state statute, the error is preserved for appellate re-
view regardless of whether the defendant entered objection at trial); see also State v. War-
ren, 236 N.C. 358, 360, 72 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1952) (holding that defendant is entitled to a
new trial where statutorily forbidden evidence was admitted and no objection was noted; it
is the duty of the trial judge to prevent the introduction of such evidence and failure to do
so must be held for reversible error).
33. See Rush, 340 N.C. at 179-80, 456 S.E2d at 822-23.
34. 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981).
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nal cases. 35 The Freeman court found that the policy of protecting
communications within the marital relationship could be promoted by
a rule of spousal incompetency only in the case of "confidential com-
munications" between marriage partners.36 In response to this change
in the common law, the North Carolina legislature amended section 8-
57(b) to provide that a spouse shall be competent to testify against a
defendant spouse, but may not be compelled to do So.37
The Rush court also analyzed whether the admission of the 911
tape had compelled Ms. Rush to "testify" against the defendant ,
The court reasoned that the testimony of a third person as to the out-
of-court statements of another does not cause the declarant to "tes-
tify" within the meaning of the statute; therefore, the court found no
violation of section 8-57(b). 9
Having determined that the statute did not compel exclusion of
Ms. Rush's statements, the court then looked to the common-law rule
of spousal privilege.40 The court reasoned that barring the admission
of such statements would defeat the administration of justice without
advancing in any way the purposes for which the privilege had been
35. See infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text (analyzing more completely the
court's decision in Freeman, particularly as it relates to the reasoning in the Rush case).
36. Freeman, 302 N.C. at 595-96,276 S.E.2d at 453; see supra notes 69-84 and accompa-
nying text (explaining "confidential communications").
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(b) (1986); see supra note 29 (quoting the full text of the
statute). Prior to the amendment, § 8-57 provided: "Nothing herein shall render any
spouse competent or compellable to give evidence against the other spouse in any criminal
action or proceeding . . . ." Act of Mar. 30, 1967, ch. 116, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 177
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1986)).
38. Rush, 340 N.C. at 181, 456 S.E.2d at 823.
39. Id. The court defined "testify" as "to make a solemn declaration, under oath or
affirmation, in a judicial inquiry, for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Id.
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICrMONARY 1476 (6th ed. 1990)). Ms. Rush, therefore, did not
"testify" when she made the statements to the operator over the telephone, and the only
solemn declaration made under oath was that of the witness who authenticated the tape at
trial. Id. The court also noted that § 8-57(c), which declares the incompetency of testi-
mony concerning confidential communications between spouses was not implicated be-
cause the defendant had conceded that the comments of Ms. Rush to the 911 dispatcher
were not "confidential communications." Id.; see infra note 127 and accompanying text
(explaining why Rush did not argue that his wife's comments were protected by the confi-
dential communications privilege). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(c) provides: "No husband or
wife shall be compellable in any event to disclose any confidential communication made by
one to the other during their marriage."
40. Rush, 340 N.C. at 181-82, 456 S.E.2d at 824; see State v. Josey, 328 N.C. 697, 704,
403 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1991) (asserting that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 "is a declaration that,
with some exceptions, the common law rule of spousal privilege applies"); State v. Free-
man, 302 N.C. 591, 594, 276 S.E.2d 450, 452-53 (1981) (holding that the common law rules
of spousal competency remain in effect, except as they are modified by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-57).
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retained under Freeman.4 Finding no compulsion in introducing the
out-of-court statements through a third party, the court held that the
admission of the statements was consistent with the policy underlying
the common-law privilege against adverse spousal testimony.42
Finally, the Rush court considered "whether [the statements]
were relevant and offered for either a nonhearsay purpose or under
an exception to the hearsay rule."'43 Because the court interpreted
section 8-57 as not proscribing the admission of Ms. Rush's state-
ments,44 the error was not preserved, and was thus subject only to
plain error review.4 5 Applying this standard, the court assumed argu-
endo that the comments were inadmissible but nonetheless concluded
that the record contained ample additional evidence upon which the
jury could have found premeditation and deliberation. 6 Therefore,
the court held that the admission of the out-of-court statements of Ms.
Rush to the 911 operator was not reversible error.47
Because Freeman transformed the marital privilege rule, the ad-
missibility of non-confidential, extra-judicial statements of a spouse
against a defendant spouse introduced through a third party was an
issue of first impression in North Carolina.48 The Rush court resolved
41. Rush, 340 N.C. at 181-82, 456 S.E.2d at 824.
42. 1&
43. Id, at 182, 456 S.E.2d at 824; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the operation of and the reasoning for the court's employment of the plain error
standard of review).
44. Rush, 340 N.C. at 179-82, 456 S.E.2d at 822-24.
45. 1a at 180, 456 S.E.2d at 823. Under this standard, a court considers first whether
the introduction of the evidence was error and secondly whether, despite the error, the jury
could have been expected to reach the same verdict. Id
46. Id at 182-83, 456 S.E.2d at 824. The court considered, for example, a statement
Rush gave to the police on the night of the murder in which he admitted that he retrieved
his gun from his house and shot Strickland because he sought an end to Strickland's con-
stant harassment of him. Id at 183, 456 S.E.2d at 824. The court also noted that the
physical evidence corroborated this initial version of events, and the court found that the
contrary claim of self-defense offered by the defendant at trial was therefore easily discred-
ited. Id Also, although the court did not consider this factor, Ms. Rush's plea to her
husband "not [to] do this" and to "think about [their] son" seems to be fairly convincing
evidence of premeditation and deliberation, as well as strong evidence in defeat of the
defendant's self-defense claim. Id at 183, 456 S.E.2d at 825.
47. Id at 183, 456 S.E.2d at 824.
48. Id. at 181,456 S.E.2d at 824. Pre-Freeman decisions addressed the admissibility of
out-of-court statements made by a spouse, but were premised on the now-discarded com-
mon-law rule of the incompetency of adverse spousal testimony. See, e.g., State v. Suits,
296 N.C. 553, 557-58, 251 S.E.2d 607, 609-10 (1979) (holding that the testimony of a police
officer relating spouse's assertive action was inadmissible because incompetent); State v.
Cousin, 291 N.C. 413, 417-18, 230 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1976) (holding that, despite the incom-
petency of adverse spousal testimony, evidence procured as a result of spouse's voluntary
statements to police was admissible against defendant-spouse); State v. Dillahunt, 244 N.C.
524, 525, 94 S.E.2d 479, 479-80 (1956) (finding evidence of spouse's statement through
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the issue by applying the same reasoning used to limit the bounds of
the spousal privilege in Freeman.49 Like the Freeman court, the court
in Rush considered the policy behind the spousal privilege of allowing
"marriage partners to speak freely to each other in confidence without
fear of being thereafter confronted with the confession in litigation.""0
The court concluded that "[a]lowing the admission of non-confiden-
tial, out-of-court statements made by a spouse and introduced against
the defendant spouse for the state through a third party promotes the
administration of justice without infringing on the confidence of the
marital relationship."'
The court's analysis in Rush reflects a judicial tendency to inter-
mingle three separate doctrines that historically comprised the com-
mon law of marital privilege. The first of the three forms was the
spousal incompetency rule, which forbade the testimony of one spouse
either for or against the other spouse.52 This doctrine was premised on
the evidentiary rule that prohibited the testimony of interested par-
ties,53 as well as on the belief that a husband and wife shared a single
legal existence.54 Because a defendant was unable to testify on his
third party witness inadmissible because of incompetency); State v. Warren, 236 N.C. 358,
359-60, 72 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1952) (finding testimony of police officer as to spouse's incrimi-
nating statement to be inadmissible due to incompetence).
49. Rush, 340 N.C. at 182, 456 S.E.2d at 824; see infra notes 131-33 and accompanying
text (comparing the Rush and Freeman decisions).
50. Rush, 340 N.C. at 182, 456 S.E.2d at 824.
51. Id
52. See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 162, 188 S.E.2d 317, 321 (1972) (noting
that "[a]t common law husband and wife were absolutely incompetent to testify in an ac-
tion to which either was a party"); 1 E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LrrrL.TON § 6b
(1628) ("It hath been resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against
or for her husband.").
53. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); see Michael W. Mullane, Tram-
mel v. United States: Bad History, Bad Policy, and Bad Law, 47 ME. L. REv. 105, 125
(1995) (noting that early English common law presumed that the testimony of parties hav-
ing an interest in the case would lack reliability). The testimony of those interested in
protecting people with whom they share intimate bonds was viewed with particular suspi-
cion. Id. at 126.
54. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; see, e.g., Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 150, 52
S.E.2d 350, 351 (1949) (noting that "[a]t common law the husband and wife were consid-
ered one,- the legal existence of the wife during coverture being merged in that of the
husband"). Medieval law generally reflected the notion that a husband and wife were one,
and that the "one" was the husband. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44. Modern courts recog-
nize this concept as a relic of the past. Id at 52 ("Nowhere in the common-law world-
indeed in any modem society-is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a
separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human be-
ing."). But see Mullane, supra note 53, at 122 nn.73-74 (claiming that a society can be
"modem" without adhering to a "presumption of sexual equality," and suggesting that
"the medieval courts [may have] accorded wives somewhat more recognition than is sug-
gested by the Court in Trammel").
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own behalf, his wife, deemed to be an extension of him, was likewise a
forbidden witness.55 The spousal incompetency rule addressed itself
not to the preservation of harmony between spouses, but to the risk
that the evidence would be unreliable or unduly prejudicial.56
The common-law rule of spousal incompetency is now defunct in
all states, including North Carolina.57 When courts abandoned the
rule that a defendant was an incompetent witness, the common law
still recognized the incompatible rule of spousal incompetency.
58
However, because the defendant was no longer considered untrust-
worthy and was allowed to testify for himself, the justification for dis-
qualifying his spouse ceased to exist. North Carolina's response to
this inconsistency was the pre-Freeman version of section 8-57, which
provided that a spouse was a competent witness for, but not against,
the defendant-spouse.59  Thereafter, the North Carolina courts ap-
plied the second doctrine of marital privilege, the rule against adverse
spousal testimony, as opposed to complete spousal incompetency.60
55. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.
56. See Mullane, supra note 53, at 124.
57. See State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 596-97 & n.1, 276 S.E.2d 450, 452-54 & n.1
(1981). However, most states did not reject the spousal incompetency rule until well into
the nineteenth century. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2227, 2228, 2245
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (describing the historical phases of the spousal incompentency
rule and its abolition). In fact, it was not abolished in federal courts until 1933. See Funk
v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380-87 (1933).
58. See American Bar Association Committee on the Improvements in the Law of Evi-
dence, Report, in 63 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssoCzATON 570, 594-95 (1938)
(reporting that at common law, spouses were forbidden to testify either for or against one
another but that by 1938, this rule of disqualification had long been abolished in almost all
states).
59. Act of Mar. 30, 1967, ch. 116, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 177 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(1986)). See State v. Alford, 274 N.C. 125, 127-33, 161 S.E.2d
575, 577-81 (1968) (stating the common-law rule against adverse spousal testimony, but
holding that the statutory exception for divorced spouses applies); State v. Rice, 222 N.C.
634, 635-36, 24 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1943) (holding that refusal to allow spouse to testify is
error).
60. A rule against adverse spousal testimony, however, has its own specific policy and
most likely existed before the rule of spousal incompetency. See Mullane, supra note 53, at
127-28; 8 WIOMORE, supra note 57, § 2234. Courts in general have a history of blurring the
lines between these two forms of marital privilege. See E.C. Sanderson, Note, Evidence-
Privileged Communications Between Husband and Wife, 15 N.C. L. REV. 282, 283 n.2
(1937). Commentators have suggested that the doctrinal confusion may stem from Lord
Coke's 1628 pronouncement of a rule of disqualification of favorable spousal testimony, in
which he simultaneously referred to the already recognized privilege of the defendant
spouse to refuse such testimony. See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Note, State v. Freeman: Adverse
Marital Testimony in North Carolina Criminal Actions-Can Spousal Testimony Be Com-
pelled? 60 N.C. L. REV. 874, 877 n.29 (1982) (citing 1 COKE, supra note 52, § 6b)).
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The common-law rule against adverse spousal testimony6' pro-
hibits either spouse from testifying against the other in a criminal pro-
ceeding,6' promoting an interest in preserving peace within the
marriage.63 In most jurisdictions today, it functions more like an evi-
dentiary privilege than a rule.' 4 Rather than operating as a per se
prohibition, the rule against adverse spousal testimony usually allows
such testimony if the witness spouse raises no objection.65 Because
adverse spousal testimony is presumably reliable, allowing its admis-
sion strikes a balance between the judicial search for the truth and the
protection through the law of the marriage relationship. 66 In this re-
spect, the privilege against adverse spousal testimony is distinguish-
able from the old rule of spousal incompetency. While the
incompetency rule served to eliminate a perceived risk of allowing un-
61. The rule against adverse spousal testimony is also known as the "privilege for anti-
marital facts." See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2227.
62. See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 528 (1960) (defining the rule against
adverse spousal testimony as a bar to admission of even voluntary testimony of a witness
spouse if such testimony tends to incriminate defendant spouse); Hawkins v. United States,
358 U.S. 74, 77-79 (1958) (allowing defendant's spouse to testify against him was reversible
error). At this writing, only four states continue to employ a rule of incompetency for
adverse spousal testimony. See HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 621-18 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.42 (Anderson Supp. 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5913 (1978); Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-12-104 (1977).
63. See Nehf, supra note 60, at 881-82; see generally Mullane, supra note 53, at 135-61
(discussing a vast array of moralistic policies behind the marital privileges). However,
many authors have argued that the commonly proffered reasons for the privilege are insuf-
ficient to justify its negative effects on the administration of justice. See, e.g., 5 JEREMY
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 340 (1827) (arguing that the privilege sur-
passes the boundaries of making "every man's house his castle," and allows a person to
convert her home into a "den of thieves," assuring to every married individual "one safe
and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for every imaginable crime"); CHARLES
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 61, at 139 (E.
Cleary ed. 1972); WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2228; Joseph A. Fawal, Note, Questioning the
Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern World, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 307,318-21
(1976). But see Note, Federal Courts: Adverse Testimony by Spouse of Accused in a Crimi-
nal Prosecution, 24 CAL. L. REV. 472, 474 (1936) (criticizing these arguments for their
assumptions that the accused is guilty, and that her spouse's incriminating statements will
therefore lead the court to the truth, when the presumption of the law should be that the
accused is innocent).
64. A rule generally seeks to exclude evidence of which the court is suspicious and
thus forbids the factfinder's consideration of the evidence, whether or not the parties ob-
ject to its admission. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 272 N.C. 463, 468, 158 S.E.2d 626, 629-30
(1968) (finding reversible error in simply calling the spouse of the defendant to the stand).
A privilege, on the other hand, confers upon its holder the ability, but not the obligation, to
prevent the introduction of otherwise competent evidence. See, e.g., State v. Waters, 308
N.C. 348, 355-56, 302 S.E.2d 188, 193-94 (1983) (holding that adverse spousal testimony is
admissible if witness-spouse waives her privilege not to testify).
65. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958) (indicating that adverse
spousal testimony is admissible if both spouses consent).
66. See Mullane, supra note 53, at 130.
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reliable testimony to fall into the hands of the factfinder, the privilege
against adverse testimony protects the sanctity of marriage at the cost
of concealing what is likely to be truthful information from the
factfinder.67 However, both the incompetency rule and the rule
against adverse testimony are conditioned upon a presumption of loy-
alty between spouses. In either case, if the adverse testimony is volun-
teered, it may be that the presumption has been rebutted.68
The confidential communications privilege is the third form of
the marital privilege. By excluding evidence of communications be-
tween spouses which are "induced by the marital relationship and
prompted by the affection, confidence, and loyalty engendered by
such relationship, 69 the confidential communications privilege en-
courages unfettered communication between marriage partners.70
The privilege is rooted in four basic assumptions: (1) the communica-
tions originate in confidence; (2) confidence is essential to the marital
relationship; (3) the marital relationship is a proper object of encour-
agement by the law; and (4) the general injury that would accrue to
marriage relationships by disclosure is probably greater than the bene-
fit that would result from judicial investigation of the truth.7'
The confidential communications privilege is often confused with
the rule against adverse spousal testimony, though each is based on a
different policy interest. The rule against adverse testimony excludes
the spouse's testimony in order to avoid hostility that may result
within a marriage from the compulsion of adverse testimony itself.72
However, the confidential communications privilege addresses the
chilling effect on communication within a marriage that may result
from the threat of such compulsion in the future.73 Furthermore, the
confidential communications privilege is narrower than the rule
67. Id. at 131-35
68. Many jurisdictions, including North Carolina, have taken this view and have tai-
lored the rule against adverse spousal testimony to apply where the prosecution seeks to
compel the defendant's spouse to take the stand, but not where the defendant unilaterally
seeks to prevent his spouse from testifying against him. See State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 709
n.1, 360 S.E.2d 660, 662 n.1 (1987); State v. Waters, 308 N.C. 348, 356, 302 S.E.2d 188, 193-
94 (1983).
69. State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 598, 276 S.E.2d 450, 454 (1981).
70. Sanderson, supra note 60, at 283 ("The social gain to be fostered is complete confi-
dence between spouses.").
71. See Alicia Brown, Comment, State v. Hurley: Erosion of the Marital Privilege for
Confidential Communications in Tennessee, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 835, 837 (1994); see also 8
WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2228 (describing policies behind spousal incompetency rule).
72. See, e.g., State v. Thorne, 260 P.2d 331, 336 (Wash. 1953) (distinguishing policy
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against adverse testimony in that it applies only to those facts which
are the subjects of confidential communications between marriage
partners.74 It is also broader in the sense that it can apply to spousal
testimony that is not necessarily damaging to the defendant's case,75
or to cases in which neither spouse is an interested party.
76
The lack of judicial familiarity with the confidential communica-
tions privilege that has caused it to be confused with the adverse
spousal testimony doctrine is partly attributable to prolonged enforce-
ment of both the rule against adverse spousal testimony and the
spousal incompetency rule.77 Though the privilege was recognized as
early as 1838 in North Carolina,78 in most instances in which a spouse
was called upon to disclose a confidential communication the other
spouse was an adverse party (such as a criminal defendant), and the
testimony was therefore prohibited by the rule against adverse spousal
testimony.79 Most other cases in which a spouse would have been
asked to reveal a confidential communication involved a defendant's
attempt to call his spouse to testify on his behalf, which was forbidden
by spousal incompetency.80
The only time the confidential communications privilege would
have been exclusively implicated in the common-law regime of marital
privilege was a case in which neither spouse was an interested party.81
It is the rare case that a litigant seeks to present evidence of a confi-
dential communication made between two spouses, neither of whom
has an interest in the case.82 Therefore, despite frequent acknowl-
edgement and widespread approval of the policy it advanced, 83 the
confidential communications privilege remained functionally dormant
until the spousal incompetency rule was rejected and the rule against
adverse spousal testimony was revised.84
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Darush, 420 A.2d 1071, 1075-76 (Pa. 1980).
75. See, e.g., Dalton v. People, 189 P. 37, 38 (Colo. 1920).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1045 (1978); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Foster, 90 Ill. 121, 125 (1878); Willis v.
Gammill, 67 Mo. 730, 731 (1878).
77. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2332.
78. Hicks v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204,205, 155 S.E.2d 799,800 (1967); State v. Jolly, 20 N.C.
(3 Dev. & Bat.) 108, 108-09 (1838).
79. See 8 WiGMORE, supra note 57, § 2334.
80. Id.
81. Id § 2235.
82. Id
83. See id.; Charles W. Quick, Privileges Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 26 U.
CIN. L. REv. 537, 550-51 (1957).
84. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 2245.
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The North Carolina legislature added to the confusion by making
a provision for the confidential communications privilege in the pre-
Freeman version of section 8-57 as well as referring to the rule against
adverse spousal testimony.85 The General Assembly revised the stat-
ute to add: "Nothing herein shall render any spouse competent or
compellable to give evidence against the other spouse in any criminal
action ... .,"86 This revision entangled the doctrines of adverse incom-
petency and confidential communications. The vague language of the
revision also made it difficult for the courts to determine whether the
statute explicitly prohibited the introduction of adverse spousal
testimony.87
Prior to Freeman, the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed
the admissibility of an out-of-court spousal statement in State v. War-
ren.8" A defendant's wife had remarked to the police officer who ar-
rested her husband that "if he had not been going so slow, he wouldn't
have been caught."89 The defendant appealed the trial court's deci-
sion to admit the statement through the testimony of the police of-
ficer.90 The Warren court held that introduction of the incriminating
statement of the defendant's spouse was reversible error.91 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court made no reference to a common-law
doctrine regarding the incompetency of adverse spousal testimony,
but instead relied solely on the words of the statute.92 The court im-
plied that section 8-57 codified the marital privilege, and that it was
therefore unnecessary to consider the common law as a separate doc-
trine.93 Furthermore, the court read the statutory language "to give
evidence" to include out-of-court statements as well as in-court testi-
mony, and interpreted section 8-57 as a prophylactic rule against ad-
verse spousal testimony.94
85. See Act of Mar. 30, 1967, ch. 116, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 177 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1986)).
86. Id
87. See infra notes 88-121 and accompanying text.
88. 236 N.C. 358, 359-60, 72 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1952).
89. Id. at 359, 72 S.E.2d at 764.
90. ld.
91. Id. at 360, 72 S.E.2d at 764.
92. Id. at 359, 72 S.E.2d at 764. This was a necessary element of the Warren court's
holding, because absent a finding of statutory violation, the defendant's failure to object to
the admission of the statement at trial would have rendered the issue reviewable only
under the plain error standard. See supra notes 43-47 (explaining this policy in the context
of Rush).
93. Warren, 236 N.C. at 359-60, 72 S.E.2d at 764. But see supra note 40 and accompa-
nying text (explaining how the court interpreted the statute in exactly the opposite manner
in Rush).
94. Warren, 236 N.C. at 359-60, 72 S.E.2d at 764.
2119
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In State v. Dillahunt,95 the court again invoked section 8-57 to
exclude evidence of an out-of-court statement made by a spouse.
6
The court emphasized that the prohibitory language of the statute ex-
tended to the defendant's wife's out-of-court statement because the
statement was a "declaration[ ] made by one spouse not in the pres-
ence of the other. '97 The court offered no explanation for this part of
its holding,98 but the reasoning may indicate confusion with the confi-
dential communications privilege, which requires that the information
a defendant seeks to exclude be the subject of a communication from
one spouse to the other.99 Also, the opinion seemed to suggest a
wife's lack of authority to make a potentially damaging statement
without the consent of her husband. This reflects an attitude reminis-
cent of the policies advanced in support of the spousal incompetency
rule, such as the lack of individual identity for married women.'
State v. Suits' examined whether the out-of-court actions of a
spouse were admissible against a defendant when introduced through
a third party. 02 In this case, the court held that section 8-57 was
merely an enabling provision to the admission of favorable spousal
testimony, and that the common law-rule prohibiting adverse spousal
testimony generally remained in effect. 10 3 This interpretation was in-
consistent with the holdings in both Warren and Dillahunt, but was an
equally reasonable construction of the statute. The court reasoned
that the list in section 8-57 of the situations in which adverse spousal
testimony was to be competent evidence, considered along with the
statutory language stating that "[n]othing herein shall be construed to
render any spouse competent or compellable to give evidence against
the other in a criminal action," was merely the legislature's statement
of exceptions to the common law rule against adverse spousal testi-
mony.10 4 The court maintained that adverse spousal testimony was
95. 244 N.C 524, 94 S.E.2d 479 (1956) (per curiam).
96. Id. at 525, 94 S.E.2d at 479-80.
97. Id.
98. ML
99. See, eg., State v. Holmes, 330 N.C. 826, 833-34, 412 S.E.2d 660, 664-65 (1992);
Hicks v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204,205-07, 155 S.E.2d 799, 800-01 (1967); see also supra notes 69-
84 and accompanying text (discussing the confidential communications privilege).
100. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
101. 296 N.C. 553, 251 S.E.2d 607 (1979).
102. Id. at 557, 251 S.E.2d at 609.
103. l1& As explained above, see supra note 60 and accompanying text, the pre-Free-
man version of the statute displaced the common-law rule of spousal incompetency. The
rule against adverse spousal testimony did not necessarily grow out of this rejection, as it
advances a different policy and has independent common-law roots.
104. Suits, 296 N.C. at 557, 251 S.E.2d at 609.
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per se incompetent under common law,105 but by ruling that the stat-
ute did not codify the rule against adverse testimony, the Suits court
laid the foundation for the judicial transformation of the marital privi-
lege doctrine in Freeman.
In 1981, in State v. Freeman'0 6 the court held that "[h]enceforth,
spouses shall be incompetent to testify against one another in a crimi-
nal proceeding only if the substance of the testimony concerns a 'con-
fidential communication' between the marriage partners made during
the duration of their marriage."'1 7 The court asserted its power to
reshape the rules of marital privilege by relying on the notion in Suits
that the rule of incompetency of adverse spousal testimony existed
only at common law.10 8 Weighing the interest in promoting the mar-
riage relationship versus the interest in learning the truth, 0 9 the Free-
man court invalidated the common-law rule, finding that it ultimately
frustrated the administration of justice more than it advanced marital
harmony." 0 Thus, the court declared the old common law rule null
and void."' Rather than merely eliminating the rule of incompetency
for adverse spousal testimony, Freeman created a new rule of incom-
petency conditioned upon the existence of "confidential communica-
tions,""' 2 which assured the interconnection of the doctrines of marital
privilege.
In rejecting the incompetency rule for adverse spousal testimony,
the Freeman court failed to articulate whether it sought to leave a
privilege against compulsion in its place." 3 Because adverse spousal
105. Id.
106. 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981).
107. Id. at 596,276 S.E.2d at 453. The Freeman case caused a major upheaval in North
Carolina common law, which previously had adhered almost unquestioningly to the old
principle of the incompetency of adverse spousal testimony. See, e.g., State v. Suits, 296
N.C. 553, 557, 251 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1979); State v. Dillahunt, 244 N.C. 524, 525, 94 S.E.2d
479, 479-80 (1956); State v. Warren, 236 N.C. 358, 360, 72 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1952); State v.
Aaron, 29 N.C. App. 582, 584-85, 225 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1976). For comprehensive analyses
of Freeman's abrogation of the common-law rule forbidding adverse spousal testimony, see
Nehf, supra note 60, at 874-76; Douglas P. Arthurs, Note, Spousal Testimony in Criminal
Proceedings-State v. Freeman, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 990, 1001-07 (1981).
108. Freeman, 302 N.C. at 594-95, 276 S.E.2d at 452-53. Common law may always be
revised by the courts in which it was created if the judges become aware of a need for
change. Id. (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)); Francis v. Southern
Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371
(1933); State v. Alford, 274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E.2d 575 (1968)).
109. Freeman, 302 N.C. at 594-96, 276 S.E.2d at 452-54.
110. Id. at 596, 276 S.E.2d at 453-54.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text (discussing the confidential
communications privilege).
113. Freeman, 302 N.C. at 596, 276 S.E.2d at 453-54 (1981).
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testimony was traditionally incompetent, it had been a moot question
whether such testimony was compellable. The abolition of the incom-
petency rule raised new concerns over the propriety of compulsion as
a means of obtaining adverse spousal testimony. 1 4 The Freeman
court suggested that the only justification for retaining any type of
marital privilege was the enhancement of free and unfettered commu-
nication between spouses,'115 and therefore conditioned common-law
incompetency of adverse spousal testimony upon the "confidentiality"
of the desired evidence."
16
This reasoning suggested that adverse spousal testimony would
be compellable, provided that the subject matter of the testimony was
not a confidential communication, because open communication
within the marriage would not be affected by the fear of one day being
compelled to disclose information not gained through the marital rela-
tionship."' The legislature, however, soon preempted that possibility
by revising section 8-57 into its present form, which provides: "The
spouse of the defendant shall be competent but not compellable to
testify for the State against the defendant in any criminal action
",118
As amended, section 8-57 changed not only the rule regarding
adverse spousal testimony itself, but also the language in which it was
expressed. While the old statute referred to "givfing] evidence"
against one's spouse," 9 new language in section 8-57 referred to "tes-
114. See Nehf, supra note 60, at 882.
115. Freeman, 302 N.C. at 596,276 S.E.2d at 453-54; see also Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (suggesting that the sole remaining justification for a rule against
adverse spousal testimony is the enhancement of harmonious marital communication and
vesting the privilege to refuse adverse spousal testimony in the witness-spouse, to the ex-
clusion of the defendant-spouse). For a critical treatment of this view of marital privilege,
see generally Mullane, supra note 53, at 109-10 (accusing the Court of thoughtlessly dis-
carding the law of traditional social values); Steven N. Gofman, Note, "Honey, the Judge
Says We're History". Abrogating the Marital Privileges Via Modern Doctrines of Marital
Worthiness, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 843, 855-71 (1992) (examining the legislative and judicial
erosion of legal doctrines of marital worthiness).
116. Freeman, 302 N.C. at 596, 276 S.E.2d at 453.
117. See Nehf, supra note 60, at 876; see also Arthurs, supra note 107, at 1007 (claiming
that "[i]f the spouse may be compelled to testify, the rule against adverse spousal testi-
mony has been completely abolished in North Carolina, and the only evidentiary rule re-
maining to protect the marital relationship is the privilege protecting confidential
communications").
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(b) (1995); see State v. Josey, 328 N.C. 697,705, 403 S.E.2d
479, 483 (1991) (holding that Freeman and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-75(b) do not allow for the
compulsion of adverse spousal testimony regardless of whether the testimony concerns a
confidential communication).
119. Act of Mar. 30, 1967, ch. 116, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 177 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1986)).
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tify[ing]" against a defendant spouse.120 On the eve of Rush, no cases
had addressed the issue of non-confidential out-of-court statements in
the context of this statutory amendment.
12 1
The Rush court reasoned that amended section 8-57 was the em-
bodiment of the Freeman decision, and meant to mirror the court's
abolition of the incompetency rule for adverse spousal testimony, as
well as its unstated preservation of a privilege against compulsion to
testify, by removing the contradictory language the old statute con-
tained.122 The court concluded that the legislature intended to impose
no additional requirements with the statutory amendment.
23
Because the sole prohibition in section 8-57 is the admission of
"compelled" spousal "testi[mony]," the court considered whether the
admission of third party testimony regarding Ms. Rush's out-of-court
statements had "compelled" her to "testify" against her husband. 24 It
might seem that the out-of-court statements of a spouse could be ex-
cluded if that spouse invoked her privilege not to give adverse testi-
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1995) (emphasis added); see also supra note 29 (quoting
the current version of the statute in full).
121. Rush, 340 N.C. at 181, 456 S.E.2d at 824. At least pre-Freeman cases that ad-
dressed the issue yielded a confusing array of determinative standards. See State v. Suits,
296 N.C. 553, 557-58, 251 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1979) (stating that when the State presented
testimony of police officer as to spouse's conduct of producing evidence that was used
against defendant-spouse, officer's testimony was inadmissible because "a husband or wife
[is] incompetent to testify... against his or her defendant-spouse in a criminal action")
(emphasis added); State v. Cousin, 291 N.C. 413,417-18,230 S.E.2d 518,521 (1976) (stating
that when spouse directed police to the whereabouts of the murder weapon, evidence was
admissible because spouse herself "never testified nor was any statement [made] by her ad-
mitted into evidence") (emphasis added); State v. Dillahunt, 244 N.C. 524, 525, 94 S.E.2d
479, 479-80 (1956) (stating that when spouse gave statement to the police which tended to
incriminate defendant-spouse, police officer's testimony to that effect was inadmissible be-
cause spouses are incompetent to testify against one another and "[t/he prohibition extends
to declarations made by one spouse not in the presence of the other") (emphasis added);
State v. Warren, 236 N.C. 358, 359, 72 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1952) (stating that when police
officer's testimony included incriminating comment of spouse, such testimony was inadmis-
sible against defendant-spouse because under § 8-57, "the wife [is] neither competent nor
compellable to testify to her husband's hurt.., and... her declarations against him should
not be received when not made in his presence nor by his authority") (emphasis added);
State v. Aaron, 29 N.C. App. 582, 584-85, 225 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1976) (stating that when
police officer testified that information given by spouse led to recovery of stolen goods
introduced as evidence against defendant-spouse, testimony was admissible because § 8-57
"was not intended, and it does not, prohibit a husband or wife from making voluntary state-
ments to police officers during the investigatory stage of a criminal proceeding") (emphasis
added).
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mony, as did Ms. Rush, because spousal testimony is now competent
but not compellable." 5
The court relied instead on a strict interpretation of section 8-57,
referring to the definition of "testify" as it appears in Black's Law
Dictionary, and determined that spousal declarations made outside
the courtroom and introduced through a third party witness do not
qualify as spousal "testimony" within the meaning of the statute.
1 26
By defining these statements as out of the statutory purview,12 7 the
court was able to use the malleable common law of marital privilege,
unhampered by legislative restrictions, as a tool for carving out a pol-
icy-oriented response to the question presented in Rush.12 8 The court
125. 1& at 179, 456 S.E.2d at 822 (noting that Ms. Rush asserted her privilege not to
take the stand and give evidence against the defendant at trial).
126. ld. at 181,456 S.E.2d at 822; see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the court's analysis of the term "testify").
127. Section 8-57(c) also prevents the compelled disclosure of confidential communica-
tions. See supra notes 29, 39. However, because Rush stipulated that his wife's statements
were not the subjects of confidential marital communications, the court did not utilize this
portion of the statute in its analysis. Rush, 340 N.C. at 181, 456 S.E.2d at 823. In order to
be a "confidential communication" within the meaning of the statutory and common law
rule, the substance of the testimony at issue must have been induced by the marital rela-
tionship and prompted by the affection, confidence, and loyalty engendered by the mar-
riage. State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 598, 276 S.E.2d 450, 454 (citing Wright v. Wright,
281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972); Hicks v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967);
Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 211 N.C. 175, 189 S.E. 507 (1937); McCoy v. Justice, 199 N.C. 602,
155 S.E. 452 (1930); State v. Freeman, 197 N.C. 376, 148 S.E. 450 (1929); Whitford v. North
State Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 223, 79 S.E. 501 (1913)). Communications between spouses
made in the presence of third parties cannot reasonably be expected to be confidential and
thus are not protected by the privilege. See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 330 N.C. 826, 832-34, 412
S.E.2d 660, 663-65 (1992); Hicks v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 205-08, 155 S.E.2d 799, 800-01
(1967). Accordingly, Rush did not attempt to argue to the court that his wife's statements
were privileged confidential communications. Rush, 340 N.C. at 181, 456 S.E.2d at 823.
Note that "confidential communication" has been interpreted most often in civil cases
rather than in criminal cases. This is due to the fairly recent nature of the judicial abolition
of the rule against adverse spousal testimony for criminal cases. See State v. Freeman, 302
N.C. 591, 596-98, 276 S.E.2d 450, 453-55 (1981). Because the common-law rule made all
adverse spousal testimony inadmissible, there was no need for separate debate over the
"confidential" nature of the testimony in criminal cases. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 79 (John W. Strong ed. 1992) (explaining that it was not until
states began to allow spouses to testify in criminal cases that problems regarding confiden-
tial communications arose). On the other hand, spouses are both competent and compella-
ble witnesses in civil cases, but a privilege against disclosing "confidential communications"
is nonetheless reserved. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(c) (1986). The court in Freeman di-
rected that the interpretations given in civil cases should be imputed to criminal cases.
Freeman, 302 N.C. at 597-98, 276 S.E.2d at 453-54.
128. In support of the principle that courts are authorized to revise rules of common-
law marital privilege, though not those of legislative declaration, see Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980); Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948)
(Black, J., dissenting); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933); State v. Alford, 274
N.C. 125, 128-33, 161 S.E.2d 575, 577-80 (1968).
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detailed the reasons advanced in Freeman for the modification of the
common-law rule against adverse spousal testimony, agreeing with
Freeman's proposition that the modern justification for retention of
marital privilege is to "[allow] marriage partners to speak freely to
each other in confidence without fear of being thereafter confronted
with the confession in litigation. ' 129 The Rush court therefore found
that "the spousal privilege does not bar non-confidential, out-of-court
statements made by a spouse and introduced against a defendant
spouse for the State through a third party."'
130
The problem with fixing the bounds of the post-Freeman spousal
privilege according to the strict definition of the word "testify" is that
the privilege itself depends on a less literal interpretation of that word.
According to Rush, out-of-court spousal statements are not excluded
by the statutory privilege against compulsion to testify, and if non-
confidential, neither are such statements excluded by virtue of com-
mon-law spousal privilege. Common-law spousal privilege as defined
in Freeman provides that "spouses shall be incompetent to testify
against one another ... if the substance of the testimony concerns a
'confidential communication.' ,,131 A strict definition of "testify" indi-
cates that if a confidential communication were submitted in the form
of an out-of-court spousal statement, the defendant could exclude it
neither (1) by statutory marital privilege, under Rush; nor (2) by com-
mon law marital privilege, because the common law privilege, too, is
expressed in terms of a spouse's incompetency to "testify" to a confi-
dential communication.132 Therefore, considered together with Free-
man, Rush creates a loophole through which the defendant's
confidential communications may be used against him. Even if the
communication may be revealed only through a third party witness to
whom the spouse has voluntarily revealed the defendant's confidence,
marital communication will be less intimate if marriage partners are
not fully protected against ensuing confrontation with their confes-
sions in litigation.
For example, refer to the introductory hypothetical and assume
that, before Pat's murder, Susan and John discussed the fact that John
harbored negative feelings toward Pat. Under Rush, if Susan reveals
the substance of this conversation to the police officer, John cannot
129. Rush, 340 N.C. at 182, 456 S.E.2d at 824 (citing Freeman, 302 N.C. at 596, 276
S.E.2d at 453-54).
130. Id.
131. Freeman, 302 N.C. at 596, 276 S.E.2d at 453.
132. See supra note 131. The court might distinguish these situations by adopting a
more lenient meaning of "testify" as it is used in the interpretation of common law marital
privilege.
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invoke the marital privilege to exclude evidence of the officer's testi-
mony regarding this confidential communication. This defeats the
policy of the spousal privilege as expressed in both Rush and Freeman
in the sense that John is penalized at trial because he openly confided
in his spouse.
133
Freeman impliedly announced the North Carolina Supreme
Courts' intention to treat the marital privilege as a single legal doc-
trine, rather than decode the old complex, multi-faceted doctrine.
34
The recent holding in Rush is meant as another step toward the per-
ceived simplicity of a trimmed, but oddly assembled, rule of marital
privilege. The court has effectively replaced the rule against adverse
spousal testimony with the statutory rules prohibiting the compulsion
of spousal testimony. 35 Marital peace was the original policy aim of
the rule, and by denying the defendant the right to exclude a spouse's
incriminating testimony, the current formulation probably aggravates
this objective. The statutory rules serve to protect the free will of the
witness, regardless of the condition of her marital relationship.
136
Furthermore, the confidential communications privilege has be-
come a rule of incompetency. 37 In truth, the privilege to exclude
should belong only to the communicator of the information, because
the policy of promoting open communication seeks to prevent only
the trepidation of the marital partner who desires to disclose his confi-
dences to his spouse. When a defendant's spouse is called to testify
against him in a criminal proceeding, however, the confidential infor-
mation generally sought by the prosecution is that which has been
communicated by the defendant to his spouse. Thus, the rule of in-
competency has the same functional effect as would a privilege vested
in the communicating spouse. Yet the rule adopted by the court in
Rush may afford defendants neither a rule of incompetency nor a priv-
ilege when confidential, out-of-court statements are introduced
133. However, out-of-court statements are, of course, subject to the hearsay rule. See
State v. Perry, 54 N.C. App. 479, 480-81, 283 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1981). Therefore, the state-
ments may be excluded as inadmissible hearsay without regard to the marital privilege.
See id. Only because Rush failed to enter an objection at trial did the court ignore hearsay
as a ground for reversal, subject to the plain error standard of review. See supra notes 43-
47 and accompanying text.
134. See Freeman, 302 N.C. at 596, 276 S.E.2d at 453.
135. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
136. See Gofman, supra note 115, at 844 (arguing that courts are not in a position to
determine whether or not there is harmony remaining in a marriage, and that therefore the
marital privileges should be retained in expansive form).
137. See Rush, 340 N.C. at 182, 456 S.E.2d at 824; see also State v. Holmes, 330 N.C.
826, 835-36, 412 S.E.2d 660, 665 (1992) (holding that a spouse may not voluntarily testify to
confidential communications when the defendant spouse asserts the privilege).
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through third party testimony. If a subsequent communication of a
confidence from a spouse to a third party is all that is required to
defeat the privilege, then the most private and confidant marital ex-
changes may quickly become fodder for courtroom cross-examination
or convictions. In the event that Rush is taken to this logical conclu-
sion, the marital privilege as it has existed in North Carolina for many
years will unceremoniously vanish.
KIMBERLEY R. CHAPMAN
Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: North Carolina
Recognizes Custodial Obligations as a Factor in
Determining Alimony Entitlements
The ubiquitous single mother in American society has not gar-
nered concern commensurate with her financial dilemma. Her plights
are far too often underestimated or wholly overlooked. The obstacles
she encounters daily as she struggles to balance the demands of full-
time employment, motherhood, and a host of other obligatioris, in-
cluding the need to secure quality child-care, are difficult for manay to
imagine. With the virtual plethora of challenges facing divorced single
mothers, a question presents itself: Do alimony and child sujbport
payments by absentee fathers truly ameliorate such difficulties? This
is a question with which legislatures and tribunals across the nition
are currently struggling. It is likely that such issues will continue to
attract attention in the future, as long as the incidence of divorce
among American couples remains high.'
Unfortunately, as a result of the modern frequency of divorce, the
corresponding economic burdens borne by divorced mothers and their
children after marital dissolution are also on the rise. Indeed, many
recent studies attribute the devastating economic impact of divorce as
a primary cause of the difficulties facing divorced single mothers.
2 Of
1. Professor Jana Singer writes:
Close to fifty percent of American marriages now end in divorce. Each year
more married couples across the country end their unions in dissolution than in
death. Experts predict that if current divorce rates hold steady, almost half of all
children born in the 1980s will spend at least part of their childhood in a house-
hold headed by a divorced parent.
Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1103 (1989); see
also THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 691 (Robert Famighetti et al. eds., 1995)
(reporting that one out of two marriages now end in divorce); Nancy E. Dowd, Stigma-
tizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 19,21-22 (1995) ("Single-parent families now
constitute twenty-six percent of all families with minor children and are the most rapidly
growing family form in America .... Divorced or separated single parents remain the
largest group of single parents (nearly sixty percent), almost double the number of never-
married single parents (just over thirty percent) .... "); Grahm B. Spanier & Paul C. Glick,
Marital Instability in the United States: Some Correlates and Recent Changes, 30 FAM. REL.
329, 332 (1981) (discussing the prevalence of divorce).
2. See generally, LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEX-
PECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEoUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA (1985) (discussing the fiscal consequences of divorce on single mothers); James
B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal. The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and
Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987) (same); Heather R. Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An
Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986) (same).
female-headed families in the United States,3 the poverty rate in 1991
was fifty-five percent 4 -five times higher than the poverty rate among
families headed by married couples.5 Even if not declining to the pov-
erty level, the post-divorce standards of living for women and children
almost always decrease substantially.6
One important but widely overlooked factor7 contributing to this
precipitous decline in the economic well-being of divorced women has
been the legal assumption of economic equality among divorcing
spouses.8 This assumption largely ignores the reality that women con-
tinue to assume primary responsibility for housework and child care,
3. This category accounts for 90% of all American children living in households
headed by a divorced parent. Singer, supra note 1, at 1103; see Dowd, supra note 1, at 23
("Most single-parent families with children are [headed by] women.").
4. Dowd, supra note 1, at 23.
5. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 28 (1992); see
also Dowd, supra note 1, at 23 ("[A] majority of female-headed families ... are poor. The
1990 poverty line for a family of one adult and two children was $10,419; the approximate
average income of poor female-headed families was $4,500 .... Although female-headed
households constitute only about ten percent of all households, they account for nearly
one-third of the poverty population.").
6. See WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at 323. As Weitzman notes:
For most women and children, divorce means precipitous downward mobility-
both economically and socially. The reduction in income brings residential moves
and inferior housing, drastically diminished or nonexistent funds for recreation
and leisure, and intense pressures due to inadequate time and money.... On a
societal level, divorce increases female and child poverty and creates an ever
widening gap between the economic well-being of divorced men, on the one
hand, and their children and former wives on the other.
l.
7. Many factors contribute to this "feminization" of poverty. For example, some
commentators have attributed the devastating economic effects of divorce on women and
children to the rise of no-fault divorce laws throughout American jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
id. at 20-50. It is suggested that the no-fault laws now in place in most states eliminate the
precious bargaining power that women once enjoyed under a fault-based regime. Now,
because divorce is unilaterally attainable by even the most blameworthy husbands, women
are deprived of any leverage in negotiating a favorable divorce settlement for themselves.
Id. at 20.
For more sources on no-fault divorce and its effects on women, see Marsha Garrison,
How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases?: An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision
Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401,419-420 (1996) (noting the shift of modem divorce law away
from its traditional goal of remedial, fault basis); Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow,
Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law,
in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 194-98 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kay eds., 1990).
The phrase "feminization of poverty" was coined by sociologist Diana Pearce in 1978
after her research revealed a strong correlation between gender and poverty. See The Fem-
inization of Poverty: An Issue for the 90s, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 73,73 (1991); see gener-
ally Diana M. Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare, 11 URB &
SOC. CHANGE REV. 28 (1978).
8. See Dowd, supra note 1, at 60-61. Professor Dowd states that the current post-
divorce model:
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even when employed outside the home, and ignores the effect of this
reality on their earning potential.9 Indeed, women typically choose
employment that minimizes interference with their family obligations
and allows interruption for custodial caretaking. 10 Because such em-
ployment is usually marked by low wages," divorced women find
themselves with an income well below half of their pre-divorce in-
come.' 2 This means that when the marital dissolution of a couple with
children results in an award of custody to the mother, she must then
bear the burden of supporting the children on less than half the family
income, further contributing to her dramatic decrease in standard of
living.'
3
This decrease in standard of living, coupled with caretaking re-
sponsibility, would seem to create a compelling argument for alimony
entitlement. In practice, however, such an award is atypical. For ex-
ample, in the middle to late 1980s, only around fifteen percent of all
divorced women, whether or not they were custodians, were awarded
presumes that each [marital] partner resumes the position he or she had before
the marriage, as modified by his or her responsibility for parenting children. It
presumes that any interruption of wage work or modification of work behavior in
response to family responsibilities during the marriage can be overcome by mak-
ing different choices in labor market work after divorce. The divorce system,
therefore, presumes that the burden of parenting will be equally distributed be-
tween two independent self-supporting adults. The realities of divorced single-
parent families are starkly at odds with these presumptions. Men and women
continue to emerge from divorce at opposite economic poles: men's financial po-
sition improves, while women's sharply declines.
Id. at 61.
9. See SYLVIA ANN HEWLET-r, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERA-
TION IN AMERICA 81 (1986).
10. Id
11. Id. at 83. Hewlett states that:
[w]age-earning profiles for men and women demonstrate the severely depressing
effect of child rearing on female earnings.... [W]omen miss out on the rapid
upward mobility men typically experience in their late twenties and thirties. At
this critical stage of most career paths, women have children (or at least 90 per-
cent of them do), and given inadequate (or no) maternity leave and the paucity
and expense of child-care facilities, the majority of working women are forced to
make drastic compromises in their work lives.
Id.; see also Diane Dodson, The Relationship Between Child Support and Alimony, 4 J. Am.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 25, 32-33 (1988) ("Although most divorced mothers work,
they can be expected to earn far less than their ex-husbands .... Women are also concen-
trated in a small number of occupations that offer low pay and limited opportunity for
advancement.").
12. WE1TZMAN, supra note 2, at 327-29.
13. Id. at 323 ("[W]hen income is compared to needs, divorced men experience an
average 42 percent rise in their standard of living in the first year after divorce, while
divorced women (and their children) experience a 73 percent decline.").
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alimony, and only six percent actually received alimony payments.
14
This is in sharp contrast with spousal support awards in the early
twentieth century, when the importance of providing spousal support
to custodial parents-typically mothers-was widely accepted.15 In-
deed, the importance of custodial obligations is expressly mentioned
in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 16 and the divorce statutes
of many states.' 7 Many other states' statutes include a spouse's custo-
dial obligations among the factors to be considered when determining
the need for and amount of spousal support awards.1 8 There are two
primary justifications advanced for recognizing a divorced spouse's
custodial status in determining alimony entitlements. First, the stan-
dards of living of the custodian and the child are too closely related to
14. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATIONS RE-
PORTS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY tbls. K & L (1991). Often courts are reluctant to
award alimony because they believe that it is better to encourage care-giving spouses to
seek work outside the home and thereby "rehabilitate" themselves following a divorce.
See generally David H. Relsey & Patrick P. Fry, The Relationship Between Permanent and
Rehabilitative Alimony, 4 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAv. 1 (1988) (summarizing the
state of permanent and rehabilitative alimony). "Rehabilitative alimony" awards are
designed to terminate after one or two years in order to allow one spouse time to acquire
skills needed to enter the labor force. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET. AL., FAMILY LAW 286 n.2
(2d ed. 1991). Often a rehabilitative award is based on unrealistic assumptions about the
ability to a long-term homemaker to re-enter the work force successfully. Id.
15. See Ann L. Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71
N.C. L. REV. 721, 727 (1993) (" 'The first and most important of all the functions of ali-
mony relates to the care of children.' ") (quoting HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 441 (1968)).
16. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (U.M.D.A.) § 308(a) provides that a
spouse is eligible for alimony only if he [or she]: "(1) lacks sufficient property to provide
for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employ-
ment or is the custodian of a minor child whose condition or circumstances make it appro-
priate that the custodian may not be required to seek employment outside the home."
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 347-48 (1987) (emphasis
added). If the spouse meets these preconditions, the statute lists six factors to be consid-
ered in arriving at the appropriate amount of alimony. Ld. § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 348.
17. Professor Estin, supra note 15, at 727 & n.16, notes that at least ten states use the
U.M.D.A. formula in their alimony or spousal maintenance statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-319.A.2 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-114(1)(b) (West 1987);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(a)(2) (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.200(1)(b)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); MINN. STAT. § 518.552.1(b) (1990); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 452.335.1(2) (Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203(1)(b) (1991). In some states,
however, the U.M.D.A. § 308(a) formula has been adopted without the custodial language.
See IDAHO CODE § 32-705.1 (Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090 (West
Supp. 1992).
18. See Estin, supra note 15, at 727 n.18. Examples of these statutes include CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4801(a)(5) (West 1986); IowA CODE ANN. § 598.21(3)(e) (West Supp. 1992); LA.
CrV. CODE ANN. art. 112(A)(2)(d) (West Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1988);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236[B][6][a][6] (McKinney 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.18(c)(1)(f) (Anderson Supp. 1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(b)(7) (1991); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-16(b)(4), (13) (1992).
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consider one in isolation of the other.19 Secondly, the enormous non-
monetary contributions of the custodian dramatically affect her earn-
ing capacity, and thus her ability to manage without support from the
non-custodian.2 °
North Carolina has recently expressed its willingness to recognize
the economic burdens borne by custodial spouses in determining ali-
mony awards by virtue of two separate but related events: one judi-
cial, and the other legislative. Specifically, in the recent case of Fink v.
Fink,21 the North Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted the language
of North Carolina General Statute section 50-16.521 as allowing judi-
cial discretion to consider a divorcing spouse's custodial status in set-
ting a proper alimony award.2s In a related development the same
month that Fink was decided, the North Carolina General Assembly
enacted new alimony legislation. 4 This legislation repealed or signifi-
cantly altered much of the existing statutory law regarding alimony,
and embraced a principle similar to that established by the court of
appeals in Fink. The effect of the Fink decision and the new alimony
legislation is that North Carolina courts may be more attentive to the
special needs of caregivers in setting alimony awards than have the
courts of many other states-even in those states with similar "custo-
dian-oriented" legislation already in place.25 Furthermore, the new
alimony legislation serves to bolster the conclusions reached by the
19. See Dodson, supra note 11, at 35-36.
20. Id.
21. 120 N.C. App. 412, 462 S.E.2d 844 (1995), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 654, 467
S.E.2d 710 (1995). See infra notes 31-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fink.
22. This statute was repealed and replaced by new alimony legislation which became
effective on October 1, 1995. Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 319, §12, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 518, 525. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision in Fink on October 17, 1995.
Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 412,462 S.E. 2d at 844. However, the new alimony legislation was
inapplicable to the case because the relevant statute provides that the new Act applies
neither to "pending litigation, nor to future motions in the cause seeking to modify orders
or judgments in effect on October 1, 1995." Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 319, §12, 1995 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 518, 525.
23. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 418, 462 S.E.2d at 849-50.
24. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A, 16.2A, 16.3A (1995); see also infra notes 99-111
(discussing the new legislation and its effects on the prior law regarding alimony awards in
North Carolina).
25. See supra note 18 for a non-exhaustive list of states that have enacted alimony
statutes explicitly authorizing the consideration of a spouse's custodial duties in setting
alimony awards. Professor Estin has noted the dismal reality that even under these pro-
gressive alimony statutes, "maintenance awarded to facilitate the care of children is unu-
sual." Estin, supra note 15, at 728. In contrast, because North Carolina's new alimony
legislation has now been supported by judicial action, it is hopeful that "custodian-ori-
ented" spousal support will be awarded more frequently in North Carolina than in the
other states.
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Fink court by ensuring that custody will be a factor in determining
alimony entitlements.
This Note first discusses the Fink decision and the court of ap-
peals' analysis that led it to recognize the care-giving responsibilities
of custodial spouses.26 The Note then turns to the sparse precedent
regarding the relationship of custodial status to alimony and spousal
maintenance in North Carolina.27 Subsequently, the Note addresses
the new alimony legislation, as well as the likely effects of the statute
on the current state of North Carolina alimony law in general.' Next,
the Note analyzes the close nexus between custodian-oriented ali-
mony awards and child support, in recognition that the line between
these two areas of domestic law is often difficult to discern.29 Finally,
the Note concludes by considering the significance that North Caro-
lina and other states will place on the relationship between custodial
obligations and alimony entitlements in their efforts to remedy the
economic imbalance between divorcing couples.3 °
Calvin and Robbie Fink were married on July 22,1973.31 On July
23, 1989, exactly one day after their sixteenth anniversary, the Finks
separated.32 Two years later, in October 1991, Robbie Fink filed a
complaint seeking a divorce, temporary and permanent alimony, at-
torneys' fees, custody, child support, and equitable distribution. 33 Six
weeks later, a consent order was entered granting Ms. Fink custody of
the couple's child, and directing Mr. Fink to pay child support in the
amount of $425 per month in accordance with the North Carolina
Child Support Guidelines.34 Because Calvin Fink stipulated that he
had committed acts of marital misconduct constituting grounds for ali-
26. See infra notes 31-79 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 112-43 and accompanying text. The confusion over the precise
boundaries of this nexus is embodied in the Fink decision itself. One of the defendant's
primary arguments on appeal was that the trial court improperly crossed the line between
his child support obligation and his alimony duties in predicating the plaintiffs alimony
award in part on her custodial status. 120 N.C. App. at 420, 462 S.E.2d at 851.
30. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
31. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 413, 462 S.E.2d at 847.
32. ld.
33. Id. at 414, 462 S.E.2d at 847.
34. hd Mr. Fink was also ordered to maintain medical insurance for the child and to
defray certain orthodontic expenses of the child. Id. Under the applicable Child Support
Guidelines, Mr. and Ms. Fink's monthly gross incomes were specified as $3,179 and $1,426,
respectively. Id.; see infra notes 115-26 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory
Child Support Guidelines). In June 1993, the parties entered into a consent judgment re-
garding the equitable distribution of their marital property. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 414,
462 S.E.2d at 847.
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mony under section 50-16.2 of the North Carolina General Statutes,35
the focus of the subsequent alimony hearing was the issue of Ms.
Fink's dependency.
3 6
After determining both the plaintiff's and the defendant's
monthly net incomes and expenses,37 the trial court concluded that
Ms. Fink had "a shortfall of $562.00 per month in meeting her own
needs,"38 and that Mr. Fink could contribute $409 per month to Ms.
Fink to reduce this shortfall. 9 On appeal, the defendant argued that
the trial court erred by including a sum for child support in the
amount of the plaintiff's needs. 4° Mr. Fink's argument focused on the
fact that a child support order had already been entered under the
applicable Child Support Guidelines.41 Because the trial court calcu-
lated the plaintiff's own monthly child-care expenditures to be $767-
35. This statute was repealed by the enactment of the new alimony legislation in June,
1995. However, the new alimony legislation provides that in awarding alimony, a court
should consider whether such an award would be equitable "after considering all relevant
factors, including... [t]he marital misconduct of either of the spouses." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-16.3A (a), (b)(1) (1995). The term "marital misconduct" is defined in § 50-16.1A to
include the same factors that were listed as grounds for an alimony award to a dependent
spouse in former § 50-16.2 (repealed 1995).
36. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 414, 462 S.E. 2d at 847. At the alimony hearing, the court
also considered whether Ms. Fink had committed acts that should disallow or reduce any
alimony otherwise payable. Ide Because the trial court's ruling on this issue was not ap-
pealed by Mr. Fink, it will not be further considered.
37. The trial court first determined that the defendant had a net monthly income of
$2,099, and then established that he had "reasonable needs for his own support and main-
tenance" of $1,088 per month. Id. at 415, 462 S.E.2d at 848. The court also found that,
after subtracting from his monthly net income the amount in child support and other ex-
penses he provided directly for the child, the defendant had $1,497 per month with which
to meet his needs. Id. at 416, 462 S.E.2d at 848. This left the defendant with a surplus of
$409 per month ($1,497 less $1,088). Id. at 417, 462 S.E.2d at 849.
Turning to the needs of the parties' child, the trial court determined that "[i]n addition
to medical insurance coverage and other needs which the defendant directly provides for
[her], the Child has other reasonable needs for her support and maintenance of $1,192.00
per month." Id. at 415, 462 S.E 2d at 848. The court subtracted the amount paid by Mr.
Fink under the Child Support Guidelines ($425 per month) from the amount of the child's
needs ($1,192 per month) and found that Ms. Fink "provides the remaining $767.00 per
month." Id. at 416, 462 S.E.2d at 848.
38. The trial court calculated Ms. Fink's reasonable needs to be $1,055 per month. Id.
at 416, 462 S.E.2d at 848. It then determined her shortfall by subtracting that amount and
the $767 that it found she provided to the parties' child each month from her net monthly
income ($1,260). Id. The court thus concluded that Ms. Fink had "a shortfall of $562 per
month in meeting her own needs." Id.
39. Id. at 417,462 S.E.2d at 849. In reaching this figure, the trial court simply applied
the amount it had earlier determined as Mr. Fink's surplus per month. See supra note 37.
40. Although the opinion does not specify the amount complained of by Mr. Fink, it
appears to have been the $767 per month that the trial court found to have been expended
by Ms. Fink for the care of the child. See supra note 37.
41. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 417, 462 S.E.2d at 849. For a discussion of the Guidelines
and an analysis of their application, see infra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
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an amount exceeding her presumed child support obligations under
the Guidelines-the defendant argued that she was getting the benefit
of this higher allocation of child support expenditures because the
higher allocation affected her entitlement to alimony under the trial
court's calculations.42
In considering the defendant's argument, the court of appeals
first interpreted the meaning of "dependency" as one of the statutory
prerequisites for alimony.43 The applicable North Carolina statute de-
fined a "dependent" spouse as one" 'who is actually substantially de-
pendent upon the other spouse for his or her maintenance and
support or is substantially in need of maintenance and support from
the other spouse.' "I The court of appeals then alluded to the hazy
distinction between the "actually substantially dependent" and the
"substantially in need" standards.45 Quoting the North Carolina
Supreme Court decision Williams v. Williams,4 6 the court explained,
"Actually substantially dependent" means "the spouse seek-
ing alimony must have actual dependence on the other in
order to maintain the standard of living in the manner to
which that spouse became accustomed during the last several
years prior to separation." . . . "Substantially in need of"
[support] means that the dependent spouse "would be un-
able to maintain his or her accustomed standard of living (es-
tablished prior to separation) without financial contribution
from the other." ... [I]t appears that the trial court based its
determination of dependency upon plaintiff's being substan-
tially in need of defendant's support.47
42. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 417, 462 S.E.2d at 849. Compared to the rigid mathemati-
cal formula of the Guidelines, the trial court's method of calculation was undoubtedly
more uncertain and open to discretionary subjectivity. See infra notes 122-26 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Guidelines' income-sharing model).
43.. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 417, 462 S.E.2d at 849. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (re-
pealed 1995) provided that only a dependent spouse was entitled to alimony in North Car-
olina. The new alimony legislation effective October 1, 1995 retains this requirement. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995) (providing in part that "[t]he court shall award ali-
mony to the dependent spouse upon a finding that one spouse is a dependent spouse and
the other is a supporting spouse, and that an award of alimony is equitable after consider-
ing all relevant factors."); 'see also infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text (discussing
the new alimony legislation).
44. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 417, 462 S.E.2d at 849 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3
(repealed 1995)). The new alimony statute retains this language. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-16.1A (1995).
45. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 417, 462 S.E.2d at 849.
46. 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980). For a discussion of Williams, see infra notes
80-95 and accompanying text.
47. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 417, 462 S.E.2d at 849 (quoting Williams, 299 N.C. at 180-
82, 261 S.E.2d at 854-55 (citations omitted)).
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The court of appeals then turned to a closer analysis of the "sub-
stantially in need" standard. Again relying on the Williams case, the
court explained that whether a spouse meets this dependency stan-
dard must be determined by construing North Carolina General Stat-
ute section 50-16.3 in pari materia with the terms of former General
Statute section 50-16.5 which listed factors for the trial court to con-
sider in determining the amount of alimony.4 8 Using these factors as
its guide, the court of appeals then followed the three-part test set
forth in Williams. Under the first part of the Williams test, the trial
court must determine the pre-divorce social and economic standard of
living of the parties.4 9 Second, the court must "determine the present
and prospective earning capacity [of each spouse] and any other 'con-
dition' (such as health and child custody). '50 Finally, the trial court
must determine whether the spouse seeking alimony "has a demon-
strated need for financial contribution from the other spouse in order
to maintain the [pre-divorce] standard of living.
' 5 1
Under this three-part test, the court noted its obligation to deter-
mine "whether child care expenses incurred by a custodial spouse
should be taken into account in a finding of dependency, i.e., whether
the expenses incurred as a caregiver is one of the factors contemplated
in Williams and by our alimony statutes. ' 52 In reaching an affirmative
answer to this question, the court relied on two family law authorities,
Homer Clark53 and Lenore Weitzman,:4 and found explicit authority
for the recognition of child-care responsibilities in setting alimony
awards.
48. Id. at 418, 462 S.E.2d at 849-50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5 (repealed 1995) pro-
vided, "[a]limony shall be in such amount as the circumstances render necessary, having
due regard to the estates, earning, earning capacity, condition, accustomed standard of
living of the parties, and other facts of the particular case." Id. (emphasis added). See
infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's interpretation of the
term "condition."
49. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 418, 462 S.E.2d at 850.
50. Id. (quoting Williams, 299 N.C. at 182-83, 261 S.E.2d at 855-56) (emphasis added).
51. Id. (quoting Williams, 299 N.C. at 182-83, 261 S.E.2d at 855-56).
52. Id. at 419, 462 S.E.2d at 850.
53. Id. (" 'The first and most important of all the functions of alimony relates to the
care of children.' ") (quoting HOMER CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMESTIC RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES § 17.5, at 253 (2d ed. 1987)).
54. The court noted Clark's analysis of Weitzman's suggestion that even if a divorced
custodian works outside the home and receives child support, it remains likely that the
custodian's income will be insufficient to support himself or herself and the children. Id.
(citing CLARK, supra note 53, at 253-54 (citing Lenore Weitzman, The Economics of Di-
vorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony, and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181 (1981))). "In this situation [he or] she should be entitled
to alimony as a way of providing for the care of the children in a family setting." Id. (citing
CLARK, supra note 53, at 254).
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With this in mind, the court found further authority to consider
child care obligations within the three-part Williams test itself.5  Spe-
cifically, the court noted that in the second part of its test, the Wil-
liams court parenthetically noted "child custody" as an example of a
"condition" affecting the determination of dependency. 6 From this
analysis, the court of appeals found judicial authority to consider the
financial responsibilities borne by custodial parents in determining the
standard of living to which they were accustomed during their
marriage.
5 7
The court found further statutory authority in the language of
former General Statute section 50-16.5(b), which allowed the court to
consider "other facts of the particular case" in determining depen-
dency. 8 The court cited previous North Carolina decisions interpret-
ing the "other facts" language to include: the "length of the marriage
and contributions 'to the financial status of the family over the
years,' "I' "marital fault, '60 "income tax consequences,' 6 1 "and the
effects of inflation."'62 The court concluded that a custodial parent's
"care-giving and monetary" obligations were consistent with such
examples.6 3
The court found a final type of authority by comparing its holding
with the case law of other jurisdictions "which allow consideration of
such obligations in the dependency decision as well as in determining
the amount of support awarded."'  It also considered statutes of
other states that expressly include custodial obligations among the fac-
55. l at 419, 462 S.E.2d at 850.
56. UL; see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
57. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 419, 462 S.E.2d at 850. In contrast, the dissent argued that
the custodial responsibilities considered in an alimony determination should be those
"spiritual, intellectual, and emotional" in nature, but not "financial." Id. at 428,462 S.E.2d
at 855 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
58. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 420, 462 S.E.2d at 851; see also supra note 48 (setting forth
the language of former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5 (repealed 1995)).
59. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 420,462 S.E.2d at 851 (citing Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C.
174, 185, 261 S.E.2d 849, 857 (1980)).
60. Id (citing Williams, 299 N.C. at 187-88, 261 S.E.2d at 858).
61. hU (citing Perkins v. Perkins, 85 N.C. App. 660, 667, 355 S.E.2d 848, 852, disc. rev.
denied, 320 N.C. 633, 360 S.E.2d 92 (1987)).
62. Id. (citing Roberts v. Roberts, 38 N.C. App. 295,302-03,248 S.E.2d 85, 89 (1978)).
63. Id.
64. Id at 421,462 S.E.2d at 851-52. For examples of some of these comparative juris-
dictions, see, e.g., Wolfburg v. Wolfburg, 606 A.2d 48, 51-52 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992); Ham-
monds v. Hammonds, 597 So.2d 653, 655 (Miss. 1992); Barber v. Barber, 360 S.E.2d 574,
576 (Ga. 1987); McNally v. McNally, 516 So.2d 499, 501 (Miss. 1987); Fields v. Fields, 343
S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
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tors pertinent to a determination of alimony awards. 65 The court con-
cluded that "[w]hile North Carolina's alimony statute, unlike the
foregoing, does not contain express language which specifically allows
consideration of the custodial spouse's care-giving obligations to the
minor children, 66 our holding is nonetheless consistent with the 'over-
riding principle' of 'fairness' which guides the determination of
alimony."67
Disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that "child care ex-
penses incurred by a custodial spouse should be taken into account in
a finding of dependency in the determination of alimony," Judge
Wynn dissented.68  He first attacked the majority's willingness to
adopt from the "parenthetical[] indicat[ion]" in Williams the notion
that child custody could be an "other condition" that trial courts may
65. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 421-22, 462 S.E.2d at 852. For examples of these state
statutes, see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(3)(e) (West 1995); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art.
112 (A)(2)(f) (West 1993); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW. § 236[b][6][a][6] (McKinney 1986); OR.
REv, STAT. § 107.105(1)(d)(g) (1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701(b)(7) (1991); W.
VA. CODE § 48-2-16(b)(15) (1995); Wis., STAT. ANN. § 767.26(5) (West 1993); see also
supra note 18 for a list of such states.
66. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 422, 462 S.E.2d at 852. The court's language is especially
significant because, as discussed later, the new alimony statute, effective October 1, 1995,
explicitly lists custodial obligations as a factor to consider in determining the amount of
alimony awards, thus joining the ranks of those states listed supra notes 17 and 18.
Although this case was decided over two weeks after the effective date of the new statute,
the court was unable to point to the new statute as authority as it was inapplicable to this
case. See supra note 22. Clearly, the court wished to justify its holding on public policy
grounds, perhaps lending judicial support to the new statute, to be relied upon when the
court does in fact face a Fink-type issue under the new legislation. See infra notes 98-111
and accompanying text for a discussion of the new alimony statute.
67. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 422,462 S.E.2d at 852 (citing Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447,
460, 342 S.E.2d 859, 867 (1986)). At this point in the opinion, the court turned to the
defendant's second assignment of error-that regardless of the definition of "dependency,"
the trial court erred by establishing its own calculation of the amount that the plaintiff
contributed to the parties' child per month, because when determining the amount the
defendant contributed, it simply adopted the amount that had been statutorily calculated
under the Child Support Guidelines. Id. Because this argument raises questions concern-
ing the often hazy distinction between custodial-premised alimony and child support, it will
be discussed infra when the Guidelines are discussed. See infra notes 115-26 and accompa-
nying text.
The defendant raised several other grounds for reversal. For example, he argued that
the trial court erred by not including certain "third party payments" as part of plaintiff's
income and by "excluding certain nonbinding debts as 'expenses' for the purposes of deter-
mining dependency and alimony." See Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 425-27,462 S.E.2d at 854-55.
Because the court of appeals cursorily disposed of these arguments upon a finding of di-
rectly-applicable precedent, these independent arguments will not be addressed. Id.
68. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 427, 462 S.E.2d at 855 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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consider in hearing an alimony claim. 69 He found it revealing that in
the fifteen years since Williams was decided, no North Carolina court
had interpreted that language to mean that a trial court could consider
child support expenses as an "other condition. ' 70 Judge Wynn ex-
pressed concern that by so holding in Fink, "the majority [today] takes
that novel step and in doing so inextricably intertwines the determina-
tion of alimony dependency with the determination of child
support."
71
In Judge Wynn's view, the parenthetical reference to "child cus-
tody" in Williams did not compel a consideration of "child support
expenses.'72  Rather, he found statutory support for a reading of
"child support" to include "providing for the financial well-being of
the child ... , [for which] the court must calculate the expenses in-
curred for rearing the child, 73 whereas "child custody" involves the
responsibility of providing for the "spiritual, intellectual, and emo-
tional development of the child."74 Thus, he would have read the term
"child custody" to compel a determination of several factors in-
dependent from those financial in nature.
Judge Wynn then noted the potential long-range effects he felt
the majority's decision may have on the law of alimony and child sup-
port, as well as on the circumstances of this particular case.76 For ex-
ample, he noted that in this case, the Finks' child would turn eighteen
years old in 1996, at which time any child support expenses the de-
69. Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting); see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing
the Williams three-part test and its parenthetical reference to child custody as an "other
condition").
70. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 427, 462 S.E.2d at 855 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
71. kd (Wynn, J., dissenting). This is somewhat related to one of the defendant's argu-
ments raised on appeal, in which he assigned error to the trial court's failure to adhere to
the Guidelines in determining the amount of child care expenses attributed to the plaintiff.
For a discussion of this argument and of the statutory Guidelines, see infra notes 115-26
and accompanying text.
72. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 427-28, 462 S.E.2d at 855-56 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
73. 1l at 427, 462 S.E.2d at 855 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Wynn
found support for this interpretation of the term "child support expenses" from the lan-
guage of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4, -13.1 (repealed 1995). Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 427,462
S.E.2d at 855 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
74. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 428, 462 S.E.2d at 855 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
75. Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting). Judge Wynn found further support for the distinction
he drew between "child support" and "child custody" through an analysis of the inherent
nature of each. Specifically, he viewed custody as something that may be more of a benefit
than a detriment to the custodial parent, thus constituting a "qualitative benefit" to the
custodian, whereas child support is a "quantitative financial detriment" to its obligors. Id
at 428, 462 S.E.2d at 856 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
76. Id at 428-29, 462 S.E.2d at 856 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
1996] FAMILY LAW 2139
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fendant was legally obliged to pay would typically end.7 7 Alimony ob-
ligations, on the other hand, would continue until the dependent
spouse remarries or dies;
thus, Mr. Fink could potentially pay alimony under this order
based on an improper deviation from the Child Support
Guidelines for a time period long after his child support obli-
gation has terminated. Accordingly, if child expenses are
considered for purposes of determining permanent alimony,
then such a consideration necessitates a redetermination of
alimony when each child reaches the age of majority. No
such result was ever contemplated by our legislature.7"
Based upon his finding that inclusion of the child's needs in the
plaintiff's alimony determination constituted reversible error, Judge
Wynn dissented from that part of the majority's opinion.79
Although the majority in Fink premised its holding solely on a
reading of the North Carolina Supreme Court case of Williams v. Wil-
liams,"° North Carolina lower courts had grappled with the meaning
of "dependency" long before Williams was ever decided.81 However,
the Williams case was the first time the North Carolina Supreme
Court addressed the issue of custody in relation to alimony awards.
The parties in Williams had been married for thirty years and had
77. kld at 428, 462 S.E.2d at 856 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
78. Id (Wynn, J., dissenting). Interestingly, perhaps following the lead of the major-
ity, Judge Wynn also neglected to mention the new alimony legislation, which does contem-
plate the consideration of child-care expenses incurred by custodial parents in a
determination of that parent's entitlement to alimony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.3A(b)(7) (1995). For a discussion of the new alimony statute, see infra notes 99-109 and
accompanying text.
79. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 429,462 S.E.2d at 857 (Wynn, J., dissenting). Judge Wynn
also raised the argument addressed by the majority that the trial court erred by deviating
from the Guidelines in determining the amount of child support the plaintiff expended per
month. Id at 429, 462 S.E.2d at 856 (Wynn, J., dissenting). For a discussion of this argu-
ment and the applicable Child Support Guidelines, see infra notes 115-26 and accompany-
ing text.
80. 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980).
81. See, e.g., Peeler v. Peeler, 7 N.C. App. 456, 172 S.E.2d 915 (1970) (addressing the
issue of the dependency of a wife owning substantial property upon divorce in an action for
alimony pendente lite). For a definition of alimony pendente lite, see infra note 104. In
Peeler, the defendant argued that the plaintiff did not qualify for a finding of dependency
under the applicable alimony statute, and that the court should hold that "to be a depen-
dent spouse, one should not be able to exist without the aid of the other spouse." Id. at
461, 172 S.E.2d at 917. The court of appeals rejected this assertion, relying on the "sub-
stantially in need" language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(3) to find that "[tlhe mere fact
that the wife has property or means of her own does not prohibit an award of alimony
pendente lite." Id. at 462, 172 S.E.2d at 919 (citing Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148
S.E.2d 218 (1966)). The court concluded by emphasizing that it did "not think that the law
requires that a dependent spouse should be impoverished before the court can make such
an award." IL (citing Mercer v. Mercer, 23 N.C. 164, 116 S.E.2d 443 (1960)).
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three adult children and one minor child.' After finding that the de-
fendant was the president and primary shareholder of Alfred Williams
and Company in Raleigh, with a worth of $870,000 and an annual
gross income of $116,660 in 1976-77, the trial court had awarded the
plaintiff permanent alimony of $1,000 per month, along with posses-
sion of the parties' home, mortgage, tax and utility payments, payment
of home insurance, certain medical expenses, and $4,500 per year for
private school tuition for the minor child. 3 The defendant appealed,
disputing the trial court's finding that his wife was either "actually
substantially dependent" upon him or "substantially in need of sup-
port" from him.84
The supreme court began with an analysis of the meaning of the
terms "dependent" and "supporting" spouse under General Statutes
sections 50-16.1(3) and 50-16.1(4). 85 The court then noted that
although the legislature had "not spelled out what is precisely meant
by the terms 'actually substantially dependent,' 'substantially in need
of,' and 'maintenance and support,' "86 "the intent of the legislature
controls."8 Applying the plain meaning rule of statutory construc-
tion, the court found that the meaning of the term "actually substan-
tially dependent" was "clear." The term "obviously implie[d] that the
spouse seeking alimony must have actual dependence on the other in
order to maintain the standard of living to which that spouse became
accustomed during the last several years prior to separation. 88 After
finding that the plaintiff in the Williams case obviously would not
qualify under that standard, the court then addressed the alternative
definition of dependency, the "substantially in need" standard. Con-
ceding that this standard was not so easily construed as the "actually
substantially dependent" standard, the court noted that the term "ob-
viously refers to something less than being 'actually substantially
dependent.' "89
To determine the meaning of this term, the court used an alter-
nate rule of statutory construction, which provides that a legislative
act should be construed as a whole, such that none of its provisions
82. Williams, 299 N.C. at 176, 261 S.E.2d at 852. The parties agreed prior to trial that
the plaintiff should have custody of the minor child. Id. at 176, 261 S.E.2d at 852.
83. Id at 177-78, 261 S.E.2d at 852-53.
84. Id at 178, 261 S.E.2d at 853.
85. Id. at 179-80, 261 S.E.2d at 853-54; see supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text
(discussing the Fink court's treatment of the analysis in Williams).
86. Williams, 299 N.C. at 179, 261 S.E.2d at 854.
87. Id. at 179-80, 261 S.E.2d at 854.
88. Id. at 180, 261 S.E.2d at 854.
89. Id.
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will be deemed redundant if they can reasonably be construed other-
wise.90 Thus, interpreting the language of this provision in pari
materia with the rest of the alimony statute, the court concluded that it
was necessary to turn for guidance to General Statute section 50-16.5
providing the criteria for determining the amount of an alimony
award.9 This statute provided that the amount of an alimony award
should be as much "as the circumstances render necessary," consider-
ing factors such as the "estates, earnings, earning capacity, condition,
accustomed standard of living of the parties, and other facts of the
particular case."'
Construing the term "substantially in need of maintenance and
support" in light of the above statutory provision, the court concluded
that this standard required only that the "spouse seeking alimony es-
tablish that he or she would be unable to maintain his or her accus-
tomed standard of living (established prior to separation) without
financial contribution from the other."93 The court then set forth its
test, as later adopted in Fink, for determining whether a spouse has
met the "substantial need" standard for dependency. 94 As noted ear-
lier, it was in this test that the supreme court parenthetically listed
"child custody" as a "condition" that could be considered in the de-
pendency analysisf5
Although until Fink no North Carolina case since Williams ad-
dressed the consideration of child custody in awarding alimony to a
dependent spouse, many cases have applied the Williams test for de-
termining whether a spouse is "substantially in need of maintenance
and support" from the other spouse.96 Now, with the enactment of
the new alimony legislation effective October 1, 1995 which explicitly
lists child custody as a relevant factor, it is clear that North Carolina
90. ld. at 180-81, 261 S.E.2d at 854.
91. I& at 181, 261 S.E.2d at 854-55.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5(a) (repealed 1995).
93. Williams, 299 N.C. at 181-82, 261 S.E.2d at 855.
94. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (setting forth the Williams test). The
test as set forth in Williams actually included a fourth part, which consisted of a considera-
tion of the "financial worth or 'estate' of both spouses." See Williams, 299 N.C. at 182-84,
261 S.E.2d at 855-56. Because this factor has only been invoked by the courts in cases like
Peeler v. Peeler, 7 N.C. App. 456, 461-62, 172 S.E.2d 915, 917-19 (1970), and Williams, in
which the dependent spouse herself has had independent wealth, it need not be addressed
for it was not applicable to the situation of Ms. Fink.
95. Williams, 299 N.C. at 182-83, 261 S.E.2d at 855-56; see also supra notes 55-57 and
accompanying text (discussing the court's parenthetical reference to "child custody").
96. See, e.g., Lamb v. Lamb, 103 N.C. App. 541, 548, 406 S.E.2d 622, 626 (1991); Per-
kins v. Perkins, 85 N.C. App. 660, 665-66, 355 S.E.2d 848, 852, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C.
633, 360 S.E.2d 92 (1987); Talent v. Talent, 76 N.C. App. 545, 548, 334 S.E.2d 256, 258
(1985); Capps v. Capps, 69 N.C. App. 755, 758, 318 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1984).
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courts will consider custodial obligations in determining alimony
awards more frequently. 9 With this expected rise in consideration of
the issues addressed by Fink, it is necessary to examine the new ali-
mony legislation in greater detail to determine what effect, if any, it
will have on future alimony awards.98
In addition to making several alterations of the existing alimony
statute, the new legislation repealed certain provisions of the former
statute9 9 and replaced them with three new sections.' 00 The first,
North Carolina General Statute section 50-16.1A, is the new defini-
tional section of the alimony statute, which retains most of the old
definitions with some alterations and additions.' The second new
provision is section 50-16.2A, which creates an entirely new category,
"postseparation support." 02 Under section 50-16.1A(4), "postsepara-
tion support" is defined as "spousal support to be paid until the earlier
of either the date specified in the order of postseparation support, or
an order awarding or denying alimony."' 0 3 This new type of support
effectively replaces the old "alimony pendente lite"'04 that was used
97. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(7) (1995).
98. See generally Wiley P. Wooten, Alimony Legislative Changes, in NORTH CAROLINA
ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FAMILY LAW: LEGISLATIVE UPDATE SEMINAR AND SEC-
TION MEETING 1 (1995) (discussing the history and enactment of the new statute). The
history behind the enactment of the new legislation dates back to the late 1980s, when the
Family Law Section of the North Carolina Bar Association (NCBA) charged an Alimony
Committee with the task of revising and rewriting portions of North Carolina's alimony
statute. Id. The committee developed an "alimony bill" which was met with approval by
both the Family Law Section and the Board of Governors of the NCBA in 1993. Id. Later
that year, the bill was introduced in the North Carolina House of Representatives. Id.
Before passing the House, the bill was substantially revised, and was then introduced in the
Senate. Id. The Family Law Section of the NCBA, however, decided that the revisions
proposed by the House of Representatives were unacceptable, and decided to withdraw
the bill from Senate consideration. Id. In redrafting the alimony bill, the Alimony Com-
mittee attempted to incorporate both its original objectives and those expressed by the
House. Id. In making its revisions, the Alimony Committee worked closely with the legis-
lature's Family Issues Committee and developed a slightly revised bill. Id. at 1-2. This bill
eventually received approval from both the House and the Senate, becoming effective on
October 1, 1995. Id. at 2.
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (repealed 1995) ("Definitions"); id. § 50-16.2 (repealed
1995) ("Grounds for Alimony"); id. § 50-16.3 (repealed 1995) ("Grounds for Alimony
Pendente Lite").
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A (1995) ("Definitions"); id. § 50-16.2A (1995) ("Post-
-separation Support"); id § 50-16.3A (1995) ("Alimony").
101. See. e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(1) (1995) (allowing a judge to make an ali-
mony award for a specified or indefinite time).
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A (1995).
103. § 50-16.1A(4).
104. "Alimony pendente lite" is alimony ordered to be paid pending the final judgment
of divorce in an action for divorce. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(2) (repealed 1995). Accord-
ing to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:
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prior to the new legislation to achieve essentially the same result.10 5
The third and final new provision, section 50-16.3A of the North Car-
olina General Statutes, is the most relevant to this discussion. 10 6 This
section significantly rewrites and revises the rules for the entitlement,
amount, and duration of alimony awards.0 7 Specifically, joining the
ranks of a host of other states that have enacted similar provisions, 08
this statute provides a list of factors to be considered in determining
the amount, duration, and manner of alimony payments. The factors
include "[t]he extent to which the earning power, expenses, or finan-
cial obligations of a spouse will be affected by reason of serving as the
custodian of a minor child."'0 9
Thus, North Carolina statutory law now expressly directs" 0 its
state courts to consider the caretaking obligations of a custodial par-
ent in determining the amount and duration of alimony awards. Ad-
ditionally, the language of the statute clearly embodies a financial or
monetary-based definition of "child custody," as opposed to the
"emotional, spiritual, and inteliectual"-based definition asserted by
Judge Wynn."' Upon first impression, it appears that the issues
raised in Fink regarding the applicability of custodial expenses to ali-
mony determinations will be easily resolved in future litigation under
The purpose of the speedy proceedings for alimony pendente lite [wa]s to give the
dependent spouse subsistence and counsel fees pending trial of the action on its
merits. This result place[d] the dependent spouse on a more nearly equal footing
with the supporting spouse for purposes of preparing for and prosecuting the de-
pendent spouse's claim.
Black v. Black, 30 N.C. App. 403, 404, 226 S.E.2d 858, 859, appeal dismissed, 290 N.C. 775,
229 S.E.2d 31 (1976).
105. One significant distinction between "alimony pendente lite" and "postseparation
support" lies in the potential creation of a "postseparation support" window. Under the
definition of postseparation support, if an effective date of termination for postseparation
support payments is specified in neither the postseparation support order, nor in the order
awarding or denying alimony, the postseparation support payments may continue indefi-
nitely if the dependent spouse never sues for alimony (or at least until an effective alimony
award would have terminated, that is, when the dependent spouse remarried, cohabitated,
or died). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(4) (1995). Alimony pendente lite, on the other
hand, was expressly limited to an amount paid "pending the final judgment of divorce
." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(2) (repealed 1995).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A (1995).
107. § 50-16.3A.
108. See, e.g., supra notes 17 and 18 (listing the statutes of other such states).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(7) (1995) (emphasis added).
110. The preamble of § 50-16.3A(b) reads, "In determining the amount, duration, and
manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including [the
factors listed above]." It. § 50-16.3A(b) (emphasis added).
111. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 428, 462 S.E.2d at 855; see also supra notes 72-75 and ac-
companying text (discussing Judge Wynn's disapproval of the majority's financially-based
interpretation of child custody).
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the new alimony statute. Moreover, the legislation supports the result
reached in Fink, buttressing the concerns expressed in that decision
with a precise statutory backbone.
However, this new statutory language and the approach adopted
by the Fink court arguably blurs the fine line between child support
and alimony. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the distinction be-
tween these two remedies, and to consider whether custody-based ali-
mony has obliterated any part of that distinction. On appeal, Calvin
Fink argued that the trial court erred by not referring " 'to the pre-
sumptive guideline child support schedule to determine the amount of
Robbie Fink's income from her own employment attributable to her
pro rata share of the child support.' "112 In response, the court of
appeals noted that because a previous order had already been entered
establishing the defendant's child support obligation under the Guide-
lines, the parties were collaterally estopped from asserting amounts
different than those determined under the Guidelines.' 1 3 The court
thus agreed with the defendant's argument, finding that "[a]s child
support under the Guidelines is conceived as a 'shared parental obli-
gation' and defendant's contribution was established by application of
those Guidelines, the trial court erred by not utilizing the same meth-
odology in its calculation of plaintiff's contribution.""' 4
To understand and better appreciate the court of appeals' holding
on this point, a brief explanation of the basis of and history behind the
Child Support Guidelines is necessary. Prior to the enactment of the
Guidelines, child support awards varied across the country signifi-
112. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 423,462 S.E.2d at 853. As discussed supra note 37, the trial
court calculated the child's reasonable monthly needs to be $1,192. Id. at 415, 462 S.E.2d
at 848. The trial court then subtracted from that amount the $425 per month paid by the
defendant under the Child Support Guidelines and concluded that the remaining $767 of
the child's needs was provided for by the plaintiff. Id. at 416, 462 S.E.2d at 848.
113. IL at 423, 462 S.E.2d at 852-53 (citing Burton v. City of Durham, 118 N.C. App.
676, 680, 457 S.E.2d 329, 331-32, disc rev. denied and cert. denied, 341 N.C. 419, 461 S.E.2d
756 (1995)).
114. Id at 424, 462 S.E.2d at 853. Judge Wynn agreed with this finding by the majority
in his dissent:
[W]hen the trial court included the minor child's "needs" of $767.00 in its alimony
order, this determination had the effect of rendering two child support orders. A
child support consent order had already been entered in accordance with the
child support guidelines. That order contained a finding that no deviation from
the ... guidelines was justified. Increasing Mrs. Fink's claimed personal needs
and expenses by including non-guideline expenses of the minor child resulted in
an increase in the amount of child support that Mr. Fink was ordered to pay,
although it was denominated "alimony." As such, it is tantamount to modifying
the child support order without a motion to modify having been filed and without
any evidence or the required findings to justify a deviation from the guidelines.
Id. at 429, 462 S.E.2d at 856 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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cantly. This discrepancy was attributable to the variety of factors that
jurisdictions considered, and to the inherent discretion that judges ex-
ercise in making case-by-case child support awards. 115 In an effort to
achieve greater uniformity of child support awards and their enforce-
ment, Congress enacted the Child Support Enforcement Amendments
in 1984, which required all states to develop guidelines for determin-
ing child support by October 1, 1987.116 States retained discretion,
however, to decide whether the Guidelines would be binding." 7 As a
result, child support awards continued to be inconsistent." 8
Congress responded to this continuing discrepancy by enacting
the Family Support Act of 1988, which required states to establish and
enforce guidelines for child support awards.119 Several different
guideline formulas emerged and were adopted by various states.a2
These formulas included the flat percentage method, the income
shares model, and the Delaware Melson method.1
21
Of these three, the income shares model has become the most
widely used formula, and is the approach that North Carolina has
adopted. 22 This formula accounts for the income of both parents in
an attempt to approximate the standard of living the child would have
enjoyed had the parents remained together. 23 First, a preliminary
115. See JOHN DE Wrrr GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 265 (1993).
116. North Carolina complied with this federal law by enacting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
13.4(ci) (1995). See LLOYD T. KELSO, NORTH CAROLINA DIVORCE, ALIMONY, AND
CHILD CUSTODY § 10-3, at 133-36 (3d ed. 1995).
117. See Victoria Vazquez, Note, Evaluation of the New York Child Support Standards
Act Have the Guidelines Really Made a Difference?, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 279, 284 (1995).
118. GREGORY, supra note 115, at 265.
119. See Vazquez, supra note 117, at 284-85. This law requires the Guidelines to be
applied as a rebuttable presumption of the amount of child support awarded. 42 U.S.C.
§ 667(b)(1), (2) (1994). Under the direction of the statutory mandate in § 50-13.4(l), the
North Carolina Conference of District Court Judges adopted Guidelines effective August
1, 1991; some subsequent amendments took effect on October 1, 1994. See KELsO, supra
note 116, § 10-3, at 135.
120. See GREGORY, supra note 113, at 265.
121. Il The fiat percentage and Delaware Melson methods are less frequently adopted
than the income shares method. Id. Under fiat percentage guidelines, the amount of child
support is based on the income of the obligor and the number of children, without consid-
eration of the custodial parent's income or any extraordinary expenses of the child. Id.
The Delaware Melson guidelines formula, on the other hand,
is based on the principle that the basic needs of a person's children must be met
before the parent should be allowed to retain any income beyond that necessary
to satisfy the parent's minimum needs .... presum[ing] that excess income should
be shared to allow children to benefit from an absent parent's higher standard of
living.
Id. at 266.
122. See, eg., Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 342, 396 S.E.2d 344, 348 (1990).
123. GREGORY, supra note 115, at 266.
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child support amount is calculated based on the parent's combined
income and child-care expenses. 24 This estimate is then adjusted and
modified with items such as work-related child-care costs, health in-
surance premium costs for the minor child, and extraordinary ex-
penses for children with special needs."2 Finally, the parents are
expected to contribute to the aggregate child support obligation in a
pro rata amount of their respective gross incomes.' 26
Because of the presumptive nature of child support calculations
rendered under the statutory guidelines, it is clear that in Fink the trial
court overstepped its boundaries by failing to adopt those calculations
in determining the amount contributed by Ms. Fink to the support of
the parties' child. Thus, it remains to be determined whether the
court of appeals was justified in holding that the custodial status of a
spouse may ever be considered in finding that spouse dependent and
thus deserving of an award of alimony.
Although the type of alimony contemplated in Fink closely re-
sembles traditional child support, 27 several justifications have been
offered for such awards of custodial-based alimony. First, the court of
appeals in Fink itself noted that
where family dissolution occurs, one of the policies of do-
mestic relations law is "to make as easy and as equitable an
adjustment as possible with due regard to the interests of the
parties, society, and the state." Children, as part of "the fam-
ily unit," are no less affected by divorce than separating
spouses, society, or the state. We therefore hold that custo-
dial responsibilities constitute a "condition" to be considered
by the trial court in its determination of dependency so as to
effect as equitable an adjustment as possible, with due regard
to all affected interests. 1'
Likewise, it has been suggested that the fundamental premise behind
the federal government's emphasis on uniform and presumptive statu-
tory child support was the belief that such measures would help ease
124. ld.
125. Id.
126. I&; Vazquez, supra note 117, at 288-89.
127. The majority in Fink expressed its own concern on this matter when it stated:
"[A]limony is payment for support of a former spouse and child support is pay-
ment for support of a minor child[,] ... [and] the two must be kept separate when
the court determines the appropriate awards as to each[;] the distinction between
the two kinds of payments is easily blurred, particularly when the child for whom
the support is needed resides primarily with the recipient of the alimony."
Fink, 299 N.C. App. at 420, 462 S.E.2d at 851 (quoting Wolfburg v. Wolfburg, 606 A.2d 48,
52 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992)).
128. Fink, 120 N.C. App. at 420-21, 462 S.E.2d at 851 (citations omitted).
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the devastating economic effects of divorce on dependent spouses and
their children. 129 This was coupled with the recognition that the eco-
nomic burdens on custodial spouses had not theretofore been reme-
died by alimony awards, the latter being awarded too infrequently or
in an amount inadequate to meet the spouse's needs.130 However, the
Child Support Guidelines have not by themselves ended the disparity
in the standard of living between the non-custodian and the
custodian.1
3 1
Furthermore, traditional (non-custodial based) alimony payments
do not resolve the inadequacies attributed to child support awards
under the Guidelines. For this reason, it seems justified that custodial
obligations and care-giving expenses should be directly considered in
setting alimony awards, even though alimony awards under such a
modified standard would tend to blur the distinction between alimony
and child support. Two arguments have been offered for such a
consideration:
1. The standard of living of the custodian and children are
inextricably intertwined, and to address increasing the chil-
dren's standard of living without considering the custodian's
financial circumstances at the same time is not possible.
2. The custodian makes an enormous non-monetary contri-
bution to the upbringing of the children and suffers a reduc-
tion in his or her own earning capacity as a result.
132
In an effort to respond to such concerns about the post-divorce
financial burden faced by child custodians, North Carolina has de-
cided to consider custodial obligations in the determination of a de-
pendent spouse's alimony entitlement. And if there is doubt as to the
129. See Dodson, supra note 11, at 27-37.
130. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that custodial
spouses sacrifice higher wage-earning opportunities in order to allow time for child rearing,
but few receive alimony).
131. Dodson, supra note 11, at 30. The author cites three reasons for this phenomenon.
First, the estimates of child-care expenses made during the marriage under the Guidelines
are understated, and such expenses increase post-divorce. Second, these estimates do not
take into account the non-monetary care-giving responsibilities of the custodian. Third,
the Guidelines do not address the reality that the child's standard of living is directly deter-
mined by that of the custodian and his or her household. Because the Guidelines thus do
not consider the financial situation of the custodian, the results achieved thereunder are
skewed. I&.
132. Id. at 35-36.
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strength of the new legislative provision so providing,133 the judiciary
has indicated its willingness to back it."3
While one can conclude that future issues of the type raised in
Fink will be easily resolved by judicial resort to statutory require-
ments and case law precedent, the two independent measures have
not yet been tested together. Thus, it remains to be seen whether dis-
crepancies between the language of Fink and that of the statutory test
will allow some flexibility for a lower court that is determined to deny
an alimony award to a particular claimant. For example, the Fink
court held that a spouse's status as a custodian could constitute a fac-
tor in finding that spouse dependent, 35 which is in turn a prerequisite
to an award of alimony.1 36 The new alimony statute, however, allows
consideration of custodial status as a factor in determining the amount
and duration of alimony, presumably only after the spouse has already
met the independent burden of dependency. 37 In addition, the stat-
ute lists custodial responsibilities as a relevant factor in finding an
award of alimony equitable, also a prerequisite to an award under the
statute.13  Again, however, the court will only arrive at a determina-
tion of the "equity" of an alimony award after already having found
the claimant a dependent spouse.1 39 Thus, it is arguable that the hold-
133. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(7) (1995); see also supra notes 98-111 and ac-
companying text (discussing the new alimony legislation).
134. See Fink,120 N.C. App. at 422, 462 S.E.2d at 852 ("[E]xpress language which spe-
cifically allows consideration of the custodial spouse's care-giving obligations to the minor
child . . . is ... consistent with the 'overriding principle' of 'fairness' which guides the
determination of alimony."); see also supra text of note 66 (suggesting that the Fink hold-
ing lends judicial support to the new alimony statute).
135. Id at 421, 462 S.E.2d at 851 ("We ... hold that custodial responsibilities constitute
a 'condition' to be considered by the trial court in its determination of dependency.").
136. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995) ("[T]he court shall award alimony to
the dependent spouse upon a finding that one spouse is a dependent spouse, [and] that the
other spouse is a supporting spouse."); see also supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
137. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b), (b)(7) (1995) ("In determining the amount,
duration, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including ... [t]he extent to which the earning power, expenses, or financial obligations of
a spouse will be affected by reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child.").
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995) provides in part: "The court shall award
alimony to the dependent spouse upon a finding that one spouse is a dependent spouse...
and that an award of alimony is equitable after considering all relevant factors, including
those set out in subsection (b) of this section." Id. § 50-16.3A(a) (emphasis added). Subsec-
tion (a) thus incorporates by reference subsection (b)'s list of "relevant factors," one of
which is custodial expenses and obligations. See supra note 137 (listing custodial obliga-
tions as one such relevant factor in determining the amount, duration and manner of pay-
ment of alimony).
139. See supra note 138 (providing the language of § 50-16.3A(a)). The use of the con-
junction "and" in the language of subsection (a) clearly indicates that a court must find
both that the claimant spouse is a dependent as well as that an award of alimony to her
would be equitable.
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ing in Fink went a step beyond the approach embodied in the new
alimony legislation by allowing custodial obligations to factor into the
preliminary finding of dependency.
Even more likely, however, the two independent measures will
complement each other, allowing a court the flexibility to rely on one
or the other, or both. For example, if a claimant spouse has independ-
ent income or employment and thereby has difficulty meeting the stat-
utory dependency requirement,140 a court may point to the Fink
decision as authority to consider her custodial status in meeting that
requirement. Further, whether a custodial spouse establishes depen-
dency based on Fink or by other evidence, a court may consider the
burdens of the custodian in determining the proper amount and dura-
tion of alimony under the new legislation.' 41 Although it may be im-
possible to predict precisely how Fink v. Fink4 ' and the new alimony
legislation' 43 will be received and construed by lower courts, what is
certain is that the combination of the two has brightened the future
for the advancement of gender equality in North Carolina alimony
law, and will hopefully continue to illuminate the path toward the de-
feminization of poverty among North Carolina's custodial parents.
NANCY E. LECROY
140. See supra note 136 (setting forth the language of the statutory dependency
requirement).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A (1995).
142. 120 N.C. App. 412, 462 S.E.2d 844 (1995), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 654, 467
S.E.2d 710 (1996).
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A to -16.3A (1995).
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Bromhal v. Stott: Revisiting the Court's Role in Separation
Agreements in the Context of Attorneys' Fees
There are three parties to a marriage contract-the husband,
the wife and the State.'
Traditionally, courts commonly accepted the above view of the
institution of marriage.2 Indeed, even though "marriage has often
been described as a civil contract, until recently it was the state, and
not the parties, that set the terms of this contract."3 Marriage was not
only thought to involve the relationship between husband and wife,
but also perceived as implicating larger issues of social concern and
policy, issues within the prerogative of courts to control.4 A divorce
or separation provided the most difficult context in which to reconcile
these competing interests. On one hand, courts were sympathetic to
the separate individuals' interests in contracting the terms of their
new, separate lives. On the other hand, courts felt particularly com-
pelled to intervene in the dealings between husbands and wives at the
dissolution of a marriage.5
However, over roughly the past twenty-five years developments
in the law in most states have dramatically changed the dynamics of
1. Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 453, 35 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1945). The court contin-
ued, "For this reason marriage is denominated a status, and certain incidents are attached
thereto by law which may not be abrogated without the consent of the third party, the
State." Id.
2. In fact, other courts have independently stated this precise sentiment. See, e.g.,
Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Wis. 1950).
3. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1456
n.46.
4. Thomas E. Carbonneau, A Consideration of Alternatives to Divorce Litigation,
1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1127-28 ("The fabric of marriage ... consists of more than just
disparate strands of contract law interwoven by the thread of party autonomy. Marriage
implicates larger social interests, and transcends purely individual concerns.").
5. Id. at 1128. Professor Carbonneau emphasizes that "[t]he dynamics of this curious
triangular association are particularly evident when the parties are terminating the per-
sonal relationship. In the name of public policy, a court of law usually intervenes at this
stage to deal with disputes that ensue from the dismantling of the matrimonial associa-
tion." Id. Professor Sally Sharp has stated that
[r]econciling the principles of individualism and equality with the institution of
marriage has never been an easy task .... Nowhere are the tensions between
these principles more obvious than in the continuing attempts of the law to ac-
commodate freedom to contract, the sine qua non of a laissez-faire system, with
restrictions on the ability of spouses to contract with regard to dissolution of
marriage.
Sally B. Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Con-
tractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1399, 1399 (1984).
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this "marriage triangle" between sjpouses and the state.6 Spouses are
now free to contract with respect to "virtually all issues incident to
divorce," as long as the agreement adheres to basic contract principles
of fairness.7 The primary impetus for this change was the no-fault di-
vorce movement of the 1960s,s which gave couples the freedom not
only to choose whether and when to end their marriage, but also to
determine the consequences of their divorce, financial or otherwise,
through private separation agreements.9
North Carolina has followed the trend of other jurisdictions in
transforming its divorce laws in recent decades. In addition to the no-
fault divorce revolution, 10 even greater changes in North Carolina law
6. See Singer, supra note 3, at 1444. Professor Singer notes that "[o]ver the past
twenty-five years, family law has become increasingly privatized. In virtually all doctrinal
areas, private norm creation and private decision making have supplanted state-imposed
rules and structures for governing family-related behavior." Id. Professor Singer contin-
ues: "This preference for private over public ordering has encompassed both the substan-
tive legal doctrines governing family relations and the preferred procedures for resolving
family law disputes." Ild.
7. Sally B. Sharp, Semantics as Jurisprudence: The Elevation of Form over Substance
in the Treatment of Separation Agreements in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REv. 319, 321-22
(1991) [hereinafter Sharp, Semantics] (noting that the separation contract must only be
"basically just and reasonable," and be free from fraud, duress, and undue influence). In
the past, although the couple could contract as to the terms of their own divorce, spouses
were prohibited from contracting to alter "the fundamental duties and responsibilities
which the law attaches to the marital status." ROBERT E. LEE, 2 NORTH CAROLINA FAM-
iLY LAW § 183 (4th ed. 1980) (citing HOMER CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1.9
(1968)). Husbands and wives were prohibited from making any agreements which contem-
plated or induced divorce, and the husband could not be relieved of his duty of support.
The latter was a duty imposed on a husband by law to support and maintain his wife and
children to the best of his ability. Id. § 128. However, the traditional duties of marriage
have been much eroded. Id. § 183 (1995 Supp.). For example, a husband and wife now
may enter a valid premarital contract concerning the disposition of their property upon
separation or marital dissolution, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52B-4(a)(3) (1987), and may even
modify or eliminate the duty of marital spousal support, § 52B-4(a)(4). The only specific
prohibition remaining is that the couple may not limit or adversely affect the husband's
duty of support owed to his children. § 52B-4(b).
8. No-fault divorce laws made it suddenly possible for a spouse to unilaterally decide
to end her marriage, where previously she had to prove fault on the part of her spouse, and
prove that she herself was without fault. Victoria M. Mather, Commentaries: Evolution
and Revolution in Family Law, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 405,409 (1993). The advent of no-fault
divorce made it "easier" to get a divorce. Id. For a summary of the development and
principles of no-fault divorce from a national perspective, see MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 188-90 (1989).
9. Singer, supra note 3, at 1445. Singer notes that "most states now permit divorcing
couples to make binding and non-modifiable separation agreements with respect to both
property division and spousal support." Id. at 1474.
10. See supra note 8 (describing no-fault divorce). Under no-fault divorce laws, either
party to a marriage may dissolve the marriage at the end of the requisite waiting period
simply by applying to the court. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1995). North Carolina's
statute requires that the couple must have been separated for one year prior to such appli-
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resulted from the passage of the Equitable Distribution of Property
Act" in 1981.12 The Act gave North Carolina courts the power to
distribute marital property at divorce, but it also gave spouses the
freedom to contract out of the statute.' 3 Under the statute divorcing
spouses may distribute marital property according to their own
wishes, as long as the agreement is written, signed, and acknowl-
edged.14 The private agreement provision advanced two underlying
cation. Id. If this requirement is satisfied, the divorce will be automatically granted. See
id. In Harrington v. Harrington, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated that the no-
fault divorce statute was "enacted in order to enable a husband and wife to terminate their
marriage without the sensationalism and public airing of dirty linen which necessarily ac-
company a divorce based on fault." 22 N.C. App. 419, 422,206 S.E.2d 742, 745, rev'd on
other grounds, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974).
11. Equitable Distribution of Property Act, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1995)).
12. Sally B. Sharp, The Partnership Ideak The Development of Equitable Distribution
in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REv. 195, 196 (1987) [hereinafter Sharp, Partnership IdealI.
Prior to the new Act, title to property determined property distribution upon divorce in
North Carolina. Sharp, Semantics, supra note 7, at 326. Because of the title system,
"North Carolina courts were, quite literally, lacking in power to transfer real property...
upon divorce.... [T]here was nothing in the history or experience of the North Carolina
legal system to cushion its abrupt introduction to equitable distribution principles, or even
to the concept of 'marital property.' " Sharp, Partnership Ideal, supra, at 196-97. Professor
Sharp concludes: "Substantively and procedurally ... the divorce settlement process in
this State has been rebuilt from the ground up, from 1981 to the present." Id. at 197.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1995). This provision states:
Before, during or after marriage the parties may by written agreement, duly exe-
cuted and acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 52-10 and 52-
10.1 ... provide for distribution of the marital property in a manner deemed by
the parties to be equitable and the agreement shall be binding on the parties.
Id. Section 52-10 provides that contracts between husbands and wives not inconsistent
with public policy are valid, and that married persons may release any rights in each other's
property which they acquired by marriage as long as the release is in writing and acknowl-
edged by the parties before a certifying officer. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10(a) (1991). The
certifying officer must not be a party to the contract. § 52-10(b). Section 52-10.1 authorizes
any married couple to execute a separation agreement not inconsistent with public policy.
§ 52-10.1. Separation agreements are also required to be in writing and acknowledged
before a certifying officer as defined in § 52-10(b). Id.
14. Case law has added the requirement that the agreement not be the product of
fraud or duress. Knight v. Knight, 76 N.C. App. 395,398,333 S.E.2d 331,333 (1985) ("[A]
court of equity will refuse to enforce a separation agreement, like any other contract,
which is unconscionable or procured by duress, coercion or fraud."). The North Carolina
Court of Appeals noted in Johnson v. Johnson that the court would not even require a
showing of fraud to invalidate an agreement:
Courts have thrown a cloak of protection about separation agreements and made
it their business, when confronted, to see to it that they are arrived at fairly and
equitably. To warrant equity's intervention, no actual fraud need be shown, for
relief will be granted if the settlement is manifestly unfair to a spouse because of
the other's overreaching.
67 N.C. App. 250,255,313 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1984). Transactions between husband and wife
"must be fair and reasonable." Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 196, 159 S.E.2d 562,567
(1968); cf. Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 293, 354 S.E.2d 228, 234 (1987) (noting, in the
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policies: the importance of the freedom to contract and the encour-
agement of separation agreements "in order to avoid the excessive
costs, in terms of both money and time, that judicial equitable distri-
bution entails."' 5 North Carolina courts have "accepted the sound-
ness of these policies by deferring to the language of separation
agreements when the intent of such agreements is clear and the agree-
ments conform to traditional rules of fair contracting. 
'16
However, the move toward allowing complete freedom of con-
tract in separation agreements has not been as clear-cut as this sum-
mary suggests.' 7 States still retain a public policy interest in regulating
certain aspects of divorce.'8 Particularly in North Carolina, a tension
remains between treating settlement agreements as "any other con-
tract" and treating them as a special type of contract requiring the
"'utmost concern' in the form of judicial scrutiny for unfairness and
overreaching."' 9 In North Carolina, this tension surfaces in the provi-
sion that allows couples to construct private separation agreements
course of validating a separation agreement, that the parties neither showed nor attempted
to show fraud or duress in entering the agreement).
15. Heather Newton, Note, Hagler v. Hagler: The North Carolina Supreme Court
Construes a Separation Agreement, 66 N.C. L. REv. 1254, 1255 (1988).
16. Id.; see, e.g., Hartman v. Hartman, 80 N.C. App. 452, 455, 343 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1986)
(upholding a separation agreement, which expressed the parties' clear intent to fully dis-
pose of their marital property, as precluding the court's application of equitable distribu-
tion principles).
17. See Sharp, Partnership Ideal, supra note 12, at 198 (noting that North Carolina
courts have "faced very difficult interpretative problems in all stages of the property divi-
sion process," and emphasizing that the courts have been forced to deal with these issues
"virtually without the benefit of any useful precedent or reliable legislative history"); see
also supra note 12 (pointing out that North Carolina's switch from its former title system
for distribution of marital property to equitable distribution forced the state to create a
new settlement process). In fact, Professor Sharp concludes that in "virtually every state,"
the law concerning separation agreements is "at times nothing less than impenetrable."
Sharp, Semantics, supra note 7, at 320.
18. See Sharp, Semantics, supra note 7, at 322 (noting the state interest in ensuring
both that the agreements are procedurally and substantively fair).
19. Id at 322-23 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 67 N.C. App. 250, 255, 313 S.E.2d 162,
165 (1984)). One reason for the lingering public policy concern surrounding separation
agreements is that, traditionally, women have been the parties most harmed by divorce
settlements. See Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony:
The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 829 (1988) ("Numer-
ous studies report that divorce leaves the wife at a severe economic disadvantage and ex-
plain the coining of the phrase 'the feminization of poverty.' "); Singer, supra note 3, at
1445 n.2 ("A plethora of recent studies establish that no-fault divorce results in severe
economic dislocation for many women and children."); see also Sharp, Partnership Ideal,
supra note 12, at 196 (noting that the rise in no-fault divorce "appears to have been a major
cause of the well-documented decline in the economic well being of dependent spouses
[(usually women)] and their children after divorce" because "no-fault... eliminated what
had been the only true source of bargaining power for a financially dependent spouse-the
ability to preclude the other spouse from obtaining a divorce").
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generally. This provision states that "[a]ny married couple is hereby
authorized to execute a separation agreement not inconsistent with
public policy which shall be legal, valid, and binding in all respects. 2 °
Thus, a husband and wife in North Carolina who wish to dissolve their
marriage may draft a private agreement as to the terms of the separa-
tion, but any provisions of this agreement that a court later deems in
violation of public policy may not be enforced.2
Although the issue arose in the somewhat unusual context of at-
torneys' fees, Bromhal v. Stott2 2 tested the balance between freedom
of contract and judicial supervision of divorce; the North Carolina
Supreme Court for the first time clearly indicated its intent to treat
separation agreements differently than "any other contract." The
court upheld as consistent with public policy a provision in a private
separation agreement that, should either party fail to comply with the
terms of the agreement, the party who brought a successful suit for
enforcement would be awarded attorneys' fees and any other costs
incurred in the enforcement action.23
However, contractual provisions awarding attorneys' fees in a
successful action to enforce a contract had traditionally been declared
void as against public policy in North Carolina, unless statutory au-
thority existed for such an award.24 Therefore, if the court had treated
the separation agreement in this case like "any other contract,"25 the
provision would have been invalidated. However, relying heavily on
public policy grounds 26 that separation agreements are indeed unlike
"any other contract," the court upheld the award.2 7
This Note first discusses the facts and procedural history of
Bromhal, including the opinions of both the North Carolina Court of
Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court.28 It then details the
traditional law of contractual indemnification clauses,29 followed by
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1991) (emphasis added).
21. Id. Note that, unlike the Equitable Distribution Act, agreements made pursuant
to this provision are not limited to the distribution of property upon separation or dissolu-
tion, but can include matters such as alimony and child support. See a
22. 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995).
23. Id. at 707, 462 S.E.2d at 222; see infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the facts and holding of Bromhal).
24. See infra notes 59-84 and accompanying text.
25. See supra text accompanying note 19.
26. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
27. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 707, 462 S.E.2d at 222.
28. See infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 59-84 and accompanying text.
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the relatively brief history30 of case law involving attorneys' fees pro-
visions in separation agreements.3' The Note then analyzes the
court's opinion in Bromhal in the context of this background law, in-
cluding an analysis of the opposing argument made by the dissenting
judge on the North Carolina Court of Appeals, and finds Bromhal to
be an attempt by the North Carolina Supreme Court to clarify a con-
fusing, but ultimately correct, disposition by the court of appeals.32
Finally, the Note concludes that the court's decision followed logically
from both the precedent involving attorneys' fees indemnification
provisions and the limited precedent involving those provisions in sep-
aration agreement litigation.3 By setting separation agreements apart
from ordinary commercial contracts based on the fact that they take
place in significantly different "markets, 34 the court paved the way
for more positive steps for dependent spouses, and resurrected the
role of public policy from the ashes to which the revolution in divorce
law seems to have reduced it?5
Laura Bromhal (Stott) and Gregory Stott were married on April
23, 1977, and had two children during the course of their ten-year
marriage. 6 The Stotts separated on or about August 17, 1987, and
entered into a separation agreement. 7 They subsequently entered
into a modification agreement.38 When Mr. Stott failed to comply
with the child support provision of the separation agreement, Ms.
Bromhal brought suit against him. In her complaint, Bromhal
sought both an order requiring Stott to pay the child support he owed
30. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (discussing significant changes in
North Carolina law with respect to divorce in recent years).
31. See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 103-37 and accompanying text. There was no dissent from the deci-
sion of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
33. See infra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text; see also Sharp, Semantics, supra
note 7, at 325-26. Professor Sharp observes:
[T]he most significant victim, and innocent bystander, of [the developments in the
settlement process in recent decades] is the current state and role of public policy
in North Carolina.... Quite simply, the settlement agreement process now seems
to be largely unguided by meaningful principles of public policy or judicial review.
Il
36. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 703, 462 S.E.2d at 220.
37. Id.
38. Id. Under North Carolina law, a modification of an original separation agreement
must be made pursuant to the same formalities and requirements as the original agreement
as set forth in section 52-10.1. Greene v. Greene, 77 N.C. App. 821, 823, 336 S.E.2d 430,
432 (1985). That is, it must be consistent with public policy, in writing, and acknowledged
by both parties before a certifying officer not a party to the agreement. § 52-10.1.
39. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 703, 462 S.E.2d at 220.
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and reimbursement of attorneys' fees incurred in bringing the enforce-
ment action, pursuant to a provision of the original agreement which
stated: "Suit costs. If either party shall fail to keep and perform any
agreement or provision hereof, the other party shall be entitled to re-
cover reasonable attorney's fees and any and all other expenses in-
curred in any action instituted to enforce provisions of this
agreement.
'40
The trial court awarded Bromhal approximately $22,500 for the
unpaid child support (plus interest) and an additional marital debt,
plus $40,000 in attorneys' fees incurred throughout the enforcement
proceeding.41 Stott appealed this award to the North Carolina Court
of Appeals.4'
The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the award of attor-
neys' fees43 and in support of its holding affirming the award cited two
prior North Carolina Court of Appeals cases. Edwards v. Edwards44
held that a similar provision was not inconsistent with public policy
under North Carolina General Statutes section 52-10.1 and was thus
binding.4  Carter v. Foster46 held that a similar provision was enforce-
40. 1& (quoting Separation Agreement, 27).
41. Id.
42. Ld. Of the many issues decided by the trial court, only two assignments of error
were considered on appeal. Bromhal v. Stott, 116 N.C. App. 250, 253-54, 447 S.E.2d 481,
483-84 (1994), affd, 341 N.C. 702,462 S.E.2d 219 (1995). The court disposed of Stott's first
four arguments because the orders from which they arose were not designated in the notice
of appeal as required by Rule 3(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Id. at 253, 447 S.E.2d at 483. Furthermore, Stott failed to brief several of his arguments or
cite any authority in support of them as required by Rule 28(b)(5) of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure; the court thus considered these arguments abandoned. Id.
43. Bromhal, 116 N.C. App. at 254-55, 447 S.E.2d at 484. The court of appeals in fact
considered two assignments of error. The first assignment of error was the trial court's
determination that Bromhal's acceptance and endorsement of certain checks from )Stott
did not constitute an accord and satisfaction of the child support obligation. Id. at 253-54,
447 S.E.2d at 484. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's finding of fact on the
basis that (1) there must have been an agreement between the parties that payment or
acceptance of less than the full amount owed constituted an accord and satisfaction; and
(2) this agreement had to be supported by consideration. ld. at 254, 447 S.E.2d at 484
(citing Fruit & Produce Packaging Co. v. Stepp, 15 N.C. App. 64, 189 S.E.2d 536 (1972), for
the former proposition, and Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App.
342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969), for the latter). Because neither of these requisite elements was
present, no accord and satisfaction was found. Id. This issue was unrelated to the award of
attorneys' fees, which was the only issue appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 702, 462 S.E.2d at 220.
44. 102 N.C. App. 706, 403 S.E.2d 530, discretionary review denied, 329 N.C. 787, 408
S.E.2d 518 (1991). See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Edwards.
45. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 533-34.
46. 103 N.C. App. 110, 404 S.E.2d 484 (1991). See infra notes 106-12 and accompany-
ing text for further discussion of Carter.
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able in the context of a separation agreement such as the present one,
in which the parties entered into an agreement clearly settling all
claims that might arise from the divorce.47
Judge Greene disagreed with the majority's holding on the attor-
neys' fees provision.a Although he acknowledged that this type of
provision might well be consistent with public policy, Judge Greene
pointed out that the North Carolina Supreme Court had held in Still-
well Enterprises, Inc. v. Interstate Equipment Co.4 9 that an award of
attorneys' fees, even pursuant to a" 'carefully drafted contractual pro-
vision,' " must have statutory authority supporting it in order to be
upheld.50 Judge Greene concluded that there was no statutory author-
ity as required by Stillwell for the award of attorneys' fees in Edwards
and Carter, the two cases cited by the majority.5' Greene further ob-
served that the courts in Edwards and Carter nonetheless upheld the
fee awards without either applying or distinguishing Stillwell.57 Be-
cause the holdings in Edwards and Carter disregarded what Greene
considered the direct authoritative precedent of Stillwell, Judge
Greene argued that the Bromhal majority incorrectly relied on Ed-
wards and Carter to uphold the attorneys' fees award. 3
The North Carolina Supreme Court then accepted the case solely
on the issue of attorneys' fees.54 Without directly addressing the con-
cerns raised by Judge Greene, the court made explicit what had been
merely implicit in the court of appeals' opinion: there was indeed stat-
utory authority for the attorneys' fees award in this case, and that au-
thority was to be found in North Carolina General Statutes section 52-
10.1. 5 So long as the provision in question was consistent with public
policy, the parties were free to place it in their agreement.5 6 Relying
47. Carter, 103 N.C. App. at 117, 404 S.E.2d at 489.
48. Bromhal v. Stott, 116 N.C. App. 250, 255, 447 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1994) (Greene, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), affd, 341 N.C. 702,462 S.E.2d 219 (1995). Judge
Greene agreed with other aspects of the majority's opinion. See supra notes 42-43 (discuss-
ing other issues raised on appeal).
49.' 300 N.C. 286, 266 S.E.2d 812 (1980).
50. Bromhal, 116 N.C. App. at 255-56, 447 S.E.2d at 485 (Greene, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Stillwell, 300 N.C. at 289, 266 S.E.2d at 814-15). For
further discussion of Stillwell, see infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
51. Bromhal, 166 N.C. App. at 256, 447 S.E.2d at 485 (Greene, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
52. 1l (Greene, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. (Greene, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 702, 462 S.E.2d at 220.
55. Id. at 703-04,462 S.E.2d at 220; see also supra note 13, and notes 20-21 and accom-
panying text (discussing the statutory underpinnings for separation agreement indemnifica-
tion provisions).
56. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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on an article written by Professor Sally Sharp of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law, the court found that
public policy weighed heavily in favor of the provision.57 The court
concluded by distinguishing past cases that had invalidated attorneys'
fees contract provisions as contrary to public policy, finding such pre-
cedent applicable only in a commercial context.58
The general rule followed in this country, aptly termed the Amer-
ican Rule, states that attorneys' fees incurred by the successful party
in an action are not recoverable in the absence of a statute or an en-
forceable contract authorizing their award.59 North Carolina courts
follow this rule with respect to statutorily authorized attorneys' fee
awards,6 0 but have traditionally held that contractual agreements pro-
viding for the payment of attorneys' fees by the losing party in an
enforcement action are void as against public policy.
61
As noted earlier, the case law in North Carolina specifically in-
volving provisions for attorneys' fees in separation agreements is
scant.62 There is, however, early precedent with respect to contractual
attorneys' fees indemnification provisions generally. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court first addressed a contractual indemnification pro-
vision for attorneys' fees in the 1892 case Tinsley v. Hoskins.63 The
provision in Tinsley, a stipulation in a promissory note, stated that "in
case this note is collected by legal process, the usual collection fee
shall be due and payable therewith."64 The court concluded that pro-
visions of this nature do not in actuality provide an award of attor-
neys' fees, but rather, such provisions impose a penalty or forfeiture
57. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 704-05, 462 S.E.2d at 220-21 (quoting Sharp, Semantics, supra
note 7, at 319-20, 326, 349); see infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text (detailing the
Bromhal court's public policy discussion).
58. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 705-07, 462 S.E.2d at 221-22. The court discussed, in order,
Tinsley v. Hoskins, 111 N.C. 340, 16 S.E. 325 (1892) (involving an indemnification provi-
sion in a promissory note), Williams v. Rich, 117 N.C. 235, 23 S.E. 257 (1895) (same),
Tbrner v. Boger, 126 N.C. 300, 35 S.E. 592 (1900) (same in deed of trust), and Stillwell
Enters., Inc. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286,266 S.E.2d 812 (1980) (involving provi-
sion in commercial lease and discussing similar provisions in cases involving promissory
notes, deeds of trust, guaranty on promissory notes and commercial construction
contracts).
59. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); see
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-262 (1975) (discussing
the history and development of the American Rule).
60. See infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 10-12 (discussing the fact that the law surrounding divorce and
divorce settlement procedures has been substantially rewritten since 1981).
63. 111 N.C. 340, 16 S.E. 325 (1892).
64. 1&
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on the breaching party.65 According to the Tinsley court, attorneys'
fees contract provisions " 'tend[ ] to the oppression of the debtor and
... encourage litigation, [are] a cover for usury, ... contrary to public
policy and void.' "66 The court concluded that "stipulations like the
one now sued upon, when incorporated into obligations of this partic-
ular character, are against public policy and therefore invalid." 67
Three years later, in Williams v. Rich,6s the court applied the rule
against contractual indemnification provisions to a similar provision in
a promissory note. In Williams the defendant executed the note, se-
cured by a deed of trust, payable to a mortgage company.69 The pro-
vision in question stated that if the interest on the note was not
promptly paid and had to be collected by suit, all costs of collection,
plus a charge of ten percent of the principal and interest "as attorney's
fees," were to be paid by the defendant debtor.70 Relying on Tinsley,
the court held that there was no error in a jury instruction that such a
provision allowing for repayment of more than the loan amount plus
ordinary interest "was evidence of the usurious nature of the transac-
tion."' 71 Again, as in the context of a promissory note, the court
viewed the provision as imposing a forfeiture, possibly usurious, and
as encouraging litigation.72 Thus, the provision was void as against
public policy.
73
65. Id. at 341, 16 S.E. at 325.
66. Id. (quoting Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Sevier, 14 Fed. 662, 663 (1882)). The court
elaborated: "'It would be idle to limit interest to a certain rate [under usury laws], if under
another name forfeiture may be imposed to an amount without limit.' " Id. (quoting Bul-
lock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137 (1878)).
67. Id. at 342, 16 S.E. at 325. The language, "when incorporated into obligations of
this particular character," appears to support the Bromhal court's distinction between com-
mercial contracts and separation agreements, whether interpreted to indicate promissory
notes in particular, or commercial instruments generally. See infra notes 134-37 and ac-
companying text (distinguishing attorneys' fees provisions in a commercial contract from
those in a separation agreement). Tinsley is usually cited for the proposition that an attor-
neys' fees indemnification provision specifically in a promissory note is invalid as against
public policy, as opposed to such provisions appearing in contracts generally. See, e.g.,
Yeargin Constr. Co. v. Futren Dev. Corp., 29 N.C. App. 731, 733, 225 S.E.2d 623, 625
(involving a commercial construction contract), discretionary review denied, 290 N.C. 660,
228 S.E.2d 459 (1976); EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 12 N.C. App. 481,482, 183 S.E.2d 859,
860 (1971) (involving a promissory note), affid, 281 N.C. 140, 187 S.E.2d 752 (1972).
68. 117 N.C. 235, 23 S.E. 257 (1895).
69. ld at 236, 23 S.E. at 258.
70. Ido at 237, 23 S.E. at 258.





North Carolina courts have continued to find such indemnifica-
tion provisions invalid.74 Consistently, these opinions have empha-
sized the fact that in the debtor-creditor context, such provisions could
easily become a mask for usurious oppression of debtors, and such
conduct could not be sanctioned by the courts. More recent opinions
"clearly indicate that such provisions are generally deemed unenforce-
able without regard to the type of instrument in which they appear,
75
at least in the commercial context.
North Carolina courts do recognize, however, the exception to
the American Rule for statutorily authorized attorneys' fees awards.
In Stillwell Enterprises, Inc. v. Interstate Equipment Co.7 6-the prece-
dential case at issue in Judge Greene's dissent 77 -the North Carolina
Supreme Court first repeated the general rule against allowing attor-
neys' fees indemnification clauses in debtor-creditor contracts.78 The
court reiterated the general North Carolina rule "that a successful liti-
gant may not recover attorneys' fees, whether as costs or as an item of
74. See, e.g., Stillwell Enters., Inc. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 290, 266
S.E.2d 812,815 (1980) (lease agreement); Howell v. Roberson, 197 N.C. 572, 573, 150 S.E.
32, 33 (1929) (promissory note); Security Finance Co. v. Hendry, 189 N.C. 549, 557-58, 127
S.E. 629, 633 (1925) (promissory note); Turner v. Boger, 126 N.C. 300,302,35 S.E. 592,593
(1900) (deed of trust); Brisco v. Norris, 112 N.C. 671, 677, 16 S.E. 850, 852 (1893) (promis-
sory note); Yeargin Constr. Co. v. Futren Dev. Corp., 29 N.C. App. 731, 734, 225 S.E.2d
623, 625 (construction contract), discretionary review denied, 290 N.C. 660,228 S.E.2d 459
(1976); EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 12 N.C. App. 481, 482, 183 S.E.2d 859, 860 (1971)
(promissory note), affd, 281 N.C. 140, 187 S.E.2d 752 (1972).
75. See Stillwell, 300 N.C. at 290, 266 S.E.2d at 815. While this language taken out of
context could appear to expand the limitation on contractual indemnification provisions to
all types of contracts, even outside the commercial world, this case involved a provision in
a commercial instrument, a lease agreement. Id. at 287, 266 S.E.2d at 813. The court actu-
ally intended to expand the rule from applying only to Tinsley circumstances, involving a
specific type of commercial instrument (promissory notes and security instruments), to cir-
cumstances involving any type of commercial instrument, "without regard to the type of
instrument." Id. at 290,266 S.E.2d at 815. Thus, the court in Stillwell referred approvingly
to EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, which gave an expansive, generic interpretation of the
Tinsley rule, by citing "Tinsley for the proposition that 'provisions calling for a debtor to
pay attorney's fees incurred by a creditor in the collection of a debt' " were generally
unenforceable. Id. (quoting EAC Credit Corp., 12 N.C. App. at 482, 183 S.E.2d at 859)
(emphasis added). Therefore, this language in Stillwell is arguably not intended to prohibit
contractual indemnification clauses for attorneys' fees outside of the commercial context.
76. 300 N.C. 286, 266 S.E.2d 812 (1980).
77. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
78. See Stillwell, 300 N.C. at 289, 266 S.E.2d at 814. The case involved a commercial
lease for a pushloading road scraper, which allegedly broke in two and caused damages to
the plaintiff-lessee. Id. at 287, 266 S.E.2d at 813. When the plaintiff sued, the defendant-
lessor countersued for the payment of back rental payments, and invoked an indemnifica-
tion clause which provided for attorneys' fees in the event that the lessor had to sue to
recover the debt. Id. at 287-88, 266 S.E.2d at 813. See supra note 75 and accompanying
text (discussing the limitation of Stillwell to the commercial context).
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damages,... [e]ven in the face of a carefully drafted contractual pro-
vision indemnifying a party for such attorneys' fees as may be necessi-
tated by a successful action on the contract itself."7 9 However, the
court continued, finding that the rule yields when "such a recovery [of
attorneys' fees] is expressly authorized by statute.
80
In fact, the court in Stillwell found such statutory authority to val-
idate the attorneys' fees provision in the commercial lease involved-
section 6-21.2 of the North Carolina General Statutes. This statute
authorizes a provision for attorneys' fees associated with "any note,
conditional sale contract or other evidence of indebtedness" if collec-
tion through an attorney at law should become necessary after matur-
ity.81 To combat the concerns that such provisions would induce or
encourage usurious interest rates masquerading as attorneys' fees,82
the statute caps such an award at fifteen percent of the outstanding
balance at the time collection is pursued.8 3 The court in Stillwell
found the leasing agreement involved therein to fall within the stat-
ute's ambit as a "note, conditional sale contract or other evidence of
indebtedness," and therefore upheld the fee-shifting provision of the
lease on this statutory ground.84
The antipathy of North Carolina courts toward contractual in-
demnification provisions for attorneys' fees seems to indicate that a
similar statutory authorization for such provisions in separation agree-
ments must exist in order to uphold their validity.8 5 As discussed
79. Stillwell, 300 N.C. at 289, 266 S.E.2d at 814-15. For the proposition that litigants
always bear the cost of their own attorneys' fees, the court cited Hicks v. Albertson, 284
N.C. 236,238,200 S.E.2d 40,42 (1972). Again, this principle is consistent with the Ameri-
can Rule as generally followed in this country. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
In support of the proposition followed in North Carolina that this rule holds even when
attorneys' fees provisions are purposefully placed in a contract, the court cited Howell v.
Roberson, 197 N.C. 572, 150 S.E. 32 (1929), and Tinsley v. Hoskins, 111 N.C. 340, 16 S.E.
325 (1892). See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing Tinsley).
80. Stillwell, 300 N.C. at 289, 266 S.E.2d at 814 (citing Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C.
236, 200 S.E.2d 40 (1972)). The North Carolina Supreme Court stated in Hicks: " 'The
general rule in this State is that, in the absence of statutory authority therefore, a court may
not include an allowance of attorneys' fees as part of the costs recoverable by the success-
ful party to an action or proceeding.'" Hicks, 284 N.C. at 238,200 S.E.2d at 42 (quoting In
re King, 281 N.C. 533, 540, 189 S.E.2d 158, 162 (1972)) (emphasis added).
81. .N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.2 (1986).
82. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
83. § 6-21.2(1). If no amount is specified in the instrument in question, the provision
will be deemed to provide for recovery of fifteen percent of the outstanding balance. § 6-
21.2(2).
84. Stillwell, 300 N.C. at 294-95, 266 S.E.2d at 818.
85. Section 6-21.2, applied in Stillwell to validate such a provision, does not expressly
authorize fee-shifting in the separation agreement context, although it could be argued that
the alimony or child support provisions of such an agreement are "evidences of indebted-
ness." According to the court in Stillwell, the legislative history of § 6-21.2 indicated
2162 [Vol. 74
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
above, section 52-10.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes autho-
rizes parties to a marriage to execute separation agreements, setting
their own terms for marital dissolution; the only qualification is that
no provision may be contrary to public policy.86 Otherwise, the agree-
ment will be "legal, valid, and binding in all respects."' According to
the only North Carolina case to consider the issue before Bromhal
reached the supreme court, section 52-10.1 provides the necessary
statutory authorization for an attorneys' fees indemnification provi-
sion in a separation agreement.
In Edwards v. Edwards"8 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
was faced with a separation agreement containing a clause which
stated that if either party failed in its obligations, financial or other-
wise, to the other party, or to the children involved, the defaulting
party would indemnify the other for any enforcement costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees.89 After recognizing the general rule that
attorneys' fees are not awarded unless expressly authorized by stat-
ute,90 the court noted that the statutory authority most relevant in
this context was section 52-10.1. 91 Under the language of that statute,
the court found the clause in question not to be inconsistent with pub-
liec policy.92 Therefore, because the agreement was executed "pursu-
ant to the statute,"93 the court found it to be" 'binding in all respects'
including the indemnity clause." 94 Had the court ended the opinion
there, Edwards would constitute the first arguably sound finding of
statutory authorization for indemnity clauses in separation
agreements.
clearly that the statute was "intended to supplement [the Uniform Commercial Code and]
those principles of law generally applicable to commercial transactions." Id at 293, 266
S.E.2d at 817 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has
stated that "[i]t is clear that a 'note' and 'conditional sales contract' are the primary types
of 'evidence of indebtedness' contemplated by the statute." State Wholesale Supply, Inc.
v. Allen, 30 N.C. App. 272, 277, 227 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1976).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1991); see supra text accompanying note 20.
87. § 52-10.1 (emphasis added).
88. 102 N.C. App. 706, 403 S.E.2d 530 (1991).
89. See id at 712, 403 S.E.2d at 533.
90. Id.
91. Id at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 533.
92. Id The court did not elaborate on its underlying reasoning; it simply stated that
"[w]e find nothing inconsistent with public policy in the ... indemnity clause." Id
93. Id. Presumably this language refers to the statute's technical requirements, that
the agreement be "in writing and acknowledged by both parties before a certifying officer
as defined in G.S. 52-10(b)." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1991). Thus the clause com-
ported with both the substantive (public policy) and procedural requirements of § 52-10.1.
94. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 534 (quoting § 52-10.1).
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However, the Edwards court in fact confused its holding by con-
tinuing with the following statement:
To hold otherwise would, in effect, hold that parties cannot
contract for indemnification for attorneys' fees unless specifi-
cally authorized to do so by statute. We find that the general
rule disallowing attorneys' fees unless statutorily authorized
does not encompass this situation where the parties volunta-
rily contracted for indemnification for such fees. Therefore,
we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing attorneys'
fees.95
Strangely, this statement seems extraneous to the holding, rather
than the basis for the holding, as the court claims.96 The court had
already found that, based on the statutory authority for separation
agreements-which the court conceded was required for an award of
attorneys' fees97 -the provision was valid because it was consistent
with public policy and was "executed pursuant to the statute."98 How-
ever, in the quoted excerpt above, the court seemed to authorize the
use of the second exception to the American Rule as it is generally
accepted in jurisdictions outside North Carolina: not only are indem-
nity provisions authorized by statute excepted from the general rule
against fee-shifting, but also indemnity provisions for which the par-
ties voluntarily contracted, whether or not statutorily authorized.
If indeed this broader language was an attempt to create a new
(at least in North Carolina) exception, the Court of Appeals' decision
in Edwards would seem to contradict vast areas of prior North Caro-
lina case law with respect to indemnity provisions.99 In fact, the court
did not explicitly limit the application of its broader language to the
facts or context of a separation agreement between divorcing spouses;
arguably, the court intended for the new Edwards "exception" to ap-
ply in all cases of voluntarily contracted-for indemnity provisions."00
One commentator has even concluded that the court's statement,
95. Id.
96. The first narrowly drawn conclusion of the court, that the provision was valid as
consistent with the public policy and other requirements of § 52-10.1, appears to be a suffi-
cient basis for the holding that the clause in question was valid. Perhaps, then, the later,
more broad language can be dismissed as dicta, and not essential to the holding.
97. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., supra note 74 (citing cases spanning this century which hold indemnity
provisions to be invalid as against public policy in the debtor-creditor context regardless of
the fact that the parties voluntarily contracted to include the clauses).
100. See Lucy V. Fountain, Note, Edwards v. Edwards and the Award of Attorneys' Fees
for Breach of a Separation Agreement, 70 N.C. L. REv. 2016, 2016 (1992) (concluding that
"while Edwards may be a good decision on its facts, the opinion creates confusion as to the
status of traditional North Carolina contract law").
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" 'To hold [otherwise] would, in effect, hold that parties cannot [vol-
untarily] contract for indemnification for attorneys' fees unless specifi-
cally authorized to do so by statute,' "I"o could have the effect of
"overrul[ing] established precedent in all sorts of contract cases and
render[ing] North Carolina's statutes specifying exceptions to the gen-
eral prohibition against attorneys' fees meaningless."' 2
Against this backdrop, Bromhal v. Stott"°3 reached the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, and then the North Carolina Supreme
Court. The court of appeals found the indemnity clause valid by rely-
ing on the narrow holding of Edwards, that section 52-10.1 authorizes
attorneys' fees provisions, that the clause involved in Edwards was not
against public policy, and that it was executed in accordance with the
statute.1°4 The court did not mention or even allude to the later, more
broad language of Edwards, that merely voluntarily contracting for an
indemnity provision could take parties out of the general rule that
such clauses are void as against public policy.'05
The court of appeals did, however, place additional reliance on a
similarly dubious' 0 6 holding in Carter v. Foster.'0 7 The court in Carter
had statutory authorization at its disposal to hold the contractual in-
demnification provision in question valid-North Carolina General
101. Id at 2026 (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. 706, 713, 403 S.E.2d 530,
534 (1991)).
102. Id at 2025. This same commentator concedes that "if the Edwards decision is
limited to its facts by subsequent panels [of the North Carolina Court of Appeals], the
decision signals a recognition that separation agreements are by their nature quite distinct
from traditional arm's-length transactions," but warns that "[u]nless the North Carolina
General Assembly modifies the General Statutes or the courts limit the decision to its
facts.... Edwards will create confusion and provide a convincing argument for those seek-
ing to enforce indemnification clauses in all types of contracts." Id
103. 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995).
104. Bromhal v. Stott, 116 N.C. App. 250, 254-55,447 S.E.2d 481,484 (1994), affd, 341
N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995).
105. See id; see supra text accompanying note 95.
106. See, e.g., supra note 74 (listing cases holding indemnity provisions to be invalid as
against public policy in the debtor-creditor context regardless of the fact that the parties
voluntarily contracted to include the clauses); supra note 80 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the only qualification of the general rule in North Carolina as the situation in which
a statute specifically authorizes the fee award).
107. 103 N.C. App. 110, 404 S.E.2d 484 (1991). Carter involved a loan agreement de-
tailing the manner in which certain promissory notes, which represented the plaintiff's
loans totaling $155,000 to the defendant to capitalize his business venture, would be repaid.
Id. at 111-12, 404 S.E.2d at 485-86. The business eventually failed, and the plaintiff filed
suit alleging default on the promissory notes and the loan agreement. Id. at 112, 404
S.E.2d at 486. The parties then signed a "Stipulation and Settlement Agreement," in-
tending to settle the matter, and this agreement contained a provision that the defendant
owed the plaintiff attorneys' fees in the amount of fifteen percent of the outstanding
amounts of the debts not yet repaid. Id.
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Statutes section 6-21.2.108 This section states that provisions for the
payment of attorneys' fees appurtenant to a note or "other evidence
of indebtedness" are "valid and enforceable" for as much as fifteen
percent of the outstanding balance at the time collection is pursued.10 9
The court noted that these sections " 'represent[ ] a far-reaching ex-
ception to the well-established rule against attorney's fees obliga-
tions.' "110 However, after concluding that the provision at issue in
Carter did not fall within the statutory language,"1 the court nonethe-
less held that "parties may, in settling disputes, agree to the payment of
attorney's fees.""' 2 This was the language relied upon by the court of
appeals in Bromhal v. Stott. 13
Judge Greene strongly dissented from the portion of the majority
opinion holding that the indemnification provision in Bromhal v. Stott
was valid."4 As to the majority's reliance on Edwards, Judge Greene
focused his criticism on the ambiguity of the Edwards holding." 5 Ar-
guing that attorneys' fees awards are valid if and only if they are spe-
108. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 6-21.2, 6-21.2(1) (1986).
110. Carter, 103 N.C. App. at 114, 404 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting State Wholesale Supply
Inc. v. Allen, 30 N.C. App. 272, 276, 227 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1976)).
111. Il. at 115,404 S.E.2d at 487-88. The court found that, because the indemnification
provision appeared in the context of the settlement agreement between the parties, the at-
torneys' fees provided for therein were not an obligation for attorneys' fees "upon any
note ... or other evidence of indebtedness" under § 6-21.2. Id.
112. Ld. at 115,404 S.E.2d at 488 (emphasis added). This holding is potentially reconcil-
able with the general rule in North Carolina against contracting for attorneys' fees as a
second exception. The court based its holding on the fact that this was not a typical con-
tract, but rather it was the negotiated settlement of competing claims as to the terms of an
already-existing contract. See id. The settlement through compromise of disputed claims is
to be encouraged by the courts, and thus " 'the nature or extent of rights of each should
not be nicely sc[r]utinized.' " ld. (quoting Armstrong v. Polkavetz, 191 N.C. 731, 734-35,
133 S.E. 16, 17-18 (1926)) (alterations in original). The court of appeals in Bromhal lik-
ened the separation agreement between divorcing spouses to this type of accord and satis-
faction in that it was a settlement and release of any and all marital claims arising from the
marital "contract." See Bromhal v. Stott, 116 N.C. App. 250, 255, 447 S.E.2d 481, 484
(1994), affd, 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995). Perhaps the court was searching for a
way to except Bromhal from the general rule so as to uphold the award, without explicitly
stating that separation agreements in the context of divorce are different than ordinary
contracts and deserve special attention. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the treatment of separation agreements like other contracts). Such a holding might
provide a way to distinguish separation agreements from ordinary contracts on the basis of
"accord and satisfaction" principles, without explicitly stating that separation agreements
are different than "any other contract." The supreme court did not have such difficulty in
holding separation agreements to be different. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying
text (discussing the Bromhal holding).
113. Bromhal, 116 N.C. App. at 254-55, 447 S.E.2d at 484 (1994).
114. l at 255-56, 447 S.E.2d at 485 (Greene, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
115. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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cifically authorized by statute,"16 Judge Greene stated that "this Court
in Edwards, without any citation to Stillwell, [either applying or distin-
guishing it,] upheld an award for attorneys' fees granted pursuant to a
separation agreement even though there was no statutory authoriza-
tion for such an award. 11 7 Judge Greene attacked Carter v. Foster"8
on the same basis: the court had upheld a fees award in the admitted
absence 1 9 of specific statutory authority, without either acknowledg-
ing the rule of Stillwell or distinguishing Stillwell from the present
facts.12 0 Because the majority of the court of appeals in Bromhal v.
Stott relied for its holding solely on these shaky decisions, both of
which arguably disregarded the precedent of a higher court, Judge
Greene could not agree.'
2'
Finally, Bromhal reached the North Carolina Supreme Court.
This court had not yet had the opportunity to decide the efficacy of
indemnity clauses for attorneys' fees incurred in the enforcement of a
separation agreement, 122 and had little precedent to guide it other
116. Bromhal, 116 N.C. App. at 255-56, 447 S.E.2d at 485 (Greene, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (relying on Stillwell Enters., Inc. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300
N.C. 286, 289, 266 S.E.2d 812, 814-15 (1980)).
117. Id. at 256, 447 S.E.2d at 485 (Greene, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. 103 N.C. App. 110, 404 S.E.2d 484 (1991); see supra notes 108-12 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Carter decision).
119. In Carter the court clearly, determined that the statute involved did not apply.
Carter, 103 N.C. App. at 114-15, 404 S.E.2d at 487-88.
120. Bromhal, 116 N.C. App. at 256, 447 S.E.2d at 485 (Greene, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
121. Id. (Greene, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Greene con-
cluded that "because Edwards and Carter did not apply or purport to interpret Stillwell and
because Stillwell is unambiguous in its holding and remains the law of this State, this Court
is bound to follow Stillwell, not Edwards or Carter." Id. (Greene, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
122. Tvo cases involving this issue had recently reached the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, but both were disposed of on other grounds. See Fountain, supra note. 100, at
2020-22 (noting that "[b]oth decisions ... left open the possibility for a court to grant
attorneys' fees under a separation agreement clause in the proper circumstances"). The
first, Baird v. Baird, involved an indemnification provision that authorized an award of
attorneys' fees in the event that a suit for enforcement of the separation agreement became
necessary. 86 N.C. App. 201,206, 356 S.E.2d 823,826 (1987). The court of appeals upheld
the trial court's determination that this provision was inapplicable because the "matter was
resolved by construction of the agreement, not enforcement of the agreement," and there-
fore "there is not a 'prevailing party' within the meaning of the [indemnification clause of
the] Separation Agreement." Id. The second case, which reached the court of appeals the
next year, arose from a similar provision in a separation agreement. Brown v. Brown, 91
N.C. App. 335, 371 S.E.2d 752 (1988). In order for attorneys' fees to be awarded to one
party, the other party had to materially breach the separation agreement and be found in
default. See id. at 340, 371 S.E.2d at 755. However, in Brown, the trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's action for rescission based on material breach, and made no specific findings of
fact that the defendant violated the separation agreement. Id. Therefore, no attorneys'
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than general contract principles, public policy as to the dissolution of
marriage,123 and Edwards. 24 The court began by clarifying the lower
court's reliance on Edwards, stating that the court of appeals had in-
terpreted Edwards to mean that section 52-10.1 authorized the award
of attorneys' fees in an enforcement action involving a separation
agreement. 125 The court concluded that there could be "no question"
that the broad language of section 52-10.1 authorizes a couple execut-
ing a separation agreement "to include any provision, including the
one [for attorneys' fees in case an enforcement action becomes neces-
sary], unless that specific provision violates public policy., 26
The court then set about determining whether the inclusion of
such a provision in a separation agreement violates the public policy
of North Carolina. Quoting from a law review article by Professor
Sally Sharp, 27 the court concluded that the North Carolina General
Assembly clearly views separation agreements as "instruments of
sound public policy" in response to "the growing number of divorces
taking place in our society."' 28 Noting that an assumption underlying
Professor Sharp's article is the fundamental differences between sepa-
ration agreements and other kinds of contracts, 29 the court appeared
to agree with Sharp, stating that " '[t]he state has strong and legiti-
mate policy interests in settlement agreements that differ markedly
from its interests in most other private contracts.' "130
According to the court, allowing provisions for attorneys' fees to
be recovered in an action to enforce such agreements furthers state
policy by ensuring that the support provisions for the dependent
fees could be awarded pursuant to the agreement for a default. Id. at 340-41, 371 S.E.2d at
755.
123. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing the tensions present in the
courts' relationship to a divorcing couple).
124. Interestingly, Judge Orr, who wrote the court of appeals' arguably confusing opin-
ion in Edwards, had moved to the North Carolina Supreme Court by the time Bromhal
reached that court four years later. Justice Orr then wrote the opinion in Bromhal, in a
unique position perhaps to remedy some of the confusion and anxiety caused by the earlier
holding, see supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text, as well as address the concerns
expressed by Judge Greene at the court of appeals, see supra notes 114-21 and accompany-
ing text.
125. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 703, 462 S.E.2d at 220.
126. Id. at 704, 462 S.E.2d at 220.
127. The court quoted at length from Sharp, Semantics, supra note 7, at 319-20.
128. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 704, 462 S.E.2d at 220-21.
129. Id. at 704, 462 S.E.2d at 221.
130. Id. (quoting Sharp, Semantics, supra note 7, at 349). Sharp lists as examples the
state's interest in protecting citizens from "bargaining contexts which are peculiarly condu-
cive to overreaching tactics" and its interest in ensuring adequate measures are taken
through settlement agreements to provide for dependent spouses and children. Id.
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spouse and child will be enforced.' 3' In this way, parties will not be
disadvantaged by choosing private resolution over a court action for
child support, custody, or alimony, in which attorneys' fees could
clearly be granted under North Carolina General Statutes sections 50-
13.6 and 50-16.4.132 The court thus concluded that the public policy of
North Carolina supported both separation agreements and the inclu-
sion of an indemnification provision that takes effect if compliance
becomes a problem. 33
The court also distinguished the line of decisions holding indem-
nification provisions unenforceable. 34 The court differentiated be-
tween "business-oriented lawsuits" and cases such as Bromhal,
concluding that the public policies applicable in the debtor-creditor
and commercial contract cases do not apply in the context of separa-
tion agreements between divorcing parties.135 Because a "separation
agreement is different from a commercial, arms-length transaction[, i]t
cannot be analyzed in terms of the marketplace and bargaining
power.' 1 36 Thus, the provision for attorneys' fees in the separation
131. Id. at 705, 462 S.E.2d at 221. That is, a spouse who would not ordinarily sue to
enforce the agreement because of a lack of resources would be able to do so knowing that
the costs will be reimbursed. See id.
132. Id2 Section 50-13.6 provides that attorneys' fees may be awarded, in an action for
custody and/or child support, to a plaintiff, acting in good faith, who otherwise could not
afford to bring the action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.6 (1995). Section 50-16.4 allows attor-
neys' fees to be awarded to a dependent spouse if that spouse would be entitled to alimony
under § 50-16.3A or post separation support under § 50-16.2A. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.4
(1995). The purpose of § 50-16.4 is to enable the dependent spouse to meet the supporting
spouse "on substantially even terms by making it possible for the dependent spouse to
employ adequate counsel" in litigation over the issue of alimony. Hudson v. Hudson, 299
N.C. 465, 473, 263 S.E.2d 719, 724 (1980) (citing Schloss v. Schloss, 273 N.C. 266, 160
S.E.2d 5 (1968)). By analogy, the dependent spouse who constructs her own separation
agreement (perhaps precisely because she cannot afford to apply to the court to settle the
terms of her divorce) should be placed "on substantially even terms" as her former hus-
band, should the judicial enforcement of her separation agreement ever become necessary
due to his breach.
133. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 707, 462 S.E.2d at 222.
134. I. at 705-06, 462 S.E.2d at 221-22 (distinguishing, in order, Tinsley v. Hoskins, 111
N.C. 340, 16 S.E. 325 (1892); Thrner v. Boger, 126 N.C. 300, 35 S.E. 592 (1900); and Wil-
liams v. Rich, 117 N.C. 235, 23 S.E. 257 (1895)). See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying
text (discussing Tinsley and Williams).
135. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 222 ("The policy reasons given for denying enforcement in the
cases cited do not apply to the facts before us.").
136. I& The court quoted with approval the following passage from Professor Sharp:
Standard contract principles are designed to operate within the context of a ra-
tional, competitive market that assumes a relative parity of bargaining strength
between the parties. To equate the "market" of settlement agreements, marriage
dissolution-a situation virtually always accompanied by extraordinary stress and
rarely accompanied by mutual desires to achieve fair results-with the paradig-
matic "marketplace" in which strangers bargain at arms' length, is simply to ig-
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agreement context was upheld as not inconsistent with public policy,
and therefore was legal and binding under section 52-10.1.137
The supreme court's decision is consistent with the prior case law
dealing with contractual provisions for attorneys' fees. The court fol-
lowed the general rule that no attorneys' fees can be awarded without
statutory authority138 and found the authority for such an award pur-
suant to a separation agreement in section 52-10.1.139 In so doing, the
court both clarified the earlier confusion in the court of appeals' Ed-
wards decision, and also answered Judge Greene's concerns below in
Bromhal.
The court made no reference to the broader language in Ed-
wards, which stated that parties could voluntarily contract for indem-
nification of attorneys' fees regardless of statutory authority.14 0 The
court focused solely on the narrower language of the holding of the
note the realities of human nature, the adversarial process, and the realities of
most divorce bargaining.
Id at 706-07, 462 S.E.2d at 222 (quoting Sharp, Semantics, supra note 7, at 350).
137. Id at 707, 462 S.E.2d at 222.
138. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
139. Arguably, however, § 52-10.1 does not provide this authority. While the statute
does allow couples to "execute a separation agreement not inconsistent with public policy
which shall be legal, valid, and binding in all respects," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1991),
the language does not explicitly provide for the award of attorneys' fees. In contrast, pro-
visions under North Carolina law regarding the analogous context of awarding fees in-
curred in bringing an action for alimony and/or child support do expressly provide that
attorneys' fees (or costs, alternatively) are recoverable in connection with those actions.
See, e.g., supra note 132 (discussing the award of attorneys' fees under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 50-13.6,50-16.4 (1995)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21(4) (1986) (stating that costs in an action
for alimony or divorce are taxable against either party, or may be apportioned between the
parties, at the discretion of the court). Therefore, the supreme court's conclusion in
Bromhal, that the legislature intended § 52-10.1 to encompass a provision for attorneys'
fees, when other statutory provisions in this area explicitly provide for fee awards if at all,
is questionable under the maxim of contract construction "expression unium est exclusio
alterius." Because the legislature has indicated its tendency to expressly provide for fee-
shifting when desirable, perhaps the absence of such a specific provision signifies a con-
scious intent not to allow fee-shifting in the context of separation agreements. See gener-
ally Fountain, supra note 100, at 2024 (arguing similarly with respect to the Edwards
court's invocation of § 52-10.1 as authorizing attorneys' fees awards pursuant to an indem-
nification clause).
On the other-hand, the injection of public policy a. an element of the § 52-10.1 analy-
sis arguably alters the above conclusion, allowing for a less strict reading of § 52-10.1 in the
context of attorneys' fees. Because of its recognition that public policy supports treating
separation agreements differently that other contracts, the court perhaps sees this policy as
a reason to interpret § 52-10.1 more broadly than other statutes as to whether attorneys'
fees need be expressly authorized by the statute in order to be awarded at all. Therefore,
although there is explicit statutory authorization for the award of attorneys' fees in the
context of alimony, -child support, and child custody, these statutes need not be read as
necessarily excluding the award of fees in the present context of § 52-10.1.
140. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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court of appeals, which implicitly relied on section 52-10.1 for the stat-
utory authority to award attorneys' fees.141 In Bromhal, the court ex-
plicitly stated that this statute provided the authority for such an
award, and thus the indemnification provision at issue was valid if
consistent with public policy. 4
With respect to Judge Greene's concerns, the court's response
was twofold: The first response was the clarification of the Edwards
holding, as discussed above. 143 The second issue argued by Judge
Greene and addressed by the supreme court in Bromhal was the pre-
cedent established in Stillwell, requiring statutory authority for attor-
neys' fees awards. 44 The supreme court responded to Judge Greene's
adherence to Stillwell not only by finding that statutory authority did
exist in both Edwards and Bromhal'4 5-and thus the holding of Still-
well was followed in both cases-but also by explicitly distinguishing
Stillwell from the facts of Bromhal in its public policy discussion. 46
After finding that statutory authority allowed the indemnification pro-
vision in question if consistent with public policy, the court found that
Stillwell was not necessarily the most appropriate precedential focus
for a public policy discussion in the separation agreement context. 147
Although Stillwell did state the same general rule requiring statutory
141. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
142. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 704, 462 S.E.2d at 220. Again, perhaps Justice Orr, the au-
thor of both the earlier court of appeals opinion in Edwards and the Bromhal supreme
court opinion, was taking full advantage of his opportunity in Bromhal to clarify the con-
fusing language of Edwards. See supra note 124.
143. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. In addition, the court in Bromhal
did not rely on Carter v. Foster, 103 N.C. App. 110, 404 S.E.2d 484 (1991), with its dubious
holding that, in the accord and satisfaction context, parties may agree to attorneys' fees
provisions even in the absence of statutory authority. Carter, 103 N.C. App. at 115, 404
S.E.2d at 488. Judge Greene took issue with the court of appeals' reliance on both Carter
and Edwards. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Judge Greene concluded: "I am
aware that panels of this Court are bound by prior decisions of this Court, but I do not
believe that this rule applies when the prior decisions of this Court do not apply or purport
to interpret a previous [North Carolina] Supreme Court opinion clearly requiring a con-
trary result." Bromhal v. Stott, 116 N.C. App. 250, 256, 447 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1994)
(Greene, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted), aff'd, 341 N.C.
702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995). In such cases, Judge Greene stated, "this Court has 'the re-
sponsibility to follow [North Carolina Supreme Court] decisions until otherwise ordered by
the [North Carolina] Supreme Court.' " 1d. (Greene, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 118, 431 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1993)).
145. This authority, in the form of § 52-10.1, was implicitly recognized in Edwards, and
made explicit by the supreme court in BromhaL Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 704, 462 S.E.2d at
220.
146. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy under-
pinnings of Bromhal).
147. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 706, 462 S.E.2d at 222.
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authority for attorneys' fees awards, Stillwell involved a commercial
lease, not a separation agreement.14  The court thus concluded that
"the public policy justifications in debtor-creditor and commercial
contract cases do not apply to a separation agreement."'
1 49
The court then enumerated the public policies that are involved
in the separation agreement context. These include: " 'minimiz[ing]
the psychological and economic costs of divorce,... creat[ing] better
prospects for post-divorce cooperation between the parties, . . .
lessen[ing] the impact of divorce upon children, and... promot[ing]
judicial economy.' ,,'50 The court found that the judicial enforcement
of attorneys' fees provisions in such agreements would help to pro-
mote the policies behind separation agreements generally, by encour-
aging dependent spouses to enforce the agreements in court, and thus
found that public policy supported attorneys' fees awards as well as
separation agreements generally.1
5 '
Because the conflicting policies of the law involving separation
agreements-the "any other contract" approach versus the recogni-
tion that these agreements are different from contracts in the ordinary
commercial marketplace-have never been resolved by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, the court in Bromhal was navigating virtu-
ally uncharted waters.152 In beginning to clearly define both the poli-
cies underlying the nature of separation agreements as well as a policy
favoring enforcement of these agreements by upholding attorneys'
fees provisions, the court has taken a positive step in developing
meaningful standards with respect to seperation agreements. 53 The
court not only opened the door for a greater role in the future for
148. Stillwell Enters., Inc. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286,287-88,266 S.E.2d 812,
813 (1980). See supra note 78.
149. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 706, 462 S.E.2d at 222.
150. Id. at 704, 462 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting Sharp, Semantics, supra note 7, at 320).
151. Id. at 705, 462 S.E.2d at 221. But see Fountain, supra note 100, at 2024-25 (noting
that North Carolina courts have commented in the past that the potential award of attor-
ney's fees might induce plaintiffs to bring frivolous suits as a means of harassment).
152. See supra note 12 (discussing the fact that the law surrounding divorce and divorce
settlement procedures has been substantially rewritten since 1981).
153. This positive step will most impact dependent spouses, usually women, and their
children. See supra note 19. For a discussion of other steps that North Carolina courts
have recently taken to help dependent spouses see Nancy E. LeCroy, Note, Giving Credit
Where Credit Is Due: North Carolina Recognizes Custodial Obligations as a Factor in De-
termining Alimony Entitlements, 74 N.C. L. REv. 2128 (1996) (discussing a recent North
Carolina Court of Appeals decision and new provisions of the North Carolina alimony




judicial supervision of the separation agreement process in general, 154
but the court's opinion, by specifically enunciating a policy in support
of attorneys' fees provisions, will also enable the party with less bar-
gaining power in the dissolving relationship to preserve some ability
to enforce the agreement.155 Parties and their attorneys should ap-
proach separation agreements with much greater caution following
Bromhal. Not only is the court's opinion, which is actually a limited
extension of the freedom to contract, open to broad interpretation, but
even on its face the opinion carries great weight in favor of imposing
values of fairness and equality into the divorce process on behalf of
dependent spouses. The state appears once again to be a party to the
marriage contract in North Carolina.
MELINDA J. SEEDS
154. Critics might not be so quick to applaud Bromhal as a conscious step toward judi-
cial intervention to promote fairness between divorcing spouses. Although the opinion
was unanimous, the court was unanimous in 93 percent of the cases decided in 1995, "a
marked increase" compared with past years. Joseph Neff, Today's State Supreme Court
Not Inclined to Find Fault with Cases, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 9, 1996, at
Al. With the retirement of Justices Exum and Meyer, the "strong personalities" of the
court, the court "has become more centrist and less divided." Id. at Al, A17. That is,
Bromhal may or may not represent a new, strong judicial stance with respect to judicial
intervention in separation agreements.
155. See supra note 19.
1996] 2173
North Carolina's New Punitive Damages Statute: Who's
Being Punished, Anyway?
"We are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been
questioned by some writers. .... "
The United States Supreme Court in 18521
The punitive damages doctrine has been criticized for well over a
century. In recent years, however, the criticism has reached a boiling
point, fueled by reports of allegedly outrageous awards for seemingly
minor injuries.3 In response to the fear that juries are out of control, a
majority of states have passed tort reform legislation imposing re-
straints on punitive damages.4 Last year, the wave of anxiety hit
North Carolina, prompting the General Assembly to pass tort reform
legislation5 that included a new series of statutes codified as Chapter
1D. 6 The new chapter limits the situations in which punitive damages
can be imposed7 and puts a cap on the amount which can be
awarded.8 However, by imposing a cap on punitive damages, the leg-
islature arguably is punishing the very people the doctrine of punitive
damages is intended to protect-the victims of outrageous conduct
and unsafe products. 9 The sponsor of the legislation, State Represen-
tative Charles Neely, praises the new laws as a type of preventative
1. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852).
2. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me. 1985) ("Arguments against the
availability of such awards have been circulating for one hundred years and longer."). But
see generally Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393 (1993) (discussing the philosophical underpinnings for
punitive damages generally, rebutting the criticisms of the doctrine, and supporting the
need for punitive damages as civil punishment).
3. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
4. A majority of the states have enacted some variant of punitive damages legislation.
See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 5 n.14 (1990). For an overview of punitive damage reform at the state level, see
infra Appendix A.
5. See Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (Supp. 1995)) (addressing medical malpractice); Act of July, 29,
1995, ch. 522, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1 to -1.2
(1995)) (addressing products liability).
6. Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 514, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1D-1 to -50 (1995)).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15.
8. Id. § 1D-25.
9. See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
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medicine.' ° However, many have criticized the legislation as a severe
solution to an imaginary problem."
This Note examines the new punitive damages statutes in detail
to determine the impact they will have on trial practice in North Caro-
lina.12 The Note then gives a brief overview of punitive damages in
North Carolina before the new laws were enacted, in order to com-
pare and highlight the changes made by the legislation.' 3 Next, the
Note takes a broad look at the century-long debate over the doctrine
of punitive damages and the current situation in North Carolina to
determine if a change was really necessary.' 4 Finally, the Note com-
pares the North Carolina reform to similar reforms in other states and
comments on the measures the North Carolina legislature decided to
adopt.
15
The new punitive damages statute "applies to every claim for pu-
nitive damages, regardless of whether the claim for relief is based on a
statutory or a common-law right of action or based in equity."' 6
Under the new statute, punitive damages may be awarded for two
purposes: "to punish a defendant for egregiously wrongful acts and to
deter the defendant and others from committing similar wrongful
acts."17 As a prerequisite for an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff
10. See Punitive Damages Bill Debated, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, June 22,
1995, at B2 ("There have been few huge punitive damage awards so far in North Carolina
but Rep. Chuck Neely, R-Wake, warned: 'We need to fix this ship before it sinks.' ").
11. See, e.g., Sharon L. Brawley, Tort Reform a Bad Idea For Cdnsumers, Workers,
GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, July 1, 1995, at A8 ("North Carolina already has the most
restrictive product-liability laws in the United States, in addition to the nation's shortest
statute of repose and statutory prohibition of strict liability."); Michael Ballance, Tilting at
Windmills, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Sept. 3, 1995, at F3 ("Punitive damages are
notoriously rare in North Carolina .... "); Punitive Legal Reform, NEws & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), April 18, 1995, at 8A (describing the legislative proposals as "drastic, arbi-
trary limits on punitive damages in all civil cases").
12. See infra notes 16-46 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 47-93 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 94-146 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 147-94 and accompanying text.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-10 (1995).
17. Id- § 1D-1. Courts widely agree that these two purposes are the definitive goals of
punitive damages. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (1994)
("What we are concerned with is the possibility that a guilty defendant may be unjustly
punished .... ) (emphasis added); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991)
("Imposing exemplary damages ... creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a
position 'to guard substantially against the evil to be prevented.' ") (quoting Louis Pizitz
Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927)); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489,
498-99 (K.B. 1763) ("Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person,
but likewise as a punishment to the guilty [and] to deter from any such proceeding for the
future .... ") (emphasis added). But cf. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview:
Functions, Problems, and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REv. 363, 374-81 (1994) (discussing the edu-
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must prove that the defendant is liable for compensatory or nominal
damages.18 In addition, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convinc-
ing evidence 19 that an aggravating factor "was present and was related
to the injury for which compensatory damages were awarded."20
This aggravating factor must be either fraud,2' malice,22 or willful
or wanton conduct. 23 Willful or wanton conduct is defined by the stat-
ute as "the conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to
the rights and safety of others, which the defendant knows or should
know is reasonably likely to result in injury, damage, or other
harm."' 4 According to the statute, willful or wanton conduct is a
more egregious standard of conduct than gross negligence.25 In addi-
tion, the statute provides that punitive damages cannot be awarded
cation, retribution, deterrence, compensation, and law enforcement functions of punitive
damages).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a) (1995). Nominal damages are included in the defini-
tion of compensatory damages. Id § 1D-5(2).
19. Id § 1D-15(b). The clear and convincing standard of proof has been applied in
several other areas of North Carolina law. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(e)
(1995) (termination of parental rights); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-267(h) (1993) (involuntary
commitment); Leggett v. Rose, 776 F. Supp. 229, 236 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (existence of con-
tract to devise property); Dorsey v. Dorsey, 306 N.C. 545, 547, 293 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1982)
(reformation or cancellation of instruments); North Carolina State Bar v. Sheffield, 73 N.C.
App. 349, 354, 326 S.E.2d 320, 323 (charge of attorney misconduct), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
981 (1985); Hall v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 46 N.C. App. 760, 764, 266 S.E.2d 397, 400
(1980) (where plaintiff in defamation action is a public figure), disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C.
88 (1980). See generally 2 HENRY BRANDIS, JR., BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVI-
DENCE § 213 (3rd ed. 1988) (discussing the clear and convincing standard as well as such
alternate formulations as the clear, strong, and convincing standard, and the clear, cogent,
and convincing standard). See infra Appendix A for a list of other states which use this
burden of proof in punitive damages litigation.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a) (1995).
21. Id. § 1D-15(a)(1). This term "does not include constructive fraud unless an ele-
ment of intent is present." Id. § 1D-5(4); see infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a)(2) (1995). Malice is "a sense of personal ill will to-
ward the claimant that activated or incited the defendant to perform the act or undertake
the conduct that resulted in harm to the claimant." Id § 1D-5(5); see infra notes 159-73
and accompanying text.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a)(3)(1995); see infra notes 171-73 and accompanying
text. See infra Appendix A for similar aggravating factors in other states.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-5(7) (1995). It is unclear how this standard of conduct dif-
fers from the historical North Carolina definition, if at all. See infra notes 171-73 and
accompanying text.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-5(7) (1995).
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against a person on the basis of vicarious liability,26 and cannot be
awarded solely for breach of a contract.27
Even if a claimant is able to prove liability for compensatory
damages and the presence of an aggravating factor, the new statute
limits the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded.2 8 A pu-
nitive damage award against a defendant may not exceed three times
the amount of compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is
greater.29 The jury may not be told about the cap,"° and if they award
an amount in excess of the cap, the court is required to enter a judg-
ment for the maximum amount permitted under the statute.31 The
one exception to the limitation on punitive damages is for injury or
harm caused by a defendant driving while impaired by alcohol or
drugs.32 Furthermore, if the claimant is pursuing another statutory
remedy that provides for multiple damages, such as the unfair and
deceptive trade practices statute,33 the plaintiff must elect prior to
judgment 34 between punitive damages and the alternative remedy.35
The statute also provides for certain procedural safeguards to en-
sure a fair punitive damages award. First, the jury must consider the
26. Id § 1D-15(c). This section states:
Punitive damages may be awarded against a person only if that person partici-
pated in the conduct constituting the aggravating factor giving rise to the punitive
damages, or if, in the case of a corporation, the officers, directors, or managers of
the corporation participated in or condoned the conduct constituting the aggra-
vating factor giving rise to punitive damages.
id.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(d) (1995).
28. Id. § 1D-25. Only a few states have put such a limit on punitive damages. For a
comprehensive list of those states, see infra Appendix A.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (1995). It is unclear how multiple claims might affect
this cap. For instance, if a claimant has two different claims against the same defendant,
both of which entitle him to punitive damages, is the maximum cap $500,000 or $250,000?
Also, if two plaintiffs have a claim against the same defendant for punitive damages and try
them together, are both claims subject to the same $250,000 cap? The answer to these
questions is uncertain, but the most logical approach would apply the cap to each separate
claim. This would mean that the cap would be $500,000 if the defendant was liable on two
separate claims, whether they were brought by the same plaintiff or two different plaintiffs.
30. Id. § 1D-25(c).
31. Id. § 1D-25(b).
32. Id. § 1D-26. The actions of the defendant must "give rise to an offense of driving
while impaired under G.S. 20-138.1, 20-138.2, or 20-138.5." Id.; see generally William C.
Cooper, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 PEPP. L. REv. 117 (1980)
(arguing that punitive damages are an appropriate sanction for drunk drivers).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1994). This statute provides for treble damages if a
violation is found. Id. § 75-16.
34. According to traditional North Carolina law, prior to judgment does not mean
before the verdict. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-20 (1995).
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purposes of punitive damages36 and may consider evidence which re-
lates to eight factors laid out in the statute, including the defendant's
ability to pay.3 7 The court is required to read these factors and pur-
poses to the jury during its instructions.3 Moreover, upon motion by
the defendant, the trial will be bifurcated so the issues of liability and
the amount of punitive damages are tried separately, although the
same trier of fact will decide both phases.39 The statute also provides
for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees "against a claimant who
files a claim for punitive damages that the claimant knows or should
have known to be frivolous or malicious. ' 40 Finally, the statute re-
quires the trial court to produce a written opinion detailing "its rea-
sons for upholding or disturbing" an award of punitive damages.4'
In addition to enacting section ID, the General Assembly also
made conforming changes to two existing statutes. The wrongful
death statute was amended to reflect the higher standard of conduct
required for a finding of liability for punitive damages." Prior to the
change, gross negligence gave rise to a claim for punitive damages in
wrongful death actions.43 The new law indicates that wrongful death
actions are now governed by the same standard as all other punitive
damages claims. 4 The legislature also codified special pleading re-
quirements for punitive damages. 5 Under the new law, a claim for
punitive damages must be "specifically stated, except for the amount,
and the aggravating factor that supports the award of punitive dam-
ages shall be averred with particularity. '
46
The doctrine of punitive damages was first considered in North
Carolina in 1797 in the case of Carruthers v. Tillman.' Subsequently,
36. Id. § 1D-35(1); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
37. Id. § 1D-35(2). See infra text accompanying note 89 for the list of specified
factors.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-40 (1995).
39. Id § 1D-30. This is to prevent prejudicial evidence of past wrongful conduct and
net worth during the liability phase of the trial. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying
text.
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-45 (1995).
41. Id § ID-50.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (Supp. 1995).
43. Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 514, § 2, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1984)) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)
(Supp. 1995)).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (Supp. 1995).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(k) (Supp. 1995).
46. Id
47. 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 501 (1797). For a treatment of North Carolina law on punitive
damages before 1981, see Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Postscript: Punitive Damages in North Caro-
lina, 59 N.C. L. REV. 1255 (1981).
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"North Carolina has consistently allowed punitive damages solely on
the basis of its policy to punish intentional wrongdoing and to deter
others from similar behavior." 8 Although punitive damages have an
established place in North Carolina jurisprudence in serving this pol-
icy, the North Carolina Supreme Court has continually expressed its
desire to constrain the expansion of the doctrine.49
Historically, the most substantial impediment to plaintiffs' ability
to collect punitive damages has been the required presence of aggra-
vating factors. This limitation was established early in the develop-
ment of the punitive damages doctrine, and has been applied in a
myriad of situations.50 Aggravating factors have been defined differ-
ently depending on the type of actionable wrong upon which they
were founded. For example, in the area of intentional torts, aggra-
vated conduct has been defined as actual or express malice, such as
personal ill will, insult, rudeness, indignity, oppression, bad motive, or
48. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105,113,229 S.E.2d 297,302 (1976); see
also Overnite Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 30, 125 S.E.2d
277, 286 (1962) ("Punitive damages are never awarded as compensation. They are
awarded above and beyond actual damages, as a punishment for the defendant's inten-
tional wrong."), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Cavin's Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins.-Co., 27
N.C. App. 698,701,220 S.E.2d 403,406 (1975) ("Punitive damages, as the descriptive name
clearly implies, are awarded as punishment.").
49. See, e.g., Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 27, 92 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1956) (stating
that, despite some commentators' characterization of the punitive damages doctrine as an
"anomaly," it occupies "an established place in our law" and the court is "not disposed to
expand the doctrine beyond the limits established by authoritative decisions"); see also
Fourth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law-Punitive Damages, 35 N.C. L. REv.
177, 223-24 (1957) (discussing history of punitive damages).
50. See, e.g., Newton, 291 N.C. at 112,229 S.E.2d at 301 (fraud); Oestreicher v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 136, 225 S.E.2d 797, 808 (1976) (fraud); Woody v.
Catawba Valley Broadcasting Co., 272 N.C. 459, 463, 158 S.E.2d 578, 581-82 (1968) (libel);
Van Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 261 N.C. 539, 546, 135 S.E.2d 640, 645 (1964)
(appropriating land); General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Distributors, Inc., 253 N.C. 459, 473,
117 S.E.2d 479, 490 (1960) (seizing goods); Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
222 N.C. 512,516,23 S.E.2d 894,896 (1943) (conversion of automobile); Hairston v. Atlan-
tic Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 642, 645, 18 S.E.2d 166, 168 (1942) (assault and battery);
Harris v. Queen City Coach Co., 220 N.C. 67, 69, 16 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (1941) (company
refusing to transport plaintiff); Horton v. Carolina Coach Co., 216 N.C. 567, 569, 5 S.E.2d
828, 830 (1939) (company made a woman passenger and her child disembark in a lonely
place short of their destination); Ford v. McAnally, 182 N.C. 419, 421, 109 S.E. 91, 92
(1921) (assault, false arrest, and malicious prosecution); Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
175 N.C. 130, 132, 95 S.E. 92, 94 (1918) (nuisance by blasting); Smith v. Morganton Ice Co.,
159 N.C. 151, 155-56, 74 S.E. 961, 963-64 (1912) (restraint of trade contrary to antitrust
law); Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 17, 21, 72 S.E. 619, 621-22
(1911) (company refusing telephone service); Hayes v. Railroad, 141 N.C. 195, 199, 53 S.E.
847, 848 (1906) (railroad using excessive force to eject vagrant); Wylie v. Smitherman, 30
N.C. (8 Ired.) 236,239 (1848) (burning county courthouse); Duncan v. Stalcup, 18 N.C. (1
Dev. & Bat.) 440, 441 (1836) (shooting livestock).
1996] 2179
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.-1 On the other
hand, in wrongful death claims prior to the new statute, gross negli-
gence constituted aggravated conduct.52 For claims based on negli-
gence, aggravated conduct has been found when the defendant
wantonly committed the legal wrong against the plaintiff. 3 The terms
"wanton" and "willful" have often been used interchangeably.-4 In
addition, these terms have frequently been used in conjunction with
the term "reckless.
55
Historically, fraud and contract claims have been treated differ-
ently than other actions. The relationship between punitive damages
and actions based on fraud has been called a "singularly confused"
area of North Carolina law. 6 As stated in Swinton v. Savoy Realty
Co., 57 actions based on fraud were not exempt from the rule requiring
the presence of an aggravating factor before punitive damages could
be awarded.58 However, in 1976, Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance
Co.59 overruled Swinton insofar as that case required "some kind of
aggravated conduct in addition to actionable fraud or [made] any dis-
tinction between 'simple' and 'aggravated' fraud" in the recovery of
punitive damages.60 The Newton case controlled on this issue until the
passage of Chapter ID.61
51. See, e.g., Shugar v. Guill, 304 N.C. 332, 338-39, 283 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1981) (malice
and personal ill will); Newton, 291 N.C. at 112, 229 S.E.2d at 301 (insult, rudeness, and
oppression); Woody, 272 N.C. at 463, 158 S.E.2d at 582 (wanton and reckless disregard of
plaintiff's rights).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1984) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-18-2(b) (Supp. 1995)); Cole v. Duke Power Co., 81 N.C. App. 213, 217-18, 344
S.E.2d 130, 132-33, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 281, 347 S.E.2d 462 (1986).
53. Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 28-29, 92 S.E.2d 393, 396-97 (1956). The Hinson
court defined wanton as a "conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the
rights and safety of others." Id. at 28, 92 S.E.2d at 397.
54. See, e.g., Berrier v. Thrift, 107 N.C. App. 356, 358-61, 420 S.E.2d 206, 207-09
(1992), disc. rev. denied, 333 N.C. 254, 424 S.E.2d 918 (1993); Nance v. Robertson, 91 N.C.
App. 121, 123, 370 S.E.2d 283, 284, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 477, 373 S.E.2d 865 (1988);
Starkey v. Cimarron Apartments, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 772, 774-75, 321 S.E.2d 229, 231
(1984), disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 798, 325 S.E.2d 633 (1985); Roberts v. Davis, 15 N.C.
App. 284, 285, 189 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1972). For a discussion of the meaning of these terms
in the new statute, see infra notes 159-73 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723,725,73 S.E.2d 785,787 (1953),
overruled in part by Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
56. Newton, 291 N.C. at 112, 229 S.E.2d at 301.
57. 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785 (1953), overruled in part by Newton v. Standard Fire
Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
58. Swinton, 236 N.C. at 725, 73 S.E.2d at 787.
59. 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
60. Id at 113-14, 229 S.E.2d at 302 (citation omitted).
61. See Bumgarner v. Tomblin, 63 N.C. App. 636, 643,306 S.E.2d 178,183 (1983), disc.
rev,. denied, 324 N.C. 333, 378 S.E.2d 789 (1989); Shaver v. N.C. Monroe Constr. Co., 63
N.C. App. 605, 616, 306 S.E.2d 519, 526 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 154, 311 S.E.2d
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Under North Carolina common law, punitive damages also were
not allowed for simple breach of contract, excluding contracts to
marry and the failure of a public service company to perform an obli-
gation imposed upon it by its public franchise.62 Although the pres-
ence of an aggravating factor was still required, the breach could be
grounds for recovery of punitive damages when it also constituted or
was accompanied by an identifiable tortious action.63 In addition,
North Carolina traditionally allowed recovery of punitive damages
from a corporation whose agent wantonly committed a tort in the
course of employment.
64
Other common-law checks on the award of punitive damages ex-
ist. First, a claim for punitive damages cannot constitute a cause of
action standing alone, and such damages are only recoverable when
the jury finds that an actionable legal wrong has been committed
against the plaintiff or his property and awards the plaintiff either
nominal or compensatory damages.65 Second, if a claimant pursues
294 (1984); Carter v. Parsons, 61 N.C. App. 412,420,301 S.E.2d 405,410 (1983). Newton is
still good law after the new statute, but under a slightly different theory. Under § 1D-
15(a)(1), fraud is an aggravating factor which can give rise to an award of punitive dam-
ages. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a)(1) (1995). As a result, in actions based on fraud, the
fraud itself will justify punitive damages. However, constructive fraud will no longer give
rise to punitive damages. See infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
62. See Newton, 291 N.C. at 111, 229 S.E.2d at 301; King v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
273 N.C. 396, 398, 159 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1968); Swinton, 236 N.C. at 726, 73 S.E.2d at 787;
Mesimer v. Stancil, 45 N.C. App. 533, 534, 263 S.E.2d 32, 32 (1980); see also Sean Deve-
reux, Comment, Remedy-"Extra-Contractual" Remedies for Breach of Contract in North
Carolina, 55 N.C. L. REv. 1125 passim (1977) (discussing the possibilities for awarding
punitive damages in breach of contract cases).
63. See Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 196,254 S.E.2d 611, 621 (1979) (breach of
contract accompanied by intentional infliction of emotional distress); Hill v. Pinelawn Me-
morial Park, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 231,237, 275 S.E.2d 838, 841-42 (describing plaintiffs seek-
ing specific performance of contract to sell mausoleum crypt and damages resulting from
subsequent sale of crypt to third parties), rev'd on other grounds, 304 N.C. 159, 282 S.E.2d
779 (1981); cf Barnes v. Ford Motor Co., 95 N.C. App. 367,374,382 S.E.2d 842,846 (1989)
(finding that defendant's "willful" refusal to pay plaintiff did not give rise to a tort action or
subject the defendant to liability for punitive damages). Chapter 1D explicitly codifies this
traditional rule by stating that "[p]unitive damages shall not be awarded ... solely for
breach of contract." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(d) (1995).
64. Clemmons v. Life Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 416, 424, 163 S.E.2d 761, 767 (1968), super-
seded on other grounds, Gatlin v. Bray, 81 N.C. App. 639, 344 S.E.2d 814 (1986); Binder v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 516, 23 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1943). The new
law partially overrules these holdings by awarding punitive damages against a corporation
only when "the officers, directors, or managers of the corporation participated in or con-
doned the conduct constituting the aggravating factor giving rise to punitive damages."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(c) (1995).
65. Clemmons, 274 N.C. at 423-24, 163 S.E.2d at 766; Parris v. H.G. Fischer & Co., 221
N.C. 110, 113, 19 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1942); Ransom v. Blair, 62 N.C. App. 71, 76, 302 S.E.2d
306, 309 (1983). This rule remains in force after the ratification of the new statute. N.C.
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punitive damages while also seeking a statutory remedy that provides
for multiple damages,6 6 North Carolina case law does not allow the
claimant to receive both awards; instead, the claimant must elect prior
to judgment which damages to collect.67
After several landmark United States Supreme Court cases,
68
judges nationwide shifted their focus to another punitive damages
arena: the standards that juries use in arriving at an amount, and the
post-trial review procedures to be used in assessing that amount.
69
Probably the most important of these cases was Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip.7 ° In ruling on the constitutionality of the Al-
abama system, the Haslip Court dealt with the question of what pro-
cedures were necessary to ensure that punitive damages awards did
not violate due process. 71 While refusing to establish a "mathematical
bright line" formula for determining whether an award was constitu-
tional, the Supreme Court stated that "[o]ne must concede that unlim-
ited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-
GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a) (1995). Although this statute only speaks of compensatory dam-
ages, nominal damages are included in that definition. Id. § 1D-5(2).
66. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1, -16 (1994) (providing for treble damages for
an unfair or deceptive trade practice).
67. Ellis v. Northern Star Co., 326 N.C. 219, 227, 388 S.E.2d 127, 132 (1990); United
Lab., Inc., v. Kuykendall, 102 N.C. App. 484, 493, 403 S.E.2d 104, 110 (1991), affd, 335
N.C. 183, 437 S.E.2d 374 (1993); see also Mapp v. Toyota World, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 421,
427, 344 S.E.2d 297, 301 ("[I]t would be manifestly unfair to require plaintiffs in such cases
to elect before the jury has answered the issues and the trial court has determined whether
to treble the compensatory damages found by the jury .... ), disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C.
283, 347 S.E.2d 464 (1986). It is important to remember that the plaintiff may recover the
punitive damages amount, the compensatory amount awarded for the statutory violation
and attorneys' fees. See United Lab., Inc., 102 N.C. App. at 493, 403 S.E.2d at 110, affd
335 N.C. 183,437 S.E.2d 374 (1993). This rule was not always so clear. See generally Chris-
topher Blair Capel, Note, Unfair Trade Practices and Unfair Methods of Competition in
North Carolina: Are Both Treble and Punitive Damages Available For Violations of Section
75-1.1?, 62 N.C. L. REv. 1139 (1984) (arguing that North Carolina courts would reach the
negative conclusion). This rule also is unchanged by the new statute. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1D-20 (1995).
68. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). For
an analysis of these cases, see James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and
Developments, 14 REv. Lmo. 419, 427-36 (1995).
69. See McKown, supra note 68, at 430-36. North Carolina changed its procedures as a
result of these cases. For a discussion of the changes, see infra notes 84-90 and accompany-
ing text.
70. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
71. Id at 7-8. In Haslip, the Supreme Court upheld a punitive award of $840,000 aris-
ing out of a bad faith claim against an insurance company and its agent. Id. at 6-7, 24.
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in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar
one's constitutional sensibilities. 72
In assessing Alabama's method, the Court found that its "consti-
tutional calculus" benefited from three things. 73 First, Alabama's jury
instructions were specific.74 The trial court instructed the jury as to
the purposes of punitive damages and told it to consider" 'the charac-
ter and the degree of the wrong.' -75 In addition, the jury was told
that punitive damages are not compulsory, but discretionary.76 Be-
cause of these instructions, the Court concluded that an Alabama
jury's discretion "was not unlimited.
'77
Second, under the Alabama system, the trial court conducted a
post-trial review of jury verdicts awarding punitive damages,78 " 're-
fiect[ing] in the record the reasons for interfering with a jury verdict,
or refusing to do so, on grounds of excessiveness of the damages.' "79
The trial court took into consideration a number of factors in making
this decision: the culpability of the defendant's conduct, the desirabil-
ity of deterring others from similar conduct, the impact of the award
upon the parties, the impact of the award on innocent third parties,
and other factors.80 The Supreme Court thus found that this proce-
dure "ensures meaningful and adequate review by the trial court
whenever a jury has fixed the punitive damages."
'81
72. Id. at 18. In a more recent case, the Supreme Court again refused to establish a
fixed mathematical formula for determining whether a punitive damages award was consti-
tutional, but did set out three "guideposts" to aid in determining whether the award was
"grossly excessive." See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) In
Gore, the Court held that "[e]lementary notions of fairness... dictate that a person receive
fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment but also of the
severity of the penalty .....Id. at 1598. Three "guideposts" are indicators of the presence
or absence of such notice: "[T]he degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the dis-
parity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [the claimant] and his punitive
damages award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized
or imposed in comparable cases." Id. at 1598-99. Applying these guideposts to the facts,
the Supreme Court overturned the punitive damage award as "grossly excessive." Id. at
1604.
It is too early to ascertain how state legislatures will respond to the Gore decision.
However, the decision should not affect North Carolina's new punitive damages law as
damages in North Carolina are now capped at a statutorily-set maximum amount. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (1995).
73. Id. at 18-22.
74. Id. at 19-20.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Id. at 20.
79. Id (citing Hammond v. City of Gadsen, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986)).
80. Id. (citing Hammond, 493 So. 2d at 1379 (Ala. 1986)).
81. Id
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Finally, appellate review of punitive damage awards in Alabama
also considers a number of factors: (1) whether there is a reasonable
correlation between the punitive damages and the harm done or likely
to occur; (2) the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the dura-
tion of the conduct, the defendant's concealment of the conduct, and
the past existence and frequency of such conduct; (3) the profitability
of the conduct and the desirability of eliminating the profit and creat-
ing a loss; (4) the defendant's economic position; (5) the costs of litiga-
tion; (6) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for his
conduct (considered in mitigation); and (7) the existence of any addi-
tional civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct (also
considered in mitigation),s2 The Haslip Court concluded that this "re-
view makes certain that the punitive damages are reasonable in their
amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has oc-
curred and to deter its repetition." 3
Before Haslip, North Carolina's pattern jury instructions on puni-
tive damages were very similar to those used in Alabama.8 4 However,
North Carolina's trial courts only reviewed punitive damage verdicts
upon motion of the defendant and then only to determine if the award
was supported by the evidence or if the award was excessive.85 Fur-
thermore, appellate review was not guided by specific factors.
Many states reacted to Haslip with judicial determinations that
their procedures provided sufficiently reasonable guidance or by in-
corporating procedures similar to those existing in Alabama. 6 North
Carolina's Pattern Jury Instruction Committee issued two sets of new
instructions which, in less complex cases, instructed jurors that puni-
tive damage awards "must bear a rational relationship" to the amount
needed to punish or deter and, in more complex cases, required jurors
to consider the Haslip factors.87
82. Id. at 21-22.
83. Id, at 21.
84. See N.C. Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil - 810.01 (Feb. 1986); N.C. Pattern Jury
Instructions - Civil - 810.00 (May 1975).
85. See Shugar v. Guill, 304 N.C. 332, 339, 283 S.E.2d 507, 511-12 (1981); Harris v.
Queen City Coach Co., 220 N.C. 67, 69, 16 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (1941).
86. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408, 1418 (4th Cir. 1992) (Vir-
ginia); Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501, 503 (Ga. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1096 (1992); Alexander & Alexander v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc.,
596 A.2d 687, 708-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), cert. denied, 605 A.2d 137 (Md. 1992);
Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 353-55 (S.C. 1991); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833
S.W.2d 896, 901-02 (Tenn. 1992); Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 908-10
(W. Va. 1991).
87. N.C. Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil--810.01-.02 (May 1992). Jurors had to be
permitted to consider the Haslip factors in order to comply with the North Carolina Con-
stitution, which provides for a right to trial by jury on all issues of fact. Thus, it is unconsti-
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In accordance with Haslip, Chapter 1D requires that jurors be
instructed regarding the purposes of punitive damages.88 In addition,
jurors must be told that they may consider the following factors:
a. The reprehensibility of the defendant's motives and
conduct.
b. The likelihood, at the relevant time, of serious harm.
c. The degree of the defendant's awareness of the probable
consequences of its conduct.
d. The duration of the defendant's conduct.
e. The actual damages suffered by the claimant.
f. Any concealment by the defendant of the facts or conse-
quences of its conduct.
g. The existence and frequency of any similar past conduct
by the defendant.
h. Whether the defendant profited from the conduct.
i. The defendant's ability to pay punitive damages, as evi-
denced by its revenues or net worth.8 9
The statute also requires the trial court to "state in a written opin-
ion its reasons for upholding or disturbing the finding or award."90
Pleading requirements are also more stringent under the new law.
Since North Carolina has adopted a form of notice pleading, it has not
been necessary for punitive damages to be specially pleaded by name
in the complaint.91 The plaintiff was simply required to place the de-
fendant on notice as to the aggravating circumstances which would
justify an award of punitive damages. 9 Under the new pleading stat-
ute, however, a claim for punitive damages must be "specifically
stated, except for the amount, and the aggravating factor.., shall be
averred with particularity." 93
tutional for trial and appellate courts to consider evidence that was not before the jury
when reviewing an award. See N.C. CONST. art. I, §25.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-40 (1995).
89. Id. § 1D-35(2). These factors come in large part from Haslip. See supra notes 82-
83 and accompanying text.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-50 (1995).
91. Shugar v. Guill, 304 N.C. 332, 338, 283 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1981).
92. Ui at 337-38, 283 S.E.2d at 510. In Shugar, the Supreme Court held that the alle-
gation that" 'the defendant, without just cause, did intentionally, willfully and maliciously
assault and batter the plaintiff' " was sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages. Id- at
335-36, 338,283 S.E.2d at 509-10 (quoting plaintiff's complaint). A more recent case, prior
to the enactment of the new reforms, had even called this minimal requirement into ques-
tion. Huff v. Chrismon, 68 N.C. App. 525, 527, 315 S.E.2d 711,712 (1984) (holding that a
complaint need no longer set out allegations of "facts or elements showing aggravating
circumstances which would justify an award of punitive damages"), disc. rev. denied, 311
N.C. 756, 321 S.E.2d 134 (1985).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(k) (Supp. 1995).
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North Carolina's new punitive damages laws were spurred by
widespread sentiment that punitive damage awards were out of con-
trol. Critics and courts alike have condemned the doctrine. 94 For ex-
ample, Justice O'Connor has been a steadfast opponent of what she
considers the pressing problem of punitive damages. 95 In her dissent-
ing opinion in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,96 she
wrote that "punitive damages are skyrocketing. '97 Further, she stated
that "[a]s recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive dam-
ages affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability case was
$250,000.... Since then, awards more than [thirty] times as high have
been sustained on appeal." 98
Several key cases on the national scene have exacerbated this im-
age of a runaway tort system. Currently, one of the most famous is
the McDonald's "hot coffee" case.99 This case involved a woman who
purchased coffee at a McDonald's drive-thru window and accidentally
spilled it on her lap.' 0 She then sued the corporation seeking puni-
tive damages for burns she suffered from the excessive temperature of
the coffee. 01 She was subsequently awarded the sum of $2.7 million
in punitive damages.10 2
Another noteworthy suit is the Exxon Valdez case. 10 3 The plain-
tiffs, Alaskan fishermen, alleged damages stemming from an oil spill
94. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) ("We note once again
our concern about punitive damages that 'run wild.' "); Peter Huber, No-Fault Punishment,
40 ALA. L. Rev. 1037, 1050 (1989) ("[Pjunitive damages remain a special problem, and one
in need of urgent attention."); Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Dam-
ages Statutes: A Proposed Alternative, 20 J. LEGis. 191, 197-98 (1994) ("Critics contend
that punitive damages are routinely awarded, the amounts awarded are large, the fre-
quency and size of awards has been rapidly increasing, and the problem is national in
scope.").
95. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282-83 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
97. Id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 782090 (LRP
Jury) (Bernalillo County Dist. Court, N.M. Sept. 1994).
100. Id. at *1.
101. Id.; see infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
102. Liebeck, 1994 WL 782090, at *1; see Jack Torry, Coffee Scalding Defines Tort Bat-
tle: Senate Hotly Debates Punitive Damages Ceiling For Lawsuits, PrrrsBURGH POsT-GA.
zelrrE, May 4, 1995, at Al.




from an Exxon oil tanker.1°4 Exxon was ordered to pay $5 billion
dollars in punitive damages. 1 5
Some industries in particular have felt a blow from high punitive
damage awards. For instance, juries appear to be more than ready to
level big punches at insurance companies in bad-faith cases.'0 6 Puni-
tive damage awards have, for all practical purposes, destroyed the as-
bestos industry. 0 7  Critics argue that punitive damages threaten
research and development of new products, and may have led to the
abandonment of potentially useful products.'
104. Id. at *5; see also Caleb Soloman, Exxon Is Told To Pay $5 Billion For Valdez Spill,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at A3, A8 (discussing the case).
105. Soloman, supra note 104, at A3.
106. Andrew Blum, Angry Jurors Take It Out On Insurers; Are the Recent Big Punitive
Awards a Trend?, NAT'L L.J., May 13,1991, at 1 (pointing to a new study by Chicago-based
American Bar Foundation). Blum cites three examples: (1) A motorist in Alaska won
$1.2 million in punitive damages when an insurer refused her minor claim; (2) Lloyds of
London was forced to pay $60 million in punitive damages after turning down a claim
concerning a burned restaurant; and (3) A Mississippi anesthetist received $15 million in
punitive damages from St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. I& at 1, 10.
107. Formerly a very successful company in the asbestos industry, the Johns-Manville
Corporation was a defendant in approximately 17,000 personal injury lawsuits and had
tried or settled 3570 suits at an average cost of $20,000 each by the time it filed bankruptcy.
In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710,751 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also
In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged-
A Proposal for the Use of Federal Common Law in Mass Tort Class Actions, 58 BROOK. L.
REv. 553, 565-71 (1992) (giving more examples of the history of asbestos litigation). Also,
an Illinois court noted that the Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corporation, a former producer
of asbestos-containing products, may potentially be liable for "$8.5 billion for punitive
damages alone." Kochan v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 610 N.E.2d 683, 694 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994).
Some members of the plaintiff's bar have openly expressed a desire to put certain
other industries out of business. The tobacco industry may be one example:
Longtime anti-tobacco lawyers, like [John] Banzhaf and [Richard] Daynard, pre-
dict the first big judgment against the [tobacco] companies will be handed down
in fall 1995 or spring 1996. The first cigarette company will go bankrupt, they say,
in 1997. Even some independent legal experts say they could be right this time.
Mark Curriden, The Heat Is On, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 58, 61.
108. Robert W. Pritchard, Comment, The Due Process Implications of Ohio's Punitive
Damages Law-A Change Must Be Made, 19 U. DAYTON L. Rnv. 1207, 1224 n.138 (1994)
(" 'The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and devel-
opment of new products. Some manufacturers of prescription drugs, for example, have
decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine
into the market.' " (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
This criticism is termed the "overdeterrence" problem with punitive damages. See Amelia
J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic
Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 326-27 (1991).
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Another argument against high punitive damages is that the un-
predictability of awards is unfair and a violation of due process.' 0 9 It
is argued that the judicial system invites arbitrary and capricious judg-
ments by allowing juries to set the amount of damages with "little
more than an admonition to do what they think is best."t ' Critics
also argue that punitive damage awards give plaintiffs an unfair ad-
vantage in settlement negotiations, decrease the availability and in-
crease the cost of insurance coverage, and subject the defendant to
multiple punishment for the same conduct."'
Still another generally held belief is that, because punitive dam-
ages result in a windfall to the plaintiff, these plaintiffs become "eager
victims.""' 2 In other words, plaintiffs allow themselves to be injured
by being contributorily negligent and then collecting both actual dam-
ages and bonus punitive damages." 3 This not only increases the
heavy burden on the judiciary system, but allows persons to unfairly
manipulate the system to their own advantage and to the detriment of
others.
Supporters of the punitive damages doctrine claim that huge jury
awards are the exception rather than the rule, citing "eye-glazing stud-
ies of numbers and size of awards to counter the assertions of the tort
reformers.""' 4 Proponents assert that these studies invariably show
109. Toy, supra note 108, at 323-24. The Supreme Court has ruled that there is a due
process right that could be violated without sufficient guidance to juries and adequate post-
trial review by the courts. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)
(pointing out that although Alabama's procedures did not violate due process, the award at
issue "may be close to the line"); Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it leaves the door open
for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in
civil cases brought by private parties."); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486
U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("In
my view, because of the punitive character of such awards, there is reason to think that this
may violate the Due Process Clause.").
110. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring). The jury was told that
it could " 'take into account the character of the defendants, their financial standing, and
the nature of their acts.' " Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan argued that
"[g]uidance like this is scarcely better than no guidance at all." Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
111. E.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: An Em-
pirical Study of the Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive Damages in Product Liability,
16 JusT. Sys. J. 21, 21 (1993).
112. Toy, supra note 108, at 328-29.
113. See David D. Haddock, et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary
Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1, 37-38 n.108 (1990); Toy, supra note 108, at 328-29.
114. Hurd & Zollers, supra note 94, at 191. The most comprehensive of these empirical
studies is by Professor Michael Rustad. See generally Michael Rustad, In Defense of Puni-
tive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA
L. REv. 1 (1992) (examining results of four previous studies-Rand Institute for Civil Jus-
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that juries are not out of control in handing out punitive damage
awards.115 In one such study, Professors Michael Rustad and Thomas
Koenig only located a total of 355 punitive damage awards among the
thousands of product liability suits included in a twenty-five-year
survey."
16
Commentators are quick to point out that even if punitive dam-
ages are high and unpredictable, the harms to business interests are
overstated.117 In other words, if asbestos companies are forced out of
business by punitive damages awards, it is because they produced an
unsafe product and tried to conceal the dangers, not because some-
thing is wrong with the system.
The belief that punitive damages are running rampant in the
United States stems largely from stories that focus on the amount of
damages awarded rather than the egregious conduct of the com-
pany."18 These skewed tales are then reported in the popular media as
completely factual. 119 One example is President Reagan's tale of a
man who successfully sued the telephone company when the booth
from which he was making a call was struck by a drunk driver. 20
What the President omitted from this anecdote was the victim's
perspective:
I would not be standing on an artificial leg if the booth had
not been installed so close to the road and if the door had
opened as it was supposed to when I tried to get away from
the oncoming car. It's nobody's fault but the telephone com-
pany's that I was in the way of that car when it hit. 2'
tice Study, American Bar Foundation Study, GAO Study, and Landes and Posner Study-
and then analyzing his own findings); see also Koenig & Rustad, supra note 111, at 25
(discussing the same earlier studies).
115. See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 114, at 23, 85-88.
116. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform,
39 VILL. L. REv. 363, 372 (1994) (citing MICHAEL RUSTAD & THOMAS KOENIG PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE LAST QUARTER CEN-
TURY OF VERDICTS 16 (Nov. 14, 1991)).
117. See Rustad, supra note 114, at 85-88 (discussing the social functions of punitive
damages); Toy, supra note 108, at 324-26 (stating that unpredictability and large awards are
needed to serve the deterrence function of punitive damages).
118. See Rustad, supra note 114, at 21 ("Stories abound of incredibly stupid or careless
consumers collecting multi-million dollar windfalls after being hurt by their own folly.").
119. See, e.g., Malcom S. Forbes, Fact and Comment, FORBES, Jan. 27, 1986, at 17.
120. Victims Charge Administration Distorted Their "Sufferings" in Tort Reform Bid,
DAILY REP. FOR EXEcUTIvES (BNA) No. 142, at A-13 (July 24, 1986).
121. Id-
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Another such example is the all-too-famous McDonald's coffee
case.122 What caused such a stir was the $2.7 million award for spilled
coffee, 23 but many people are not aware of the following facts:
1. McDonald's, by corporate policy, kept its coffee between 180
to 190 degrees. At that temperature, it could cause life-threatening
burns within seven seconds if spilled.
2. The plaintiff was hospitalized for eight days and received skin
grafts.
3. The plaintiff has permanent scars on over 16 percent of her
body.
4. McDonald's own experts did not contest the fact that the cof-
fee took 25 minutes to cool to a drinkable temperature.
5. The McDonald's quality-assurance manager testified that the
corporation had a list of more than 700 other burn cases.
6. $2.7 million dollars was chosen by the jury because it was
equal to two days of McDonald's coffee sales. 24
In the midst of this concern over punitive damages, North Caro-
lina passed its new statute designed to keep these awards at a reason-
able level. However, there is even less evidence of excessive punitive
damages in this state than there is nationwide. A search of both ap-
pellate cases and trial level jury verdicts that occurred before the new
laws' passage reveals no apparent abuse of the doctrine of punitive
damages.
First, a study of all North Carolina appellate cases for the last ten
years suggests that punitive damage awards in North Carolina have
been fairly modest. 2 5 Of the 319 cases which were analyzed, the jury
awarded punitive damages in only fifty-two cases. Of these fifty-two
122. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 782090 (LRP
Jury) (Bemalillo County Dist. Court, N.M. Sept. 1994); see supra text accompanying notes
99-102.
123. See Ann Landers, Juries Need Reality Check On Hot-Drink Suits, GREENSBORO
NEWS & RECORD, Oct. 6, 1995, at D3 (responding to a letter from "Still Angry in Atlanta"
describing the plaintiff as "a malingering old biddy who pumped up her alleged injuries to
get more money"). The jury award was lowered by the trial judge to $480,000, and Mc-
Donald's settled for an even lower amount, another fact that is sometimes omitted from
accounts. Torry, supra note 102, at Al.
124. Charles Allen, Fighting Over More Than Just Spilled Coffee, FAYETrEVILLE OB-
SERVER-TIMES, March 30, 1995, at 15A (authored by the plaintiff's son-in-law).
125. This study includes cases from both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the
North Carolina Supreme Court dating from January 1986 through January 1996. A search
for cases containing the words "punitive damages" was performed in the NC-CS database
of Westlaw. Cases cited to both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court were counted as one case.
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cases, fifteen were reversed on appeal,2 6 five were cases in which the
plaintiff elected to take treble damages instead of punitive dam-
ages, 27 and one was an arbitration award.' 8 Therefore, only thirty-
one cases remain in which punitive damage awards were upheld. 9
126. See McNeill v. Durham County ABC Bd., 322 N.C. 425, 431, 368 S.E.2d 619, 623
(1988) ($7000 for assault and battery); Abernathy v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 321
N.C. 236,242,362 S.E.2d 559,562 (1987) ($5000 for personal injury); Mullins by Mullins v.
Friend, 116 N.C. App. 676, 686, 449 S.E.2d 227, 233 (1994) ($20,000 for false imprison-
ment); Edwards v. Hardin, 113 N.C. App. 613, 618,439 S.E.2d 808, 812 (1994) (amount not
given); Spry v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 105 N.C. App. 269, 276, 412
S.E.2d 687, 691 ($150,000 for nonrenewal of teaching contract), affd, 332 N.C. 661, 422
S.E.2d 575 (1992); Flippo v. Hayes, 98 N.C. App. 115, 120,389 S.E.2d 613,616 ($45,000 for
malicious prosecution), affd, 327 N.C. 490, 397 S.E.2d 512 (1990); Hunter v. Spaulding, 97
N.C. App. 372, 381,388 S.E.2d 630, 636 (1990) ($1.1 million for fraud); Darnell v. Rupplin,
91 N.C. App. 349, 354, 371 S.E.2d 743, 747 (1988) ($50,000 for alienation of affections);
Russell v. Town of Morehead City, 90 N.C. App. 675,683,370 S.E.2d 56,61 (1988) ($17,301
for assault and battery); Hall v. Coplon, 85 N.C. App. 505, 510, 355 S.E.2d 195, 198 (1987)
(plaintiff received $25,000 for assault; defendant received $30,000 for assault); Sheppard v.
Community Fed. Sav. & Loan, 84 N.C. App. 257, 262, 352 S.E.2d 252, 255 ($130,000 on
defendants' counterclaims), disc. rev. denied, 319 N.C. 459, 356 S.E.2d 6 (1987); Britt v.
Britt, 82 N.C. App. 303, 318, 346 S.E.2d 259,268 (1986) ($400,000 for fraud), rev'd on other
grounds, 320 N.C. 573,359 S.E.2d 467 (1989); Dunn v. Harris, 81 N.C. App. 137, 140, 344
S.E.2d 128, 130 ($75,000 for malicious prosecution), disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 702, 347
S.E.2d 40 (1986); York v. Taylor, 79 N.C. App. 653, 656, 339 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1986)
($10,000 for unfair trade practices); Pinehurst, Inc., v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, Inc., 79 N.C.
App. 51, 65, 338 S.E.2d 918, 926 ($18,000 for unfair trade practices), disc. rev. denied, 316
N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986).
127. See Ellis v. Northern Star Co., 326 N.C. 219, 227-28, 388 S.E.2d 127, 132 (1990)
($12,500 for libel); Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 564,
374 S.E.2d 385, 389 (1988) (two dollars awarded for fraud); Jennings Glass Co. v. Brum-
mer, 88 N.C. App. 44, 53, 362 S.E.2d 578, 584 (1987) (amount uncertain for fraud), disc.
rev. denied, 321 N.C. 473,364 S.E.2d 921 (1988); Mapp v. Toyota World, Inc., 81 N.C. App.
421,427, 344 S.E.2d 297, 301 ($10,000 for unfair trade practices), disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C.
283, 347 S.E.2d 464 (1986); Wilder v. Hodges, 80 N.C. App. 333, 334, 342 S.E.2d 57, 58
(1986) ($3000 for false representation). Such an election is required under North Carolina
law. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
128. See Carteret County v. United Contractors of Kinston, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 336,
346, 462 S.E.2d 816, 823 (1995) (amount not given).
129. The following cases include ones in which the case was reversed or remanded for
reasons other than the punitive damage award. United Lab., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 335 N.C.
183, 188-89, 437 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1993) ($100,000 for interference with contract); Rowan
County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 23, 418 S.E.2d 648, 662
(1992) ($1 million for asbestos claim); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 331 N.C. 743, 744, 417 S.E.2d
447, 448 (1992) ($25,000 for assault and battery); Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 330
N.C. 681, 696, 413 S.E.2d 268, 276 (1992) ($100,000 for unfair trade practices); Hajmm Co.
v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 595, 403 S.E.2d 483, 494 (1991) ($100,000
for breach of fiduciary duty); Huberth v. Holly, 120 N.C. App. 348,356,462 S.E.2d 239,244
(1995) ($5000 for trespass); Lyon v. May, 119 N.C. App. 704, 707, 459 S.E.2d 833, 836
($250,000 for interference with contract), disc. rev. denied, 341 N.C. 650, 462 S.E.2d 512
(1995); Muse v. Charter Hosp., Inc., 117 N.C. App. 468, 473, 475, 452 S.E.2d 589, 594-95
($2 million against hospital and $4 million against hospital corporation for wrongful death;
award warranted but error to award both), aff'd, 342 N.C. 403, 464 S.E.2d 44 (1995); Lee v.
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Two of the punitive damage awards upheld by the court of ap-
peals are somewhat anomalous. In Muse v. Charter Hospital, Inc.,130
four million dollars were awarded against the hospital corporation and
two million against the hospital itself. 131 The court of appeals held
that it was error to award both amounts because the hospital was the
instrumentality of the corporation. 32 However, this award has been
included in the list of upheld awards since one of the awards will sur-
Bir, 116 N.C. App. 584, 592,449 S.E.2d 34, 39 ($100,000 awarded for trespass), cert. denied,
340 N.C. 113, 454 S.E.2d 652 (1994); McLean v. Mechanic, 116 N.C. App. 271, 279, 447
S.E.2d 459, 463 (1994) ($10,000 for criminal conversation), disc. rev. denied, 339 N.C. 738,
454 S.E.2d 654 (1995); Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C. App. 1, 16,437 S.E.2d 519,
528 (1993) ($225,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress), disc. rev. denied, 336
N.C. 71, 445 S.E.2d 29 (1994); Juarez-Martinez v. Deans, 108 N.C. App. 486, 496, 424
S.E.2d 154, 160 ($30,000 for civil assault), disc. rev. denied, 333 N.C. 539, 429 S.E.2d 558
(1993); Lovell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 108 N.C. App. 416, 427, 424 S.E.2d 181, 188
(1993) ($225,000 for insurance bad faith), af-d, 334 N.C. 682, 435 S.E.2d 71 (1993); Berrier
v. Thrift, 107 N.C. App. 356,366,420 S.E.2d 206,212 (1992) ($250,000 for wrongful death),
disc rev. denied, 333 N.C. 254, 424 S.E.2d 918 (1993); Maintenance Equip. Co. v. Godley
Builders, 107 N.C. App. 343, 354-55, 420 S.E.2d 199, 206 (1992) ($175,000 for trespass),
disc. rev. denied, 333 N.C. 345, 426 S.E.2d 707 (1993); MacClements v. Lafone, 104 N.C.
App. 179, 188,408 S.E.2d 878, 883 ($135,000 for medical malpractice), disc. rev. denied, 330
N.C. 613, 412 S.E.2d 87 (1991); Jennings v. Jessen, 103 N.C. App. 739, 746, 407 S.E.2d 264,
268 (1991) ($300,000 for alienation of affection); Boyd v. L.G. DeWitt Trucking Co., 103
N.C. App. 396, 406, 405 S.E.2d 914, 921 (1991) ($4 million for wrongful death), disc. rev.
denied, 330 N.C. 193, 412 S.E.2d 53 (1991); Shaw v. Stringer, 101 N.C. App. 513, 518, 400
S.E.2d 101, 104 (1991) ($50,000 for criminal conversation and alienation of affections);
Jones v. McCaskill, 99 N.C. App. 764,767,394 S.E.2d 254,256 (1990) ($75,000 for wrongful
death); Harris v. Temple, 99 N.C. App. 179, 183-84,392 S.E.2d 752,754 ($7500 for slander),
disc rev. denied, 99 N.C. App. 179,392 S.E.2d 752 (1990); New Bern Pool & Supply Co. v.
Graubart, 94 N.C. App. 619, 629, 381 S.E.2d 156, 162 (1989) ($53,000 for fraud), aff'd, 326
N.C. 480, 390 S.E.2d 137 (1990); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C. App. 431, 438-
39, 378 S.E.2d 232, 236-37 (1989) ($50,000 for infliction of emotional distress); Bumgarner
v. Tomblin, 92 N.C. App. 571, 577, 375 S.E.2d 520, 524 ($350,000 for breach of fiduciary
duty), disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 333,378 S.E.2d 789 (1989); Raymond U. v. Duke Univ., 91
N.C. App. 171, 185-86, 371 S.E.2d 701, 711 (1988) ($50,000 for slander upheld; $1 million
for malicious prosecution reversed), disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 629, 374 S.E.2d 590 (1988);
Robinson v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 87 N.C. App. 532, 516, 361 S.E.2d 909, 921 (1987)
($105,000 for personal injury), disc. rev. denied, 321 N.C. 474, 364 S.E.2d 140 (1988); Me-
dina v. Town and Country Ford, Inc., 85 N.C. App. 650, 659, 355 S.E.2d 831, 837 (1987)
($62,500 for malicious prosecution), affd, 321 N.C. 591, 364 S.E.2d 140 (1988); Stone v.
Martin, 85 N.C. App. 410, 420-21, 355 S.E.2d 255, 261 ($300,000 for breach of fiduciary
duty), disc rev. denied, 320 N.C. 638,360 S.E.2d 105 (1987); Olschesky v. Houston, 84 N.C.
App. 415, 420-21, 352 S.E.2d 884, 888 (1987) ($77,500 actual and punitive damages com-
bined for assault); Sanders v. Spaulding & Perkins, Ltd., 82 N.C. App. 680, 681-82, 347
S.E.2d 866, 868 (1986) ($1000 for fraud); Cole v. Duke Power Co., 81 N.C. App. 213, 227-
28, 344 S.E.2d 130, 138 ($1.5 million for wrongful death), disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 281,
347 S.E.2d 462 (1986).
130. 117 N.C. App. 468, 452 S.E.2d 589 (1995).
131. Id. at 471, 452 S.E.2d at 593.
132. Id. at 473, 452 S.E.2d at 594.
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vive remand. In Olschesky v. Houston,133 the court of appeals never
actually allocated the award between punitive and actual damages.
Instead, the opinion merely stated that $77,500 was recovered for both
combined.134  For simplicity, the entire amount has been treated as
punitive damages for the purpose of this study.
Including the amounts awarded in Muse and 0schesky, the total
amount awarded in the thirty-one cases was approximately $15.6 mil-
lion. The average award was $504,080.65 and the median award was
$100,000. These figures do not shock the conscience, especially con-
sidering the fact that they are spread over a ten year time span.
Very high awards are certainly the exception. For instance, absent
the two highest awards, Muse 35 and Boyd v. L.G. DeWitt Trucking
Co.,136 the numbers change dramatically. The median award remains
at $100,000, but the average drops by more than half to $194,017. This
demonstrates the manner in which a few extremely high awards can
cast a different light on the entire system.
A study of selected jury verdicts returned similar results. 37 The
thirty-four verdicts between April 1987 and August 1995 reveal
slightly higher, but not outrageous, numbers.' 38 The highest award
133. 84 N.C. App. 415, 352 S.E.2d 884 (1987).
134. Id. at 416, 352 S.E.2d at 886.
135. Muse, 117 N.C. App. at 471, 452 S.E.2d at 593 ($6 million).
136. Boyd, 103 N.C. App. at 400-01, 405 S.E.2d at 917-18 ($4 million).
137. These jury verdicts come from the Association of Trial Lawyers of America - Jury
Verdict database (ATLA-JV) and the LRP-JV database on WESTLAW. These jury ver-
dicts are not a scientific cross-section of the state as a whole, but are the verdicts which
were voluntarily submitted to the database. If anything, this probably means the awards
are higher than a random sample because the higher the award, the more incentive trial
lawyers would have to place it on WESTLAW and advertise their victory.
138. Hardison v. Ferebee, No. 93 CVS 1160, 1995 WL 689899 (LRP Jury) (Craven
County Aug. 1995) ($375,000 for infliction of emotional distress); Strickland v. Rush, No.
94 CVD 5377, 1995 WL 95133 (LRP Jury) (Wake County Jan. 1995) ($750,000 for wrongful
death); Williams v. Patel, No. 94 CVS 2414, 1995 WL 689887 (LRP Jury) (Forsyth County
Jan. 1995) ($10,000 for wrongful termination); Best v. Cox, No. 94 CVS 182, 1994 WL
767025 (LRP Jury) (Forsyth County Nov. 1994) ($100,000 for emotional distress); Koziol v.
Rodwell, No. 92 CVS 2783, 1994 WL 766659 (LRP Jury) (Wake County Sept. 1994)
($50,000 for personal injury); Poy v. Mendez, No. 93 CVS 340, 1993 WL 553584 (LRP Jury)
(Carteret County Dec. 1993) ($10,000 for assault and battery); Roberts v. First Citizens
Bank & Trust Co., No. 91 CVS 11490, 1993 WL 553586 (LRP Jury) (Wake County Oct.
1993) ($1 million for wrongful termination); Denton v. Oreshack, No. 92 CVS 8352, 1993
WL 332998 (LRP Jury) (Wake County Mar. 1993) ($1500 for personal injury); Vann v.
Rogers, No. 92 CVS 644, 1993 WL 370360 (LRP Jury) (Carteret County Mar. 1993)
($25,000 for personal injury); Allen v. McLamb, No. 91 CVS 474, 1993 WL 518916 (LRP
Jury) (Johnston County Jan. 1993) ($25,000 for drunk driving injury); Hardy v. CSX
Transp., Inc., No. 90 CVS 1443, 1992 WL 438766 (LRP Jury) (Pitt County July 1992) ($1.75
million for wrongful death); Watkins v. Ennis, No. 89 CVS 324, 1992 WL 438672 (LRP
Jury) (Brunswick County Mar. 1992) ($35,000 for sexual harassment); Faison v. Hillhaven
Corp., No. 89 CVS 64, 1991 WL 453508 (LRP Jury) (Hertford County Nov. 1991) ($7.5
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was $7.5 million in Faison v. Hillhaven Corp., a case in which a nursing
home withheld a prescription of morphine from a patient who was
dying of prostate cancer, administering a placebo instead.139 The av-
erage award, however, was $674,394.72. If the Faison case is excluded,
the average falls to $453,805.88. Moreover, many of these awards are
so recent that at the time of this writing they have not yet been
appealed.
Other studies support the conclusion that punitive damage
awards are within reasonable limits in North Carolina.1 40 One expla-
nation for this phenomenon is that there were already several checks
in place that discouraged punitive damage awards before enactment
of the new laws. For example, North Carolina is still a contributory
negligence state,141 so that no award may be given if the plaintiff was
even slightly negligent. 42 Therefore, if the McDonald's case 143 had
come up in this state, there would not have been an award.144 Other
million for nursing home negligence); Vassallo v. Griffiths, 1991 WL 447308 (LRP Jury)
(New Hanover County Mar. 1991) ($179,000 for wrongful death); Summerville v. Volk, No.
91 CVS 1330, 1992 WL 552359 (LRP Jury) (Henderson County Jan. 1991) ($5000 for medi-
cal malpractice); Hayes v. Hayes, No. 89 CVS 3269, 1990 WL 466092 (LRP Jury) (Forsyth
County Oct. 1990) ($1 million for wrongful death); Parks v. Hayes, No. 89 CVS 3232, 1990
WL 466093 (LRP Jury) (Forsyth County Oct. 1990) ($1 million for wrongful death); Bobat-
siaris v. Shook, No. 90 CVS 1194, 1990 WL 466167 (LRP Jury) (Buncombe County Oct.
1990) ($9000 for personal injury); Willcox v. Hedgepethe, No. 89 CVS 2503, 1990 WL
465756 (LRP Jury) (Wake County Sept. 1990) ($5000 for drunk driving accident); Kincey v.
Collins, No. 89 CVS 612, 1990 WL 462675 (LRP Jury) (Wake County May 1990) ($8500 for
personal injury); Bartlett v. Bartlett, No. 88 CVS 3362, 1989 WL 392082 (LRP Jury) (Bun-
combe County June 1989) ($50,000 for sexual assault by family member); Amos v. Celotex
Corp., No. C-87-431-G, 1989 WL 388844 (LRP Jury) (Guilford County Feb. 1989) ($1.5
million for asbestos injuries); Locklear v. Blackmon, No. 88 CV 590, 1989 WL 388778
(LRP Jury) (Robeson County Jan. 1989) ($1000 for personal injury); Sargent v. Murray
Say. Ass'n, No. 87 CVS 746, 1988 WL 372422 (LRP Jury) (Wake County Oct. 1988) ($3.25
million shared by five employees subject to emotional distress from sexual harassment);
Byrd v. Davis, No. 87 CVS 774, 1988 WL 368342 (LRP Jury) (Cumberland County Apr.
1988) ($3 million for paralysis caused by drunk driver); Braxton v. Davis, No. 86 CVD
8084, 1987 WL 233595 (LRP Jury) (Wake County Oct. 1987) ($600 for personal injury);
Hutchins v. Southern R.R., No. 84 CVS 2210, 1987 WL 361280 (ATLA) (Wake County
May 1987) ($105,000 for personal injury); King v. Dunn, No. 85 CVS 8222, 1987 WL
231507 (LRP Jury) (Wake County Apr. 1987) ($5800 for drunk driving accident).
139. Faison, 1991 WL 453508, at *1.
140. See, e.g., Ballance, supra note 11, at F3 ("Punitive damages are notoriously rare in
North Carolina, especially massive McDonald's coffee-type awards. Even when punitive
damages are assessed, they fall in the $30,000 range, not in the millions of dollars, despite
the fact that the state has never placed a cap on damage awards.").
141. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 237, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968).
142. Id.
143. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 782090 (LRP
Jury) (Bemalillo County Dist. Court, N.M. Sept. 1994).
144. The plaintiff in the McDonald's case was found 20% comparatively negligent. Id.
at *1.
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checks on the doctrine stem from North Carolina's failure to recog-
nize strict liability in product liability actions, 45 and a short statute of
repose.
146
Despite these preexisting limitations, the legislation was en-
acted, 47 and its passage required the legislature to choose what to
include in the new law."4 Four modifications included in North Caro-
lina's new statute deserve further discussion: the new clear and con-
vincing standard of proof,149 the new standards of conduct required
for an award of punitive damages, 50 the provision permitting bifurca-
tion of the trial,'15 and the punitive award cap.15
The new statute requires clear and convincing evidence of an ag-
gravating factor before punitive damages may be awarded.'
5 3 Imposi-
tion of this heightened burden of proof is not a novel idea. In
Haslip, 54 the Supreme Court suggested that although the "prepon-
derance of the evidence" standard of proof was not a violation of due
process, the "clear and convincing evidence" standard was probably a
better choice. 55 Many states have agreed with the Court's assess-
ment,156 and the arguments for a higher standard of proof have sup-
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (1995).
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50 (1983) (setting the statutory repose period at six years).
147. One explanation for the passage of the legislation could be the misconception held
by many citizens that awards are often excessive. See supra notes 94-105, 114-24 and ac-
companying text. A more cynical explanation has been offered by many critics of the legis-
lation. They point to the big-business connections of the bill's sponsor, Charles Neely,
whose clients surely supported this new law. See, eg., Carol D. Leonnig, Corporate Lawyer
Authored Some Bills: Neely Says He Has No Conflict, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Apr. 19,
1995, at 12A ("[Neely's] client list reads like a Who's Who of corporate liability cases:
Dow Corning, maker of silicone breast implants; McDonald's Corp., seller of piping hot
coffee; Ford Motor Co., manufacturer of the Pinto. It also includes Glaxo, Inc., North
Carolina's largest pharmaceutical firm."). Neely claimed to have no conflict of interest in
calling for this legislation, id., but some commentators have questioned that assertion.
148. Presumably, the legislature looked to similar statutes in other states for guidance.
See infra Appendix A for a comparison of punitive damage law in the fifty states.
149. See infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 159-73 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(b) (1995). See supra note 19 for a summary of other
areas of North Carolina law which are subject to the clear and convincing burden of proof.
154. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
155. Id. at 23 n.11 ("There is much to be said in favor of a State's requiring ... a
standard of 'clear and convincing evidence' .... ).
156. See, e.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986)
(arguing that a higher standard is better because the deterrent effect of punitive damages is
lessened if too "loosely assessed"); lttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1985)
("[S]uch a higher standard of proof is appropriate for a claim for punitive damages.");
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 457-58 (Wis. 1980) (stating that the quasi-
criminal nature of punitive damages warrants a higher standard); see infra Appendix A
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port.157  For instance, because punitive damages are designed to
punish, they are quasi-criminal fines, and thus should only be awarded
in the "most egregious of cases.' 158 Arguably, this principle also does
not hurt the victim, as he should only be entitled to a windfall, if at all,
when the defendant has done something outrageous.
In the new legislation, the North Carolina General Assembly
consolidated the different standards of conduct which had historically
been applied 159 into the terms of "fraud," "malice" and "willful or
wanton conduct."' 6 ° As Chapter 1D applies in every claim for puni-
tive damages,'16 no such damages may be awarded unless fraud, mal-
ice, or willful and wanton conduct is proved.' 62 It is unclear, however,
whether these standards are more stringent than their common-law
definitions. Certainly wrongful death actions, which previously al-
lowed gross negligence as a basis for recovery of punitive damages,
are subject to a higher standard.'63 Also, the statute explicitly ex-
cludes constructive fraud from the definition of fraud,' 64 reversing
North Carolina common law,165 which allowed a recovery of punitive
damages for constructive fraud.
1 66
(listing states that have adopted the clear and convincing burden). But see, e.g., Transpor-
tation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 32 (Tex. 1994) (declining to judicially adopt the
clear and convincing standard).
157. See McKown, supra note 68, at 453-58; Owen, supra note 116, at 407-08.
158. See Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) ("[B]ecause
punitive damages are to be awarded only in the most egregious of cases, a plaintiff must
prove the defendant's intentional, fraudulent, malicious, or reckless conduct by clear and
convincing evidence.").
159. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15 (1995) (stating that one of these factors must be met in
every claim for punitive damages). Malice is "a sense of personal ill will toward the claim-
ant that activated or incited the defendant to perform the act or undertake the conduct that
resulted in harm to the claimant." Id. § 1D-5(5). Willful or wanton conduct is "the con-
scious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others, which
the defendant knows or should know is reasonably likely to result in injury, damage, or
other harm." Id. § 1D-5(7).
161. Id. § 1D-10. Wrongful death actions are placed under this statute as well. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(5) (Supp. 1995).
162. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15 (1995).
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(5) (1984) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(5) (Supp. 1995)).
164. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-5(4) (1995) (the statute excludes constructive fraud "unless
an element of intent is present").
165. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 1, 13, 379
S.E.2d 868, 875 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 328 N.C. 578, 403 S.E.2d 483 (1991); Bum-
garner v. Tomblin, 92 N.C. App. 571, 576, 375 S.E.2d 520, 523, disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C.
333, 378 S.E.2d 789 (1989); Sanders v. Spaulding & Perkins, Ltd., 82 N.C. App. 680, 681,
347 S.E.2d 866, 867-68 (1986).
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Since malice concerns cases where the defendant has ill will to-
ward the particular claimant, 67 it sets a higher threshold than willful
or wanton conduct, which only requires indifference. 68 Thus, it is un-
clear whether malice will ever have to be proven to receive punitive
damages, since the statute authorizes an award if willful or wanton
conduct is shown. Perhaps in those cases where malice has tradition-
ally been required before punitive damages were awarded, such as in
malicious prosecution actions, 69 this standard will still apply. If so,
the standard will be somewhat more restrictive than the traditional
North Carolina definition of actual malice, since the traditional defini-
tion included recklessness and a wanton disregard of the plaintiff's
rights. 7 °
The statutory definition of willful or wanton conduct, in turn, is
taken verbatim from the definition of wanton conduct in Huff v. Chr-
ismon,'171 and Hinson v. Dawson.'72 The Court of Appeals in Huff
explicitly held that proof of motive or intent was not necessary to sup-
port a claim for punitive damages based on wanton conduct.173 The
new willful or wanton standard thus appears to be merely a codifica-
tion of the common law.
North Carolina legislators also chose to include a very important
procedural safeguard in the new punitive damages law. Under section
1D-30, the defendant may move for a bifurcated trial in which the
issues of compensatory damages and punitive damages will be tried
separately. 74 This is especially important because section 1D-35 per-
mits the jury to consider evidence concerning past misconduct by the
defendant and the net worth of the defendant in setting punitive dam-
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-5(5) (1995).
168. Id. § 1D-5(7).
169. See, e.g., Cook v. Lanier, 267 N.C. 166, 170, 147 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1966); Mitchem v.
National Weaving Co., 210 N.C. 732, 735, 188 S.E. 329, 330-31 (1936).
170. See Best v. Duke Univ., 337 N.C. 742, 753, 448 S.E.2d 506, 512 (1994) ("Actual
malice exists 'only where the wrong is done willfully or under circumstances of rudeness,
oppression or in a manner which evidences a reckless and wanton disregard of the plain-
tiff's rights.' ") (quoting United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 335 N.C. 183, 191, 437 S.E.2d
374, 379 (1993)); Jones v. Gwynne, 312 N.C. 393, 405, 323 S.E.2d 9, 16 (1984) (indicating
that the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit "must offer evidence tending to prove that
the wrongful action of instituting the prosecution was done for actual malice in the sense of
personal ill-will, or under circumstances of insult, rudeness or oppression, or in a manner
which showed the reckless and wanton disregard of the plaintiff's right.") (quoting Brown
v. Martin, 176 N.C. 31, 33, 96 S.E.2d 642, 643 (1918)) (internal quotations omitted).
171. 68 N.C. App. 525, 531, 315 S.E.2d 711, 714, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 756, 321
S.E.2d 134 (1984).
172. 244 N.C. 23, 28, 92 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1956).
173. Huff, 68 N.C. App. at 531-32, 315 S.E.2d at 714-15.
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-30 (1995).
1996] 2197
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ages.' 75 For the jury to hear such evidence about the defendant's
wealth and prior misconduct before determining liability for compen-
satory damages could be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Bifur-
cating the trial bars such evidence until the jury has already decided
the question of liability for compensatory damages. Most critics
praise this particular reform as fair and logical. 176 In fact, one com-
mentator argues that "bifurcation is necessary for a case to fulfill con-
stitutional due process requirements.' 77
Without a doubt, the most controversial part of the new statute is
the cap placed on punitive damage awards.' 78 Although caps provide
the benefit of constraining excessively high awards, several criticisms
can be leveled against them. First, caps lend predictability to a doc-
trine whose real value lies in unpredictability. 79 If awards become
predictable, large wealthy corporations may include them as a cost of
doing business and thus will not be deterred from marketing unsafe
products. 180 Second, caps may hurt small businesses disproportion-
175. Id. § 1D-35(2). Most scholars seem to agree that evidence of a defendant's wealth
is necessary for the jury to impose a punitive damage award, because it gives them a stan-
dard by which to measure the severity of their punishment. See generally, Annotation,
Punitive Damages: Relationship To Defendant's Wealth As Factor In Determining Propriety
of Award, 87 A.L.R. 4th 141 (1995) (discussing the relation between the defendant's finan-
cial position and the proper amount of punitive damages). But see Kenneth S. Abraham &
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's
Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415 (1989) ("In our view, the defendant's wealth is irrele-
vant to the goal of deterring socially undesirable conduct and is an improper consideration
in assessing the basis for retribution.").
176. See McKown, supra note 68, at 446-53; Owen, supra note 116, at 408-09.
177. McKown, supra note 68, at 446 (citing Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional
Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269, 272 (1983)).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (1995). Upon deciding to place a cap on the amount
of punitive damages, North Carolina legislators had at least three options. First, they could
have placed an absolute dollar cap such as Virginia had at one time. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992) (establishing a $350,000 ceiling on punitive damages). Second,
they could have designed a dollar cap and carved out certain exceptions where the cap
would not apply. See, e.g., At.. CODE § 6-11-21 (1993) (setting the cap at $250,000, but
not to apply if actual malice is shown, if the conduct is part of a pattern or practice of
intentional wrongful conduct, or to libel, slander, or defamation). Alabama's cap was de-
clared unconstitutional as a denial of right to trial by jury in Hartsfield v. Alabama Power
Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993). Finally, North Carolina could have opted for a multiplier
system, as in Texas, where punitive damages may not exceed a certain ratio of actual dam-
ages, such as four to one. See, e.g., TEx. Civ. PRic. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West
Supp. 1996) (establishing the cap as the greater of $200,000 or two times the amount of
compensatory damages plus any non-economic damages, not to exceed $750,000). North
Carolina opted for a combination fixed cap and multiplier. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-
25(b) (1995).
179. Hurd & Zollers, supra note 94, at 200; see also Toy, supra note 108, at 324-26
(arguing that deterrence may only be accomplished by unpredictability of awards).
180. Toy, supra note 108, at 324-36. But see Diane Dimond, Think It Over and Get
Back To Us, Supreme Court Ruling on Punitive Damages Awards, 52 INs. REv. 32, 32
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ately as compared with large corporations, because large corporations
may not feel as much sting from a capped punitive damage award,
while small businesses could still be dealt a severe blow. 181 Third, in
the case of multiplier or ratio caps, which set a maximum amount as a
multiple or ratio of compensatory damages,"s critics argue that it is
not appropriate to link the amount of punitive damages to the amount
of compensatory damages awarded. 83 The result would be that the
focus for awarding punitive damages would not be on the conduct of
the defendant, but on the harm suffered by the claimant. Commenta-
tors point out that the jury "must be free to consider what might have
happened as a consequence of the defendant's behavior, not only
what did happen, and punish accordingly."' Finally, the cap reduces
the incentive for victims to take their case to court by limiting their
potential awards. In conjunction with threatened sanctions for frivo-
lous claims and a higher standard of proof, this incentive is reduced
even further. With fewer victims taking these cases to trial, fewer un-
safe products will be taken off the market. This saves large corpora-
tions money at the expense of the safety of the general public.
Based on existing limitations and the fact that punitive damages
in North Carolina have historically not been excessive, a cap on puni-
tive damages was not needed in North Carolina, and should not have
been included in the statute. Drunk drivers were the only defendants
excluded from the cap,'85 although the disregard they show for other's
safety arguably is no worse than the decision of a wealthy corporation
to knowingly market an unsafe product.
One of the valid arguments against punitive damages is the criti-
cism of the large windfall given to the plaintiff. 86 Rather than
preventing these windfalls through the use of caps, North Carolina
should have followed the lead of several states by requiring a percent-
age of the award to be turned over to a general state fund, or a fund
(1991) (quoting Martin Connor, President of the American Tort Reform Association,
claiming that taking into account the wealth of the defendant is like "charg[ing] different
fines for running a red light depending on how rich the driver is").
181. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 94, at 200 ("An arbitrary cap set at a fixed dollar
amount suggests that we can put a price ex ante on outrageous behavior."); Owen, supra
note 116, at 409-10 (arguing that arbitrary limits rob the decision-maker of flexibility
needed to further the purposes of punitive damages).
182. Hurd & Zollers, supra note 94, at 200-01. For instance, some statutes cap punitive
damages at an amount not to exceed three times compensatory damages. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 201. "The message is worth sending, whether or not the plaintiff has suffered
great harm." Id. at 200.
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-26 (1995).
186. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 94, at 201-02; Owen, supra note 116, at 410-11.
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established to fight the evils to which the victim was subjected. 87 The
plaintiff has little standing to argue that she is entitled to this money
as a matter of right, since her injuries have been compensated with
other damages.' 88 Although questions have been raised as to the con-
stitutionality of such laws, 89 the policy of avoiding windfalls to plain-
tiffs while still punishing defendants is sound. However, the North
Carolina bill does not contain such a provision. Rather, the defendant
simply is not required to pay any money awarded in excess of the
cap.'
90
Not only did the legislature include some provisions it should not
have, it failed to include some items that would have enhanced the
law's fairness toward the business interests it was designed to protect.
If the North Carolina legislature was serious about protecting corpo-
rations from being put out of business for an isolated mistake, which is
one of the main arguments in support of reform,19' it omitted an ex-
cellent way to do just that. Georgia's statute provides that only one
punitive damage award may be recovered from a defendant for the
same conduct in product liability actions. 9 While this may not work
well in mass-tort cases where claims mount over long periods of time,
it is arguably appropriate for single-event disasters, such as plane
crashes.' 93 This is unlikely to result in a "race to the courthouse" if
used in conjunction with a provision which puts punitive damages into
a state fund, 94 since the first plaintiff to file would not receive the
entire award. The defendant would be punished, but the award would
be less likely to force the defendant to close its doors.
In summary, North Carolina's new punitive damages statute is
deficient in a number of respects. First, it is an attempt to remedy a
problem which does not yet exist and in all likelihood will never exist
as long as North Carolina remains a contributory negligence state.'95
Furthermore, the statute is not a drastic change from the common law
with two obvious exceptions: the damage cap and the heightened bur-
187. McKown, supra note 68, at 436-43. See infra Appendix A for a list of states that
have such a provision.
188. See Woody v. Catawba Valley Broadcasting Co., 272 N.C. 459,463, 158 S.E.2d 578,
581-82 (1968); Cotton v. Fisheries Prods. Co., 181 N.C. 151, 152-53, 106 S.E. 487, 488
(1921).
189. See, e.g., Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 273 (1991) (holding Colo-
rado's statute to be a violation of the state takings clause).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (1995).
191. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
192. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (1987 & Supp. 1995).
193. Owen, supra note 116, at 411.
194. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
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den of proof.196 While the burden of proof is arguably justifiable, the
cap is unfair and unnecessary.197 Other sincere possibilities for reform
were not included, such as a procedure by which a portion of punitive
damage awards goes to a state fund for the general public, and a pro-
hibition on more than one award being leveled against a defendant for
the same conduct. 198
The result of the new law is that the punitive damages doctrine is
no longer a useful way to regulate conduct of corporations or individ-
uals. Those who are wealthy enough to afford the capped amount
may continue or possibly increase their unsafe conduct to the detri-
ment of the general public. Even those who might still be deterred by
the threat of a capped punitive damage award will face less of a threat
from victims, who must meet a higher burden of proof, face less recov-
ery and risk the possibility of sanctions. The punitive damages doc-
trine has been useful in the past by encouraging safer products and by
putting a check on the non-criminal, but harmful conduct of others.
This usefulness is limited under the new laws for the reasons discussed
above. Ultimately, Chapter 1D takes a doctrine designed to punish
egregious wrongdoers and subverts it in such a way that the people
who will really feel the punishment are the innocent bystanders.
BRIAN TIMOTHY BEASLEY
196. See supra notes 153-77 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
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Appendix A: Punitive Damages Reform at the State Level'
WHAT THE CATEGORIES MEAN:
Standard of Proof. What burden must be met in order to receive a
punitive damages award?
Cap and Exceptions: Whether and when punitive damages are capped
and at what amount?
Money to State: Whether any portion of the punitive damages award
goes into a state fund?
Conduct Required: How must the defendant act to be subject to a
punitive damages award?
1. ALABAMA
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. ALA. CODE § 6-
11-20 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
Cap and Exceptions: Punitive damages may not exceed $250,000 un-
less there exists a pattern or practice of wrongful conduct, actual
malice, libel, slander, or defamation. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21
(1993). This section was declared unconstitutional by Henderson
v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 894 (Ala. 1993).
Money to State: No. See Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d
1021, 1025 (Ala. 1992).
Conduct Required: Conscious and deliberate oppression, fraud, wan-
tonness or malice with respect to the plaintiff. ALA. CODE § 6-
11-20 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
2. ALASKA
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.020 (1994).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap on punitive damages.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Reckless indifference, maliciousness, or wanton-
ness. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska
1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
I. See also RICHARD L. BLATIr ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE




Standard of Proof. Clear and convincing evidence. Linthicum v. Na-
tionwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap on punitive damages.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Outrageous, malicious, and fraudulent conduct.
Linthicum, 723 P.2d at 680.
4. ARKANSAS
Standard of Proof- Preponderance of the evidence. National Bank of
Commerce v. McNeill Trucking Co., 828 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Ark.
1992) (Dudley, J., concurring).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap on punitive damages.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Wanton conduct or such disregard that malice
may be inferred. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. Doss, 899 S.W.2d
464 (Ark. 1995).
5. CALIFORNIA
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294(a) (West Supp. 1995).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap on punitive damages.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Oppression, fraud, or malice. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294(a) (West Supp. 1995).
6. COLORADO
Standard of Proof- Beyond a reasonable doubt. CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (West 1987).
Cap and Exceptions: Punitive damages may be no more than actual
damages unless judge finds either continued action during pen-
dency of case or aggravated injury during pendency of case, in
which case they may be no more than three times the amount of
actual damages. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-21-102(1)(a), (3)
(West 1987).
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Fraud, malice, or willful and wanton. CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (West 1987).
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7. CONNECTICUT
Standard of Proof- Preponderance of the evidence. Freeman v.
Alamo Management Co., 607 A.2d 370, 375 (Conn. 1992).
Cap and Exceptions: Punitive damages may not exceed two times ac-
tual damages in products liability cases. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-240b (West 1991).
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Reckless indifference, or intentional and wanton
conduct. Gargano v. Heyman, 525 A.2d 1343, 1347 (Conn. 1987).
8. DELAWARE
Standard of Proof- Standard civil burden of preponderance of the
evidence. See, e.g., Cathleen C.Q. v. Norman J.Q., 452 A.2d 951,
954 (Del. 1982). Burden of proof has not been specifically ad-
dressed in the context of punitive damages.
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Willful and wanton conduct. Jardel Co. v.
Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 529-30 (Del. 1987).
9. DISTRiCr OF COLUMBIA
Standard of Proof. Clear and convincing evidence. Raynor v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238, 245 (D.D.C. 1986).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Willful and outrageous, gross fraud, evil motive,
active malice, or deliberateness. Mariner Water Renaturalizer of
Wash., Inc. v. Aqua Purification Sys., Inc., 665 F.2d 1066, 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
10. FLORIDA
Standard of Proof- Preponderance of the evidence for up to three
times the compensatories. Clear and convincing evidence is
needed to exceed cap. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West Supp.
1996).
Cap and Exceptions: Limited to three times compensatory damages
unless clear and convincing evidence that award was not exces-
sive. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1996).




Conduct Required: Wantonness, recklessness, or gross disregard.
White Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026, 1028-29 (Fla.
1984).
11. GEORGIA
Standard of Proof. Clear and convincing evidence. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(b) (Supp. 1995).
Cap and Exceptions: $250,000 except in products liability actions and
cases involving intentional torts. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g)
(Supp. 1995).
Money to State: 75% went to state for product liability actions. GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1995). This statute, which
became effective on July 1, 1987, was held unconstitutional in Mc-
Bride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D.
Ga. 1990).
Conduct Required: Willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, or
oppression. General Refractories Co. v. Rogers, 239 S.E.2d 795,
797-98 (Ga. 1977).
12. HAWAII
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. Masaki v. General
Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 575 (Haw. 1989).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Require& Wantonness, oppression, or malice. Beerman v.
Toro Mfg. Corp., 615 P.2d 749, 755 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980).
13. IDAHO
Standard of Proof: Preponderance of the evidence. IDAHO CODE § 6-
1604(1) (1990).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, malicious, or out-
rageous conduct. IDAHO CODE § 6-1604(1) (1990).
14. ILLINOIS
Standard of Proof. Standard civil burden of preponderance of the
evidence. See, e.g., In re Arya, 589 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992). Burden has not been specifically addressed in the context
of punitive damages.
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
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Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Fraud, actual malice, deliberate oppression, will-
fulness, or gross negligence. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d
353, 359 (Ill. 1978).
15. INDIANA
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-34-2 (Bums 1986).
Cap and Exceptions: Three times actual damages or $50,000, which-
ever is greater. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-4 (Burns Supp. 1995).
Money to State: 25% of the award goes to the plaintiff and 75% to the
state. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-6(a) (Burns Supp. 1995).
Conduct Required: Willful and wanton misconduct. Bud Wolf Chev-
rolet, Inc. v. Robertson, 519 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Ind. 1988).
16. IOWA
Standard of Proof. Clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. IOWA
CODE § 668A.1(1)(a) (1987).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: If conduct was directed specifically toward plaintiff,
plaintiff gets entire award. If conduct was not directed specifi-
cally toward plaintiff, 75% of award goes to state. IowA CODE
§ 668A.1(2) (1987).
Conduct Required: Willful or wanton disregard. IowA CODE
§ 668A.1(1)(a) (1987).
17. KANSAS
Standard of Proof. Clear and convincing evidence. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3702(c) (1994).
Cap and Exceptions: Limited to the lesser of either the defendant's
adjusted gross income over the last five years or five million dol-
lars unless the defendant profited from the conduct. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3702(e) (1994).
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Willful or wanton conduct, fraud, or malice. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(c) (1994).
18. KENTUCKY
Standard of Proof. Clear and convincing evidence. Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 411.184(2) (Baldwin 1992).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
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Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Oppression, fraud, or malice. Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 411.184(2) (Baldwin 1992).
19. LOUISIANA
Standard of Proof Preponderance of the evidence. Galjour v. Gen-
eral Am. Tank Car Corp., 764 F. Supp. 1093, 1100 (E.D. La.
1991).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Varies according to statute. See LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 2315.3 (West Supp. 1996).
20. MAINE
Standard of Proof. Clear and convincing evidence. Tuttle v. Ray-
mond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1989).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Malice. Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1365.
21. MARYLAND
Standard of Proof: Clear and convincing evidence. Owens-Illinois v.
Zanobia, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (Md. 1992).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Actual malice. Owens-Illinois, 601 A.2d at 652-53.
22. MASSACHUSETTS
Standard of Proof Preponderance of the evidence. See LaLonde v.
LaLonde, 566 N.E.2d 620 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
Cap and Exceptions: Varies according to statute. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 160, § 225 (West 1992) ($5,000 cap for malicious
injury to railroad); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West
1992) (no cap for damages for death by negligence).
Money to State: No.
Conduct: Varies according to statute. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
160, § 225 (West 1992) (malicious injury to railroad requires mal-
ice); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West 1992) (damages
for death by negligence requires willful, wanton, or reckless).
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23. MICHIGAN
Standard of Proof: Preponderance of the evidence. Children of
Chipewa, Ottawa, and Potawatomy Tribes v. Regents of Univ. of
Mich., 305 N.W.2d 522, 529 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Malicious, willful, and wanton. Kewin v. Massa-
chusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980).
24. MINNESOTA
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. MINN. STAT.
§ 549-20(1) (1988 & Supp. 1995).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Deliberate disregard. MINN. STAT. § 549-20(1)
(Supp. 1995).
25. Mississippi
Standard of Proof- Preponderance of the evidence. Universal Life
Ins. Co. v. Veasley, 610 So. 2d 290, 294 (Miss. 1992).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Insult, malice, or gross negligence. Fowler Butane
Gas Co. v. Varner, 141 So. 2d 226, 233 (Miss. 1962).
26. MissouRi
Standard of Proof- Preponderance of the evidence. Menaugh v.
Resler Optometry, Inc., 799 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Mo. 1990).
Cap and Exceptions: No.
Money to State: 50% goes to state. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675
(Vernon 1987).
Conduct Required: Willful, wanton, malicious, or reckless disregard.
McClellan v. Highland Sales & Inv. Co., 484 S.W.2d 239, 242
(Mo. 1972).
27. MONTANA
Standard of Proof. Clear and convincing evidence. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1995).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
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Conduct Required: Actual fraud or actual malice. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-221(1) (1995).
28. NEBRASKA
Punitive damages are constitutionally prohibited in Nebraska. NEB.
CONST. art. VIII, § 5; see Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co.
v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 573-74 (1989).
29. NEVADA
Standard of Proof: Clear and convincing evidence. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 42.005 (1981).
Cap and Exceptions: Three times compensatory damages or $300,000
if award is $100,000 or less. Does not apply to insurance bad
faith, product liability, defamation, drunk driving, toxic sub-
stances, or housing discrimination actions. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 42.005(a)-(e) (1981).
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Oppression, fraud, or malice. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 42.005 (1981).
30. NEW HAMPSHIRE
Punitive damages are outlawed in New Hampshire. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507:16 (1986).
31. NEW JERSEY
Standard of Proof Clear and convincing evidence. N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:15-5.12a (Supp. 1996).
Cap and Exceptions: Five times compensatory damages or $350,000.
Does not apply to discrimination, civil rights, AIDS testing, sex-
ual abuse, bias, or drunk driving cases. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:15-
5.14 (Supp. 1996).
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Actual malice or wanton and willful conduct. N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2A:15-5.12 (Supp. 1996).
32. NEw MExico
Standard of Proof: Preponderance of the evidence. United Nuclear
Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. 709 P.2d 649, 654 (N.M. 1985).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
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Conduct Required: Malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, or wanton.
Samedan Oil Corp. v. Neeld, 577 P.2d 1245, 1247 (N.M. 1978).
33. NEw YORK
Standard of Proof. The standard civil burden of preponderance of the
evidence. See, e.g., Kalra v. Kalra, 539 N.Y.S.2d 761 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989). Burden of proof has not been specifically addressed
in the context of punitive damages.
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Reckless. Welch v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 440
N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (N.Y. 1982).
34. NORTH DAKOTA
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03.2-11(1) (1987).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Oppression, fraud, or malice. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03-211(1) (1987).
35. OHIO
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3) (Anderson 1991).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Malice, aggravated or egregious fraud, oppression,
or insult. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(B)(1).
36. OKLAHOMA
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 9A.I(A) (1995).
Cap and Exceptions: Various limits depending on the burden of proof
and the type of defendant. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9A.1(B)-
(D) (1995).
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Wanton or reckless, oppression, fraud, or malice.




Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.537(1) (1995).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Require& Malice or reckless and outrageous indifference.
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537(12) (1995).
38. PENNSYLVANIA
Standard of Proof. Preponderance of the evidence. Martin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1098 (Pa. 1985).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Evil motive, reckless indifference. Martin, 494
A.2d at 1096-98.
39. RHODE ISLAND
Standard of Proof. Preponderance of the evidence. Taglianetti v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 103 A.2d 67, 70 (R.I. 1954).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Willful, reckless, or wicked. Greater Providence
Deposit Corp. v. Jenison, 485 A.2d 1242, 1244 (R.I. 1984).
40. SOUTH CAROLINA
Standard of Proof. Clear and convincing evidence. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-33-135 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1995).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Malice, ill will, conscious or reckless disregard.
King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 251 S.E.2d 194, 196 (S.C. 1979).
41. SOUTH DAKOTA
Standard of Proof: Clear and convincing evidence. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987 & Supp. 1995).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Willful, wanton, or malicious. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987 & Supp. 1995).
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42. TENNESSEE
Standard of Proof. Clear and convincing evidence. Hodges v. S.C.
Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously, or reck-
lessly. Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 896, 901.
43. TEXAS
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. TEx. CiV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West Supp. 1996).
Cap and Exceptions: $200,000 or two times economic damages plus
up to $750,000 of awarded non-economic damages. Does not ap-
ply to intentional torts or actions done with malice. TEx. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West Supp. 1996).
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Malice, fraud, or gross negligence. TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West Supp. 1996).
44. UTAH
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-18-1 (1992).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: 50% of amount over $20,000 goes to state. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1992).
Conduct Required: Willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1992).
45. VERMONT
Standard of Proof- Preponderance of the evidence. Lyndonville Sav.
Bank and Trust Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 234 A.2d 340, 342 (Vt.
1967).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Insult or oppression, reckless or wanton. Furno v.
Pignona, 522 A.2d 746, 750 (Vt. 1986).
46. VIRGINIA
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. Great Coastal Ex-
press, Inc. v. Ellington, 334 S.E.2d 846, 855 (Va. 1985).
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Cap and Exceptions: $350,000. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie
1992).
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Actual malice. Peacock Buick Inc. v. Durkin, 277
S.E.2d 225, 227 (Va. 1981).
47. WASHINGTON
Punitive damages are prohibited in Washington. See Spokane Truck
& Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1073-74 (Wash. 1891).
48. WEST VIRGINIA
Standard of Proof: Standard civil burden is preponderance of the evi-
dence. See, e.g., Burk v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 58 S.E.2d
574, 581 (W. Va. 1950). Burden has not been specifically ad-
dressed in the context of punitive damages.
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Gross fraud, malice, oppression, wanton, willful,
or reckless conduct. Smith v. Perry, 359 S.E.2d 624, 625 (W. Va.
1987).
49. WISCONSIN
Standard of Proof- Clear and convincing evidence. Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 457-58 (Wis. 1980).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Willful, wanton, or reckless. Jeffers v. Nysse, 297
N.W.2d 495, 499 (Wis. 1980).
50. WYOMING
Standard of Proof. Preponderance of the evidence. Campen v. Stone,
635 P.2d 1121, 1127 n.6 (Wyo. 1981).
Cap and Exceptions: No cap.
Money to State: No.
Conduct Required: Intentional, malice, willful and wanton.
Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo.
1987).
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Public Endangerment or Personal Liberty? North Carolina
Enacts a Liberalized Concealed Handgun Statute
Does possession of concealed firearms by private citizens deter
criminal acts and promote the valid exercise of self-defense? Or does
it encourage violent crimes and bring about tragic consequences?
These questions have dominated the impassioned public discourse
over laws that regulate the carrying of concealed weapons.' The
heightened public awareness of violent crime,2 particularly homicide,
has spurred political activity by advocates and opponents of private
gun ownership. Gun control supporters have advocated tightening re-
strictions on the private ownership of handguns to prevent violent
crimes and accidental shootings by diminishing the availability of
weapons? Proponents of gun ownership, however, extol the virtues of
self-defense,4 advocate the responsible use of guns, and assert that
the Second Amendment guarantees each individual the "right to keep
and bear arms."'
1. See, e.g., Ted Gest, The Great Gun Debate: Get the Picture?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 17, 1995, at 6; Gordon Witkin, New Support for Concealed Weapons: Fear of
Crime Inspires Liberalized Laws, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 28, 1994, at 56.
2. In 1993, nearly two million violent crimes were committed in the United States.
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 10 (1994) (Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation). This number decreased by three percent in 1994. Id. For murders and non-negli-
gent manslaughters, the 1994 number was 23,305, a five percent reduction from 1993. Id. at
13. In 1994, the rate of violent crime in North Carolina decreased, but the rates for homi-
cides and overall crime increased from 1993. J. Andrew Curliss, Violent Crime Shows
Slight Drop in N.C., NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Aug. 1, 1995, at A3. North Carolina
was the site of 45,531 violent crimes in 1994. Division of Criminal Information, State Bu-
reau of Investigation, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 1994 24
(1995). This figure included 756 murders, id at 26, 29,837 aggravated assaults, id. at 46,
12,649 robberies, id at 42, and 2,289 forcible rapes, id at 34.
3. See, e.g., Garen J. Wintemute et al., When Children Shoot Children, in THE GUN
CONTROL DEBATE: You DECIDE 294, 294-98 (Lee Nisbet ed., 1990) (examining uninten-
tional firearm deaths of children over a six-year period); Sarah Brady, Working for a Safer
America, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 77,80 (1994) ("Gun control is a proven means
of successfully confronting our national gun violence epidemic... ."); id. at 84 ("[J]ust as
the legislature has required automotive manufacturers to improve the safety of
automobiles, so too should they require gun manufacturers to improve the safety of
guns.").
4. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAPIERRE, GUNS, CRIME, AND FREEDOM 26 (1994) ("No
would-be victim should be required to surrender his or her dignity, safety, property, or life
to a criminal; no person should be required to retreat in the face of attack.").
5. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Gun Accidents, in THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE: You
DECIDE 300,300-02 (Lee Nisbet ed., 1990) (arguing that bans on gun ownership are unjus-
tified and over-broad responses to concerns with firearm safety).
6. The Second Amendment of the federal Constitution provides: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr.,
1996] CONCEALED HANDGUNS 2215
Against this backdrop of polarized debate about the legal and
political soundness of gun control legislation,7 North Carolina joined a
nationwide movement towards laxity in concealed weapons regula-
tions.8 On July 10, 1995, the North Carolina General Assembly rati-
fied a bill that established a statewide permitting program for carrying
concealed handguns.9 The law provides, among other things, that any
citizen who is twenty-one or older may apply for a concealed handgun
permit.' ° Although the law excludes certain individuals from acquiring
a permit," the sheriff of the county in which the applicant resides
"shall issue" a permit to each applicant who completes an approved
Gun Control: Separating Reality from Symbolism, 20 J. CoNTEMP. L. 353, 359-60 (1994)
[hereinafter Kates, Separating Reality] (concluding that contemporary constitutional schol-
arship favors a Second Amendment guarantee of an individual right to keep and bear arms
over the collective state right to an armed militia).
7. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J.
637, 658 (1989) (arguing that indifference to the meaning of Second Amendment is com-
mon and that serious legal scholarship on the subject is overdue).
8. See infra note 129 (listing state laws that have established liberalized permit pro-
grams for carrying concealed weapons).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.10 to 415.23 (Supp. 1995).
10. Id. § 14-415.12(a)(2). The new permit program is distinct from the pre-existing
requirements for purchasing a weapon. See infra note 124 (discussing other North Caro-
lina gun laws). A recent survey found that approximately one-third of North Carolina's
residents own pistols. Poll Finds Most Oppose New Weapons Law, NEws & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), Nov. 11, 1995, at B6 [hereinafter Poll Finds Most Oppose].
11. The statute prohibits issuing a permit to an applicant who:
(1) Is ineligible to own, possess, or receive a firearm under the provisions of
State or federal law.
(2) Is under indictment or against whom a finding of probable cause exists for a
felony.
(3) Has been adjudicated guilty in any court of a felony.
(4) Is a fugitive from justice.
(5) Is an unlawful user of, or addicted to marijuana, alcohol, or any depressant,
stimulant, or narcotic drug, or any other controlled substance as defined in 21
U.S.C. § 802.
(6) Is currently, or has been previously adjudicated or administratively deter-
mined to be, lacking mental capacity or mentally ill.
(7) Is or has been discharged from the armed forces under conditions other than
honorable.
(8) Is or has been adjudicated guilty of or received a prayer for judgment con-
tinued or suspended sentence for one or more crimes of violence constituting a
misdemeanor, including but not limited to, a violation of a misdemeanor ....
(9) Has had entry of a prayer for judgment continued for a criminal offense
which would disqualify the person from obtaining a concealed handgun permit.
(10) Is free on bond or personal recognizance pending trial, appeal, or sentencing
for a crime which would disqualify him from obtaining a concealed handgun
permit.
(11) Has been convicted of an impaired driving offense ... within three years
prior to the date on which the application is submitted.
§ 14-415.12(b)(1)-(11).
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training course, passes a background check, and remits an application
fee.12 The new handgun permit law is noteworthy for two reasons: It
deliberately leaves little discretionary power to the sheriffs who are
authorized to issue permits 13 and, with few exceptions, it prohibits lo-
cal governments from enacting regulations relating to concealed hand-
gun possession.1
4
This Note examines the North Carolina concealed handgun stat-
ute with particular emphasis on the policy implications of the right to
bear concealed firearms. First, the Note discusses the provisions of
the new law and describes its path through the legislative process. 5
Second, the Note summarizes the legal background and political his-
tory that preceded the enactment of the concealed handgun law. 6
Third, the Note analyzes the statute in light of the constitutional and
public policy arguments that shaped the debate over the new con-
cealed handgun law.'7 Finally, this Note concludes that the General
Assembly, in attempting to empower private citizens and deter crime,
has embarked on an experimental course that will test the virtue of
gun carriers and the community at large.'8
The concealed handgun statute, House Bill 90, originated in the
North Carolina House of Representatives on February 1, 1995,19 and
12. lL § 14-415.12(a), § 14-415.13.
13. Prior to the new permit program for concealed handguns, North Carolina law pro-
hibited the carrying of concealed weapons. See id. § 14-269 (1994). When North Carolina
instituted its permit program, however, it went further than states which have adopted
discretionary permit programs, because those states require each applicant to demonstrate
a need for a concealed weapon. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050 (West 1992 & Supp.
1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1996). Those programs have
been criticized by proponents of gun ownership who argue that discretionary permit pro-
grams discriminate against most citizens because only celebrities and other influential pub-
lic figures have been able to acquire permits to carry concealed weapons. See Clayton E.
Cramer & David B. Kopel, "Shall Issue": The New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit
Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679,682-85 (1995) (alleging discriminatory permit reviews in Colo-
rado, New York, and California).
14. The statute reflects the General Assembly's desire for statewide uniformity in the
new concealed handgun permit program. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14415.23 (Supp. 1995).
But see infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of local restrictions
on concealed handguns in municipal buildings and parks).
15. See infra notes 19-56 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 57-122 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
19. NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILL H90, February
12, 1996, at 1 (a one-page historical compilation of House Bill H90). The bill, introduced
by Republican Representative John M. Nichols, was one of four independent concealed
weapons bills introduced in the General Assembly during the 1995 session. See Joseph
Neff, N.C. Concealed Weapons Bills Come Out From Under Cover, NEws & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), Apr. 10, 1995, at Al. In the previous two terms of the General Assembly, con-
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evolved through seven versions prior to ratification.20 The bill gath-
ered political momentum in the House, which had a new Republican
majority after the 1994 election.2' When the bill was referred to the
legislative committee hearings, several political action groups and pri-
vate citizens participated in the debate over the merits of a liberalized
concealed weapons permit program.' Nonetheless, the bill enjoyed
bi-partisan support during the committee hearings, 3 and the final
floor votes in each chamber of the General Assembly demonstrated
the popularity of the bill. The House voted to adopt the law by a vote
of ninety-two to twenty-two.24 After amending the House version, the
Senate voted thirty-six to nine in favor of ratification,' and the House
cealed handgun laws had been introduced, but were easily defeated in the Democratic-led
House. Id. at A4.
20. See HISTORY OF HOUSE BILL H90, supra note 19, at 1; see also infra notes 23-25
and accompanying text (discussing amendments in the House and Senate Chambers prior
to ratification).
21. The full House of Representatives consisted of sixty-eight Republicans and fifty-
two Democrats. See 1995 NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE OF REPRESENT-
ATIVES, DIRECTORY OF MEMBERS, COMMITTEES, RULES, AND HOUSE OFFICERS 77-84
(1995).
22. The hearings in the House Judiciary Committee, in which the bill received its first
public scrutiny, identified the major issues facing the legislators. See NORTH CAROLINA
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HOUSE JUDICIARY I COMMITTEE MINUTES, April 11, 1995 (10:00
a.m. and 12:00 noon meetings). This outline followed the testimony of various speakers
regarding the beneficial and harmful effects of the proposed legislation. Id. For example,
the Committee heard supporting testimony from Jalene Linner, a former security guard,
who related an incident in which armed robbers shot her in the head and killed her col-
league. Joseph Neff, Measure to Allow Concealed Weapons Debated, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), April 12, 1995 at A3. In contrast, law enforcement officers testified against the
bill. See iL Charles Wilkins, Director of the North Carolina Association of Chiefs of Po-
lice told the committee that a majority of police chiefs in North Carolina opposed issuing
concealed weapons permits. Id. The Committee also heard opposing testimony from Rev-
erend Collins Kilburn, Executive Director of the North Carolina Council of Churches.
HOUSE JUDICIARY I COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra, at 10:00 a.m. meeting. Later, the Com-
mittee heard supporting testimony from representatives of the North Carolina Sheriffs As-
sociation, the North Carolina Rifle and Pistol Association, and Grassroots North Carolina.
Id. at 12:00 noon meeting.
23. On April 18, 1995, the House Judiciary I Committee reported favorably on its
substitute of the original bill. HISTORY OF HOUSE BILL H90, supra note 19, at 1. The bill
then passed without major modification through the House Committee on Finance and the
House completed its floor vote on May 3. See id. The Senate received the bill from the
House on May 8, 1995 and the measure was debated in the Senate Judiciary I Committee
and in the Senate Finance Committee. Id. The Senate completed its floor vote on June 30,
and six days later, the House voted to concur with the Senate's modifications. Id.
24. NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALL, May 3, 1995
(House Bill 90).
25. NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SENATE RECORDED VOTE, HOUSE BILL
90 (June 30, 1995). The Senate modified the bill after the House approved the measure.
See NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SESSION 1995, HOUSE BILL 90 (Seventh Edi-
tion). For example, the Senate deleted the permit classifications for revolvers and semiau-
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motion to concur with the Senate amendments passed by a vote of
ninety to eighteen.26
By passing this law and significantly reducing restrictions on car-
rying concealed handguns,2 7 the North Carolina General Assembly
carved out an exception to the pre-existing state law prohibiting any
person from carrying a concealed deadly weapon when that person
was not on his own premises.2 8 Left intact by the revision is the ban
on concealment of other deadly weapons such as daggers, brass
knuckles, razors, and stun guns, when a person is not on her own
premises.29
Through its enactment of the new statute, the General Assembly
included specific provisions to establish a uniform statewide permit
program.30 When the new law became effective on December 1, 1995,
most adult North Carolinians became eligible to obtain a permit to
carry a concealed handgun throughout the state.31 Each applicant
tomatic handguns. Id. at 2; see also NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SESSION
1995, HOUSE BILL 90, at 2 (Fourth Edition) (House-approved version). The Senate also
shortened the required time of residency in the state to thirty days and clarified the criteria
for sheriffs to evaluate the mental competency of applicants as well as their incidence of
controlled substance abuse. HousE BILL 90 at 2, 3 (Seventh Edition) The Senate in-
creased the time period for the processing of applications from forty-five to ninety days
and lowered the penalty for violation of the new law from a Class I felony to an infraction
or Class 2 misdemeanor. Id. at 4, 6. Finally, the Senate deleted a provision that would
have made the listing of issued permits a public record. See HOUSE BILL 90 at 4, 5 (Sev-
enth Edition); HOUSE BILL 90 at 5 (Fourth Edition).
26. NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALL, July 6, 1995 (House
Bill 90). Under the North Carolina Constitution, the legislature has exclusive lavmaking
authority: "All bills and resolutions of a legislative nature shall be read three times in each
house before they become laws, and shall be signed by the presiding officers of both
houses." See N.C. CONST. art. II, § 22. Hence, enactment of statutes in North Carolina
does not require approval of the governor, and the governor has no power to veto legisla-
tion. See JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION: WITH HISTORY AND
COMMENTARY 87 (1995). For a general description of the lawmaking process in North
Carolina, see JOSEPH S. FERRELL, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA: A
HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATORS (6th ed. 1990).
27. The statute defines a handgun as "[a] firearm that has a short stock and is designed
to be held and fired by the use of a single hand." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.10 (Supp.
1995).
28. See id. § 14-269(a) (1994), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269(al)(2) (Supp.
1995). Prior to the new permit program, North Carolina law had continuously prohibited
concealed weapons since 1879. See THE CODE OF NORTH CAROLINA § 1005 (1883) (codi-
fying original state prohibition on concealed weapons).
29. § 14-269(a) (Supp. 1995).
30. See id. § 14-415.23 ("It is the intent of the General Assembly to prescribe a uni-
form system for the regulation of legally carrying a concealed handgun."). See also infra
note 124 (discussing the General Assembly's statutory preemption of local firearm regula-
tions during the 1996 Regular Session).
31. But see supra note 11 (describing categories of people who are ineligible to receive
permits for concealed carry under the new law).
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must: be a United States citizen who has resided in North Carolina at
least thirty days before filing an application;3 2 be at least twenty-one
years of age;33 be free from "physical or mental infirmity that prevents
the safe handling of a handgun";34 complete an approved course in
firearms safety and training;35 and the applicant must not be otherwise
ineligible to obtain a permit.36
After meeting those requirements, a person seeking a permit to
carry a concealed handgun must apply to "the sheriff of the county in
which ... [she] resides. ' 37 The applicant must submit a completed
application form,38 a nonrefundable permit fee,39 a set of finger-
prints,40  a certificate of completion from an approved training
course,4 1 and a release authorizing the disclosure of records to the
sheriff in order to evaluate the applicant's mental health or compe-
tency.42 The statute explicitly grants authority to the sheriff to "con-
duct any investigation necessary to determine the qualification or
competency of the person applying for the permit, including record
checks." 43
Within ninety days of receiving of the application materials, "the
sheriff shall either issue or deny the permit."44 An applicant may ap-
32. N.C. GEi. STAT. § 14-415.12(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
33. Id. § 14-415.12(a)(2).
34. Id. § 14-415.12(a)(3).
35. Ud § 14-415.12(a)(4). The training course must include "actual firing of handguns
and instruction in the law of this State governing the carrying of a concealed handgun and
the use of deadly force." Id. Either the course or the instructors must be certified by the
North Carolina Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission or the Na-
tional Rifle Association. Id.
36. Id § 14-415.12(a)(5); see supra note 11 (describing categories of people who are
ineligible~to receive permits for concealed carry under the new law).
37. Id. § 14-415.13(a).
38. Id § 14-415.13(a)(1).
39. Id. § 14-415.13(a)(2). The initial application fee is $80 plus an amount up to $10
that the sheriff may collect for processing the applicant's fingerprints. Id. § 14-415.19(b).
40. I § 14-415.13(a)(3). "The sheriff shall submit the fingerprints to the State Bureau
of Investigation for a records check of State and national databases. The State Bureau of
Investigation shall submit the fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as neces-
sary." Id. § 14-415.13(b). See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (discussing delays
in the permitting process due to a backlog of fingerprint checks). The new law exempts "a
sheriff who issues or refuses to issue a permit to carry a concealed handgun" from any civil
or criminal liability resulting from performance of the duties prescribed by the new law.
I § 14-415.20.
41. Id § 14-415.13(a)(4).
42. Id. § 14-415.13(a)(5).
43. It § 14-415.15(a). The statute does not state precisely which types of record
checks the sheriff may conduct. See id.
44. Id. Also, the sheriff has broad discretionary powers to grant a temporary permit
prior to completing the mandatory background check of the applicant's criminal history:
"[T]he sheriff may issue a temporary permit for a period not to exceed 90 days to a person
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peal the denial of a permit by petitioning a district court judge in the
district in which the applicant filed.45 The permit is valid for four
years throughout the state,46 and may be renewed by filing a new set
of fingerprints, a renewal fee, and a notarized affidavit that states that
the permittee remains qualified to hold a permit.47
An applicant who receives a permit may carry a concealed hand-
gun "unless otherwise specifically prohibited by law."'48 The statute
places several restrictions on the holder of a concealed handgun per-
mit. First, the permit holder "shall disclose to any law enforcement
officer that the person holds a valid permit and is carrying a concealed
handgun when approached or addressed by the officer, and shall dis-
play both the permit and the proper identification upon the request of
a law enforcement officer."'49 Second, the statute sets forth locations
where concealed handgun possession is prohibited.50 Third, the law
who the sheriff reasonably believes is in an emergency situation that may constitute a risk of
safety to the person, the person's family or property." Id. § 14-415.15(b) (emphasis
added).
45. ML § 14-415.15(c). "The determination by the court, on appeal, shall be upon the
facts, the law, and the reasonableness of the sheriff's refusal. The determination of the
court shall be final." Id.
46. Id. § 14-415.11(b).
47. Id. § 14-415.16. The renewal fee is $80. Id. § 14-415.19(a). The sheriff must up-
date the permittee's criminal history and may waive the training requirement. Id. § 14-
415.16.
48. Id § 14-415.11(a); see infra note 124 (describing other applicable state handgun
regulations). The new concealed handgun statute cautions that a state permit for con-
cealed handgun carry is not a defense to federal prosecution for illegal possession of a
firearm. See id. § 14-415.14(b).
49. Id. § 14-415.11(a). Compelled disclosure by a permit holder bearing a concealed
handgun circumvents problems with warrantless searches by police. See In re Whitley, 122
N.C. App. 610, 611-12, 468 S.E.2d 610, 611-12 (1996) (allowing pat-down search without a
warrant where police officer concludes that criminal activity may be occurring and the
suspect may be armed and dangerous).
50. See id § 14-415.11(c):
A permit does not authorize a person to carry a concealed handgun in the areas
prohibited by G.S. 14-269.2 [educational campuses], 14-269.3 [assemblies and es-
tablishments where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed], 14-269.4 [State
property and in courthouses], and 14-277.2 [parades and demonstrations], in an
area prohibited by rule adopted under G.S. 120-32.1 [outlining Legislative Serv-
ices Commission's duties], in any area prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 922 [federal fire-
arms statute] or any other federal law, in a law enforcement or correctional
facility, in a building housing only State or federal offices, in an office of the State
or federal government that is not located in a building exclusively occupied by the
State or federal government, a financial institution, or any other premises where
notice that carrying a concealed handgun is prohibited by the posting of a con-
spicuous notice or statement by the person in legal possession or control of the
premises.
Id. The law prohibits local governments from regulating concealed weapons under most
circumstances, but the statute delegates to local governments and private property owners
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prohibits the use of alcohol and most drugs while carrying a concealed
handgun.5 ' Fourth, the statute describes conditions under which the
permit may be revoked or suspended.52 Finally, the statute includes
an incremental penalty if a permit holder violates a provision of the
new program. 3 The permittee may violate the law by carrying a con-
cealed handgun without a permit in his possession, or by failing to
disclose possession of a concealed handgun to a law enforcement of-
ficer.54 Under the new statute, the first violation is punishable as an
infraction,55 while each subsequent offense is punishable as a Class 2
misdemeanor.
5 6
the authority to restrict possession of concealed weapons on their own premises. See id.
§ 14-415.23. Most local jurisdictions that have considered the issue have banned carrying
concealed weapons in government buildings and parks. See, e.g., Timothy Roberts, County
Delaying Decision on Guns: Ban for Public Sites Sits on Back Burner, CHARLOTrE OB-
SERVER, Dec. 10, 1995, at 1L (reporting bans on concealed handguns in government build-
ings in Cabarrus, Catawba, Mecklenburg, Nash, Pitt, and Wilson counties); James Eli
Shiffer, Board OKs Gun Limits, NEWs & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Dec. 12, 1995, at B4 (re-
porting prohibitions against concealed weapons on county property in Chatham, Durham,
and Orange counties). Similarly, some store owners have posted signs reading "No Con-
cealed Weapons Allowed." Wanted: Armed Shoppers, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh),
Dec. 30, 1995, at A3.
51. § 14-415.11(c). The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for a person, with or without a permit, to carry a concealed
handgun while consuming alcohol or at any time while the person has remaining
in his body any alcohol or in his blood a controlled substance previously con-
sumed, but a person does not violate this condition if a controlled substance in his
blood was lawfully obtained and taken in therapeutically appropriate amounts.
l.; cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.3(a) (1990 & Supp. 1994) (invoking same standard for
driving by any person under the age of twenty-one after consumption of alcohol or drugs).
52. § 14-415.18. The sheriff of the county of issuance or residence may revoke the
permit under various conditions:
(1) Fraud or intentional or material misrepresentation in the obtaining of a
permit.
(2) Misuse of a permit, including lending or giving a permit to another person,
duplicating a permit, or using a permit with the intent to unlawfully cause harm to
a person or property.
(3) The doing of an act or existence of a condition which would have been
grounds for the denial of the permit by the sheriff.
(4) The violation of any terms of the [permit statute].
(5) The applicant is adjudicated guilty of or receives a prayer for judgment con-
tinued for a crime which would have disqualified the applicant from initially re-
ceiving a permit.
Id.
53. See id. § 14-415.21.
54. Id. § 14-415.21(a).
55. An infraction is a non-criminal violation punishable by a fine of up to $100. Id.
§ 14-3.1(a) (1993).
56. § 14-415.21. For examples of Class 2 misdemeanors, see id. § 14-47 (1995) (libel);
id. § 14-117 (1995) (fraudulent and deceptive advertising); id. § 14-132 (1995) (disorderly
conduct); id. § 14-292 (1995) (gambling). A person who does not hold a valid permit may
not carry a concealed handgun off his own premises, unless he is a member of the armed
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The enactment of North Carolina's concealed weapons permit
law emerged from a period of political ferment on the issue of re-
stricted handgun ownership. This contemporary debate over the le-
gality of gun control has focused primarily on opposing views of the
constitutional right to bear arms under the Second Amendment.5 7
One group views gun ownership as an individual right, analogous to
similarly phrased guarantees in the First and Fourth Amendments,5 8
whereas the opposing group asserts that the right to bear arms is a
collective right belonging to the states, and therefore, individual gun
ownership can be constitutionally curtailed.5 9 In many respects these
disparate viewpoints have paralleled our nation's ongoing efforts to
confront the resiliency of violent crime in the context of a modern
society." Unfortunately, the strengths of most arguments on all sides
of the modem gun control debate are muted by the small amount of
authoritative judicial precedent on the subject.61 In particular, the
ambivalence of the United States Supreme Court toward a contempo-
rary articulation of the scope of the right to bear arms grants legisla-
tures a wide berth in which to regulate private ownership of guns.62
forces or a law enforcement agency and carrying out official duties. Id. § 14-269(a)-(b)
(Supp. 1995). Violation of this law is punishable as a Class 2 misdemeanor for the first
offense and as a Class I felony for each subsequent offense. Id. For examples of Class I
felonies, see id § 14-13 (1995) (counterfeiting); id. § 14-217 (1995) (bribery); id. § 20-
138.5(b) (1995) (habitual impaired driving).
57. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the historical roots
of the Second Amendment, see WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRIVILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR
ARMS 43-52 (1989); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLU-
TION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 7-76 (1984); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan,
The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15
U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 7-40 (1989); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the
Personal Right to Bear Arms, 43 DuKE L.J. 1236, 1244-49 (1994).
58. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 213 (1983).
59. See, e.g., Richard M. Aborn, The Battle Over the Brady Bill and the Future of Gun
Control Advocacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 417, 437 (1995) ("[C]ourts have consistently
ruled that there is no constitutional right to own a gun for private purposes unrelated to
the organized state militia."). For an analysis of the right to bear arms under the "collec-
tive" and "individual" frameworks, see EARL R. KRUSCHKE, THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 13-45 (1985).
60. See generally RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT (Don
B. Kates, Jr., ed., 1979) [hereinafter RESTRICrING HANDGUNS] (critiquing the right to bear
arms and gun control legislation from a civil libertarian viewpoint in a series of articles);
Kates, Separating Reality, supra note 6, at 355 ("[T]he 'great American gun war' is really a
culture conflict. It is less about criminology than about ideology and morality.").
61. See infra note 96 and accompanying text (summarizing interpretations of the Sec-
ond Amendment by the federal circuit courts of appeals); see also infra note 62 (discussing
the Supreme Court's reticence on Second Amendment issues).
62. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Introduction to GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITU-
TION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT ix, XXX (Robert J. Cot-
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The limited Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the right
to bear arms suggest that its legal meaning remains unsettled.63 One
of the first Supreme Court decisions to tangentially raise the issue of
the right to bear arms was the infamous decision, Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford.64 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney implicitly recog-
nized the right to keep and bear arms as an inherent entitlement of all
United States citizens.65 Despite the lamentable decision in Dred
Scott, opponents of gun restrictions argue that the case endorsed the
right to bear arms as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship,
independent of the Second Amendment.66
In 1876, the Court examined the right to bear arms in tandem
with the ability of private citizens to interfere with the constitutional
trol, ed., 1993) ("The high Court has not considered a case on the subject since [United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)] and indeed has generally denied certiorari petitions in
cases involving Second Amendment claims. For the most part, not too much can be made
of the modern federal court jurisprudence on the Second Amendment."); Van Alstyne,
supra note 57, at 1240 ("The main reason there is such a vacuum of useful Second Amend-
ment understanding, rather, is the arrested jurisprudence of the subject as such, a condition
due substantially to the Supreme Court's own inertia").
63. See supra note 62. For a survey of Second Amendment jurisprudence and theory,
see Sayoko Blodgett-Ford, The Changing Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 6 SEroN
HALL CONST. L.J. 101 (1995); Kates, supra note 58; Van Alstyne, supra note 57; David C.
Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment,
101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).
64. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). The main holding of the case was that states could deny Afri-
can-Americans, slave or free, the privileges and immunities inherent in full national citi-
zenship. Id.
65. Id. at 417. The Court concluded that endorsing full citizenship for black persons
"would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one State
of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased ... and it would
give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private.., and to keep and carry arms
wherever they went." Id. (emphasis added). The tenor of the Dred Scott decision lasted
into the Reconstruction period, during which many of the southern states enacted laws that
deprived emancipated blacks many freedoms that whites enjoyed. See CLAYTON E.
CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT
AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 97 (1994). Known as the
Black Codes, these laws severely restricted the freedom of contract and movement in order
to maintain the South's antebellum labor structure. Id. In addition, several southern states
prohibited blacks from carrying firearms without a license. Id.; see also RESTRICTING
HANDGUNS, supra note 60, at 12-13 (describing private acts of terrorism to intimidate and
disarm blacks during the Civil War period). The prohibition of gun ownership by an identi-
fied class of citizens in the Reconstruction era was reminiscent of similar practices in Eng-
land two centuries earlier. For example, the absolute English monarchs, in the name of
stable sovereignty, disarmed citizens based on race, religion, nationality, and economic
class. See HALBROOK, supra note 57, at 40. Moreover, just as Congress responded to the
Black Codes by enacting the Fourteenth Amendment, the English Parliament adopted the
English Bill of Rights in 1689 following the Glorious Revolution. See id. at 43-44. The
English Bill of Rights placed restrictions on the crown and endorsed the right to bear arms.
ld. at 46.
66. CRAMER, supra note 65, at 90.
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rights of other individuals in United States v. Cruikshank.67 In Cruik-
shank, the defendant was charged under the Enforcement Act of 1870
with impeding two black men from exercising the right "to keep and
bear arms for a lawful purpose."6 The Court's opinion, authored by
Chief Justice Waite, overturned the conviction and found that the Sec-
ond Amendment only prohibited Congress from infringing on the
right to bear arms.69 Moreover, the Court held that the police power
of the states was the primary safeguard for enforcing the right to bear
arms.
70
Ten years after Cruikshank, the Supreme Court revisited the role
of the states in observing the Second Amendment entitlements. In
Presser v. Illinois,71 the Court examined a state statute that prohibited
non-militia groups from associating, parading, and bearing arms with-
out permission from the Governor.72 Observing that Article I of the
Constitution granted Congress the power to coordinate the formation
of the militia73 and the authority to regulate the peacetime formation
67. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
68. Id at 544-45.
69. See id. at 553. The Court concluded that the right to bear arms for a lawful pur-
pose "is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent
upon that instrument for its existence. The Second Amendment declares that it shall not
be infringed; but this . . . means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress."
kla Hence, a broad reading of Cruikshank suggests that the Second Amendment does not
prohibit infringement of the constitutional right to bear arms by state or private actors. See
also Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (rejecting a Fifth Amendment claim
for taking of private property by the state). On the other hand, some commentators con-
clude that Cruikshank, despite its narrow view of federal protection under the Second
Amendment, recognized that the right to bear arms subsists independent of the Second
Amendment. HALBROOK, supra note 57, at 158; see generally Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond
the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amend-
ment, 24 RUTGERs L.J. 1, 11 (1992) ("[A] right to arms for self defense might be retrieved
from the Ninth Amendment along with the right to engage in a myriad of other basic
human activities.").
70. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-
34 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act because it exceeded Congress's
enumerated power under the Commerce Clause and interfered with the police power re-
served to the states).
71. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
72. Id. at 253-54.
73. See id. at 260. The Constitution empowers the Congress:
[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for gov-
erning such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the
Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Con-
gress ....
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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of troops by the states,74 the Court upheld the state law because it did
not interfere with the federal government's "rightful resource for
maintaining the public security."75 Hence, the facts of the case did not
require adjudication of rights protected by the Second Amendment;
rather, the case turned on the ability of Congress to regulate armed
groups under its enumerated Article I powers. Nevertheless, the
Presser Court, relying heavily on Cruikshank, further reasoned that
the Second Amendment only guaranteed protection from federal en-
croachment, not from intrusion by state governments.76
Cruikshank and Presser presented the Court's view that the Sec-
ond Amendment restrains the federal government's regulatory pow-
ers. Subsequently, the Court divulged more of its view of the type of
activity that is protected from government interference. In Robertson
v. Baldwin,77 the Court examined the constitutionality of narrow ex-
ceptions to the explicit provisions of the Bill of Rights:
[T]he first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly
known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down
any novel principles of government, but simply to embody
certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited
74. Presser, 116 U.S. at 260. The Constitution provides, "[n]o State shall, without the
consent of Congress, keep Troops ... in time of peace .... U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
75. Presser, 116 U.S. at 265, 269.
76. Id. at 264-65. As it had done in Cruikshank, the Court declined to incorporate the
Second Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.; see also Miller v. Texas, 153
U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (holding that the Second and Fourth Amendments "operate only on
the Federal power"). Although Presser has never been overruled, the Court shortly there-
after held that other provisions in the Bill of Rights could be incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-35
(1897) (requiring compensation for taking of private property by the state). During the
1960's, the Court significantly expanded its incorporation doctrine. See, e.g., Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (First Amendment freedom of
speech and press); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (First Amend-
ment establishment clause); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment
right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures). These decisions buttress the
argument that the Second Amendment has been implicitly incorporated as well. The im-
plications of incorporating the Second Amendment's protections into the Fourteenth
Amendment's authority over state action were articulated in United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938): "There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." For a thorough
discussion of incorporation of the complete Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193 (1992).
77. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
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from our English ancestors, and which had from time imme-
morial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions
arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating
these principles into the fundamental law, there was no in-
tention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be
recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus, the
freedom of the press (art. 1) does not permit the publication
of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publica-
tions injurious to public morals or private reputation; the
right of the people to keep and bear arms (art. 2) is not in-
fringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weap-
ons; the provision that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy (art. 5) does not prevent a second trial, if upon the
first trial the jury failed to agree, or if the verdict was set
aside upon the defendant's motion ....778
This decision acknowledges two important tenets of federal con-
stitutional law: The fundamental nature of the right to bear arms and
the propriety of restrictions on possession of concealed weapons. 7 9
The Court's last major pronouncement on the scope of the Sec-
ond Amendment came in 1939. In United States v. Miller,"° two de-
fendants were indicted in federal court in Arkansas for violating the
National Firearms Act of 1934.81 The trial court quashed the indict-
ment, holding that the federal statute violated the Second Amend-
ment.82 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed in an opinion
authored by Justice McReynolds: ."In the absence of any evidence
tending to show that possession or use of [a sawed-off shotgun] ... has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. '8 3 The
78. Id at 281-82 (emphasis added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("Concealed weapons create an immediate and severe danger to
the public.").
79. For a discussion of concealed weapons regulations and the North Carolina consti-
tution, see infra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
80. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
81. Id. at 175. The law prohibited transporting sawed-off shotguns in interstate com-
merce. Id. at 175 n.1.
82. Id. at 177.
83. Id. at 178. Since Miller, the Supreme Court has briefly examined whether the Sec-
ond Amendment guarantees an individual or collective right to bear arms. See, e.g., Lewis
v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (upholding defendant's conviction for federal
firearms violation because it did not "trench upon any constitutionally protected liber-
ties"); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (concluding
that the "Second Amendment... was designed to keep alive the militia"); see also United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (comparing the references to "the
people" in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments).
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Court noted that the weapon was not "part of the ordinary military
equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense. '
Hence, Miller seemingly limited Second Amendment guarantees to
activities within the scope of a well-regulated militia.
85
In the immediate aftermath of Miller, there was sparse legal con-
frontation regarding the regulation of gun ownership. 6 However,
political assassinations on American soil' spurred the enactment of
the Gun Control Act of 1968,88 representing a turning point toward
the modem debate over gun control. The Act prohibited interstate
shipment of firearms to private individuals, banned the sale of guns to
minors,89 drug addicts and convicted felons,9° and increased licensing
requirements for gun dealers.9 Although the Act represented a com-
prehensive federal response to gun violence, many of its provisions
were rolled back in the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986.92
In November 1993, President Clinton signed the Brady bill into
law, instituting a five-day waiting period for handgun purchases and
provided funding to help states improve their criminal record-keeping
systems.93 Then, following the trend set by the Brady bill, in 1994 an
84. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
85. Id. In modem times, the term "militia" is synonymous with the National Guard of
the United States and the National Guard of each state. See, e.g., Perpich v. Department
of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 340-46 (1990) (tracing the history of the organized militia from
the colonial period to the present).
86. See Cottrol, supra note 62, at xxix: "For nearly two decades after Miller little ex-
isted in the way of federal firearms regulation. State and local legislation, with a few ex-
ceptions ... usually provided traditional regulations governing the manner of carrying
weapons, not outright prohibitions. There was little serious attempt to mount constitu-
tional challenges to these restrictions."
87. Congress debated several gun control proposals soon after the assassinations of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Senator Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. ROBERT J. SPITZER,
THE POLrrICS OF GUN CONTROL 143-45 (1995).
88. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1214 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1968)).
89. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a), (b)(1) (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994)).
90. Id. § 922(d).
91. Id. § 923.
92. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-29
(1986)). The Act relaxed the licensing requirements for dealers, 18 U.S.C. §923 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 923 (1994)), and permitted interstate sales of rifles and
shotguns between residents of states whose laws allowed such sales. Id. § 926(A) (1986)
(codified as amended at § 926 (1994)).
93. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §921 (1993)); see also Stephen R. Rubenstein, Brady Act
Regulations and Requirements, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL HISTORY
RECORDS: BRADY AND BEYOND 19, 19-21 (1995) (Department of Justice) (summarizing
the main provisions of the Brady bill). The Brady Act's waiting period has been upheld in
several federal court decisions. See, e.g., Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir.
1996); Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1029-33 (9th Cir. 1995).
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assault weapons ban was enacted, outlawing the sale and possession of
nineteen types of semiautomatic weapons.94
In conjunction with the broadening federal legislation on gun
possession, the public's awareness of violent crime prompted state
laws and local ordinances.95 Predictably, many of these laws and ordi-
nances have been challenged by private citizens as violations of the
Second Amendment, and in response, the federal courts of appeals
have uniformly rejected their claims. 6 The most celebrated case, de-
spite its relatively early date, is Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove.97
In 1981, the village of Morton Grove, Illlinois enacted the first hand-
gun ban in the United States.98 Shortly thereafter, residents chal-
lenged the validity of the law under the Illinois and federal
constitutions. 99 The federal district court rejected the plaintiff's claims
under the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and upheld the
law.100 Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed, holding that Presser controlled the plaintiff's
Second Amendment objections to the ordinances and concluding that
94. Cf. SPrrZER, supra note 87, at 152-57 (describing a 1989 shooting spree in a Stock-
ton, California school yard by a gunman armed with an AK-47 assault rifle). In March
1995, the House of Representatives voted 239 to 173 to repeal the assault weapons ban.
John E. Yang, House Votes Repeal of Assault-Gun Ban: Gingrich Fulfills Promise to NRA,
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1996, at Al.
95. See generally B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, in THE GUN CON-
TROL DEBATE: You DECIDE 63, 68-71 (Lee Nisbet ed., 1990) (discussing the limited effec-
tiveness of local gun purchase restrictions because of widespread availability of firearms
through a nationwide market).
96. See, e.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 100 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding the Second
Amendment guarantees a right held by the states, not individuals); United States v. Brous-
sard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1041 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting claim to a Ninth Amendment individual
right to bear arms); Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 965 F.2d 723,729-31
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a California state law banning assault weapons did not violate
the Second Amendment because such a claim could only be made against the federal gov-
ernment); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548,550 (4th Cir. 1974) (rejecting defendant's
challenge to the federal law prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons because
the Second Amendment only guarantees a collective right related to a well-regulated mili-
tia). The Fourth Circuit still follows the holding in Johnson. See Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d
120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that "the Second Amendment preserves a collective,
rather than individual, right").
97. 695 F.2d 261, 264 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
98. The law prohibited possession of any handgun that had not been rendered perma-
nently inoperative. See id at 263 n.1; see also HALBROOK, supra note 57, at 195 (contrast-
ing the Morton Grove setting-a middle-class suburb-with the historically urban regions
that enacted strict gun control ordinances).
99. For the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis of the ordinance, see Kalodimos v. Vil-
lage of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 269-79 (Ill. 1984) (holding that the Morton Grove
ban on operable handguns did not violate the Illinois Constitution).
100. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F.Supp. 1169 (N.D. II. 1981), affd, 695
F.2d 261 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
2228 [Vol. 74
1996] .- CONCEALED HANDGUNS 2229
the states' authority to regulate gun possession-unlike Congress's-
was not restricted by the Second Amendment. 10 1 Furthermore, the
court dismissed the Ninth Amendment claim and rejected the plain-
tiff's contention that the complete Bill of Rights had been implicitly
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. °2
The North Carolina Constitution guarantees the right to bear
arms in language that resembles the federal constitution's Second
Amendment, 103 but the North Carolina constitutional provision is ex-
plicitly qualified for citizens carrying concealed weapons. 1°4 Several
101. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 269. The court adamantly refused to ignore precedent from
Presser-holding that the states were not bound by the Second Amendment-and Miller-
holding that the right to keep and bear arms was enjoyed by individuals in order to main-
tain a well-regulated militia. See id at 269-70. Some commentators dispute this states'
rights view of the Second Amendment:
If the Second Amendment creates a right on the part of the states, rather than
individuals, then by necessity it works a pro tanto repeal of certain limitations on
state military power found in the Constitution proper, renders the National
Guard unconstitutional, at least as currently constituted, and creates a power on
the part of state legislatures to nullify federal gun-control laws, if such laws are
inconsistent with that state's scheme for organizing its militia.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A
Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1737, 1743 (1995).
102. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 270,271; see supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment). For commentary on
the applicability of the Ninth Amendment, see Johnson, supra note 69.
103. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 contained a provision which provided
"[t]hat the people have the right to bear arms for the defence of the state." See State v.
Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 545, 159 S.E.2d 1, 8 (1968). For a detailed analysis of the relevant
provisions in the Constitution of 1776, see Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in
the First State Bills of Rights: Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, 10
VT. L. REv. 255,279-87 (1985) (observing that North Carolina was influenced by the Penn-
sylvania Declaration of Rights which guaranteed the people a right to bear arms "for the
defense of themselves, and the state"). Although Halbrook concludes that North Caro-
lina's Constitution of 1776 guaranteed an individual right to bear arms, other commenta-
tors note that North Carolina omitted the Pennsylvania language "for the defense of
themselves." See ORTH, supra note 26, at 73. North Carolina, like many other southern
states, amended its Constitution during the Reconstruction period; the relevant clause, Ar-
ticle I, § 24, was modified in 1868 to conform to the federal constitution's Second Amend-
ment. See id. In 1875, the Constitutional Convention added another clause that
recognized the legislature's authority to regulate the carrying of concealed weapons. Id.
Four years later, the General Assembly enacted a ban on concealed weapons. See supra
note 28.
104. The North Carolina Constitution provides:
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing armies
in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the
military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil
power. Nothing herein shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or
prevent the General Assembly from enacting penal statutes against that practice.
N.C. CON T. art. I, § 30 (emphasis added).
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decisions by the North Carolina state courts have helped to define the
meaning of the right to bear arms.
In 1882, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided State v.
Speller, °5 in which a defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
state's concealed weapons statute. 0 6 The court held that the plain
text of the North Carolina constitution allowed the prohibition, 0 7 but
the court further held that even without explicit constitutional author-
ity, the legislature could regulate the right to bear arms "in a manner
conducive to the peace and safety of the public." 108
The North Carolina Supreme Court reexamined the issue twelve
years later in State v. Dixon.10 9 In Dixon, a defendant indicted for
carrying a concealed pistol attempted to show that he lacked criminal
intent because he carried the pistol for the sole purpose of selling it.'10
The court disagreed with this contention, however, holding that "[tihe
criminal intent in such cases is the intent to carry the weapon con-
cealed.""' According to the court, the statute presumed a criminal
intent if the defendant carried a concealed weapon off his premises;
however, the presumption could be rebutted by an express finding
that the defendant carried the gun "without any thought or intent to
conceal it.""'
In a broader vein, the court wrote candidly about the right to
bear unconcealed weapons in a 1921 decision, State v. Kerner."3 In
Kerner, the defendant was charged with violating a law that prohib-
ited carrying a pistol off his premises without a permit."14 The trial
court directed a verdict of not guilty, holding that the law violated the
105. 86 N.C. 697 (1882).
106. Id. at 699. The defendant argued that the legislature could not deprive a citizen of
the right to bear arms when he was under the threat of assault. Id. at 699-700.
107. Id. at 700.
108. Id
109. 114 N.C. 850, 19 S.E. 364 (1894).
110. Id at 851, 19 S.E. at 364.
111. Id at 852, 19 S.E. at 364.
112. Id. at 854, 19 S.E. at 364-65. The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
State v. Reams, 121 N.C. 556, 27 S.E. 1004 (1897):
The offense of carrying a concealed weapon about one's person and off his own
premises consists in the guilty intent to carry it concealed and not upon the intent
to use it; and the possession of the weapon raises the presumption of guilt, which
presumption may be rebutted by the defendant.
Id at 557, 27 S.E. at 1005; see also State v. Woodlief, 172 N.C. 885, 888, 90 S.E. 137, 138
(1916) ("[Cjarrying a concealed weapon for a hostile or even a defensive purpose, instead
of being an excuse for the act, or mitigation of the crime, tends rather to aggravate the
offense, and amounts to doing precisely what the statute plainly intended to forbid.").
113. 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921).
114. Id at 575, 107 S.E. at 223.
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state constitutional right to bear arms.115 On appeal, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court affirmed on two grounds: The law was "an unrea-
sonable regulation, and, besides, it would be void because for all
practical purposes it is a prohibition of the constitutional right to bear
arms."" 6 In the case, the court also wrote unfavorably about the
movement towards laws that "disarm" citizens, noting the historical
importance of an armed citizenry.
117
In 1968, the most recent significant North Carolina Supreme
Court decision on the right to bear arms came down. In State v. Daw-
son,"8 the court articulated a contemporary view of the state constitu-
tional right to bear arms." 9 The defendant was convicted of the
common-law crime of "going armed with unusual and dangerous
weapons to the terror of the people," and subsequently appealed. 2 °
The supreme court affirmed the convictions, but in dicta, the court
stated:
North Carolina decisions have interpreted our Constitution as,
guaranteeing the right to bear arms to the people in a collec-
tive sense-similar to the concept of a militia-and also to in-
dividuals .... These decisions have, however, consistently
pointed out that the right of individuals to bear arms, is not
absolute, but is subject to regulation.' 2'
115. Id.
116. Id. at 579, 107 S.E. at 225. The court distinguished between the more generalized
right to bear arms and the specific practice of carrying concealed weapons:
The former is a sacred right, based upon the experience of the ages in order that
the people may be accustomed to bear arms and ready to use them for protection
of their liberties or their country when occasion serves. The provision against
carrying them concealed was to prevent assassinations or advantages taken by the
lawless, i.e., against the abuse of privilege.
117. Id. at 575, 107 S.E. at 223.
Id. at 578-79, 107 S.E. at 225. The court described the historical benefits of allowing
the civilian population to train in the use of arms. For example, the colonies won their
independence and the frontier extended beyond the Mississippi River in large part because
"the common people" proficiently used firearms. Id- at 577, 107 S.E. at 224. The court
further cautioned against tyrannical infringement on the right to bear arms:
The usual method when a country is overborne by force is to "disarm" the people.
It is to prevent the above and similar exercises of arbitrary power that the people
in creating this Government "of the people, by the people, and for the people,"
reserved to themselves the right to "bear arms" that accustomed to their use they
might be ready to meet illegal force with legal force by adequate and just defense
of their persons, their property, and their liberties, whenever necessary.
I. at 578-79, 107 S.E. at 225.
118. 272 N.C. 535, 159 S.E.2d 1 (1968).
119. Id. at 545-49, 159 S.E.2d at 9-11.
120. Id. at 537, 541, 159 S.E.2d at 3, 6. The defendant had driven his truck through a
neighborhood and fired his gun at several residences. Id. at 538-39, 159 S.E.2d at 4-5.
121. Id- at 546, 159 S.E.2d at 9 (emphasis added). The court observed that at the time
the constitutional provisions were adopted, private arms were the principal weapons of the
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The court also approved a portion of the holding in Kerner that
recognized the General Assembly's authority to exercise its police
power and regulate gun possession.1'
As these cases indicate, the North Carolina General Assembly
has exercised its constitutional prerogative to regulate private gun
ownership.'23 Statutes enacted in 1879-and modified thereafter-se-
verely restricted the possession of concealed handguns.124 Conse-
quently, prior to the enactment of the concealed handgun permit
militia. Id. However, the court declared that arms provided by the state, rather than pri-
vately owned guns, are the primary weapons of the modern militia. Id.
122. Id. at 547, 159 S.E.2d at 10. The Dawson court observed:
"The right to bear arms, which is protected and safeguarded by the Federal and
State constitutions, is subject to the authority of the General Assembly, in the
exercise of the police power, to regulate, but the regulation must be reasonable
and not prohibitive, and must bear a fair relation to the preservation of the public
peace and safety."
Id. (quoting State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 579, 107 S.E. 222, 226 (1921)). Similarly, in
State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 505, 178 S.E.2d 449, 462 (1971), the court held:
[T]he Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, if it reaches
State action at all, reaches it by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and, therefore, would, at the most, forbid only an unreasonable and
arbitrary restriction by State or municipal law upon the right to keep and bear
arms.
Id.
123. See supra notes 103-22 (discussing state constitutional authority for regulation of
concealed weapons).
124. The concealed weapons prohibition, originally enacted in 1879, has been amended
over fifteen times. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269 note (Supp. 1995) (listing amendments to
the original North Carolina Code prohibiting concealed weapons). North Carolina has
several other gun control regulations. See id. § 14-402 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting
purchase of a pistol or crossbow without a license or permit); id. § 14-269.7 (Supp. 1995)
(codifying a 1993 statute that prohibits possession of a handgun by anyone under eighteen
years of age). In addition, some local communities have established ordinances that place
further restrictions on firearm possession. See id. § 160A-189 (1994) (granting general or-
dinance-making power to cities to regulate the discharge or display of firearms within city
limits). In 1993, the town of Chapel Hill enacted the most severe gun restrictions in the
history of the state. Jane Stancill, Chapel Hill Passes Tough Gun Control Law, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, Orange County ed.), Nov. 23, 1993, at Al. The ordinance forbids the
display of firearms at public assemblies, on public property, at polling places, or while
consuming alcohol. Id. at A8. Other forbidden acts include the displaying of pistols
shorter than six inches and the possession of weapons of mass destruction while not on
one's own premises. Id. During the 1996 Regular Session, the General Assembly severely
restricted the authority of local communities to govern the "possession, ownership, storage,
transfer, sale, purchase, licensing, or registration of firearms, firearms ammunition, compo-
nents of firearms, dealers in firearms, or dealers in handgun components or parts." 1996
N.C. Sess. Laws 727 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-409.39 to 409.40). Except for
narrowly-drawn powers reserved to counties and municipalities, the General Assembly
preempted the "entire field of regulation of firearms ... by local governments . . . ." Id.
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statute, North Carolina state law prohibited a person from carrying
concealed weapons off his premises."
North Carolina's passage of the concealed weapons permit pro-
gram in 1995, however, reflects not only a dramatic change in North
Carolina policy, but also a nationwide trend toward liberalized, non-
discretionary permit programs. During the last decade, variations in
the political climate and the uncertain constitutional status of the right
to bear arms have brought about significant activity in state legisla-
tures.126 For example, shortly after the powerful National Rifle Asso-
ciation announced in 1985 that it would lobby for permissive
concealed firearms programs,127 Florida passed a non-discretionary
"shall issue" concealed weapons permit law.128 Between 1987 and
1996, nineteen states have followed Florida's lead and adopted liberal-
125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269(a) (1993). The law did not apply to members of the
armed forces and law enforcement agencies while discharging their official duties. Id. § 14-
269(b).
126. See, eg., John C. Lenzen, Note, Liberalizing the Concealed Carry of Handguns by
Qualified Civilians: The Case for "Carry Reform", 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1503, 1506-07
(1995) ("Within the last ten years alone, twenty states have adopted concealed carry permit
systems to facilitate more liberal issuance of permits .... "). In conjunction with their
fundamental platform of Second Amendment rights, advocates for gun ownership also
maintain that concealed weapons deter or thwart criminal acts. See LAPIERRE, supra note
4, at 29-31. In a 1991 case, an Alabama man licensed to carry a concealed firearm dis-
rupted an armed robbery in a restaurant. Id. at 29-30. During the same year, a Texas
woman named Suzanna Gratia kept her gun in her car because state law prohibited carry-
ing concealed weapons, and while she ate lunch with her parents, an armed gunman went
on a rampage in the same restaurant, killing twenty-two people before shooting himself.
I. at 30. Gratia's parents were among those killed. Id.
127. See David McDowall et al., Easing Concealed Firearms Laws: Effects on Homicide
in Three States, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 193-94 (1995). With more than 2.5
million members, the NRA wields substantial political clout in the battle to protect the
interests of gun owners. OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA AND THE BAT-
TLE FOR GUN CONTROL 282-83 (1993). The NRA also enjoyed successes in the elections of
1994. For example, 80% of the NRA's favored candidates won their federal congressional
campaigns and 85% won at the state level. David Van Biema, License to Conceal, TIME,
March 27, 1995 at 26, 28. The NRA's Institute for Legislative Actions (ILA) was also
extremely influential in the sweeping liberalization of concealed weapons reform at the
state level. See NRA-ILA GRASSROOTS, VICrORY REPORT FROM THE STATES (undated
NRA publication summarizing state-by-state NRA involvement in statutory reform in
1995); see also John J. Fialka, NRA's Latest Campaign Seeks to Recruit Women and Project
New Image as Crime-Fighting Group, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1995, at A14 (describing elec-
tion of the NRA's first female president, Marion P. Hammer); Richard Lacayo, Under Fire,
TIME, Jan. 29, 1990, at 16, passim (describing history and political objectives of the NRA).
128. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §790.06 note (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) (noting that original
law, ch. 87-24, became effective Oct. 1, 1987); see also Richard Getchell, Comment, Carry-
ing Concealed Weapons in Self-Defense: Florida Adopts Uniform Regulations for the Issu-
ance of Concealed Weapons Permits, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 751 (1987) (discussing the new
Florida law). Presently, nearly thirty states have adopted a more liberalized program for
regulating concealed carry of firearms. See Lenzen, supra note 126, at 1504 n.4. In Ver-
mont, no permit is required to carry a concealed firearm; instead, the state criminalizes
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ized permit programs for carrying concealed weapons, bringing the
total number of such programs to twenty-eight.
129
North Carolina's principal firearms cases indicate that the Gen-
eral Assembly is authorized to reasonably regulate concealed hand-
gun ownership. 130 Therefore, an analysis of the 1995 law should focus
on the policies the General Assembly embraced when it established
the permit program, not the underlying constitutional issues. The
need to confront crime in the state has been well-documented,' 31 and
thus the debate over new concealed firearms laws is kindled in part by
the unknown consequences of these reforms.132 In order to determine
whether lowering restrictions on carrying concealed weapons is effec-
tive in advancing the underlying public policy of enhancing public
safety, several studies have been conducted to evaluate the effects of
carrying concealed firearms if the carrier has the intent to injure others or is on the
grounds of a state facility without permission. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (1974).
129. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700 to .790 (1994);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129 (Supp. 1995),
amended by 1996 Ga. Laws 520; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1315 (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-308 (Michie Supp. 1995); W.VA. CODE § 61-7-4 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
130. See supra notes 63-122 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of
handgun restrictions). Note, however, that the Second Amendment doctrine forms the
framework for nearly all debates over handgun restrictions. See supra notes 63-102 and
accompanying text. In 1991, former Chief Justice Warren Burger rejected an expansive
view of the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment: "This [Amendment] has
been the subject of one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word 'fraud,' on the
American public by special interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime." The
MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: First Freedoms, (Television Broadcast, Dec. 16, 1991), avail-
able in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NEWSHR File (interview with Charlayne Hunter-Gault).
See supra note 127 for a discussion of the political activities surrounding the consideration
of firearms laws.
131. See supra note 2 (discussing crime rates in North Carolina).
132. In conjunction with the new concealed handgun statute, the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly directed the Governor's Crime Commission to study the effects of the new
law and report no later than the convening of the 1997 General Assembly:
The Commission shall:
(1) Review the number of permits denied, issued, and revoked.
(2) Review any data on the use of concealed handguns by those who have per-
mits including to the extent available:
a. Instances where a crime was prevented by a person who was carrying a
concealed handgun pursuant to a permit.
b. Instances where a child or another person was accidentally injured by a
handgun carried by a person with a concealed handgun permit.
c. Instances where a handgun was used inappropriately by a person with a
concealed weapon permit.
(3) Attempt to determine the effect of Article 54B on crime in the State and on
the safety of the public.
Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 542, § 5.1, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 801.
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liberalized permit programs. 33 A University of Maryland study inves-
tigated the homicide rate in three states-Florida, Mississippi, and Or-
egon-that had enacted non-discretionary or "shall issue" carry
reform statutes. 134 The results showed that firearm homicides in-
creased after the liberalization of concealed carry laws in four of the
five urban areas studied. 35 The researchers concluded that "shall is-
sue" laws do not reduce homicides in large urban areas, and alterna-
tively, these laws may increase the number of firearm murders.
136
Other criminological data contradict the results of the Maryland
study. For example, one law review article surveyed the results from
studies that focus on the merits of self-defense measures by armed
citizens. 37 The authors reported that research "has indicated that vic-
tims who resist by using guns or other weapons are less likely to be
injured compared to victims who do not resist or to those who resist
without weapons.' 138 These results support the General Assembly's
efforts to enable the people of North Carolina to legally practice self-
defense.13
9
133. Much of the empirical evidence injected into the gun control debate has been gath-
ered in the field of criminology. See, e.g., JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN:
WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1983). Additional studies have been per-
formed in the area of public health. See, e.g., Daniel J. French, Biting the Bullet: Shifting
the Paradigm from Law Enforcement to Epidemiology; A Public Health Approach to Fire-
arm Violence in America, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1073 (1995); Arthur L. Kellerman & Don-
ald T. Reay, Protection or Peril? An Analysis of Firearm-Related Deaths in the Home, 314
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1557-60 (1986). But see Don B. Kates et al., Guns and Public
Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513, 595
(1995) (arguing that there is an "emotional anti-gun agenda in the treatment of firearms
issues in the medical and public health literature").
134. See McDowall et al., supra note 127, at 193-94.
135. Id. at 201-02. The researchers measured the change in reported homicides by fire-
arm in five cities: Miami (+3%), Jacksonville (+75%), Tampa (+22%), Portland (-12%),
and Jackson (+43%). Id. at 205. The NRA, however, reported that homicides in Florida
decreased by 21% in the study period 1987-1992. Rebecca Voelker, States Debate 'Carry-
ing Concealed Weapons' Laws, 273 JAMA 1741, 1741 (1995).
136. McDowall et al., supra note 127, at 203.
137. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and
Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995).
138. Id. at 151-52. The authors cautioned that while "moderate regulatory measures"
would not significantly reduce defensive use by victims, prohibition against gun ownership
would hamper defensive measures "that otherwise would have saved lives, prevented inju-
ries, thwarted rape attempts, driven off burglars, and helped victims retain their property."
Id. at 180.
139. North Carolina courts have adopted a two-tiered analysis of justifiable homicide
claims under the categories of perfect self-defense, which "excuses a killing altogether"
and imperfect self-defense, which "may reduce a charge of murder to voluntary man-
slaughter." See State v. Ross, 338 N.C. 280, 283, 449 S.E.2d 556, 559 (1994). The four
elements of perfect self-defense are:
1996] 2235
2236 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
Another study evaluated the impact of armed victims on the be-
havior of criminals. In a pool of over 1600 prisoners, nearly forty per-
cent reported that at some point they had foregone a criminal activity
because "they knew or believed that the victim was carrying a gun.'
140
These results suggest that access to weapons by potential victims of
crime-or at least the threat of armed defensive measures-may be a
significant deterrent to criminal activity. 4' However, proponents of
(1) [I]t appeared to the defendant and he believed it to be necessary to kill the
deceased in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm; and
(2) defendant's belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared
to him at that time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person
of ordinary firmness; and
(3) defendant was not the aggressor in bringing on the affray ... ; and
(4) defendant did not use excessive force, i.e., did not use more force than was
necessary or reasonably appeared to him to be necessary under the circumstances
to protect himself from death or great bodily harm.
State v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583, 595, 417 S.E.2d 489, 497 (1992). "Imperfect self-defense
exists where there is evidence of the first two elements of self-defense and the State fails to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the non-existence of either element but does prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that defendant either used excessive force or was the aggressor
...." State v. Watson, 338 N.C. 168, 180, 449 S.E. 2d 694, 702, temp. stay and reconsidera-
tion denied, 338 N.C. 523,457 S.E.2d 302, cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1708 (1995). A person who
is attacked with deadly force and who is free from fault in causing the attack has no duty to
retreat" 'but may stand his ground and kill his adversary.' " Id. at 186, 449 S.E.2d at 705
(quoting State v. Pearson, 228 N.C. 34, 39-40, 215 S.E.2d 598, 603 (1975)). In addition:
[O]ne may kill in defense of another if one believes it to be necessary to prevent
death or great bodily harm to the other "and has a reasonable ground for such
belief, the reasonableness of this belief or apprehension to be judged by the jury
in light of the facts and circumstances as they appeared to the defender at the
time of killing."
State v. Perry, 338 N.C. 457, 466, 450 S.E.2d 471, 476 (1994) (quoting State v. Terry, 337
N.C. 615, 623, 447 S.E.2d 720, 724 (1994)); cf. GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 101-51 (1991) (describing "the effects of guns in the hands of po-
tential victims of crime"). Kleck summarizes the psychological security of handgun posses-
sion and argues that private gun ownership supplements police protection. Id. at 120, 142.
Even where law enforcement officers are present, defensive gun use by private citizens is
reasonable because the traditional, yet highly criticized, doctrine of sovereign immunity
shields North Carolina municipalities from tort liability for negligent acts, including inade-
quate crime prevention and failing to respond to emergency calls. See Jones v. Kearns, 120
NC. App. 301, 302-04, 462 S.E.2d 245, 246, disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 414, 465 S.E.2d 541
(1995) (stating general rule of government immunity that may be waived by purchase of
liability insurance).
140. JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A
SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 146, 147 (1986). Wright and Rossi also re-
ported that approximatel; two-thirds of prisoners who had encountered an armed victim
were either scared away or shot at; the remaining one-third were not deterred. Id. at 154.
Hence, not all defensive measures actually thwart criminal acts. Id.
141. But see David McDowall et al., Additional Discussion About Easing Concealed
Firearms Laws, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 221, 224 (1995) (arguing that "relaxed
concealed firearm laws may set off an arms race" because criminals carry weapons to pro-
tect themselves from armed victims).
CONCEALED HANDGUNS
handgun restrictions fear that the availability of handguns will inevita-
bly lead to the death of unarmed victims.
142
Overall, the scarcity of reliable data concerning the effect of car-
rying concealed handguns continues to hamper advocates and oppo-
nents of liberal regulatory programs for firearms permits. The data
appear to support nearly any plausible argument relating to concealed
carry. Consequently, North Carolina and other states with non-discre-
tionary permit programs will serve as laboratories in the ongoing pub-
lic debate about crime control and the right to bear arms. 43
Nonetheless, the nationwide surge toward lax regulation of concealed
handgun possession may be tempered by the changing political envi-
ronment.'" For example, North Carolina's Attorney General
Michael Easley has expressed regret over the right-to-carry move-
ment145 and James Exum, the former Chief Justice of the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, has disparaged the state's new concealed
handgun permit law.'4 6
Another factor that will contribute to the law's overall effect on
public safety in North Carolina is the number of permits applied for
and granted. In states where similar concealed handgun laws have
142. Less than two months after Texas implemented its concealed weapons permit pro-
gram, a permit holder shot and killed an unarmed man after a traffic incident. Robert
Ingrassia, Gun Law at Center of Fatality: Man Shot Dead in Traffic Dispute, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 22, 1996, at Al. The two men's side-view mirrors touched while
they were driving. Id. The unarmed man approached the assailant's vehicle and started
punching him before he was shot once in the chest. Id. The Dallas police arrested the gun
owner, claiming that he unjustifiably used deadly force. Id. A grand jury declined to indict
the shooter for murder. See Robert Ingrassia, Gun-Permit Death Won't Go to Court:
Grand Jury Declines to Indict GP Man, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 21, 1996, at Al; see
also Gordon Witkin, Should You Own a Gun?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 1994,
at 24, 24 (describing accidental shooting of a 14-month-old boy by his 2-year-old brother in
Georgia). In Florida, which enacted a non-discretionary concealed handgun permit pro-
gram in 1987, there have been relatively few incidents involving permit holders. See
Witkin, supra note 1, at 59. Florida issued approximately 250,000 permits between 1987
and 1994; eighteen permits were revoked and forty-three were suspended because the per-
mit holders committed crimes with firearms. Id. In Dade County, the county encompass-
ing the city of Miami, there were sixty-three incidents between 1987 and 1992, including
twenty-five arrests and twelve incidents where individuals defended themselves against
criminal activity. Id.
143. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (endorsing state experimentation with social and economic policies).
144. See, e.g., Paul Bradley, N. Va. Democrats Aim at Gun Law Reversal or Modifica-
tion of Permit Rule Sought, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Dec. 1, 1995, at B1 (describing
goals of Democrats in Virginia General Assembly who prevented Republican sweep of
both chambers in November'1995 elections).
145. See Neff, supra note 19, at A4.
146. Exum Asks Fellow Episcopalians to Help Repeal Concealed Gun Law, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Feb. 2, 1996, at A3 ("I think it's an ill-conceived law, passed
hastily.").
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been enacted, the citizens responded enthusiastically to the availabil-
ity of permits by filing significant numbers of applications. 147 Within
three months after the North Carolina program commenced, approxi-
mately 14,000 North Carolinians applied for a permit, but only a small
number were issued.'48 Although the ninety-day processing period
had expired for many applications, sheriffs were unable to complete
most fingerprint checks due to delays in the criminal records
system.
149
Although North Carolina has plunged itself into the recent wave
of permissive handgun legislation, it remains to be seen whether this
legislative action against crime will continue to enjoy the tempered
acceptance it received upon enactment. 150 In the meantime, the de-
bate will be shaped by the politics of fear. Opponents of gun carrying
fear the loss of innocent lives, while advocates of gun ownership fear
defenselessness against criminal behavior. To be sure, the real issue
surrounding the new law is whether one considers all gun carriers a
threat to safety, or only those who are likely to commit an unlawful
act. North Carolina's new law attempts to distinguish between re-
sponsible gun owners and those inclined to perpetrate gun-related
147. See, e.g., Ted Gest & Marilyn Moore, Gun Controls Lifted: Florida's New Crop of
Pistol Packers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 12, 1987, at 16, 16 (reporting 36,000 re-
quests for applications one week after Florida law went into effect); Anne Saker, Va. Points
the Way With Concealed-Gun Law, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), July 9, 1995, at B1
(describing initial surge of permit applications when Virginia's weapons law went into ef-
fect on July 1, 1995). As a preliminary estimate of the number of anticipated permit appli-
cants, the North Carolina Senate's Finance Committee used the results from Florida,
where approximately one percent of the population received permits within the first two
years of the program, to estimate that North Carolina would issue over 70,000 permits
from 1995 to 1997. NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SENATE FINANCE COMMIT-
TEE MINUTES, June 27, 1995.
148. Todd Richissin, Crime Suspects Get Gun Permits, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh),
Mar. 10, 1996, at B1, B4.
149. In Wake County, for example, 775 residents applied for permits during the first
three months of the program, but only three permits were issued. Fred Hartman, Finger-
print-check Backlog Delays Permits for Concealed Guns, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh),
Feb. 29, 1996, at B3. In contrast, the sheriff of Davidson County issued more than 200
"emergency" permits that are effective for ninety days; none of these applicants had his
record checks completed. See Richissin, supra note 148, at B1. These disparate policies
demonstrate that some sheriffs have decided to issue permits to applicants for whom back-
ground checks are not complete, while other sheriffs will wait until applicants are screened
for prior criminal behavior. See id. at B4.
150. A survey of 623 North Carolina adults conducted in the fall of 1995 concluded that
approximately 57% of North Carolina residents opposed the new concealed handgun law,
while 33% supported it and 10% were undecided. Poll Finds Most Oppose, supra note 10,
at B6. Each respondent was asked, "Do you support or oppose the new state law that
allows people to carry concealed weapons?" Id. The survey was conducted by the School
of Journalism and Mass Communication and the Institute for Research in Social Science at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Il-
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crimes.15 1 However, it is unrealistic to expect law-enforcement offi-
cials to successfully segregate all high-risk gun owners .under the
newly-enacted statutory criteria.
Hence, by establishing the concealed handgun permit program,
the North Carolina General Assembly has initiated an experiment in
civic virtue and crime control. The legislature is constitutionally en-
trusted with the authority to regulate concealed handgun posses-
sion.152 Consequently, as the General Assembly observes the effects
of its actions, it should be prepared to modify or even repeal the law.
Regardless of the outcome, the lopsided political victory of the new
concealed handgun law in the General Assembly suggests that we
have deliberately chosen our own future.
WILLIAM F. LANE
151. For a discussion of the role of civic virtue in the regulation and ownership of guns,
see Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On
Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661 (1989); Wil-
liams, supra note 63. For a comparison of American and foreign attitudes toward guns and
violence, see DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY:
SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 383-93 (1992)
("Simply put, Americans do not trust authority as much as most citizens of the British
Commonwealth and Japan do.... America places more faith in its citizens than do other
nations.").
152. See supra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
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Strictly No Strict Liability: The 1995 Amendments to
Chapter 99B, the Products Liability Act
In response to a perceived onslaught of frivolous lawsuits and
skyrocketing damage awards, a tort reform movement has steadily
spread throughout the United States.' From the movement's begin-
nings in the mid-1980s, states have attempted to contain the apparent
litigation explosion of the last decade with a wide array of legislation,
including damages caps and other changes in procedural and substan-
tive law.2 North Carolina legislators took up tort reform in 1995 and
considered a package of five bills,3 including a bill to amend the North
Carolina Products Liability Act,4 now codified in the North Carolina
General Statutes Chapter 99B.
Chapter 99B was a tort reform act itself when it was originally
passed in 1979.5 Although "Products Liability Act" has the ring of
consumer protection legislation, Chapter 99B was passed amid "con-
certed lobbying by the insurance industry, manufacturers, merchants,
1. See The Tort Reform Movement's Progress Across the Nation, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 9,
1992, at 35-37 (detailing state-by-state tort reform measures instituted since 1985).
2. See id. Whether any such litigation explosion actually took place is a matter of
debate. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1287 (1992) (denying the
existence of a litigation crisis); see generally Andrew Blum, Debate Still Rages on Torts,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Blum, The Debate Still Rages] (assessing the
conflicting studies on the reality of the litigation explosion); Andrew Blum, Assessing Tort
Costs is a Game of Numbers, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 32 (reviewing recent studies on
the cost of the tort system).
3. The bills were: H.B. 636, 1995 General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing to
amend Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to require a trial judge to
order a party deemed to have filed a frivolous lawsuit to pay the other party's reasonable
expenses) (not enacted); H.B. 637, 1995 General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1995) (amending the
Product Liability Act (1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 522)); H.B. 729, 1995 General Assembly, 1st
Sess. (1995) (capping punitive damages at three times the amount of compensatory dam-
ages or $250,000, whichever is greater, and requiring that punitive damages above attor-
ney's fees be paid to the state General Fund rather than the plaintiff (1995 N.C. Sess Laws
514)); H.B. 730, 1995 General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1995) (setting standards for qualifica-
tions of expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases (1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 309)); and
H.B. 731, 1995 General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing to allow juries to hear evi-
dence that a plaintiff already has recovered compensation for an injury or loss from an-
other party (not adopted)). State Representative Charles Neely sponsored the package.
North Carolina Legislators Consider Tort Reform, LIABILITY WK., Apr. 17, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 8596527.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to 99B-11 (1995) [hereinafter Chapter 99B].
5. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 654. See Charles F. Blanchard & Doug B. Abrams, North
Carolina's New Products Liability Act: A Critical Analysis, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171,
171-72 (1980).
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wholesalers, and chambers of commerce."' 6 As with the 1995 amend-
ments, the original debate over Chapter 99B pitted pro-business
forces, claiming that there was a statewide insurance crisis, against
groups such as the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers and the
North Carolina Consumers Council.7 Chapter 99B changed little from
the 1979 version to the 1995 amendments, which represent the first
major alteration of the statute. Three amendments are particularly
noteworthy: a prohibition against strict liability in product liability ac-
tions,8 a new section setting out a cause of action for inadequate warn-
ing or instruction 9 and a new section outlining liability for design
defects.10
After briefly tracing the history of products liability law in North
Carolina and Chapter 99B specifically," this Note analyzes the 1995
modifications in the context of North Carolina case law and the law of
products liability generally, focusing on the three sections indicated.' 2
The Note then summarizes the other modifications to the law.' 3 Fi-
nally, this Note analyzes the probable impact of the 1995 version of
chapter 99B.' 4
The history of products liability law, both nationally and in North
Carolina, is marked by the erosion of the doctrine of privity of con-
tract and the rise of strict liability in tort. The general common law
rule, formulated in the nineteenth century English case Winterbottom
v. Wright,15 required privity of contract between plaintiff and defend-
ant in actions for injuries caused by defective products. The privity
requirement precluded a consumer from suing any manufacturer, dis-
tributor, or seller other than the one who actually sold the item. 6 The
6. Blanchard & Abrams, supra note 5, at 171.
7. Id at 171-72.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (1995); see infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5 (1995); see infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6 (1995); see infra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 15-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 40-105 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
15. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), reprinted in 10 MEESON AND WELSBY'S REPORTS,
Exchequer 109. In Winterbottom, the defendant contracted with the Postmaster General to
keep the mail coaches in good repair, and the defendant's subsequent failure to comply
resulted in injury to plaintiff coach driver. Id. at 109-110. Because the coach driver was
not in privity with the defendant, he was denied recovery. Id. at 114. The court stated that
"[u]nless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into
them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which [we] can see no limit, would
ensue." Id. at 114.
16. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUcTS LIABILITY, §§ 16.01-02 (3d ed.
1994). A consumer injured by a defective appliance, for example, might sue the local re-
tailer but not the company that made the product. Id.
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privity requirement was loosened throughout the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries to allow recovery in cases involving
"poisons, foods and articles affecting life and health,117 "immin-
ently dangerous defects,"' 8 and inherently dangerous products.19
Eventually, the exceptions overcame the rule, and ultimately one
case, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,20 started a trend which
eliminated the privity requirement in most product liability actions.
MacPherson may be regarded as the foundation of American
products liability law.21 After MacPherson the national trend moved
toward the concept of strict liability in tort for products sold
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property.22 This new doctrine, originally formu-
lated in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,2 3 and embodied
in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,2 4  has
17. BARNEY FINBERG & EMILY HIGHTOWER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, THE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA § 1-5 (1980).
18. Id § 1-7, at 6 (citing Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 870 (8th
Cir. 1903)).
19. Id § 1-8, at 6 (citing Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909)).
20. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). This noted opinion of Justice Cardozo held Buick lia-
ble for manufacturing a car with adefective wheel which caused injury to the plaintiff. Id.
at 1055. Liability attached despite a lack of contractual privity between manufacturer and
consumer. Id at 1053-1055.
21. The case may be regarded as foundational in the sense that it introduced "the
exception that destroyed the privity requirement." FINBERG & HIGHTOWER, supra note
17, § 1-9.
22. For a thorough discussion of the histdry and development of products liability law,
see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING, 7-19 (1949).
23. 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). In Greenman, the plaintiff was injured when a
woodworking machine malfunctioned. Id. at 899. The court held that "[a] manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human be-
ing." Id at 900. Perhaps the earliest formulation of the doctrine can be found in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); see infra note 121.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement presents
the exception as follows:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
STRICT LIABILITY '
been adopted, subject to various modifications, by all but three
states.25
North Carolina has been reluctant to stray very far from the com-
mon law. Notes one treatise: "before 1979 the 'assault on the citadel
of privity' .. . had barely passed the front gate" in North Carolina,
26
and strict liability in tort has never been adopted.27 The law began to
change in 1967 when the privity requirement in negligence actions was
eliminated in Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp.28 Privity in the war-
ranty context has also been weakened but still has not been
abandoned. 2 9
Chapter 99B was adopted in 1979 in response to a claimed prod-
ucts liability insurance crisis brought on by "[t]he expansion of con-
sumer-oriented products liability law."3 A major source of this
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
25. See 2 Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcrs LIABILITY § 8.01
(1995) (noting that Delaware, North Carolina, and Virginia are the only states that have
not adopted the Restatement position). Massachusetts and Michigan do not recognize
strict liability in tort, but in those states "a breach of implied warranty of merchantability
cause of action is almost indistinguishable from a strict liability claim." Id
26. FINBERG & HIGHTOWER, supra note 17, § 1-11 (referring to William L. Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE LJ. 1099 (1960)).
27. Id.; see supra notes 22-25, and infra notes 36-39 and 49-51 and accompanying text
(discussing the national trend toward strict products liability and North Carolina's rejec-
tion of it).
28. 271 N.C. 485,497, 157 S.E.2d 98, 106 (1967). In Corprew, the plaintiff alleged that
his crops were damaged after he applied a weed killer manufactured by the defendant
chemical company. Id at 487, 157 S.E.2d at 100-01. The plaintiff claimed inadequate warn-
ing and instructions and the court held that the "[privity] rule does not conform to modern
conditions .... The manufacturer should be held liable because it is in a position to insure
against liability and add the cost to the product. Id at 490, 157 S.E.2d at 102. The court's
justification for the imposition of liability on the manufacturer is based on the theory of
loss spreading. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. The court, recognizing that
modern sales transactions are not the simple, face-to-face encounters of earlier times, char-
acterized the Winterbottom rule as " 'horse and buggy' law for a 'horse and buggy' age."
Corprew, 271 N.C. at 490, 157 S.E.2d at 102.
29. Goods in sealed packages on which the warranty is addressed to the ultimate con-
sumer and whose label is addressed to that consumer are an exception to the privity rule,
allowing the consumer to sue. Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 3, 138 S.E.2d
753, 754 (1964). A further exception was held to apply in Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co., 270 N.C. 301,305-06, 154 S.E.2d 337, 340 (1967), where the product was advertised to
consumers and placed on store shelves by employees of the manufacturer. Privity is still
required, however, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1995), which extends the seller's
warranty to the buyer to others not in privity only if they are "natural person[s] ... in the
family or household of [the] buyer or ... guest[s] in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty." led
30. See Charles Lee Cain & James P. Murray, Survey of Developments in North Caro-
lina Law, 1979: Commercial Law, 58 N.C. L. REV. 1290, 1311 (1980).
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allegation was a 1976 position paper by the Defense Research Insti-
tute which maintained that the unavailability and/or expense of prod-
uct liability insurance was driving small manufacturers out of
business.31 Opponents challenged the existence of any such crisis but
were unsuccessful in their bid to block the Products Liability Bill.32
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted the bill as Chapter
99B and amended the statute of limitations and repose provisions of
Chapter 1.
31
The chapter's character as a manufacturer-protection law rather
than a consumer-protection law is apparent from the fact that its four,
original sections' "are addressed primarily to circumstances in which
the defendant may not be held liable."35 Chapter 99B "is not ... a
source of liability for injuries caused by products ' 36 since any products.
liability action must be based on some theory of wrongdoing, such as
negligence or breach of warranty. Although litigants have attempted
to make strict liability claims after the enactment of Chapter 99B,
their claims have been repeatedly rejected. The North Carolina
Supreme Court put it succinctly, stating that "recent comprehensive
legislation in this area by the General Assembly does not adopt strict
liability in product liability cases."'37 In short, the mere existence of a
31. Id. The paper is DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE INC., PRODUCTS LIABILITY POSI-
TION PAPER, reprinted in 5 Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABiL-
ItY app. at 1 (1979).
32. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 654; see Blanchard & Abrams, supra note 5, at 172.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50 was amended to provide a six year statute of repose under
which no products liability action could be brought more than six years after the initial
purchase. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 654. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 was amended to provide a
ten-year statute of limitations under which the cause of action did not accrue until the
harm became or should have become apparent and not more than ten years after the last
act or omission of the defendant. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 654.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to 99B-4 (1979) (amended 1995). Section 99B-10 was
added in the second legislative session of 1979 and exempts donors of food to non-profit
enterprises from liability except in cases of "gross negligence, recklessness or intentional
misconduct." Id. § 99B-10 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. §99B-10 (1995)), Finally,
section 99B-11 was added in 1987 and applies only to firearms and ammunition. This sec-
tion establishes two burdens of proof on the plaintiff and adds a provision precluding any
"comparison or weighing" of risks and benefits in a products liability action. Id. § 99B-11
(1987) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. §99B-10 (1995)). The reasons for precluding
the use of a risk/utility analysis in the case of firearms becomes apparent when one consid-
ers the rather stark terms in which such an analysis might be framed: weighing the utility
(killing) against the risk (killing).
35. CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 450
(1991) (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 449.
37. Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669,678,268 S.E.2d 504,509-10 (1980); see
also, Bryant v. Adams, 116 N.C. App. 448, 473, 448 S.E.2d 832, 845 (1994) ("North Caro-
lina expressly rejects strict liability in products liability actions."), disc. reiew., denied, 339
N.C. 736, 454 S.E.2d 647 (1995); Driver v. Burlington Aviation, Inc., 110 N.C. App. 519,
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defect will not automatically result in liability to the manufacturer.38
In addition to negligence, a products liability claim may be brought on
a theory of breach of express or implied warranty or on "other theo-
ries of recovery incud[ing] deceit and misrepresentation. '39
The 1995 amendments to Chapter 99B40 serve purposes similar to
the original legislation. Neither represent consumer protection legis-
lation and both are framed in terms of what will not result in liability
for the manufacturer or seller.41 Each was enacted in reaction to a
perceived "crisis" attributed to large damages awards and frivolous
lawsuits unfairly targeting the "deep pockets" of business and indus-
try.42 The 1979 legislation and the 1995 amendments were arguably
driven by national trends, out-of-state cases, and legal developments
not necessarily reflective of the actual state of affairs in North Caro-
lina.43 Additionally, they might fairly be characterized as an attempt
530, 430 8.E.2d 476, 483 (1993) ("To date ... North Carolina courts have limited the impo-
sition of strict liability to ultrahazardous activities."); Warren v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 92,
102, 377 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1989) ("North Carolina expressly rejects strict liability in prod-
ucts liability actions."); HoHey v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 74 N.C. App. 736, 742, 330
S.E.2d 228, 232 (1985) ("North Carolina does not recognize strict liability in products lia-
bility actions."), aff'd, 318 N.C. 352, 348 S.E.2d 772 (1986); Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. v.
Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 63 N.C. App. 292, 299, 304 S.E.2d 773, 778 (1983) ("North
Carolina does not recognize this [strict liability] doctrine .... "), disc. review denied, 310
N.C. 624, 315 S.E.2d 689 (1984).
38. See DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 35, at 454. Professors Daye and Morris note:
The manufacturer must have been negligent with respect to that defect, either in
failing to exercise ordinary care in the design or the manufacture of the product,
or in failing to discover the defect. Ordinary care may require the manufacturer
to supply adequate directions or instructions in the use of the products, or to
provide proper warning of the dangers posed by the product of which the manu-
facturer is or should be aware.
Id. at 454-55.
39. DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 35, at 450 n.4.
40. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 522.
41. See supra text accompanying note 35.
42. See supra notes 1, 6 and accompanying text (discussing the perception of frivolous
lawsuits, and noting lobbying by businesses and industries which surrounded the original
enactment of Chapter 99B).
43. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing the national perception
that strict products liability drove small manufacturers out of business, and noting the fail-
ure of Chapter 99B's opponents to convince the General Assembly that such perception
was not true in North Carolina). The debate continues both nationally and state-wide over
the need for tort reform. See Blum, The Debate Still Rages, supra note 2, at 1. ("The
debate has gotten clouded-with anecdotes, horror stories and subsequent denials."). As
Blum notes, a major problem is the lack of reliable data due to the fact that observers
" 'have nothing like the Consumer Price Index' "with which to accurately measure litiga-
tion activity. Id. (quoting Wisconsin Law Professor Marc Galanter). A favorite example
used by tort reform advocates is the $2.9 million awarded to Stella Liebeck after she spilled
a hot cup of McDonald's coffee on her lap at a drive-through window. Liebeck v. McDon-
ald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18,
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to preempt the undesirable trends and excesses of other jurisdictions.
In fact, the 1995 amendments to Chapter 99B do not so much change
the law of products liability as assure that it will not embrace strict
liability. Rather than imposing any new doctrine, the 1995 amend-
ments effectively prevent the courts from developing and expanding
the law of products liability.
The 1995 amendments make three noteworthy additions to Chap-
ter 99B as well as a number of more minor and technical changes.
First, strict liability is explicitly rejected as a theory of recovery in
product liability actions." Second, an extensive section is added out-
lining what a claimant must prove to prevail on a claim based on inad-
equate warning or instruction.45 Third, a further section is added
detailing what a claimant must prove to prevail on a claim based on
inadequate design or formulation.4 6 These three sections are concep-
tually interrelated in that warning and design defects are two mem-
bers of the "defect triumvirate" which also includes manufacturing
defects.47 Together, these three amendments to Chapter 99B form a
statutory practice that stands foursquare against strict liability.
Instead of representing a reaction to any judicial decision apply-
ing strict liability, section 99B-1.1's rejection of strict products liability
simply codifies what the North Carolina courts have held repeatedly
since Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp.48 in 1980. In light of North Caro-
1994). The story, however, seems considerably less outrageous when one considers that
the seventy-nine year-old plaintiff had to undergo skin graft surgery, suffered permanent
scarring, and that McDonald's served its coffee at forty to fifty degrees hotter than recom-
mended, and had received hundreds of previous complaints. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL
782090, at *1 (LRP Jury). Further, the punitive damage award was later reduced to
$480,000 and the compensatory award to $160,000. Id. In the context of North Carolina
law it is noteable that Ms. Liebeck was found 20% negligent. Id. If the incident had taken
place in North Carolina she would have been barred from recovery because of her contrib-
utory negligence. See DAYE & Mou~is, supra note 35, at 273-82 (discussing the doctrine of
contributory negligence in North Carolina); Brian Beasley, Note, North Carolina's New
Punitive Damageq Statute: Who's Being Punished Anyway?, 74 N.C. L. REv. 2174,2175-78
(1996) (describing punitive damage reform in North Carolina).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (1995) ("There shall be no strict liability in tort in prod-
uct liability actions."); see infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5 (1995); see infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6 (1995); see infra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
47. 2 FR U MER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at § 12.01. "Unlike its cousins involving
designs and warnings, which are usually analyzed ... using negligence concepts, the treat-
ment given to flaws in manufacturing are generally faithful to the origins of the strict liabil-
ity doctrine .... " Id. at § 11.02[3].
48. 300 N.C. 669,678,268 S.E.2d 504,510 (1980); see supra note 37 and accompanying
text. The original bill did not flatly prohibit strict liability but merely eschewed any en-
dorsement of it: "This Chapter is not intended to establish, approve, or endorse the com-
mon-law principles of strict liability in product liability cases." H.B. 637, 1995 General
Assembly, 1st Sess. (March 30, 1995 version). Strict liability in this context has been
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lina's history of antipathy toward national trends in products liability
law,49 the state's refusal to adopt strict liability ° makes section 99B-
1.1 more notable for its redundancy than for its novelty. Courts have
repeatedly confirmed that "in enacting the Products Liability Act [of
1979], the Legislature reaffirmed the reasoning of the pre-statute cases
holding that the essential elements of an action for products liability
are based upon negligence . ... That section 99B-1.1 is regarded
with dismay by the plaintiff bar is little more than an affirmation that
hope springs eternal. What the statute now assures is that strict liabil-
ity will not slip into North Carolina by way of the common law but
will have to arrive, if at all, in the noonday sun of the General
Assembly.
Similarly, the section on claims based on inadequate warning or
instruction does little to change the law, but rather codifies and elabo-
rates on the negligence standard which is already the basis of actions
based on inadequate warning or instruction. 2 As in the case of sec-
adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, subject to various limitations by judicial decision or
by statute. See SHAPO, supra note 16, § 7.02[2] ("Over the years, an increasing majority of
states has adopted strict liability in tort, either by wholesale acceptance of section 402A or,
in a few cases, through other formulations."). In its most pure form, strict liability would
hold a manufacturer liable for injury caused by its product regardless of fault. This view is
well expressed in Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 238 S.E.2d 361, 365 (Ga. 1977), in which the
court stated that "liability may be incurred irrespective of negligence, privity of contract,
warranties, or exclusions" and that "a manufacturer can still be held liable irrespective of
how carefully he observes; or any degree of care, precaution or vigilance he observes, in
trying to protect the interest of another." Id. Some courts have nevertheless included an
element of fault in their strict liability analyses even though such a position would appear
to dilute the doctrine with elements of negligence. See SHAPO, supra note 16, § 7.04[2][b].
49. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50. The lone exception to this rule is in the area of abnormally dangerous activities.
See Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blyth Bros. Co., 260 N.C. 69, 75, 131 S.E.2d 900, 905
(1963) (adopting strict liability in the context of a blasting case); DAYE & MORRIS, supra
note 35, at 355-57.
51. Driver v. Burlington Aviation, Inc., 110 N.C. App. 519, 527, 430 S.E.2d 476, 482
(1993) (quoting McCollum v. Grove Mfg. Co., 58 N.C. App. 283,286,293 S.E.2d 632, 635,
disc. review granted, 306 N.C. 742, 295 S.E.2d 760 (1982), affd, 307 N.C. 695, 300 S.E.2d
374 (1983)).
52. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 99B-5 (1995) states:
(a) No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable in any product
liability action for a claim based upon inadequate warning or instruction un-
less the claimant proves that the manufacturer or seller acted unreasonably in
failing to provide such warning or instruction, that the failure to provide ade-
quate warning or instruction was a proximate cause of the harm for which
damages are sought, and also proves one of the following:
(1) At the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller, the
product, without an adequate warning or instruction, created an unrea-
sonably dangerous condition that the manufacturer or seller knew, or in
the exercise of ordinary care should have known, posed a substantial risk
of harm to a reasonably foreseeable claimant.
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tion 99B-1.1, section 99B-5 provides assurances that the law will retain
a fault based negligence standard for products liability. Although the
section does not appear to impose any new or higher standard on the
plaintiff, it does seem to limit a court's discretion and flexibility in
determining what conduct on the part of manufacturers and sellers
will constitute negligence.
North Carolina has long recognized that failure to warn or pro-
vide adequate instructions constitutes "negligent conduct for which
manufacturers may be held liable . . . . 53 The seller has also been
under a duty to "warn of hazards attendant to the assembled and in-
stalled product's use but only when the seller 'has actual or construc-
tive knowledge of a particular threatening characteristic of the
product' and simultaneously 'has reason to know that the purchaser
will not realize the product's menacing propensities for himself.' "54
Section 99B-5 sets out the three elements necessary for an inade-
quate warning/instruction claim: 1) the manufacturer or seller acted
unreasonably in failing to provide adequate warning or instruction;55
(2) After the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller, the man-
ufacturer or seller became aware of or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known that the product posed a substantial risk of harm to a
reasonably foreseeable user or consumer and failed to take reasonable
steps to give adequate warning or instruction or to take other reasonable
action under the circumstances.
53. Driver, 110 N.C. App. at 526, 430 S.E.2d at 481. Some twelve years before the
original enactment of Chapter 99B the supreme court delineated the standard of care for
manufacturers:
He [the manufacturer] may be negligent in failing to inspect or test his materials,
or the work itself, to discover possible defects, or dangerous propensities. He
may fail to use proper care to give adequate warning to the user, not only as to
dangers arising from unsafe design, or other negligence, but also as to dangers
inseparable from a properly made product. The warning must be sufficient to
protect third persons who may reasonably be expected to come in contact with
the product and be harmed by it; and the duty continues even after the sale, when
the seller first discovers that the product is dangerous. He is also required to give
adequate directions for use, when reasonable care calls for them.
Corprew v. Chemical Corp. 271 N.C. 485,491,157 S.E.2d 98,103 (1967) (citing WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THm LAW OF TORTS 665 (3d. ed. 1964)).
54. Crews v. W.A. Brown & Son, Inc. 106 N.C. App. 324, 330, 416 S.E.2d 924, 928
(1992) (quoting Ziglar v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 151, 280
S.E.2d 510,513, disc. review denied, 304 N.C. 393,285 S.E.2d 838 (1991)). Crews involved a
latching mechanism on a walk-in freezer which was designed to prevent anyone from being
inadvertently locked in. Id. at 327,416 S.E.2d at 926-27. When the latch malfunctioned, a
teen aged girl was locked in the freezer and suffered severe frostbite. Id. at 327, 416 S.E.2d
at 927. Not only were the warnings and instructions inadequate but the manufacturer had
affixed a helpful informational label on the inside of the door which read, "YOU ARE
NOT LOCKED IN!" and explained that being locked in was impossible due to the special
"EASY ACTION" latch assembly. Id. at 326, 416 S.E.2d at 926.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5(a) (1995).
[Vol. 742248
STRICT LIABILITY
2) such failure was the proximate cause of the harm;5 6 3) the manufac-
turer or seller a) knew or should have known of the unreasonably
dangerous condition created at the time the product left its control,
57
or b) became aware or should have known of the risk to the foresee-
able user or consumer after the product left its control and failed to
instruct, warn, or take other action.58 Two further provisions preclude
liability for failure to warn of open and obvious dangers59 and relieve
the manufacturer or seller of prescription drugs from having to pro-
vide warning or instruction directly to the consumer if it is provided to
the prescriber unless direct consumer warning is required by the
FDA.
60
This section does no more than provide a succinct summary of
the elements of a negligence action for products liability.61 Although
the bill's sponsor correctly asserted that the amendments "codify cur-
rent case law on providing the elements of negligence to establish a
claim," 62 the need for codification of the elements of common law
negligence is unclear beyond its symbolic value as a reiteration of the
rejection of strict liability.
Similarly, the alternatives provided to establish liability once the
standard elements of negligence are proven deal specifically with the
knowledge requirement. There is little here that cannot be found al-
ready stated in the case law.63 These two subsections strongly resem-
ble what is known as the "state of the art" defense which asserts:
[L]iability based upon a failure to warn users of a product's
inherently dangerous quality or characteristic may be im-
56. Id
57. Id. § 99B-5(a)(1).
58. Id. § 99B-5(a)(2).
59. Id. § 99B-5(b).
60. Id. § 99B-5(c).
61. See supra note 53 and text accompanying note 55-60. These elements are un-
changed from the common law: "1) evidence of a standard of care owed by the reasonably
prudent person in similar circumstances; 2) breach of that standard of care; 3) injury
caused directly or proximately by the breach; and 4) loss because of the injury." Driver v.
Burlington Aviation, 110 N.C. App. 519, 527, 430 S.E.2d 476, 482 (1993) (quoting McCol-
lum v. Grove Mfg. Co., 58 N.C. App. 283,286,293 S.E.2d 632,635, disc. review granted, 306
N.C. 742, 295 S.E.2d 760 (1982), aftd, 307 N.C. 695, 300 S.E.2d 374 (1983)).
62. North Carolina Legislators Consider Tort Reform, supra note 3.
63. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text; see also DAYE & MORRIS, supra
note 35, at 456; Ziglar v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 53 N.C. App 147, 151,280 S.E.2d
510, 513, disc. review denied, 304 N.C. 393, 285 S.E.2d 838 (1981). These elements of
knowledge, presented as options, are very similar to the model statute on the duty to warn
or instruct provided in the American Insurance Association Proposals. AMERICAN INSUR-
ANCE ASSOCIATION PROPOSALS, PROPOSED STATUTE ON DUTY TO WARN, reprinted in 4A
Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, app. J at 1406 (1995).
Such a resemblance underscores the 1995 amendments' protection of defendants.
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posed only where the manufacturer, distributor or seller...
had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous qual-
ity or characteristic. The application of this rule.., clearly
renders not liable a defendant whose failure to warn was as-
sociated with an absence of knowledge of the dangerous
quality or characteristic because it was not "knowable"...
[because] of its not even having been then known to the sci-
entific community.6 4
Interestingly, this defense is typically employed in strict liability
cases because "when a negligence theory is applied there is no ques-
tion that actual or constructive knowledge is an essential element. ' 65
Indeed, the concept of "state of the art" as a defense to a strict liabil-
ity action has been criticized for "inject[ing] negligence principles into
a strict liability case."'6 6 The amendment's exclusion of the warning
requirement in the case of open and obvious dangers67 is in line with
both prior North Carolina case law68 and "the vast majority of states
... regardless of whether the cause of action is asserted in negligence
or in strict liability.-
69
Section 99B-6,70 addressing claims based on inadequate design or
formulation, also appears to add little to the existing negligence cause
of action for design defects. Like section 99B-5, it has the effect of
fixing the law to prevent what the legislature considered undesirable
potential developments. In a format similar to that of section 9913-5,
this section lays out the standard elements for unreasonable design
and formulation cases and provides two alternative ways of proving
negligence. The first option is to prove that the manufacturer unrea-
sonably failed to adopt a safer alternative design that could have been
adopted without substantial impairment of the product.71 The second
option is to prove that the design was so unreasonable that a reason-
able person, aware of the relevant facts, would not use the product.
7
64. Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liability for Failure to
Warn as Dependent on Defendant's Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.L.R. 4th 371 (1984).
65. Id.
66. Normann v. Johns-Manville Corp., 593 A.2d 890,894 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal
denied, 607 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1992).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5(b) (1995).
68. See Bryant v. Adams, 116 N.C. App. 448,464-67,448 S.E.2d 832,841-43 (reversing
an order of summary judgment because there was a question of fact as to whether the
danger presented by a trampoline was "open and obvious"), disc. review denied, 339 N.C.
736, 454 S.E.2d 647 (1994); see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
69. 2 FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at § 12.04. This is also the position of the
Restatement. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. k (1965).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6 (1995).
71. Id. § 99B-6(a)(1).
72. Id. § 99B-6(a)(2).
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These two options represent versions of the two major tests that are
typically used in cases involving design defects-the risk/utility test
and the consumer expectation test.
73
To aid courts in determining the outcome of the risk/utility test,
section 99B-6 also sets out a non-exclusive seven factor test to be con-
sidered when assessing the reasonableness of the manufacturer.74 The
factors to be considered are for the most part standard risk/utility con-
siderations found in many judicial and academic expositions.75 They
are essentially a gloss on the Learned Hand formula:76 Liability de-
73. For a thorough discussion of these tests, see 2 FRUMER & FRiEiMAN, supra note
25, at § 11.03[6]. North Carolina's test, like the well-known Barker test used in California,
gives the plaintiff the option of proving one or the other. Under Barker, however, once the
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
the product's utility outweighed the risk to consumers. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978). The case represents California's landmark formulation of
a test for design defect. The Barker court adopted a two-prong test combining a consumer
expectations test with a risk/utility test. Id.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(b) (1995).
75. The seven factors set out in the 1995 amendments to Chapter 99B are as follows:
1. The nature and magnitude of the risks of harm associated with the design or
formulation in light of the intended and reasonably foreseeable uses, modifica-
tions, or alterations of the product.
2. The likely awareness of product users, whether based on warnings, general
knowledge, or otherwise, of those risks of harm.
3. The extent to which the design or formulation conformed to any applicable
government standard that was in effect when the product left the control of its
manufacturer.
4. The extent to which the labeling for a prescription or nonprescription drug
approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration conformed to any
applicable government or private standard that was in effect when the product
left the control of its manufacturer.
5. The utility of the product, including the performance, safety, and other ad-
vantages associated with that design or formulation.
6. The technical, economic, and practical feasibility of using an alternative de-
sign or formulation at the time of manufacture.
7. The nature and magnitude of any foreseeable risks associated with the alter-
native design or formulation.
Id. Factors one and two consider the risks associated with the particular design and the
product user's likely awareness of those risks. Factor five considers the utility of the prod-
uct in light of the advantages of the design. Factors six and seven balance the feasibility of
an alternative design against the risks of such a design. These are unremarkable balancing
considerations that weigh the risks and utility of the current design and those of alternative
designs. Factors three and four deviate from standard risk/utility analysis by evaluating the
product in light of applicable government standards. Factor three generally takes into ac-
count conformity of design or formulation to such standards while factor four specifically
addresses the extent to which the labeling of any FDA approved drug conforms to govern-
ment or private standards. There are many variations of this risk/utility test. See, e.g., John
W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973); see also 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at § 11.03[4] (indicating that sev-
eral scholars have proposed similar lists of factors varying in number).
76. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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pends on whether the burden (B) of adequate precautions is less than
the injury (L) multiplied by the probability of its occurrence (P) as
stated in the formula B < PL.7 7
Next, the section decides the risk/utility question in favor of the
manufacturer in cases in which the product cannot be made safe with-
out compromising its utility.78 The manufacturer will not be held lia-
ble in these cases provided that such risk is "recognized by the
ordinary person with the ordinary knowledge common to the commu-
nity. '79 In the case of prescription drugs, the "ordinary knowledge"
requirement is replaced with an adequate warning or instruction re-
quirement.80 Finally, the section provides that nothing in it will pre-
clude an action under section 99B-5 for inadequate warning or
instruction.8' Therefore, failure to satisfy the requirements of a design
defect claim will not affect a claim for inadequate warning or
instruction.
Like section 99B-5, section 99B-6 seems to be largely an emphatic
reiteration that the doctrine of strict liability does not apply.8 2 The
amendment sets out a standard negligence analysis and refines it with
two options, each of which specify what will and will not be consid-
ered a defect.8 3 One option, risk/utility, allows the plaintiff to prove
that an alternative design could have been adopted.Y4 The other op-
77. Id.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(c) (1995).
79. Id
80. Idt § 99B-6(d).
81. Id § 99B-6(e).
82. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
Because strict liability is not imposed, a showing that such a defect exists will not
alone result in liability. The manufacturer must have been negligent with respect
to that defect, either in failing to exercise ordinary care in the design or the manu-
facture of the product, or in failing to discover the defect.
DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 35, at 454-55.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(a) (1995).
84. Id § 99B-6(a)(1). Proof of the existence of a safer alternative design is one
method of proving that the product as designed was defective. Some jurisdictions require
that the plaintiff show a safer design that would have been practicable, see Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 579 P.2d 1287, 1287-88 (Or. 1978), while other courts reject such a require-
ment, see Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585,590 (Wash. 1986), or make it
an option among other methods of proof, see Anderson v. Hyster Co., 385 N.E.2d 690, 692
(IIl. 1979).
The 1979 version of Chapter 99B did not mention the question of alternative design,
and the case law is for the most part silent. A 1995 Federal District Court case purporting
to apply North Carolina law cited Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 345, 368 S.E.2d
849, 859 (1988), for the proposition that "[ajn alternative design does not translate into a
legal duty in a product liability action, and an action is not maintainable merely because
the design used was not the safest possible; however, evidence of alternative designs bears
upon the question of defendant's reasonable care in designing the product." Edwards v.
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tion, consumer expectations, allows the plaintiff to show that the prod-
uct's design was "so unreasonable that a reasonable person, aware of
the relevant facts, would not use or consume a product of this
design."
'85
The "so unreasonable" language of this second option8 6 seems to
require that the plaintiff prove what amounts to recklessness or gross
negligence. If a product were so unreasonable that no consumer,
aware of the relevant facts, would use it, it follows that a manufacturer
who likely is aware of the relevant facts acts recklessly by putting such
a product on the market. Furthermore, if the manufacturer is not
aware of such facts, such lack of awareness would seem to'exceed or-
dinary negligence if the product's design is so unreasonable. This high
standard for the plaintiff suggests that in most cases the only real op-
tion will be to prove a reasonable alternative design87 under the first
option.
It is instructive to compare North Carolina's "consumer expecta-
tions test," with its high "so unreasonable" standard, to the bench-
mark Barker v. Lull Engineering8 test and to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 9 The Barker court held that "a product may be
found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner."9 In
Atro S.p.A., 891 F. Supp. 1074,1080 n.7 (E.D.N.C. 1995). Boudreau, however was constru-
ing Florida law under the rule of lex locus delecti (the law of the place of the tort furnishes
the standard of conduct). Boudreau, 322 N.C. at 335-36, 368 S.E.2d at 854. Florida law
now seems to have been adopted in the Eastern District of North Carolina, at least for
proof of alternative design in products liability cases.
Under the newly amended statute, a plaintiff in North Carolina must now prove fail-
ure to adopt an alternative reasonable design, determined by risk/utility considerations,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(a)(1) (1995), or prove what seems to be a heightened form of
negligence. Iad § 99B-6(a)(2) ("At the time the product left the control of the manufac-
turer, the design or formulation of the product was so unreasonable that a reasonable
person, aware of the relevant facts, would not use or consume a product of this design.").
At least one commentator has argued, however, that section 99B-6 has effectively imposed
an alternative design defect requirement on consumers which has "tipped the [balance] in
favor of manufacturers." See Wayne A. Logan, New Developments in Design Defect Law:
The Emergence of Reasonable Alternative Design, CAMPBELL LAW OBSERVER, Dec. 1995,
at 3, 12. This is because the statutory alternative to proving the existence of an alternative
design conceivably covers only a narrow range of products. Id.; see also infra notes 88-105
and accompanying text.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(a)(2) (1995).
86. Id
87. See Logan, supra note 84, at 10.
88. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
89. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).
90. Barker, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56.
1996] 2253
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
terms of the Restatement, two comments 9' are the origin of the con-
sumer expectations test generally,92 and the North Carolina test seems
quite close to the Restatement formulation. 93 The differences among
the three versions of the consumer expectations test appear to be of
degree. The important difference between Barker, the Restatement
formulations, and the North Carolina test is that while the first two
turn upon the consumer's reasonable expectations of product safety,
the North Carolina test's "so unreasonable" language seems to estab-
lish a bare minimum of safety that would be acceptable for a con-
sumer to even consider buying the product.94 Effectively, under the
Restatement and Barker, a product is defective if it is more dangerous
than a reasonable consumer would expect. Under North Carolina law
the product must be so unreasonable that an informed consumer
would not use it. In the former case the danger must be unexpected; in
the latter it must be intolerable. Thus, the "consumer expectations"
prong of the North Carolina test might better be characterized as
threshold tolerability.
Although this standard of proof seems to weigh heavily against
the plaintiff, it might also be seen as a concession, attempting to ame-
liorate the combined effect of the optional proof of an alternative de-
sign95 and the exemption of products whose design cannot feasibly be
changed.96  This amendment basically adopts the Restatement posi-
tion97 which "creates an exception to the doctrine of strict liability in
91. "Defective condition. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the prod-
uct is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ulti-
mate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965). "Unreasonably Dangerous.. . The article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary con-
sumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." Ia § 402A cmt. i.
92. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at § 11.03[5].
93. The American Law Institute has also adopted a reasonable alternative design re-
quirement in the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LiBILInY § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). Comment d suggests
that only a very limited range of products would be exempt from this requirement and
illustrates the point with the example of an exploding cigar. Id. § 2(b) cmt. d at 24; see also
Logan, supra note 84, at 10-11 (commenting on the ALI position and concluding that it
"marks a significant departure from its venerated strict liability position .... effectively
renounc[ing] the ALI's traditional adherence to strict liability principles in favor of negli-
gence .... ."); see generally Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability:
The ALl Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631 (1995) (commenting on the Restate-
ment (Third) project in the area of products liability).
94. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(a)(1) (1995).
96. Id. § 99B-6(c).
97. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. k (1965) provides:
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tort for certain products which are categorized as unavoidably un-
safe." 98 Thus, between the two sections, an unreasonably dangerous
product that could not be made differently without compromising its
utility and desirability, and whose danger is recognized, would never
subject the manufacturer to liability. This might theoretically exempt
a whole class of what are potentially the most dangerous products:
those that should not be manufactured at all.99
The "so unreasonable" standard seems to contemplate liability
for a product whose inherent danger outweighs any utility that it
might have. This standard seems to approach what has been termed
" '[p]roduct category' liability"'100 which involves "the impl6mentation
of liability upon 'a discrete and limited number of product catego-
ries.' ,"" These categories encompass only products whose "utility
... is so low and the risk of injury is so high as to warrant a conclusion
that it was defective and should not have been marketed at all."' 02
This concept has been embraced by a few cases but "it is not the law
of any jurisdiction because of legislature intervention."'0 3 It is, how-
ever, included in the comments to the third Restatement which the
North Carolina General Assembly appears to have paraphrased. 4
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their in-
tended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs....
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.... The seller of such
products, again and with the qualification that they are properly prepared and
marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be
held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
98. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at § 8.07.
99. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. Such products would, of course still
have to be "useful and desirable" to be considered "unavoidably unsafe" or manufacturers
would simply refrain from producing them.
100. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at § 11.03[8] (quoting James A. Hender-
son, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejec-
tion of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1297 (1991)).
101. Id. (quoting James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1263, 1297 (1991)).
102. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF ToRTs: PROD-
ucrs LIABILTIY § 2(b) cmt. d at 24 (Tentative draft No. 2, 1995).
103. Id. Cases have dealt with above ground swimming pools with vinyl liners, O'Brien
v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298,306 (N.J. 1983), and cheap "Saturday Night Special" hand-
guns, Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1158-59 (Md. 1985). To this list of
possibilities one might add exploding cigars, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) cmt.
d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995), lawn darts, and blow-guns, Logan, supra note 84, at 10.
104. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) cmt. d. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). The comment is entitled
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Ironically, it seems that North Carolina has adopted this concept by
"legislat[ive] intervention.' 1
0 5
Aside from the three sections already discussed, the remaining
amendments are largely technical rewordings, punctuation changes,
and omissions of passages made redundant by other amendments.
Two more substantive aspects of the amended law, however, are
worth noting. First, section 99B-1.2 was added to ensure that nothing
in the amended act would be construed to preclude an action based on
breach of warranty.10 6 This section appears to be unnecessary in light
of section 99B-2 which sets out the sealed container defense to breach
of express warranty and outlines who may bring suit for breach of im-
plied warranty.10 7 There may have been concern that because the
1995 amendments stressed negligence actions as opposed to strict lia-
bility, warranty actions would somehow be seen as precluded. Sec-
ond, section 3 of the bill states that the act "shall not apply to product
liability actions for injury to or the death of a person resulting from
any silicone gel breast implant implanted prior to January 1, 1996.3)108
This provision will have the effect of allowing suits involving breast
implants to proceed under prior law even if the injury occurred af-
ter the effective date of the amendments as long as they were
implanted before the effective date.10 9 This appears to be a conces-
Design Defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonable design, dnd describes product designs
that are "defective and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of danger
posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible utility that no
rational adult, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use or consume the prod-
uct." Id (emphasis added). The language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(a)(2) is remarkably
similar: "At the time the product left the control of the manufacturer, the design orformu-
lation of the product was so unreasonable that a reasonable person, aware of the relevant
facts, would not use or consume a product of this design." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(a)(2)
(1995) (emphasis added).
105. That is to say, by adopting the 1995 amendments to the Products Liability Act,
specifically N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6 (1995).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.2 (1995).
107. Id § 99B-2. For a discussion of express and implied warranty and Chapter 99B,
see DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 35, at 459-72.
108. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 522 § 3.
109. Silicone breast implants have been the subject of thousands of lawsuits since wo-
men with the devices began to experience various unexplained illneses ascribed to leaking
silicone from ruptured implants. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick, Special Report: Lawyers
to the Rescue: Legal Action Helps Keep Drug Companies Honest, But It's a Crazy Way to
Regulate an Industry, TIME, Feb. 10, 1992, at 46; Joseph Nocera, Fatal Litigation, FORTUNE,
Oct. 16, 1995, at 60; Silicone Blues: Dow Corning Tries to Shore Up Its Sagging Image,
TIME, Feb. 24, 1992, at 65. This litigation eventually produced a $ 4.2 billion global settle-
ment, Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp., No. CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994), which was approved on September 1, 1994 and is reputed to be
the largest product liability settlement in history. Sheila L. Bumbaum & J. Russell Jack-
son, Products Liability, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1994, at B4, B6. This is, however, an "opt
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sion to the strong lobbying effort of activists in the General
Assembly." 0
Unlike some other tort reform legislation, such as the cap on pu-
nitive damages, the effect of the 1995 amendments to Chapter 99B is
still unclear. The overwhelming message sent by the legislature and
underscored throughout the amendments is that North Carolina is in-
dubitably and emphatically a non-strict liability jurisdiction. If the
plain language of section 99B-1.1 could in any way be misconstrued,
the detailed exposition of the causes of action under a negligence the-
ory in sections 99B-5 and 99B-6 should remove any doubt."' If doubt
still remains, the clear inclusion of what are normally defenses to strict
liability should be decisive.1
2
Potentially the greatest change wrought by the 1995 amendments
is contained in section 99B-6, concerning alternative designs. Prior
North Carolina cases were largely silent on the question of proving an
alternative design," 3 and such proof would only represent one factor
in determining negligence." 4 Although such proof now represents
one of two options for proving a design defect, the other option ap-
pears to be of such limited application that proof of a reasonable al-
ternative design remains as the only practicable option." 5 This may
be a very burdensome and costly prospect since the average consumer
is in a relatively weak position compared to the manufacturer when it
comes to evaluating product design. The manufacturer, whose busi-
ness it is to design products, is much better able to show the feasibility
out" settlement which means that individual plaintiffs may choose not to settle and pursue
their own suits. See id. Approximately 7,800 U.S. residents and 6,500 foreign claimants
chose to opt out. Id. Dow Coming filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on May 15, 1995. Andrew
Blum, A 'Nightmare' for Dow?, NAT'L L.J., May 29, 1995, at A6. Although Dow is the
principal defendant, there are several others including Bristol-Myers, Squibb Co., 3M, and
Union Carbide Corp. Id Representative Charles Neely, the sponsor of the tort reform
package in North Carolina, is a partner at Raleigh's Maupin, Taylor, Ellis & Adams, which
lists Dow Coming as a client. One might speculate that depriving Dow Coming of any
benefit of the new law was a gesture designed to foreclose possible charges of conflict of
interest.
110. See Eleanore J Hajian, Legal Damages: Will Tort Reform Hinder Frivolous Law-
suits or Will it Reduce Consumers' Rights?, DURHAM HERALD SUN, May 21, 1995, at El.
This may be seen as a concession in that North Carolina products liability law under the
1995 amendments, especially the section on alternative design, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6
seems to place a greater burden on the consumer than the previous law.
111. See supra notes 52-105 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 64-69 (discussing the "state of the art" defense typically employed
in strict liability cases but based on a negligence theory).
113. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
114. Id.
115. Except, perhaps, among devotees of lawn darts, blow guns and exploding cigars.
See supra note 103.
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or infeasibility of alternative designs. In this regard the Barker test,
which shifts that burden to the manufacturer, 116 seems the more ra-
tional approach.
The General Assembly's perception that such "reform" was
needed is puzzling. The original 1979 Act imposed a short six year
statute of repose 17 for products liability cases. The defense of con-
tributory negligence, part of the common law of North Carolina, is
written into Chapter 99B. 118 This defense would presumably continue
to bar recovery for any plaintiff who is even one percent negligent,
even if strict liability were adopted. These considerations suggest that
tort reform, at least in the context of products liability, seeks to "re-
form" what never went astray. North Carolina is a tort reformer's
dream already.
One need not be a cynic to see that tort reform plays well to the
electorate, few of whom have the ability to gauge the need for it or its
effectiveness. Given that tort reform is a national movement,1 9 it is
understandable that state legislators would want to be a part of what
their constituents applaud on the national news. The very nature of
the tort reform movement gives a decided advantage to its advocates.
The actual reforms are often technical and deal with abstruse legal
concepts such as strict liability or the collateral source rule. This pre-
cludes the layman from making any informed assessment of proposed
legislation.
In the context of strict products liability, popular support of its
prohibition would seem at first to be counterintuitive. The theory of
"loss spreading,"1 0 which underlies the doctrine, would hold the man-
ufacturer of a defective product liable despite fault or negligence to
protect the "little guy" who is injured through contact with the prod-
uct. The underlying rationale of loss spreading is that when injury
occurs, someone pays. When no one in the chain of distribution has
been negligent, absent strict liability, the person who pays is always
116. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50 (1994). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
119. The national tort reform movement and all of the attendant controversy has been
followed closely by Andrew Blum for over ten years in THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL.
These articles are highly recommended for anyone interested in the general topic, with the
caveat that Blum is clearly in the anti-tort reform camp. See, e.g., Andrew Blum, Tort
Reform's Next Wave, NAT'L L.J. Sept. 5, 1988, at 1; Andrew Blum, The Hundred Years'
(Tort) War, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 1; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
120. See SHAPO, supra note 16, at § 7.05[7]; see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, passim (1970) (discussing loss




the injured consumer or her insurer. Strict liability, under the theory
of loss spreading, shifts the burden to the party who can best attenuate
it by spreading it to others. In the case of the manufacturer or seller,
this means through insurance and ultimately by passing the cost on to
the public.' 2' The individual consumer, obviously the least capable of
spreading the loss, is relieved of the burden.
Depending upon one's perspective, loss spreading is either ideal
or grossly unfair. The "insurance crisis" argument that preceded the
1979 enactment of Chapter 99B basically claimed that the loss spread-
ing theory did not hold up in practice. 22 The smaller manufacturers,
it was claimed, were unable to successfully spread the loss because of
the difficulty and expense of obtaining insurance. 123 The tort reform
movement of which the 1995 amendments are part seems to be based
less on the threat of a particular "crisis" than on a general perception
that the tort compensation system has gone so far in favor of the
plaintiff that society suffers an unjustified cost. In either case what is
really being rejected is the theory of loss spreading. The newly
amended Chapter 99B now insures that loss spreading will not spread
into North Carolina.
MATrHEW WILLIAM STEVENS
121. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Traynor, who later wrote the seminal Greenman
opinion, see supra note 23 and accompanying text, presaged that later formulation of strict
liability in his concurrence in Escola. He elucidated the "loss spreading" basis for strict
liability as follows:
It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against
the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from de-
fective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury
and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufac-
turer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
Id.
122. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 6-7 and 30-32 and accompanying text.
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